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Abstract: 
When Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ administration took control in 1997, it sought to 
establish a programme of organizational, performance, and democratic reform.  
Initially badged as the ‘modernizing government’ programme, it was later developed 
in the Best Value regime for local government, which imposed a centrally-controlled 
performance regime on all local authorities.  This was characterized by a managerialist 
regime of external inspections, league tables, and reliance on extensive performance 
management, overseen by the Audit Commission.  One of the first acts of the 2010 
Coalition government was to dismantle this regime, along with announcing the 
abolition of the Audit Commission. 
This research sought to examine the legacy of the 1997-2010 performance regime on 
six English local authority case studies, identified via a deviant case analysis.  An 
examination of the literature developed a conceptual model of seven dimensions of 
reform, and the research used an exploratory approach to examine the legacy of the 
performance regimes through a range of qualitative interviews and focus groups.  The 
inductive analysis of interview data found that financial austerity dominated the local 
government environment, and the impacts of these cuts were felt across the entire 
group of case studies.  
These savings requirements had effectively broken the expectation of continuous 
improvement explicit in the Best Value duty – what we refer to here as ‘the death of 
improvement’.  Authorities were reducing staffing, which resulted in the loss of 
expertise and skills.  They were also scaling back many universal services through 
‘managed decline’, and deregulation of performance regimes was stimulating 
divergent responses to performance management arrangements, as well as 
influencing the relationship between politicians and performance management, and 
central performance staff and departmental staff. There were challenges raised 
around the residual inspections, largely restricted to social care and education, and 
how these interacted with central performance team models. 
The discussion develops a three-part model of ‘performance as a system of 
governance’, which integrates three key areas of theoretical and empirical 
development: performance management frameworks, accountability, and value for 
money.  This allows four main contributions to knowledge:  
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• The concept of ‘public value for money’,  
• Further development of our understanding of multiple forms of accountability 
• A new model of performance management zones that articulates different roles 
for performance management at points within the organization 
• A categorisation of the main changes in reform paradigms 
 
It concludes that understanding the values underpinning public sector reforms through 
a range of interpretive lenses is essential to fully comprehending the impact of reforms 
at three levels: conceptualization, operationalization, and implementation. 
The legacy of Comprehensive Performance Assessment and Comprehensive Area 
Assessment can be seen in the increased capacity and capability of local authorities 
to engage with performance management, and data and evidence-driven policy 
making.  Yet, these capabilities may not have prepared authorities sufficiently for the 
demands of significant budget cuts driven by the post-2010 political environment. 
Keywords:  Performance management, public services, local government, Public 
Value, New Public Management, New Public Governance, Public Administration, 
accountability, value for money 
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Glossary and abbreviations: 
Items in italics and underlined are terms also found in the glossary 
Table 1: Glossary and abbreviations.  Source: author 
Abbr. Term: Meaning: 
 3Es Economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.  A fourth E is 
added by some (e.g. Stoker 2006) – equity 
AC Audit Commission The body charged with auditing and inspecting local 
government during the period 1983-2015.  Its 
dissolution was announced by Eric Pickles in 2010, and 
it was finally wound up on 31 March 2015.  It was the 
primary body for inspecting local government for the 
period of this thesis, i.e. 1997-2010 
ADASS Association of 
Directors of Adult 
Social Care 
Networking charity that aims to support local 
authorities and influence national policy on social care.  
Membership aimed at current or former statutory DASS 
role holders, but activities are open to all staff in social 
care roles. 
ADCS Association of 
Directors of Children’s 
Services 
Membership organization that aims to support local 
authorities and provide a collective voice to influence 
national policy on children’s services, including 
education and social care.  Membership aimed at 
current or former statutory DCS role holders and their 
management teams. 
BV Best Value The improvement and modernization regime 
implemented by New Labour in the Local Government 
Act 1999 and which describes the statutory duty to 
improve. 
BVPI Best Value 
Performance 
Indicators 
Mandatory performance indicators that all local 
authorities had to monitor and report outturns to 
government annually as part of the Best Value regime.  
BVPIs were replaced by the National Indicator Set in 
2009. 
BVPP Best Value 
Performance Plan 
Part of the Best Value regime, this was an annual 
document required to be published by local authorities 
giving the last three years’ performance data, plus an 
indication of the authority’s future plans, actions and 
targets.  
 Cabinet The senior decision-making body of the local 
authority’s political structure.  Chaired by the leader of 
the council, it comprises the senior elected members of 
the council with specific responsibilities for services, 
priorities, or departments, called portfolio holders or 
cabinet members.  The ‘leader and cabinet’ model was 
a key part of New Labour’s approach to democratic 
renewal. 
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 Cabinet members An elected member with specific delegated 
responsibility for a portfolio of services or priority areas.  
Also called portfolio holder or senior member. 
CAA Comprehensive Area 
Assessment 
Overall assessment regime primarily aimed at local 
government but extended to the relationship with 
partners, focusing at priorities and achievements in a 
local area.  CAA replaced Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment 
CPA Comprehensive 
Performance 
Assessment 
The overall council assessment regime aimed at local 
government, involving corporate and service block 
assessments of performance indicators and 
inspections. 
Cllr. Councillor Term used to describe an elected member of the local 
authority. 
CQC Care Quality 
Commission 
Inspection and regulation agency for hospitals, 
dentists, ambulances, care homes (local authority and 
independent) and other services that support people 
with social care, mental health and other independence 
needs. 
CQSW Certificate of 
Qualification in Social 
Work 
The required professional accreditation status to work 
as a social worker in the UK. 
DASS Director of Adult 
Social Services 
Statutory local authority role and the legally 
accountable person for adult social care.  Must be a 
registered social worker (i.e. hold CQSW status). 
DCLG Department for 
Communities and 
Local Government 
Department of government with responsibility for local 
government.  Previously called Department for 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) 
1997-2000, Department for Transport, Local 
Government, and Regions (DTLR), in 2000.  Between 
2000 and 2007 it was known as Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister (ODPM), and became Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) in 2007. 
DCS Director of Children’s 
Services 
Statutory local authority role responsible for children’s 
services, i.e. education and social care.  Usually either 
a teacher or a qualified social worker. 
EVR 
EVS 
Early voluntary 
redundancy / 
severance 
A voluntary agreement to take early severance or 
redundancy, usually with enhanced terms and as part 
of a cost-cutting approach to reducing staffing levels. 
 Economy One of the 3Es, economy relates to minimising the 
inputs required to deliver a service or product 
 Effectiveness One of the 3Es, effectiveness is more difficult to 
translate into quantifiable terms.  It refers to achieving 
the best outputs or outcomes for the resources used to 
deliver a service or product. 
 Efficiency One of the 3Es, efficiency is the translation of inputs 
into outputs with the least loss or waste in the process 
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 Elected member An elected representative, also known as ward 
member, councillor 
 Equity Here, used as a fourth component of the 3Es to 
suggest a refocus on fairness and social justice in 
service delivery. 
GCSE General Certificate of 
Secondary Education 
The name given to the national examination given in 
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland at 16.  Replaced 
by Ordinary Levels (O-Levels) in 2015. 
 Government Offices 
for the Regions 
Regional bodies representing central government and 
government departments in England.  Disbanded in 
2011, these bodies were the point of contact for 
negotiating local public service agreements, local area 
agreements and local strategic partnerships 
I&DeA Improvement and 
Development Agency 
Part of the LGA, a collaborative partnership 
organization focused on accelerating the speed of 
improvement activities 
 Input Part of the input, output, and outcome equation related 
to the 3Es.  Inputs are the resources used to deliver 
services.  This is largely used to describe the finances 
used to deliver services.   
LAA Local Area 
Agreements 
Successor programme to LPSA, running from 2004-
2010.  They were also a contractual-type mechanism 
offering financial reward for achieving a stretch 
performance level.  These agreements were 
negotiated by Government Offices in the Regions.  In 
theory, these were much more locally determined 
policy goals (though still requiring central government 
agreement). 
LGA Local Government 
Association 
A politically-led, representative and cross-party 
membership organization representing local councils 
and advocating for authorities with parliament 
LGMA Local Government 
Modernization Agenda 
A name given to the overall programme of 
organizational and democratic reform implemented by 
the New Labour administrations of 1997-2010. 
LPSA Local Public Service 
Agreements 
Successor programme to PSA.  They were also a 
contractual-type mechanism offering financial reward 
for achieving a stretch performance level.  These 
agreements were negotiated by Government Offices in 
the Regions but represented more locally determined 
policy goals (though still requiring central government 
agreement). 
LSP Local Strategic 
Partnerships 
Sometimes called a ‘partnership of partnerships’, an 
LSP was a partnership of a local authority with the 
other public sector organizations and voluntary and 
community bodies in the local authority geographical 
area.  They were made statutory in the Local 
Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 
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2007, and subsequently made non-statutory in the 
Localism Act 2011.  There was no statutory format, 
although they were expected to coordinate and bring 
together existing partnerships such as the Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnerships, and the Children and 
Young People Partnerships.  They were also used by 
Government Offices in the Regions to negotiate LAAs 
and LPSAs. 
MAA Multi-Area Agreements Similar to Local Area Agreements, but negotiated on a 
multi-authority basis, generally around core cities. 
NDPB Non-departmental 
public body 
An agency of government that is not aligned to a 
specific department, such as the Audit Commission 
and is accountable to parliament.  These are often 
referred (though inaccurately) as QUANGOs, or quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organizations 
NIS National indicator set A set of 192 statutory performance indicators that 
replaced the much larger Best Value Performance 
Indicators after the Local Government and Public 
Involvement in Health Act 2007, but were abandoned 
by the Coalition Government in 2010. 
Ofsted Office for Standards in 
Education, Children’s 
Services and Skills 
Inspection and regulatory body for education and 
children’s services, covering local authorities, schools, 
colleges, nurseries, childminders, fostering and 
adoption agencies and teacher training. 
 Outcome A performance indicator or measure at a high level of 
abstraction that describes a (usually longer-term) 
result, e.g. all age, all-cause mortality levels, 
educational attainment, resident satisfaction with 
cleanliness of streets etc.  Sometimes described as the 
result of effective performance. 
 Output A performance indicator or measure that describes the 
result of a process, or the ‘work done’, e.g. miles of 
street cleaned, number of people attending smoking 
cessation classes. 
 Outturn The performance level achieved at a specific point, 
usually annual but can be more or less frequent -  
sometimes quarterly, monthly etc. 
O&SC Overview and Scrutiny 
committee 
A committee of non-executive (i.e. backbench) 
councillors with a specific remit, usually linked to 
council objectives.  Membership is mixed between the 
party in control and opposition members, in set ratios 
related to overall control.  O&SCs are expected to 
generate a series of reviews, and have the power to 
‘call in’ or inspect and challenge a cabinet decision.  
PI Performance indicator A single performance measure – these can be at a high 
level of abstraction (e.g. employment level) or a low 
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level (e.g. % of minor planning applications determined 
within eight weeks). 
PM Performance 
management 
Recording and reviewing performance indicators and 
then taking corrective action or generating 
improvement activity and decisions. 
PMF Performance 
management 
framework 
The overarching ‘system’ of performance 
management, usually including business planning, 
performance reporting, generating improvement and 
performance measurement.   
PMS Performance 
management system 
Sometimes used in the literature to describe a PMF, 
but also used to describe a computer system that 
houses performance data and generates performance 
reports. 
PMeas Performance 
measurement 
(sometimes 
performance 
monitoring) 
The act of recording and reviewing performance but 
decoupled from either corrective action or 
improvement activity.  
 Portfolio holder An elected member with specific delegated 
responsibility for a portfolio of services or priority areas.  
Also called cabinet member or senior member. 
PSA Public Service 
Agreements 
A contractual-type mechanism where a financial 
performance reward was made for achieving a stretch 
performance level.  These agreements were 
negotiated by Government Offices in the Regions but 
represented national performance / policy targets. 
QUANGO Quasi-autonomous 
non-governmental 
organizations 
Used as an umbrella term for organizations to which 
government has devolved responsibility, but which is 
partly controlled and / or financed by government. 
 Stretch A term used to denote an increase in performance 
beyond what should have been expected. 
 Ward member An elected member without portfolio responsibility.  
They are representatives of their electoral ward (each 
ward is represented by three councillors, and has an 
average population of 5,500) 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to contribute to the theory and knowledge of public 
service reform and the management of performance and improvement by examining 
the residual approaches to service and performance improvement used by selected 
English public sector bodies, considering a post-2010, austerity environment. 
The history of reform efforts across the public sector is complex, varied and full of 
contention, and has provided a rich seam of material for academic study, from 
analysing broad shifts in approach, to developing and testing normative or instructive 
models (e.g. Boyne, 1996; Hood, 1995; Pollitt, 2013a).  The sheer volume, variety, 
and range of these reforms, and in particular those aimed at improving the 
management capacity and capabilities of public sector organizations has left a broad 
body of material for those organizations to draw upon.  Whilst the history of public 
sector reform is as old as the sector itself (Wilson and Game, 2011), recently many of 
the reforms were informed by the principles of what is commonly known as ‘New Public 
Management’ (hereafter referred to as NPM); approaches to service and performance 
improvement are considered to be fundamental parts of the NPM paradigm (Ferlie et 
al., 1996; Hood, 1991; Osborne, 2010b).  Debates now consider whether we are in a 
post-NPM environment, or whether emergent models of New Public Governance 
(Osborne, 2010a) are becoming dominant. Others still have considered whether the 
field of study contains sufficient theoretical development (Ashworth et al., 2013). 
The field of public service reform is also characterised by a plethora of different 
interpretive lenses, often informed by the discipline of the researcher, i.e. Public 
Administration (e.g. Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Dunsire, 
1995; Henry, 1975) or public management (e.g. Christensen and Laegreid, 2011; 
Ferlie et al., 1996; Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002; Verbeeten and Spekle, 2015).  The 
primary research presented here will contribute to knowledge by synthesising a 
conceptual model from the broader literature and investigating how change and reform 
was constructed, performed, and given meaning in a group of English local authorities.  
The primary research question therefore concerns the legacy of New Labour’s 
performance management frameworks on local government. 
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Both pre-1997 Conservative and post-1997 Labour administrations made much use 
of mandatory reforms, as well as recommended or ‘best practice’ approaches aimed 
at stimulating change.  Neither should we overlook the impact of self-directed change 
from within individual organizations.  As critics have noted (e.g. Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2000; Pollitt and Dan, 2011; Rashman and Radnor, 2005), much of this was 
implemented without any significant attempt to systematically document, justify or 
demonstrate the benefits expected or demanded, or the business case for change, 
and presented in a way that minimised the P/political implications and consequences. 
Academics have argued that this complexity, and the manner in which reforming 
efforts were rolled out from the centre, has left public bodies in an almost constant 
state of flux (Kingdom, 2000; Lowndes, 1999; Pollitt, 2013a; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2000; Stoker, 2002).  Some have identified the political drivers (Entwistle and Laffin, 
2005; Lee, 2008), and others have attempted to isolate the specific practices involved, 
often with comparison to private sector ones such as total quality management (Boyne 
et al., 2002; Furterer and Elshennawy, 2005; Pollitt, 1996), customer focus  (Drewry, 
2005; Farrell, 2010), or  performance management (de Lancer Jules, 2011; Higgins et 
al., 2004; Talbot, 2005).  Others have examined the development of the audit and 
assessment culture that became prominent over the last twenty or thirty years (e.g. 
Downe and Martin, 2006; du Gay and Pryke, 2002; Faucher-King and Le Galès, 2010; 
Power, 1994, 1997; Rashman and Radnor, 2005).  Many have commented on the role 
of markets (e.g. Boyne et al., 1999; Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Stoker, 2004a), and 
also the part played by communities and the government / governance interface (e.g. 
Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; McLaughlin et al., 2002; Osborne, 2010b; Skelcher, 2004).   
Overall, there is general agreement that there has been a significant body of reform 
specifically aiming at performance and service improvement, despite the rationale and 
benefits of such reforms not always being explicit, leading to the claim that these 
changes have often been “change for change’s sake” (Keen and Scase, 1996), and 
driven by ‘faddish’ trends in management (Hood, 1991).  This research will analyse 
these reforms to construct a conceptual model for understanding their legacy in local 
authorities, part of the group of “Best Value Authorities” set out in legislation (DETR, 
1999)  – i.e. the primary public service delivery organizations in an area, including local 
councils, NHS bodies, police, and fire and rescue services.  The focus of this research 
will be on local authorities as they represent the most significant public service bodies 
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at the local level, that is, with the largest direct budgets and most immediately 
recognisable to individuals.  Local authorities have been subject to significant levels 
of reform over the last 30 or more years, including being the main focus of research 
into NPM (e.g. Bevan and Hood, 2006a; Boyne, 1996; Game, 2002; Haubrich and 
McLean, 2006; Hoggett, 1996; Pollitt, 1996). 
It can be argued, then, that the history of public sector reform has been dominated by 
the twin driving discourses of markets and communities, with a perpetual undercurrent 
of governance, politics, and political control.  There is common agreement that whilst 
the Conservative administrations under Thatcher and Major began the process, the 
Blair and Brown Labour administrations continued to put markets conspicuously at the 
core of their public sector reforms and indeed at the heart of the ‘third way’ (e.g. 
Entwistle and Laffin, 2005; Giddens, 1998; Pollitt and Dan, 2011; Rashman and 
Radnor, 2005; Stoker, 1997, 2004a).  Pollitt and Bouckaert refer to this as a reform 
‘trajectory’ (2000), a series of planned reforms with a starting point, a desired end state, 
and a number of stages along the way.  Fairclough (2000, p.9) deconstructs the “third 
way” as a reconciliation of historically incompatible opposites from ‘old’ politics; 
essentially Labour attempting to redefine and take ownership of the centre ground of 
politics in part by adopting the doctrine of marketization initiated by the Conservatives 
(Beech, 2008), using a range of tools, assessment regimes and other mechanisms to 
deliver that agenda.  Added to this, some academics argue that we are moving to a 
post-NPM world and one where community governance is at the fore (Dunleavy et al., 
2006b; Osborne, 2010b; Wiesel and Modell, 2014), or suggest that convergence 
around a set of NPM principles is a myth (Goldfinch and Wallis, 2010). 
Legislation brought in by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat government in the 
early phase of coalition (DCLG, 2011b), however, largely removed the raft of imposed 
corporate-level performance and service improvement capacity mechanisms such as 
the Comprehensive Area Assessment, Local Area Agreements, the oneplace website 
(Audit Commission, 2010), the National Indicator Set, and the inspection role of the 
Audit Commission.  Whilst the rhetoric suggests this was to preserve the broad 
principles of reform intentions (Pickles, 2013), it clearly removed most of the 
compulsory tools and methods that the previous New Labour administrations had put 
in place.  Walker (2011) argues that the abolition of the Audit Commission was 
primarily due to political motivations.  It is interesting to note that whilst the abolition of 
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the commission was announced early in the coalition, 13 August 2010, it took four 
years until the approval of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 to formally 
timetable the commission’s demise. 
Such types of structured reform have been linked to strengthening the improvement 
capacity of local authorities (Higgins et al., 2004; Rashman and Radnor, 2005), and 
the removal of the inspection and improvement regimes without any substantial 
replacement has left a significant policy vacuum, whilst the statutory Best Value duty 
remains in force as an expectation on service delivery (DCLG, 2015b).     
As some of the political rhetoric would have us believe, local government at least has 
now had “pointless town hall red tape targets” stripped away (DCLG, 2010b) as well 
as promising that councils now have “unprecedented freedoms over how to prioritise 
their money” (DCLG, 2010a).  They (and their statutory partners, e.g. NHS, police, fire 
and rescue services etc.) are in theory free to choose whatever tools they like; the 
reality, however, appears to have been quite different. 
Given the de facto removal of most mandatory elements, we could therefore logically 
presume that what remains, i.e. those approaches that organizations retain should, in 
theory, be those that they consider useful. Yet this assumes a rational position on the 
part of local decision-makers that may not be found in the reality of public management.  
Research has demonstrated that not all tools are easy to implement effectively 
(Furterer and Elshennawy, 2005; Pidd, 2008; Radnor et al., 2012; Radnor and 
Osborne, 2013; Radnor and Walley, 2008).  The legacy of stripping away these 
performance mechanisms therefore deserves closer analysis, which is one of the 
objectives of this research, articulated through the research questions in section 2.10, 
p.64. 
This research questions Pollitt and Bouckaert’s view that “politico-administrative 
regimes” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000) are not useful units of analysis for 
understanding the “tides of reform” (Talbot, 2005), arguing that a more sophisticated 
understanding of the values, tensions, relationships and mechanisms used by each of 
the regimes is essential to unpacking the rationales and discourses used by existing 
public sector bodies in how they conceive and support specific improvement activities. 
Appraisals of these reforms so far within public services leave questions unanswered.  
How do organizations engage with reforms at a conceptual, operational and 
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implementation level?  How do reforms take account of differing theoretical and 
operational foundations of changes and integrate them into their internal narratives of 
performance, i.e. how do they discuss and justify particular methods, approaches, or 
tools?  What does this tell us about the relationships within and between organizations 
regarding the governance and management of improvement? What is it like to operate 
in this environment now, given the impact of reform policy in the 1997-2010 Labour 
administration period, and the relative absence of it in the post-2010, austerity climate 
Coalition government? 
This research explores some of the historical background to the major flows in reform 
efforts, outlines some of the key debates, and proposes a conceptual model in section 
2.9.4 for how efforts could be categorised and analysed, to address the primary 
research question, that of what legacy we can observe of the 1997-2010 reforms at 
an organizational level. 
 Reflexivity and objectivity 
NB: Owing to the reflexive nature of the discussion, and to avoid the artificiality of 
referring to myself as ‘the researcher’, I have written portions of this section in the first 
person.   
Hoshmand (1999) argues that there are difficulties in uniting qualitative research 
behind homogenous or unified practices.  Cassell and Symon (2004) suggest that it is 
desirable to inculcate a sense of reflexivity in qualitative organizational research,  to 
encourage researchers to account for not only for their epistemological and ontological 
positions but also their disciplinary practice and assumptions (2004, p.6).  Given the 
nature of this research, it is essential to consider how my disciplinary background 
might affect the methods used, data gathered, and analysis developed. 
I was head of policy and performance in three large, unitary local authorities covering 
the period of 1998-2010.  Thus, I have a level of personal experience and engagement 
with the processes of the 1997-2010 performance and improvement regime that is the 
subject of this research.  Whilst this gives me first-hand knowledge of the policies, and 
provides a degree of credibility with participants, it should also be recognised that my 
experience is in three out of 152 unitary authorities, and thus is specific and limited.  
Whilst accepting the role of researcher as “key instrument” (Cresswell, 2013), I have 
attempted to take account of the different experiences of other participants during the 
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same period of time in terms of the local context of their organizations, their 
background and roles, and their own worldviews, and how these may differ from mine, 
as well as how my actions and values inform interactions with participants.  This is 
particularly important in research where the researcher is closely involved with the 
organization, as with case studies (Stake, 1995).   
This research explored the perceptions of 35 staff at a senior level within the six case 
study organizations.  These participants represented different areas of responsibility 
with the local authority, and included politicians, staff in corporate roles, and 
departmental service staff.  Differences of view emerged between cases and within 
cases; this was to be expected.  The experiences of staff in corporate roles regarding 
the operation of the assessment regimes is bound to be different to those of 
departmental staff, who had responsibilities to different central government 
departments and ‘front line’ service responsibilities. As interpretive research, the 
inductive analysis was receptive to differences, tensions and contradictions in how 
different participants viewed the same phenomena.  The credibility brought by my 
professional background therefore aided the elicitation of these different responses 
through sharing of common experiences (Radnor, 2001; Robson, 2011).   
However, for clarity, this research was not normative, in that it did not seek to make 
judgements on the appropriateness of a case study organization’s approach or their 
performance in delivering services but rather explored the internal logic or legitimacy 
presented, and how this may have been affected by national policy and local 
circumstances.   
This does not mean that theorisation could not take place; that was certainly a goal of 
this research and is supported as a credible process (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007).  Chapter 7 outlines the theoretical development of three main 
areas arising from the research findings: new performance management models, 
multiple forms of accountability, and value for money. 
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Chapter 2. Literature review and conceptual background 
 Introduction and structure of the chapter 
This chapter adopts a narrative review approach to considering the context in which 
the research operates (section 2.2).  The purpose of this section is to locate the 
research: from Public Administration to (New) Public Management and beyond, and 
to articulate the overarching context in which the research has developed (section 2.3), 
and how this context has influenced the current position of the organizations that 
participated in the primary data gathering.  It also explores the main dimensions of 
reform that have affected local government in section 292.4, as well as examining the 
language used to discuss reforms (section 2.5), and questions the intentionality of 
some of the major changes in section 2.6. 
The research considers the foundation of the assessment and improvement regimes, 
and addresses the central research question: How has the legacy of the 1997-2010 
UK administrations’ approaches to performance and service improvement affected 
post-2010 English public services?  Therefore, another key element of the literature 
review is the exploration of the multiple uses of performance management in section 
2.7.   
To bring coherence to the divergent perspectives, this chapter will attempt to 
synthesise three main analytical and conceptual stages.  These are presented in three 
forms: 
• The first, section 2.9, presents Table 3: Summary analysis of major reform 
phases on page 52 draws together a summary of the historical apparatuses – 
that is, it articulates the key relationships, discourses, events, tools, and other 
concerns, drawing upon the chronological analysis presented in section 2.8.   
• The second, on page 62, Figure 2: Conceptual model of dimensions of reform 
synthesises the different views presented of conceptions of reform efforts into 
a conceptual model for understanding the nature and impact of efforts at the 
organizational unit of analysis level in section 2.9.3.  
• The third, Figure 1: Timeline analysis of reforms on page 56, recounts and 
integrates the key chronological events such as elections and pieces of 
legislation, along with an overlay of the analytical terms emerging from the 
previous two components. 
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 Recent background of reform scholarship 
The history of public sector (reform) scholarship has been dominated by the importing 
of private sector concepts, practices and thinking into the public sector (Keenan, 2000; 
Pollitt, 1990; Pollitt, 2013a), and in particular economic theories and concepts such as 
rational choice theory (Faucher-King and Le Galès, 2010; Stoker and Marsh, 2002), 
which by definition brings into question the role of the market and private sector in 
service delivery.  Overall, these practices are commonly referred to with the label ‘New 
Public Management’ (NPM), conceived as an alternative to the previously dominant 
understanding of how public services have been governed and managed, usually 
referred to as Public Administration (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994).  After a brief 
discussion of the context of Public Administration and (New) Public Management, the 
focus here will be on the reforms generated by successive governments, how these 
are conceived, and locating them within the overall context of public management, 
rather than a more general discussion of the differences between Public 
Administration and New Public Management, and whether reforms fit into either 
paradigm.   
In the early 1990s, Hood located New Public Management as one of five ‘megatrends’ 
that together could loosely be described as reforms (Hood, 1991), the effects of which 
would go beyond public management, i.e. the development of automation as a feature 
of service delivery.  Much has been written about some of these broad shifts in reform 
approaches (e.g. Boyne et al., 1999; Dunleavy et al., 2006b; Ferlie et al., 1996; 
Kingdom, 2000; Osborne, 2010b; Stoker, 2004a; Stoker and Wilson, 2004), and these 
discussions generally consider the transition from Public Administration to (New) 
Public Management.  Osborne and Gaebler’s book Reinventing Government (1992) is 
also credited with energising the debate around the nature of public service 
management (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Kingdom, 2000) by focusing on the private 
sector, entrepreneurial aspects of management.  Kingdom goes on to argue that this 
is a symptom of an economic and political shift: after the 1980s, “the post-war 
Keynesian orthodoxies were challenged in the rise of neo-liberalism under the 
government of Margaret Thatcher.” (Kingdom, 2000).  It can be argued, though, that 
the extent to which Osborne and Gaebler (and those they influence) were seen as 
either political or simply practical, can also serve as a proxy for critical perspective.  
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 Administration, management, and governance 
Niskanen (1971) was among the earliest academics to formally (i.e. econometrically) 
advance an economic theory of bureaucratic behaviour.  He is commonly held to be 
one of the main instigators of the shift away from established notions of Public 
Administration and public service and towards the marketized, consumerist and 
individualistic view that is firmly embedded in British policy today, and is considered a 
basic component of New Public Management (Frederickson and Smith, 2003; Hood, 
1991). Although sometimes overlooked now, Tiebout also plays a role in informing 
thinking around the relationship between citizens and the state, and the impact of 
choice and customer / citizen mobility on public service delivery (Frederickson and 
Smith, 2003; John, 1997; Tiebout, 1956).  Even if some of Tiebout’s assertions and 
assumptions have been challenged (Howell-Moroney, 2008), interestingly he 
concludes that voters should be forced to reveal (their) public preferences, and that 
local government is a sector where resource allocation based on those public 
preferences “need not take a back seat to the private sector” (Tiebout, 1956); the 
debate about private versus public is far from being a recent one.   
Prior to the influence of this American philosophy of public services,  ‘Public 
Administration’ was considered hegemonic in academic circles, being viewed as a 
bureaucratic and political model (Meier and Hill, 2005).  Rhodes (1997) argues that 
the organising perspective of the “Westminster model” was a fundamental part of 
mainstream political science in understanding how public services were governed.  It 
focused on electoral and democratic sovereignty, and political control of the neutral 
executive (civil service), rather than the physical delivery of services. 
This view of public services as bureaucratic and monolithic organizations is common 
in political discourse, enhancing the attractiveness of the importation of private sector 
practices, particularly given the strength of the rhetoric around the perceived 
weaknesses of public servants, characterised by politicians’ distrust (Aucoin, 2010).  
In the middle of the 1990s, Frederickson (1996) uses Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) 
concept of “reinventing government” as his label for NPM, and declares the problem 
of the “bureaucratic paradigm” to be at the heart of both reinventing government and 
the emergence of New Public Administration.  This term originates as far back as the 
1920s (Lynn, 2010) and is not much in vogue at present, at least within UK, US, and 
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European contexts.  Frederickson observes that much of the debate is reduced to 
binary dichotomies such as “steering rather than rowing, empowering rather than 
serving” (Frederickson, 1996), although Frederickson himself is perhaps guilty of the 
same tendency.  
Many academics (e.g. Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Ferlie et al., 2005; Frederickson, 
1996; Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 2013a) agree that the 1980s saw the start of this shift away 
from the dominance of Public Administration, which gathered pace in the 1990s, and 
is generally held to include: (Hood, 1991) 
• The reliance on the ‘rule of law’ 
• Administration that focuses on set rules 
• A key role for bureaucracy in making policy and a split between the political and 
administrative functions within organizations 
• Incremental budgeting 
• The dominance of professions  
 
This is Hood’s (1991) summation of the main facets of PA; there are others, but Hood’s 
is often cited as a useful starting point.  There is also fairly clear agreement that the 
shift was towards what was being called New Public Management (NPM).  Again, 
whilst there are multiple (sometimes competing) definitions of NPM, Hood’s definition 
is commonly accepted as the best starting point for NPM.  It states that NPM’s main 
doctrinal components are: 
• Professional management (for which we can read the culture of managerialism, 
an attack on professions, and the move to externally made policy decisions) 
• Performance management as an explicit approach 
• More focus on the control of outputs 
• The breaking up of ‘monolithic’ units in the public sector 
• An increase in the role of competition (e.g. opening public services up to 
competition from other sectors) 
• An increasing privileging of private sector management practices 
• Tighter resource controls and budgetary management, with a view to an overall 
smaller state 
• The rise to prominence of the 3Es (economy, efficiency, and effectiveness) 
 
There is a certain symmetry in using Hood’s definitions of both sides of the terrain, 
given his coining of the NPM label.  This research does not aim to challenge those 
classifications as some have, but rather includes them as part of the broader context.  
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As earlier, despite numerous attempts at a comprehensive definition of NPM 
(Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Ferlie et al., 1996; Hood, 1991; McLaughlin et al., 2002; 
Rashman and Radnor, 2005; Rhodes, 1997), the nature of NPM makes this 
challenging, as does the fact that the public sector is not an homogeneous block.  
However, a synthesis of Hood’s starting point and various other efforts can highlight a 
continuity of reforms behind much of both Conservative and Labour thinking around 
public services over the last 30 years: competition and choice (Boyne, 1996; Rhodes, 
1997), the importance of private sector behaviours and tools (Dunleavy and Hood, 
1994; Ferlie et al., 1996), individualist consumerism (Stoker, 2004a), and the need to 
‘do more with less’ (Chandler, 2000; Talbot, 2005), or the efficiency argument (Boyne, 
1996; Stoker, 1997; Wilson and Game, 2011).   
Public Administration and bureaucracy – in the academic sense – are perhaps better 
codified (e.g. Aucoin, 2010; Frederickson, 1996; Hood, 1991), but remain fuzzy 
concepts, whose demise has been predicted several times (Meier and Hill, 2005).  
Politics, administration, governance, and management are thus broadly 
distinguishable from one another – albeit sometimes by defining themselves via their 
oppositional position to one another – but are difficult to separate when it comes to 
understanding the reality of reforms’ impacts on public services.  This poses the 
question: how can we synthesise a way of examining these reforms that allow these 
multiple rationalities to be explored?  
 Structuring an understanding of the reforms 
There are numerous and varied ways of characterising, understanding and evaluating 
public service / management reforms, and in part these are guided by the overall 
disciplines within public service scholarship, as outlined in section 2.3: Public 
Administration, New Public Management, and New Public Governance.  Whilst these 
schools of thought provide useful structure and allow alignment of key concepts, in 
doing so they also risk bounding the scope of inquiry into reforms.  Section 2.8 
develops a chronological understanding of the reforms, and the concluding sections, 
2.9, 2.9.3, and 2.10 draws together the different perspectives and develops the 
conceptual model, summary analysis and key research questions.  
This section, therefore, contributes to that overall picture through a narrative review of 
some of the literature and discusses some of the most common connections between 
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reforms.  To do so, it identifies commonalities within some of the literature and then 
synthesises a conceptual model for better understanding the nature and effect of 
reforms at the organizational level.  This conceptual model is presented in Figure 2: 
Conceptual model of dimensions of reform, on page 62, section 2.9.4.  This model 
contains seven identified dimensions of reforms, i.e. thematic continuities or lever 
points that attempts to unite views from the differing scholarly perspectives, i.e. PA, 
NPM, and NPG.  These dimensions emerged from the literature, and are presented in 
more detail in the following parts of this section, but are summarised here:  
Instrumental, Structural, Market / role, People- or staff-centred, Democratic / 
decisional / community, Institutional, and Financial. 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) define public management reforms as “deliberate 
changes to the structures and processes of public sector organizations with the 
objective of getting them (in some sense) to run better”, whilst accepting that even this 
is still an inadequate definition.   This sees an instrumental and structural approach to 
service delivery, with a focus on efficiency, driving primarily towards the instrumental 
and structural dimensions.  That is, changes that are focused on the use of a tool or a 
structural change to an organization such as a restructure, as the primary mechanisms 
for effecting change (Andrews and Boyne, 2012).    
Christensen and Laegreid (2002) discuss three differing ways of conceiving reforms: 
the first, at the meso level, as response to external pressures; the second and third, 
at the macro level, being a consequence of different “historical-institutional” contexts, 
and as a consequence of differing national constitutions and “politico-administrative 
structures” (2002, pp.2-3).  In the model this research proposes in Figure 2: 
Conceptual model of dimensions of reform, these levels relate primarily to the 
institutional and democratic dimensions of change.  Stewart starts from a position of 
privileging historical influences on the current state of public services and articulates 
four “carriers of history” for local government: buildings; ways of working; culture and 
beliefs, and legislation (Stewart, 2000), which correspond to a combination of 
structural, instrumental, and people-centred dimensions.  Chandler (2000, 2009) takes 
a more traditionally bureaucratic and structural view as his starting point for 
understanding the ebbs and flows of changes within the public sector (we can use 
local government as a proxy here for the sector, as it is has the longest history and is 
the most democratic in terms of governance).   Chandler’s focus arises from a 
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consideration of the legal roles, finance and organizational structure, and sees 
“stewardship” as the defining characteristic of the relationship between central 
government and local government (Chandler, 2009), whilst also emphasising the 
significance of the democratic mechanisms.  Chandler’s view is largely asset or 
resource based, and sees the management of financial and building assets as the 
lever for delivering improved services, from the perspective of the ultimate ownership 
of these resources being with the people.  Instrumental approaches can often lend 
themselves to a compliance-driven audit approach to the use of assets and resources.  
This is observable through the use of organizational assessments such as Best Value 
reviews, and the Comprehensive Performance Assessment, which contained a series 
of sub-elements, including the use of resources assessment.   
Aligning primarily with the democratic dimension, Driver (2006) argues for the primacy 
of the political dimensions to understanding reform, pinning much of the New Labour 
reforms to attempts to deal with the Conservative legacy, and referencing the power 
of the market, nested within the key discourse of ‘modernization’; a term also much 
used by  Fairclough (2000) and Newman, who argues its main function is to legitimise 
change (Newman, 2001).  One of the proponents of a focus on the institutional 
dimension, Newman also identifies several tensions within the New Labour approach: 
the conflict between partnership and principal / agent discourses (Newman, 2001, 
pp.84-5), and draws together views of the participation agenda for public services, 
linking these to an institutional view of networks within a pluralist policy-making model 
(Newman, 2001, 2002) that argues for the importance of understanding citizen 
engagement as a driver for democratic and participatory governance reforms.   
A number of academics (e.g. Aucoin, 2010; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Lowndes, 1999; 
Lynn, 2010; Rhodes, 1996; Skelcher, 2004) develop the political debate into one of 
governance and governance structures, thus often linking democracy, engagement, 
and citizens / consumers / clients / service users, as they are variously described in 
the literature. Some argue, however, that governance should no longer be seen as 
synonymous with government (Hughes, 2010; Rhodes, 1997).  Peters (2010) sees 
“meta-governance” or “the governance of governance” as an alternative model for 
NPM, and sees performance management as one of the instruments for meta-
governance.  Although Peters makes this argument in Osborne’s New Public 
Governance, the argument for the importance of meta-governance may be challenged 
31 
 
when examining the policy for public services from 2010 onwards, as several of the 
instruments Peters discusses have been removed, e.g. performance and partnership 
requirements, by legislation in the early period of Coalition government (DCLG, 2011b; 
Parker, 2011).  
Taking a broadly systems theoretical approach, Kooiman (2010) sees the whole 
discussion of governance as one that reflects the inherent acceptance of the pluralist 
nature of policy-making, and that governance needs to be effective, efficient, legitimate 
and interactive (Kooiman, 2010), whether it controls decisions, resources, operations 
or even improvement itself. 
Osborne (2010b) has also been influential in outlining a growing move towards what 
he terms ‘New Public Governance’, although he notes that this is not being proposed 
as a new normative model that replaces New Public Management or Public 
Administration.  Rather, it could be considered a way of analysing and developing the 
processes of public service strategy and delivery. NPG is more open to a plural and 
pluralist approach that might address some of the key weaknesses of both Public 
Administration and New Public Management outlined above.  This corresponds 
primarily to the democratic dimension within this thesis’s conceptual model, and raises 
the question of whether these new governance methods have played a role in 
influencing the governance of improvement.  Later discussions in section 6.3.4, page 
188, extend this question to one of ‘governing austerity’.  Governance as a principle 
also rests of those for whom governance is operated, i.e. the community or individuals 
who use of receive public services; this relates to the community dimension.   
The market dimension is less noticeable in the debate about contextualising and 
understanding reforming practices.   Whilst highly visible in the policy arena, it does 
not play as significant a role within the academic sphere, and the focus is more often 
on empirical analysis of comparative costs or quality (Stolt et al., 2011), market 
characteristics (Hefetz and Warner, 2011), competitive tendering (Andrews et al., 2011; 
Boyne et al., 1999) or comparative performance (Walker et al., 2011; Walker et al., 
2010) as well as exploring collaboration (Entwistle and Martin, 2005) and practical 
guidance.   
This section has articulated the background literature used to establish dimensions of 
reform upon which the conceptual model has been developed.  These are: 
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• Instrumental 
• Structural 
• Market / role 
• People- or staff-centred 
• Democratic / decisional / community 
• Institutional 
• Financial 
 
The complex nature of public service scholarship means that it is not a simple task to 
isolate individual scholars within single dimensions, and thus these seven have 
emerged from a reading across multi-perspective accounts of public sector reform.   
 The power of words: the language of change and reform 
The ideological struggle represented by the administration versus management 
debate also continued on a linguistic front.  Chandler perceives a form of nominative 
determinism at play, and suggests that the coining of the phrase ‘public management’ 
brought about (or perhaps if we adopt a more cautious analysis, accelerated) the 
adoption of ‘management’, i.e. private sector processes and tools (Chandler, 2000).  
Whilst it might seem easy to dismiss the notion of labels having a causal effect on 
actions, we can observe the same principle at play when Michael Gove renamed the 
“Department for Children, Schools and Families” (DCSF) to the more conservative and 
traditional “Department for Education” (DfE) in 2010, a few days into the new 
administration (Shepherd, 2010). Fairclough (2001) suggests that discourse defines 
an object as it describes it. 
This positive labelling of efforts (such as improvement, not change, modernization, not 
reform, etc.) endured, however, and Entwistle and Laffin (2005, p.215) show how this 
‘motherhood and apple pie’ explanation of reforms was used to effectively neuter union 
opposition to changes through creating an unsupportable dichotomy of ‘in favour of 
improving services’ against ‘not in favour of improving services’.  
 As will be argued later in more detail, once we move beyond discussion of the 
overarching reform shifts, the discourse around performance reforms risks being one 
of simplistic, anecdotal views that tools used in the private sector must be both 
inherently worthwhile and of practical use in the public sector (Boyne, 2002; Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1992; Osborne and Plastrik, 1997).  This ignores the very different 
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natures found of the two sectors (Allison, 1986; Andrews et al., 2011).  Whilst the 
discourse remains stubbornly scientifically and economically rational, we should 
recognise that is not the case in reality, as experienced by public sector organizations 
(or perhaps any sector, for that matter).  
As Pollitt and Bouckaert put it:  “[…] management is not some neutral, technical 
process, but […] suffused with value laden choices and influenced by broader 
ideologies (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p.14).  On reflection, then, reforms are open 
to interpretation and this raises the question: How have public sector organizations 
discussed and created meaning and legitimacy for themselves in their selection and 
use of improvement tools? 
This tension between the common acceptance of management as a neutral or positive 
process, and the inevitably political nature of public sector reform provides a backdrop 
to the questions arising from this research and suggests the need to consider how 
public bodies navigate this tension, and whether there are observable mechanisms 
they use to support their selection of improvement philosophies and tools. 
 Chaos and co-ordination 
A common theme in the academic literature on the public sector is that of diverse 
reforms (Martin et al., 2013; Pollitt, 2013a), or even incoherent reforms, such as 
Stoker’s (2002) ‘reform by lottery claim’, Hood’s (1998) ‘contrived randomness’, or 
Parker’s (2011) invocation of Schumpeter’s (1947) ‘creative destruction’; all of which 
suggest a lack of a robust theoretical framework to reform efforts.  Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2000) also suggest that the degree of ‘intentionality’ of many reforms should be 
sceptically viewed, or at least the extent to which some of the effects were unintended 
should be considered.  In addition, public services have been subject to the same 
emergence of ‘disruptive’ or revolutionary technologies like the internet or mobile 
devices as other sectors (Christensen et al., 2000).   
Control of public resources and how they are allocated is perhaps the key mechanism 
for exercising political control and distinctiveness.  It may therefore be pertinent to ask: 
how much of the reform imposed on the sector has been subject to ideological 
intentions from political parties, whether in power or opposition?  Whilst this ideological 
may be an inevitable, and perhaps legitimate, product of an adversarial political 
system, we could also pose the question of whether public services could realistically 
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achieve what the rhetoric around ‘transformation’ promises; this may form part of 
future research.  
What emerges from the literature is that reform approaches vary from the ethereal to 
the long-lasting, but the temptation to tweak, improve or ‘radically transform’ public 
services is a constant.  Therefore, despite this apparent chaos and lack of consistency 
or even, as Pollitt and Dan (2013) argue, quantifiable impact, reform efforts continue 
to play an important part in the lives of public sector policy-makers, practitioners, and 
academics alike.   
Clarke and Newman (1997) explicitly identify managerialism as an ideology, and 
Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing Government (1992) is often viewed as a key 
milestone in the transmission of the private sector, entrepreneurial capitalist ideology.  
The philosophical and theoretical components of reform are important in 
understanding why and how organizations adapt and respond to reforms.  
 
 Performance management 
The primary research question addresses the legacy of the New Labour performance 
management frameworks.  For clarity, performance management is being used in the 
broadest sense here of measuring and acting on data gathered from services and 
service users, rather than the human resource management interpretation of 
performance management, i.e. managing individual staff performance (Gould-
Williams, 2011) 
Performance management has been a fixture in public sector reform for many years 
(Johnsen, 2005; Neely, 1999; OECD, 2004), and has been considered a key part of 
managerialist, New Public Management (NPM) reforms (Ferlie et al., 1996). In fact 
performance management is sometimes treated as being as metonymical for NPM – 
the part standing in for the whole (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2007).   
Neely (1999) discusses this in terms of a “performance revolution”.  Whilst NPM 
reforms have undoubtedly made public services more efficient and more aware of their 
relationship with the users of their services, market forces alone have not delivered on 
their promises of a customer revolution, due to a narrow focus on inputs and outputs 
(Andrews and Entwistle, 2013) and a reliance on efficiency above and beyond other 
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concerns, such as wider notions of public value (Moore, 1994; Moore, 1995; Radnor 
et al., 2016).  The debate around the utility and relevance of performance management 
also continues with a focus on the impact of performance management on strategy 
(Melnyk, Bititci et al. 2014, Franco-Santos, Lucianetti et al. 2012).  
Initially, much performance management research was (and still is) driven by rational 
instrumentalism, and thus tended to overlook questions of power and negotiation 
(Brignall and Modell, 2000).  Institutional theory (Ashworth et al., 2007; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983, 1991) has recently been more commonly used to explore notions of 
stakeholder influence and intra-organizational politics (Brignall and Modell, 2000; 
Lawton et al., 2000; McKevitt and Lawton, 1996; Oliver, 1991), and there is a more 
general acceptance of the formal and informal political nature of performance 
management, and how it influences shape and function in public service management 
(Moynihan, 2008).   
In essence, this creates a series of dividing lines between much of the scholarship – 
where explanatory, socialised interpretations of responses to performance 
management (e.g. Hood, 2007b; Pollitt, 2013c; Radnor, 2011) jostle for space with 
technical, normative definitions (Bourne et al., 2000; Bourne et al., 2003; Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992), and evaluations of the success or failure of performance management 
systems (Andrews, 2004; McLean et al., 2007; Verbeeten and Spekle, 2015; Walker 
and Andrews, 2013). 
Behn (2003) developed a framework of eight purposes of measuring performance for 
public managers, based around classical notions of management (evaluate, budget, 
promote, learn, control, motive, celebrate, and improve).  He goes on to argue that the 
only purpose for performance measurement is improvement, and that the remaining 
seven purposes are conceived only as mechanisms for delivering improvement.  The 
view of performance management as rational mechanism for focussing organizational 
or managerial attention and resources is prevalent amongst much of the literature, 
particularly that which evaluates the success of performance management systems, 
and would appear to cast a long shadow over perceptions of performance 
management in local government. 
However, an examination of wider, Public Administration-focused literature suggests 
that this overlooks the institutional, political, and ritualistic components of performance 
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management.  From an NPM perspective, performance management is a key tool in 
controlling the expenditure of an organization and in disseminating the strategy.  
However, literature considering the politics / administration dichotomy common in 
Public Administration perspectives, suggests that performance management can also 
be a tool to control the administration, generate democratic accountability or bestow 
prestige on services or individuals.  Performance management may be used for a wide 
variety of purposes, some of which have been summarised here.   This is not an 
exhaustive list, but presents some of the competing logics and modalities of 
performance, particularly with reference to public services (See also: Johnsen (2005) 
for a good discussion of some of these issues).   
Table 2: Uses of performance management: perspectives from literature 
performance 
management 
used for 
Description and support from within the literature 
Policy 
deployment 
Promoting or provoking the delivery of policy goals / objectives, i.e. from 
national perspectives (Andrews, 2004; Hood, 2007a) 
Evaluation Programmes or policy objectives – (Heinrich, 2002) 
Control of: 
Resources (Hoggett, 1996; Sanderson, 2001) 
Processes (Fisher, 1995) performance management systems as 
cybernetic system idea 
People or perhaps managerial effort? (Hood, 2007a) There is an 
extensive literature around human resources management and 
performance of individuals (For example, see Gould-Williams (2011) for 
a review of this literature with regard to public service improvement) 
Legitimacy Demonstrating political or managerial importance or worth  (Power, 
1997; Sanderson, 2001) 
Credibility / 
prestige 
Demonstrating historical performance or external perceptions as 
indicating current or future value (Behn, 2003; Boyne, 1996; Hartley and 
Downe, 2007) 
Improvement 
Instrumentally rationalist mechanisms for improving levels of outputs, 
efficiency, or economy (Andrews et al., 2006; Bourne et al., 2007; 
Bourne et al., 2000) 
Learning 
Mechanisms for drawing knowledge about ‘best practice’ and other 
notions of transferability of learning from either outside the organization, 
or internally (de Lancer Jules, 2011; Hood, 2007a) 
Accountability 
or 
transparency 
Being held to account democratically or managerially for levels of 
performance achieved, often with regard to expenditure (Behn, 2001; 
Denhardt and Aristigueta, 2011; Hood, 2007b) What happens when 
transparency meets blame-avoidance? 
Justifying 
change 
In processes, cultures, behaviours, or outcomes – or granting approval 
(Bouckaert and Peters, 2002; Radnor, 2011) 
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performance 
management 
used for 
Description and support from within the literature 
Defensively 
To protect stakeholder resources or prestige, or to negotiate stakeholder 
differences  (Bevan and Hood, 2006b; Boyne, 2003; Hood, 2007a; 
Oliver, 1991), as well as for ‘gaming’ purposes (Hood, 2006; Pollitt, 
2013c) 
Coercion Coercively imposed and thus a demanded response (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) 
Normative, 
mimetic force 
What is expected of ‘good’ organisations and copying those  (Rashman 
and Radnor, 2005) 
Habit Carrying on what has been done before (Oliver, 1991) 
Ritual 
Ritualised practice driven by belief systems (Radnor, 2011; Simons, 
1995) or symbolic performance (Pollitt, 2013c) (this is also referred to in 
this research’s findings as “the performance of performance”) 
Strategy 
deployment / 
strategic 
planning 
(Boyne, 2010; Heinrich, 2002; Melnyk et al., 2014; Neely and Bourne, 
2000; Simons, 1995) – deciding the measures helps organizations clarify 
their strategy and measures should be derived from strategy (Bourne et 
al., 2000) – a somewhat self-fulfilling cycle, perhaps. 
Narrative 
Telling a story of achievement, failure etc. Newman (2001) cites 
Corvellec’s (1996) term of ‘narratives of achievement’ as ways in which 
organisations defend their position to external scrutiny bodies (e.g. the 
Audit Commission) through what are essentially performative statements 
of their achievements, rather than robust assessments of their strengths 
and weaknesses 
Ideology 
This suggests that, like managerialism, performance management is not 
neutral, but instead a value-laden term (Clarke and Newman, 1997).  
Pollitt (2013b) discusses the phenomenon of synecdoche (the part 
standing in for the whole) whereby performance measures ‘stand in’ for 
an understanding of the service as a whole, or indeed the perceptions of 
customers / clients / citizens etc.  What is measured is thus an 
expression of the organization’s values; it could be used to deliver social 
justice through measuring equity (Moore, 1995; Stoker, 2006), or a 
marketized ideology through enforced competition (Hefetz and Warner, 
2011) 
Innovation Generating ‘innovative ideas’ in terms of changing delivery, approach or 
methods (Hartley, 2005; Osborne and Brown, 2011) 
Source: Author and works listed. 
Some of these aspects of performance management reinterpreted in section 7.1 
Performance management frameworks: models, theories, and practices, which 
develops a new, proposed performance management model driven by the empirical 
findings in section 7.1.3, page 216. 
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 Historical phases of reforms 
Just as the differing viewpoints outlined above give a valuable set of perspectives, so 
too does a longitudinal view of the major UK public sector reform efforts and the 
literature surrounding them.  Categorising the reforms by political administrations, 
seems logical given that for decades, each new administration has seemed keen to 
make a definitive mark on public services; this allows us to observe the significant 
discursive steps in the history of public sector reform. 
We can break these larger steps down and examine the key relationships that typified 
them, along with the key discourses of the day, and other relevant concerns.  This 
analysis uses the regime (i.e. the duration of a specific political administration marked 
by the general election, or by change in prime minister such as the 1979-1991 period 
of Margaret Thatcher) as the unit of analysis.  The reason for this is the significance 
of the prime ministerial role in selecting and controlling the executive in the 
Westminster model (Rhodes, 1997). 
Pollitt and Bouckaert argue for a shift from analysing regimes to looking at trajectories, 
which they define as being the mechanism for implementing an overall scenario, i.e. 
a set of reforms with a planned starting point, a desired end state and stops along the 
way (the trajectory) (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).  This research syntheses a view of 
the overall terrain that blends the interpretive lenses, historical analyses and a sense 
of Talbot’s “tides of reform” (Talbot, 2010).   
Whilst inspiration for public sector reforms can be traced back to the 19th century and 
the concept of the ‘minimal state’ (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002), those initiated by 
Margaret Thatcher are often held to be a watershed in the history of such reforms for 
English local government (Gamble, 2006).  Much has been written about the Thatcher 
years (e.g. Heffernan, 2001; McLaughlin et al., 2002; Stoker, 1997; Wilson and Game, 
2011), so here the focus will sharpen to cover primarily the New Labour 
administrations and the current coalition government, whilst using post-1979 historical 
issues as context.  This section also identifies the guiding orientation and highlights 
some of the key debates, discourses, and influences; these are then aggregated into 
a summary analysis in table 1. 
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2.8.1 1979-1990 Conservative: Margaret Thatcher 
If we could classify one single relationship as being the primary one for each epoch, 
then for the 1979-1990 phase arguably it is the relationship between the public sector 
and the market (Stoker, 2004a; Wilson and Game, 2011).  Conservative policy, driven 
enthusiastically by Thatcher, focused on imposing commercial competencies to the 
delivery of public services (Boyne, 1996), thus diminishing the scope (as rational 
choice theory would have it) for inefficient public servants to feather their own nests at 
the expense of the public, and moving away from the influence of hierarchical public 
services (Painter, 2011).  The market would therefore be the saviour of clumsy and 
overbearing services, eventually through mechanisms like compulsory competitive 
tendering (CCT) (Boyne et al., 1999), as well as financial controls like grant 
settlements.  Debates exist as to whether the primary aim of this was reducing the 
amount of public expenditure, improving the quality of service provision, or dismantling 
the state’s bureaucratic apparatus (e.g. Boyne, 1998; Dunleavy et al., 2006b; 
Grimshaw et al., 2002; Wilson et al., 2011); a mixture of these three is likely, and the 
exact ratio is probably guided by political persuasion.  Whether ideologically motivated 
or not, the rhetoric behind the marketization and privatization of the public sector was 
ostensibly about how the (financial) efficiency drive of market forces could generate 
services more clearly targeted on individual needs (as opposed to needs designated 
by public servants), and thus increase the significance of choice.  Despite this, for 
many services, it remained a fairly illusory state of affairs, and consumer choice was 
pragmatically speaking, limited (Farrell, 2010; Grimshaw et al., 2002).  The rhetoric 
gives rise to the notion of the ‘self-interested public servant’, and reforms attempted to 
address the power of this group, and in particular unions, supported by a focus on 
private sector practices like the ‘flexible work-force’, as well as in changes to 
employment law (Towers, 1989). 
This period witnessed fragmentation within the previously monolithic state apparatus, 
and increasingly saw policy creation, service delivery and funding as separate issues 
(Cole, 2000; Wilson and Game, 2011) with rate-capping and grant settlements used 
as tools to control local authority spending (Wilson and Game, 2011).  The government 
created a huge number of quasi non-governmental organizations (QUANGOs), which 
not only fragmented the decision-making, accountability and delivery aspects of many 
public services, but also packaged them into more discrete units for potential 
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outsourcing, as well as providing a layer of insulation between Whitehall and residents 
/ citizens / consumers (Kingdom, 2000). 
2.8.2 1990-1997 Conservative: John Major 
This period saw Margaret Thatcher ousted and John Major became prime minister.  
Constrained by a small and diminishing majority, and still dealing with the backlash of 
the leadership change, Major’s reforms were more modest in nature and a subtler 
consolidation of Thatcher’s ideas and ideologies using Whitehall mechanisms.  Whilst 
they provided a broad continuity of thinking, there were some distinctive developments.  
The primary relationship became that of the state and citizens, sometimes referred to 
as the public service orientation (Wilson and Game, 2011).  This began to strengthen 
notions of individualization, minimum standards, and a focus on listening to consumers 
(still using the language of the market and the private sector), typified by Major’s White 
Paper: The Citizen’s Charter (1991), recognised as the earliest UK legislative example 
of charters.  This changed the dynamic of the relationship between service and 
‘customer’ by introducing the expectation of delivery, and of redress if that delivery 
failed to meet specified standards.  Whilst the word ‘customer’ is noticeable, this 
actually frames public servants as being there to meet the needs of citizens, and this 
has been characterised as ‘citizen-servant’ in the analysis.   Whilst subject to some 
mockery for ‘faux-popularist’ initiatives such as the ‘Cones Hotline’ (Moran, 2005), The 
Citizens Charter also introduced more serious initiatives such as a range of 
performance indicators (Boyne, 1997; Drewry, 2005), sparking a focus on outcome 
measures specifically (Smith, 1993).    
Whilst the ambition to bring citizens and services closer together was broadly 
admirable, the mechanisms around the charters themselves proved to be largely 
unsuccessful (Drewry, 2005).  The 1990s also saw significant and contentious 
changes in the National Health Service driven by the 1989 white paper: Working for 
Patients and the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act. This created a split between 
purchaser and provider (Ahmed and Cadenhead, 1998; Cribb, 2008) and established 
of GPs as potential fund holders (Klein, 2010), which, when combined, led to the 
creation of the internal or quasi-market for health.  
A citizen or customer focus was not the only tool being promoted, and private sector 
total quality management approaches (TQM), including business planning and 
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benchmarking (Magd and Curry, 2003) and process improvement / redesign 
(MacIntosh, 2003; Pollitt, 1996), and strategy & measurement systems like the 
balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) appeared within the sector (Reeves 
and Bednar, 1994). 
2.8.3 1997-2007 – New Labour: Tony Blair 
This era has been called ‘a decade of unprecedented change’ (Downe and Martin, 
2006), which, from the perspective of the public sector, appears a reasonable 
statement.  The defining relationship during this period for reform was between policy 
networks and policy implementers, where a buoyant incoming Labour administration 
had a significant political mandate to enact widespread change,  badged as 
‘modernization’ (DETR, 1999); Newman (2001) considers this a loaded term used to 
legitimatize change, a view supported by Fairclough (2000), and discussed in 
forthcoming research (Glennon et al., Forthcoming).  
A clear focus emerged on tackling deprivation and ‘wicked’1 social issues (Rittel and 
Webber, 1973), and ‘creating levers’ to do so – another popular phrase that 
emphasises the role of policy-makers and implementers, rather than the market-driven 
forces preferred by Major and Thatcher.  Compulsory Competitive Tendering, highly 
unpopular with most Labour councils, was in name abolished, and the presumption 
that the state should withdraw from services dissipated (Entwistle and Laffin, 2005).  
Nevertheless, the broad market-efficiency and consumerist approaches to ‘business-
like’ public services continued unabated (Boyne et al., 1999; Entwistle and Martin, 
2005), albeit repackaged as Best Value (hereafter referred to as BV) (DETR, 1999).  
Later replaced by a raft of organizational assessments, Best Value continued the push 
for efficiency via the mechanism of market-testing, a continuing trend also observable 
in other countries (Bovaird and Halachmi, 2001).  Best Value required authorities 
covered by the legislation (mainly local authorities, parks, transport, waste and policy 
authorities, and fire and rescue services) to secure ‘continuous improvement’ by 
carrying out a rolling series of service reviews  and by benchmarking their performance 
(DETR, 1999).  The programme was self-generated and self-managed, although it 
expanded the scope of reviews to all services, rather than CCT’s ‘defined activities’, 
1 Whilst this seems a very value-laden term, this was a popular phrase within the policy guidance and 
legislation of the time, referring to the multi-causal deprivation issues affecting communities and areas. 
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and a regime of inspection and intervention (Martin, 2000).  In addition, local 
authorities had to produce a series of statutory products – including Best Value 
Performance Plans (BVPP) and a range of Best Value performance indicators, called 
BVPIs.  Academics have argued that the instruments and requirements contained 
within Best Value thus make it a total quality management approach (e.g. Boyne et al., 
2002; Higgins et al., 2004). 
A review of Best Value (Centre for Local & Regional Government Research, 2006) 
suggested that the programme had not been fully effective in driving continuous 
improvement, in part due to a lack of managerial and political commitment, and 
perhaps also due to the potential for ‘gaming’ performance (Bevan and Hood, 2006b; 
Hood, 2006; Radnor, 2011).  Earlier phases of the review had been fairly critical, 
although the final review in 2006 was a largely more positive affair, perhaps influenced 
by having already won the battle around Best Value’s faults.  Best Value reviews were 
replaced in 2007 by Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) (DCLG, 2007) 
– a more rigidly structured organizational assessment drawing on performance 
information, narrative and quantitative evidence, and inspection results.  
Downe and Martin (2006) see this as a decisive shift in the modernization agenda.  
CPA was thus born out of the need to resurrect a failing intervention regime, which 
had not taken account of overall organizational performance and instead had 
immediately attempted to improve things at service level (Downe and Martin, 2006).   
This ‘upwards’ movement in assessing the point at which performance was assessed 
facilitated making judgements on partnership working, and put the local strategic 
partnership in a leading position in local governance (Geddes et al., 2007).  Local 
Strategic Partnerships (LSPs, or sometimes known as ‘partnerships of partnerships’) 
were intended to pull together statutory organizations, private sector businesses and 
the community and voluntary sector into a series of partnerships with specific goals in 
order to improve outcomes for local people  (DCLG, 2007).  This approach generated 
a huge array of partnerships, networks and bodies that Skelcher (2004, p.33) suggests 
causes a “congested state”.  Wilson (2004a) also suggests that the plurality of the 
complex relationships between local and central government (and the partners) does 
not translate into a genuinely pluralist power or decision-making structure.  This is 
perhaps unsurprising when we explore the complexity of partnerships and 
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representation at the local level, as well as the continued controlling tendency of the 
administration.  Financial instruments such as public service agreements (PSA) were 
developed; these were contractual style arrangements between the Treasury and 
departments, with financial bonuses for achieving national policy outcomes.  These 
were then replicated between government departments and local delivering bodies 
such as councils and NHS bodies via later iterations such as local public service 
agreements (LPSA).  These ‘performance contracts’ strengthened the sense of 
centralised control (Micheli and Neely, 2010), whilst the rhetoric still exhorted 
organizations to network in order to address social issues, with LSPs given a dominant 
role within the legislation (Alonso et al., 2013; DCLG, 2007).  CPA was accompanied 
by an expectation of external discussions of performance management and 
improvement, at ‘service’, ‘organizational’, and ‘partnership’ level, as well as national 
accountability and comparative performance rankings.  Local authorities were given 
one of five reductive performance labels (poor, weak, fair, good, or excellent), and 
hospitals given similar star ratings – both a form of commensuration (Espeland and 
Stevens, 1998) where complex judgements are reduced to more simplistic, 
quantitative scores or labels.  This brings into question whether these processes were 
genuine attempts to develop accountability mechanisms or simply rituals to give the 
overall judgements legitimacy.  
At the same time, a Department of Health White Paper Saving Lives: Our Healthier 
Nation (1999) highlighted the importance of health inequalities (Dawson and Dargie, 
2002), something which was to play a significant part of later reforms around 
partnership working, and Labour’s NHS plan (2000) formalised for the first time the 
ability to buy services from the private sector (Cribb, 2008).  Labour had previously 
promised to remove the internal market in the NHS; what actually replaced it was less 
significant a change than announcements had suggested (Klein, 2010). 
Whilst the statutory assessment mechanisms came to dominate the improvement 
policy landscape, a wide range of other tools were being maintained or introduced, 
such as benchmarking,  either self-driven (Magd and Curry, 2003) or regulated through 
the Beacon Council scheme (Rashman and Radnor, 2005), Best Value (Centre for 
Local & Regional Government Research, 2006), business process improvement / 
redesign (MacIntosh, 2003), and Lean (Radnor and Walley, 2008).  The late 1990s 
also saw an explosion in the number of academic publications focused on 
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performance management (Neely, 2005), along with the creation of a significant 
number of performance indicators across the public sector (Micheli and Neely, 2010). 
2.8.4 2007-2010 – New Labour: Gordon Brown 
In some ways reminiscent of the enforced handover from Thatcher to Major, the 
manner of Brown’s succession to power was to substantially influence his political 
mandate.  As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Brown had exerted considerable control 
over public sector spending and priorities, leading to tensions between the Treasury, 
Cabinet Office, and the other main government departments.   
Whilst Brown appeared largely to focus on international affairs, such as climate 
change and international development, his period of leadership arguably began to 
deviate from some elements of the Blair trajectory.  Partnerships and collaboration 
were by then primary in the public sector policy model, including integration at strategic 
and service level, and partnerships and communities formed the primary relationship 
during this period.  This included integration between health and social care and health 
and wellbeing partnerships, section 31 agreements).  Brown oversaw the transition 
from Comprehensive Performance Assessment to Comprehensive Area Assessment, 
which aimed to evaluate the performance of all key public services in a local area – 
reinforcing a sense of partnership working.  This multi-agency assessment was 
accompanied by the dissolution of the Best Value Performance Indicator regime, 
which was replaced by the National Indicator Set, announced as part of 2007’s 
Comprehensive Spending Review.  A more pluralist approach to setting and managing 
local priorities was taken, and communities arguably had a stronger profile in local 
democracy and its relationship with other public service providers, although this may 
overstate the reality of community engagement’s reach into policy setting (Dereli, 
2011). 
2008 marked the beginning of the global financial crisis, and this came to dominate 
Brown’s premiership amid criticisms of him breaking his own rules (Smith, 2010), 
culminating in losing the 2010 election.  This had the consequence that some key 
reforms either never came to fruition or were stopped prematurely.  Given the weight 
of this, and the way in which Brown assumed power, was the direction of travel in 
terms of reform instruments a less instrumental and more participative one?  If so, 
then we could question whether breaking up the huge assessment framework for 
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public services began to demonstrate increased trust in local public services, or simply 
an unfinished pathway to a different form of control? Making a case for either 
interpretation is certainly possible.  
2.8.5 2010-2015 – Coalition government: David Cameron 
The 2010 general election saw no party able to form a majority government.  The 
Conservatives, as the party with the largest number of seats, eventually formed a 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats, and after substantial policy negotiation a coalition 
manifesto was produced (Cabinet Office, 2010).  This document promised, amongst 
other things, that the government would “give people the power to call the shots over 
the decisions that affect their lives”, firmly placing the emphasis on individuals and 
their contact with public services (Cabinet Office, 2010).  Yet, whilst a clear manifesto 
emerged, it needs to be recognised that this was a product of compromise and 
negotiation, and may well represent a position where both parties felt there were 
unsatisfactory elements (Quinn et al., 2011). 
The defining relationship for this period was between the state and individuals.  The 
white paper Open Public Services (Cabinet Office, 2011) promised an era of 
personalized public services.  It outlined a surprisingly adversarial attitude towards 
those services, however, and the foreword promised that publishing data on service 
performance was the only way to “wrest power out of the hands of highly paid officials 
and give it back to the people” (2011, p.5).    The prevailing narrative of the coalition 
government, or at least with regard to public services, is one of tight financial constraint 
and significant political and economic uncertainty (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011).  
The espoused need to rein in the budget deficit, and the resulting discourse of austerity 
has been used to justify expanding the contestability of public services, although this 
was not without issues, such as the probation service (Gale, 2012), or forestry and 
national parks (Hodge and Adams, 2013).  Overall public expenditure was reduced, 
including public budgets, both in terms of staffing salary freezes and reduced operating 
budgets.  Reductions in ‘red tape’ and bureaucracy were proposed that aimed to 
remove barriers to economic success for SMEs and other businesses.  This was 
combined with an emphasis on the community and voluntary sector, particularly linked 
to ‘payment by results’ (Baines and Davies, 2011; Painter, 2012).  Under this regime, 
public servants themselves were expected to act entrepreneurially, and to consider 
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actions like starting a public service mutual, or the so-called ‘John Lewis’ model 
(Cabinet Office, 2014b).   
In reality, this included more straightforwardly hierarchical changes, including a 
simplified planning process, as well as the significant structural and institutional 
changes such as the dissolution of the Audit Commission, Government Offices in the 
Regions, Regional Development Agencies, the so-called ‘bonfire of the quangos’ (The 
Guardian, 2012), Strategic Health Authorities and Primary Care Trusts were abolished, 
and replaced with Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs).   
Council tax increases were initially frozen, then this was lifted after 2012/13, and 
authorities were allowed an increase, capped at 2% unless they held a local 
referendum.  Further efforts were made to streamline financial mechanisms, such as 
the introduction of Universal Credit and the Better Care Fund (formerly the Integration 
Transformation Fund), which aimed to provide better integration between health and 
social care.   
There were democratic changes too, with the introduction of directly elected police 
and crime commissioners, although these elections suffered from extremely low 
turnouts, with a national average of 14.7% in 2012 (Lister and Rowe, 2015).  Local 
government witnessed changes with more directly-elected mayors, the development 
of sub-regional governance arrangements, the ability for local government to move 
back to the ‘old’ committee system, as well as the disassembling of the performance 
apparatus for local government and LSPs.   
As is discussed in the findings, the scope of these democratic changes, as well as the 
deregulation, created challenges in how organizations performed the ritual of 
demonstrating accountability and legitimacy without an organizational assessment.  
Whilst little formal evidence exists, it does not appear that the ‘armchair auditors’ have 
proved to be a suitable replacement for central regulation (Ferry et al., 2015), although 
it could also be argued that the presence of such regulation previously had not 
prevented system failure in some public services. 
2.8.6 Key agencies: 
Another significant component of the last three decades or so of public sector reform 
has been the involvement of external agencies in the process.  These agencies have 
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largely been occupied two main roles – regulators and (peer) support bodies – and 
have been widely used; in some cases, they have been critically relied upon by policy 
and decision-makers at a national level.  This, like many instances of agencies referred 
to as ‘quango’ (often more accurately non-departmental public bodies or NDPB), has 
allowed policy-making politicians to distance them from the performance of these 
services.  It could be argued that this is a reform approach in and of itself, but here it 
is proposed that this is more appropriately seen as a channel through which politicised 
reform efforts are facilitated and implemented, rather than a structured approach itself.  
Indeed, Walker (2011) has argued that the decision to abolish the Audit Commission 
owed more to a deep, ideological distrust of the Commission’s loyalties by the 
Conservatives than to an evidenced criticism of its performance, and he argues it is 
unreasonable to expect an arm’s length body not to carry out the wishes of the 
government at that time.  That is not to say that all quangos or NDPBs are inherently 
political, but there is a political aspect that cannot be avoided.  May also highlights the 
significance of the recent, i.e. associated with NPM, role of non-governmental actors 
in the process of accountability, and suggests that this tends to focus on establishing 
“legal,  bureaucratic, professional and political accountability” (2007, p.9) through 
highly prescriptive regulation, which appears to run contrary to the Coalition’s 
articulated preference for cutting bureaucracy. 
Boyne (2008) suggests that inspection agencies also focus closely on two aspects of 
performance: tangible outcomes and organizational legitimacy, arguing that 
conforming to ‘managerial fashion’ in applying the recommended trends or models is 
a significant factor in public sector bodies being classed as high performing.  It is not 
difficult to see how either of these aspects can be politicised.  Once again, this 
presents a dichotomy between the rhetoric of seemingly rational, neutral objectives – 
improved performance, responsiveness, accountability – and the reality of 
implementation of the mechanisms for achieving these goals.   
Again, we can hypothesise that the post-2010 reduction in ‘corporate’ level 
assessments and their replacement in part with developments such as the NHS 
‘recommend a friend or family’ (NHS England, 2014) or DCLG’s much vaunted 
‘armchair auditors’ (DCLG, 2011a) are an attempt to get authorities to set their own 
norms driven by ostensibly reasonable sources, i.e. patient experience, but which, in 
reality, defy any real codification or meaningful measurement.  Regulators have also 
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been criticised for a range of genuine examples of service failure, particularly the Care 
Quality Commission, and their value in the service improvement process is certainly 
contentious and worthy of further exploration.  
 Summarising the reforms  
Was this a return to the ‘hollowing out’ of the state (Rhodes, 1997)?  It can be argued 
that the coalition government embraced the global financial recession as a convenient 
rationale for reducing the size of the state, either by cutting budgets and services, and 
/ or by transferring responsibilities to the private sector.  Some have stated that the 
Coalition’s approach was more ideological than simply a response to a financial deficit 
(Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011), and Painter (2012) argues that the Blair to Brown 
transition represented a general continuity of approach, which in turn facilitated the 
Coalition’s direction.  He suggests that “a change of government was less of a rupture 
than the Coalition’s reform narrative would have us believe” (Painter, 2012, pp.12-13).   
Quinn et al. (2011) analysed the Coalition agreement in order to interrogate ‘who won’ 
from a policy perspective; their conclusions suggest that a genuine series of 
compromises occurred, although a more contemporary analysis of the impact of these 
compromises on public service reform might highlight some disproportionate impacts 
on improvement capacity, and there has been little examination yet of public sector 
perceptions of post-2010 reforms.   
As Osborne and others have argued (e.g. Hughes, 2010; Lynn, 2010; Osborne, 
2010b), models of ‘New Public Governance’ (NPG) were emerging that potentially 
represented a significant shift from the previously established models of Public 
Administration or New Public Management, whilst still recognising that these ‘old’ 
models may still be prevalent in many areas, that differing models can co-exist, and 
that no single model can be exclusive within the diversity of the public service offering.  
Before the 2010 general election, Conservative pre-electioneering enthusiastically 
championed the ‘big society’  as an attempt to move the focus from reducing the size 
of the state to instead driving reform of public services and a desire to “empower 
communities to come together to address local issues” (The Conservative Party, 2009) 
by taking on responsibility for assets, services and policy, as well as increasing the 
role played by social enterprises, and the community and voluntary sector.    Did this 
accord with Osborne’s vision of emerging New Public Governance (Osborne, 2010b)? 
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These NPG models draw on a boundary-spanning, pluralist approach to policy 
development and service management, and require very different mechanisms for 
evaluation from previous systems (Osborne, 2010b).  Will these models be reflected 
in the reality of policy and guidance?  The ‘big society’ as a concept appeared to have 
been quietly dropped during this government, but did the reality of the Coalition 
Government’s approaches to, say, free schools, clinical commissioning groups, and 
managing libraries expand governance or simply replace existing governance 
mechanisms with alternatives? 
If, as Lodge and Hood (2012) argue, the skills required for public service management 
in a climate of austerity are very different, and if, as Osborne (2010b) has it, we are 
entering a phase of New Public Governance that requires different forms of evaluation, 
how did the Coalition administration’s seemingly ‘light-touch’ approach to performance 
management and accountability interact with these emerging models and 
requirements?  Did this create a tension between ‘entrepreneurial public servants’ and 
empowering individuals to take control of their contact with public services?  Despite 
being encouraged, commissioning models such as Barnet Council’s ‘easy council’ 
approach have not yet become the norm; it may be that a public service that does not 
actually deliver the service itself a step too far (Chakrabortty, 2014).  Perhaps the 
Coalition’s lack of prescriptive approaches towards public service delivery was in some 
ways analogous to Stoker’s (2002) view of New Labour’s reform by lottery. 
As discussed earlier, we can observe some overall continuities across the “politico-
administrative regimes” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000, p.62).  Christensen and Laegreid 
(2002) also attempt to locate reforms within “historical-institutional contexts” and 
“politico-administrative structures”(2002, pp.2-3).    We can therefore draw out 
significant elements of the nature of the relationship between public services and their 
governance that help us to understand the broader context in which they operate.  The 
table below classifies each of the political regimes using the concept of the primary 
relationship (i.e. the focus of most effort / attention at the macro level), the guiding 
orientation (i.e. a description of the dominant value system operating), key discourses 
and debates that typify the period, and some of the notable mechanisms implemented 
through mandatory and non-mandatory reforms.  
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A review of the literature combined with an examination of the political changes arising 
from shifts in administration suggests that the nature of the relationship with public 
services has been subject to variations driven by both these factors.  These have been 
given a label by the author that describes the tenor of the relationship.  These 
relationships are discussed in more detail in Table 3 below, but are summarised here 
as: the neutral public servant (1970s), the self-interested public servant (1979-1990), 
the ‘citizen’-servant (1990-1997), the network public servant (1997-2007), the 
reaching-out public servant (2007-2010), and the entrepreneurial public servant 
(2010-2017). 
Broadly this captures the emphasis of each political administration’s relationship and 
is explored in Table 3: Summary analysis of major reform phases, which follows.  
‘Public servant’ is used in a more general sense here to indicate a mixture of civil 
servants, local government, and other public sector employees, i.e. police, NHS etc.
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2.9.1 Table 3: Summary analysis of major reform phases 
Table 3: Summary analysis of major reform phases 
Political 
administration 
Primary 
relationship 
Guiding 
orientation 
Key discourses and 
debates 
Other influences Some notable 
mechanisms 
1970s Central 
government 
and public 
sector 
Civic service 
orientation 
• Social equality 
• Public expenditure 
• The neutral public servant 
• State expenditure 
• Recession 
• Political instability 
• Homelessness 
legislation 
• Police complaints 
• Pay restraint 
1979 – 1990 Public sector 
and the 
market 
Market 
orientation 
• Size and extent of 
the state 
• Markets and choice 
• Privatization 
• Consumerism 
• Managerialism 
• Suspicion towards 
public / civil servants 
and the professions 
• The self-interested public 
servant 
• Choice 
• Competition 
• Importance of private sector 
growth 
• Spending control 
• Regulators or commissioners 
challenge services on behalf of 
citizens 
• Efforts to diminish trade union 
power / influence   
• CCT 
• Audit Commission 
• Grant settlements 
• Rate capping 
• Next Steps 
agencies 
• Purchaser / 
provider split 
• Internal markets 
• Right to buy 
1990 – 1997 Public sector 
and citizens 
Public service 
orientation / 
customer 
orientation 
• Choice 
• Quangos 
• Charters 
• Inspectorates 
• Purchaser / provider 
split 
• Efficiency 
• The ‘citizen’-servant 
• Citizens as consumers 
• Equality 
• Regulators or commissioners 
challenge services on behalf of 
citizens 
• Citizen’s Charters 
• Children’s 
inspections & 
Ofsted 
• Business plans 
• TQM 
• League tables 
1997 – 2007 Policy 
networks and 
policy 
implementers 
Network 
orientation 
• Partnerships 
• Modernization 
• Evidence-based 
policy making 
• The networker public servant 
• Deprivation and equality 
• Citizens challenge services 
directly 
• Freedoms and flexibilities 
• Beacon council 
• Best value (reviews 
and performance 
indicators)  
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Political 
administration 
Primary 
relationship 
Guiding 
orientation 
Key discourses and 
debates 
Other influences Some notable 
mechanisms 
• Regulation and 
inspection 
• Performance 
management 
• Joined-up 
government 
• Community 
engagement 
• Policy contracts 
• Networks and partnership 
governance 
• More pluralist approaches to 
spending control 
• Local strategic 
partnerships 
• Local public service 
agreements 
• Joint strategic 
needs 
assessments 
• Joint inspection 
reviews 
• Standards board 
• Power of wellbeing 
2007 – 2010 Communities 
and 
partnerships 
Partnership 
orientation 
• Outcomes 
• Targeting services 
on communities 
• Partnerships e.g. 
LSP 
• Participation and co-
production  
• Service 
personalization 
 
• The reaching-out public 
servant 
• Partnership and engagement 
with ‘hard to reach’ 
communities etc. 
• Deprivation and equality 
• More pluralist approaches to 
deciding priorities 
• Citizens involved in 
governance to design services 
• Comprehensive 
area assessment 
• National indicator 
set 
• Healthcare audit & 
inspection 
• Participatory 
budgeting 
• Co-production 
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Political 
administration 
Primary 
relationship 
Guiding 
orientation 
Key discourses and 
debates 
Other influences Some notable 
mechanisms 
2010 – present Individuals 
and services 
Personalization 
orientation 
• Austerity 
• Payment by results 
and ‘what works’ 
• Localism 
• Opening up more 
services to private 
providers 
• The individual 
chooses, pays  
• The entrepreneurial public 
servant 
• Recession  
• Global competitiveness 
• Commissioning 
• Accountability 
• Choice and individual power / 
control 
• Reducing ‘red tape’ 
• Power of general 
competence 
• City deals 
• Mayors 
• ‘Armchair auditors’ 
• ‘Recommend a 
friend’ measures 
• Return to 
committee decision 
making 
• DWP Mandatory 
Work Activity 
programme 
 
(Source: author and information drawn from Ashworth et al., 2007; Chandler, 2000, 2009; Christensen and Laegreid, 2002; Driver, 
2006; Dunleavy et al., 2006a; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Entwistle and Laffin, 2005; Ferlie et al., 1996; Klein, 2010; McLaughlin et 
al., 2002; Micheli and Neely, 2010; Newman, 2001; Painter, 2012; Rashman and Radnor, 2005; Stewart, 2000; Stoker, 1997, 2004b; 
Wilson and Game, 2011; Wilson and Hinton, 1993)
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2.9.2 Figure 1: Timeline analysis of reforms 
This analysis attempts to provide a structured way of considering reforms that emphasises the 
relationships and discourses operating within the public sector, whilst recognising that the 
sector is not homogenous in how it reacts, or indeed how it has been treated at different times 
by differing administrations.  Pollitt and Bouckaert suggest that changing “politico-
administrative regimes” as they call them (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000, p.62) are not an ideal 
unit of analysis.  This research contends that there are major shifts attributable to the changing 
regimes due, as Rhodes (1997) suggests, to the power of the prime ministerial role in the 
Westminster system.  This seems to be confirmed by the continued emphasis on the ownership 
of reforms as Thatcherite, Blairite etc. (Driver, 2006; Stoker, 2004b).  Therefore, it is 
appropriate to analyse the overall landscape at the level of political administration. 
Having considered the broader context in which reforms can be seen, another way of viewing 
the chronological context is provided: a timeline of key events and paradigms, as shown in 
Figure 1: Timeline analysis of reforms on page 56.  This timeline cannot capture all the events 
pertaining to public sector reform, but rather visually represents the key events, legislation, and 
policy.   
This analysis uses legislative and electoral milestones as anchoring points for more subjective 
considerations of the primary changes occurring and their interrelations.  For example, the 
guiding motivations and service orientation from Table 3: Summary analysis of major reform 
phases are overlaid with the broad theoretical movements of Public Administration to NPM and 
NPG to visually capture the shifting theoretical or philosophical currents influencing the sector. 
The major reforms and improvement activities are represented in the central portion of the 
figure by a series of labelled ovals.  The ovals represent, in a broadly indicative sense, the 
timeframe in which they were considered to exert some dominance.  This is an evaluative 
judgement made by the researcher, based on literature and personal experience within the 
sector.  The bottom third of the figure identifies the main regulatory mechanisms, and the white 
papers and acts that are most influential on local government during this time. 
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Figure 1: Timeline analysis of reforms 
 
Source: Author and as Table 3: Summary analysis of major reform phases
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Amongst the literature, there also seems to be an assumption that the drawing in of private 
sector practices is somehow ‘natural’ and that there is a purpose-driven motivation behind 
reforms; that is to say, public services are moving away from ‘wrong’ forms and towards the 
‘right’ form, that being one more analogous to the private sector.  Whilst this is clearly open to 
criticism, there appears to be considerable acceptance of the existence of convergence, i.e. 
that there is a normative, desirable ideal represented by NPM (Pollitt and Dan, 2013), and 
although academics do argue about the appropriateness of the influence of private sector 
thinking in some cases (for example, Needham, 2006; Pollitt, 1990), voices are rare that 
deviate from the convergence theory (e.g. Dunleavy et al., 2006b; Goldfinch and Wallis, 2010),   
This observation could be considered an example of a teleological position operating within the 
literature.  Teleology as a speculative philosophical approach (Outhwaite, 2006) arises from 
the Greek telos meaning purpose, and is often applied to contexts like ‘intelligent design’, i.e. 
the belief that a divine creator manufactured everything in our known universe with a purpose 
in mind.  This purpose, having been set by a higher authority, is therefore not subject to 
challenge, and provided the end purpose is achieved, then the ‘ends justify the means’.  Such 
a deterministic view usually seeks to find laws governing the situation and assumes causal 
relationships where there are none (Shipman, 1997). 
This assumption is often found within NPM literature – that the market, competition, and choice 
are what is needed to ‘cure’ public services of their weaknesses, which therefore can be 
blamed in part at least on the lack of these private sector practices.  This then can result in 
debates as to whether a case study is demonstrating convergence towards an NPM ‘ideal’ or 
divergence away, and whether the popularity of NPM is waxing or waning.  Popularity with 
whom is rarely explored, but given the compulsory nature of reforms it is hard to believe local 
organizations like councils, NHS trusts, or police forces take seriously the notion of NPM as a 
normative, guiding philosophy.  The convergence debate also runs the risk of ignoring key 
contextual and contingent data.   
This research aims to challenge this teleological notion by proposing a conceptual model that 
allows for a more sophisticated exploration of the types and nature of reforms at an 
organizational level and how they are conceived, discussed, and used to generate legitimacy 
or credibility. 
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2.9.3 Conceptual model of reform dimensions 
The political argument about the size of the state has continued mostly behind the scenes, 
occasionally moving centre stage.  One continuous factor has been the prominence of private 
sector inspired tools and techniques, principally focused on improving performance, processes, 
democracy or the experience of using the services.  Needham (2006)  suggests that the 
terminology used to describe service-users has an important effect on the public service ethos, 
and that the 1990s saw a shift away from viewing people as mere recipients and towards being 
citizens with rights enshrined in charters, bringing in the concepts of expected (minimum) 
standards and expectations of redress if these were not met.    Drewry (2005) suggests that 
this phenomenon can be observed globally, but that it has failed to make a global impact.  This 
shift in defining ethos, however, can be tracked across administrations and is shown on the 
historical analysis in Table 3: Summary analysis of major reform phases.  The 1997-2010 
Labour administrations continue this movement, where a strong focus on ‘customers’ emerges, 
emphasising the twin concepts of choice and competition, again showing the strength of the 
NPM and private management paradigm.  These are represented by the guiding values of a 
public service and customer service ethos. 
Of interest, but not for direct discussion here, is the thorny issue of funding local government 
(and precepting of funds for police and fire and rescue).  The balance and methods of funding 
sources (centralised versus local) are levers for influencing and directing policy and, by 
inference, organizational behaviour, but have for some time been accused of lacking 
sophistication (Hoggett, 1996), largely as a proxy for rich / poor or Labour / Conservative 
borough targeting. This research also excludes an examination of some of the policy specific 
changes, such as single regeneration budgets, new deal for the community or local agenda 21.   
This research will focus its attention on reform efforts that are influencing the ‘how’, ‘why’ and 
‘with whom’ of public service delivery, rather than the ‘what’. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) start 
to explore this issue by addressing either structural or process issues within reform efforts, but 
do not examine the level of detail discussed here.  In order to develop this area of inquiry further 
and to provide a way of categorising reforms, a conceptual model of reform dimensions is 
proposed in Figure 2: Conceptual model of dimensions of reform on page 62. 
As outlined earlier, a range of tools and techniques have been used over the last 30 plus years, 
such as performance management, business process improvement, total quality management 
tools, customer charters, etc. and these can be considered a fundamental part of NPM.  Some 
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of these improvement mechanisms have been ‘suggested’, some explicitly imposed, and 
others merely encouraged, and they have had varying degrees of success (Talbot, 2005).   
Clearly the emphasis on public service provision being contestable brings with it a requirement 
to be able to classify, catalogue and assess performance levels, both current and desired, from 
deliverers of services.  Labour administrations introduced overall assessment regimes starting 
with CPA, and later CAA, which were efforts to foreground the results achieved by public bodies; 
although it can be argued that they actually highlighted a ritualistic public performance of results 
instead (Broadbent, 2003; Oliver, 1991), what this research will later term ‘the performance of 
performance’ in section 4.3.3 on page 134, which concerns moves towards more ‘authentic’ 
performance management.  Initial efforts to stimulate public interest in accountability 
mechanisms for public services have largely been unsuccessful or abandoned (i.e. the Audit 
Commission’s Oneplace website), apart from specific and high-profile instances of service 
failure, such as Winterbourne View hospital, Rotherham child sexual exploitation scandal or 
the Mid-Staffordshire Hospital Trust2 case, to name but a few. 
The extent and scope of reform efforts deployed in the public sector mean that no single 
taxonomy is likely to be realistically achievable or helpful.  Instead, the typology below is one 
way of examining the key theoretical drivers behind reforms.  Whilst the concept of change 
affecting organizations in different ways is not a novel one (e.g. Lewin’s 1947 force field 
analysis or Leavitt’s 1965 entry points model), many of the reforming mechanisms deployed in 
the public sector have often overlooked fundamental consequences or impacts in other parts 
or aspects of the organization; principally this may have been through having too narrow a 
focus, or too shallow intellectual or theoretical underpinnings.   This aligns with Pollitt and 
Bouckaert’s (2004) ‘missing components’ from reform scenarios.  In an historical review, Pollitt 
subsequently identifies four main gaps in reforming white papers over the last 40 years: 
• Absence of systematic evidence of problems or supporting solutions 
• An absence of targets (not performance measures, here, but rather targets for the 
reforms themselves) 
• No efforts to cost the reforms 
2 These high-profile scandals involved poor quality care being exposed via whistle-blowers and inspections.  
Winterbourne was a care home in Cornwall where elderly staff were physically and emotionally abused, and the 
Mid-Staffs Hospital Trust was the subject of a national campaign and ultimately an independent review after 
concerns were raised about poor quality care leading to raised mortality rates.  Rotherham’s case concerned a 
systemic network of child sexual exploitation of looked after or vulnerable children, which was ignored by police 
and social services because of concerns about the reliability of the girls who came forward. 
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• No formal review process (Pollitt, 2013a) 
 
Pollitt is persuasive that the evaluations of such efforts have lacked objective evidence beyond 
the simplistic ‘mini case’ or anecdote (Pollitt, 2013b).  An insufficient empirical basis for 
nationally legislated performance reforms would suggest the possibility of an ideological (i.e. 
NPM) motivation, rather than one grounded in effective research or evidence.  Additionally, if 
mandated tools lack this support, then the threshold for applying self-selected tools and 
consultancy becomes even weaker; it has been suggested that the public sector is particularly 
vulnerable to being sold approaches by consultants that lack academic or evidential credibility 
and do not provide value for money (Craig and Brooks, 2006). 
Furthermore, research into Lean methods (e.g. Osborne et al., 2013; Radnor et al., 2012; 
Radnor and Osborne, 2013) has shown that not all tools are equally or easily implementable 
without clearer organizational understanding and commitment; the transfer of practice from the 
private sector to the public is not without problems (Bateman and Lethbridge, 2013).  
Even if the tools themselves were universally accepted and benign, does their selection and 
use remain a situation dictated by the managerial (and sometimes P/political) discourses within 
organizations?  Might their use be dependent on local managerial ability, as well as their 
capacity and willingness to adopt new methods, or even sometimes to recognise problems 
when they occur?  As Pidd (2008) points out, even the most common of improvement tools, 
performance management, can have a dysfunctional effect on organizations if poorly executed.  
Radnor and Barnes (2007) go on to suggest that the extent to which these tools have 
penetrated the public service apparatus is also a factor, particularly when considering the 
complexity of multi-agency delivery of services, as is the importance of adaption, rather than 
mere adoption.  Townley et al. (2003) and Townley (2008) argue that some of these issues 
also stem from the uncritical acceptance of the notion that performance management (and we 
can perhaps include other tools here, too) is ‘rational’, whereas in reality, rationality is 
constructed or ‘ascribed’ by those who experience it (Townley, 2008); human factors are often 
the decisive ones, rather than relying on empirical data. 
This all suggests that a complex and subtle set of factors influence an organization’s view and 
use of particular approaches to service and performance improvement, but what evidence is 
there to suggest that the theoretical underpinnings of reforms are widely considered at the 
policy-making or implementation level?   
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The conceptual framework below, then, is suggested as a mechanism for understanding and 
categorising the change levers that influence the improvement and delivery of public services; 
some are exogenous and imposed, others are endogenous and thus self-generated or 
sustained.  Public sector bodies are highly complex organizations and understanding the 
process of reform is as important as the outcomes themselves (Halligan, 2002).  This research 
suggests that this framework should also take account of these different levels of engagement. 
• Conceptualization: i.e. the intellectual and philosophical foundations of reform, 
affecting the nature of the organization 
• Operationalization: i.e. how these foundations are translated into policy and guidance 
• Implementation: i.e. how policy and guidance are put into practice the reality of lived 
experience in the service environment 
 
This chapter has shown that much of the academic literature focuses on the conceptualization 
of reforms, and whether or not they fit into discrete paradigms such as NPM, and much of the 
practitioner literature appears concerned with success or failure in implementation.  It could be 
argued, however, that each of these perspectives sometimes ignores the nature of institutions 
and their own need for compelling narratives with regard to reforms.  How are these internal 
narratives constructed? How are the emotional and logical aspects of reforms handled by 
organizations?  The conceptual model presented aims to explore some of these issues with a 
number of case study organizations (see section 3.7.2 on page 96). 
The information contained in Table 3: Summary analysis of major reform phases provides an 
overview of differing approaches to implementing and understanding reforms, collating 
changes by chronological shifts in administrations. This is important in order to understand the 
broad changes in values and principles driving public sector reform.  It is necessary to 
contextualise the impact of the broad paradigms of change such as NPM.  This chapter 
establishes that this research does not seek to evaluate NPM or other paradigms, nor to 
appraise the success or failure of particular administrations; rather, to contextualise and 
understand the complex, rational and sometimes emotional aspects of reforms in practice.  
Whilst some of the changes that were applied to local government were distinctive in each 
administration, themes that emerge that provide a cross-cutting view.  For example, both CCT 
and Best Value could be considered reforms that engage with marketization and contestability 
of public services, despite being implemented by different administrations and having different 
values driving them.  There have been structural changes to local government through local 
government reorganization (LGR) in the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s.  These have taken different 
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forms, but have focused on the same thematic issues, i.e. the removal of two-tier government 
in England. Therefore, an additional view can be gained by examining the cross-cutting focus 
of overall reforms, which can then be clustered and then synthesised into a series of thematic 
reform perspectives.   
This research has developed these into an exploratory typology of reforms that could be used 
to increase understanding of the changes in administration by collating changes into a series 
of dimensions of reforms.  These dimensions are: instrumental, structural, market / role, 
people- or staff-centred, democratic / decisional / community, institutional, and financial. 
They are represented diagrammatically in Figure 2: Conceptual model of dimensions of reform.  
2.9.4 Figure 2: Conceptual model of dimensions of reform 
Figure 2: Conceptual model of dimensions of reform 
 
Source: Author, based on material drawn from: (Ashworth et al., 2007; Ashworth et al., 2010a; 
Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Faucher-King and Le Galès, 2010; Ferlie et al., 1996; Ferlie et al., 
2005; Halligan, 2002; Hood, 1991; Klein, 2010; Lane, 1997; Lodge and Hood, 2012; Lowndes, 
1999; Micheli and Neely, 2010; Osborne, 2010a; Painter, 2012; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; 
Radnor and Barnes, 2007; Rashman and Radnor, 2005; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1997, 1999a; 
Wilson, 2004a; Wilson and Hinton, 1993)   
The major dimensions of change types have been developed from the discussion in section 
2.4.   
Table 4 shows individual examples of techniques, tools or approaches that fit within the 
dimensions.  These are indicative examples rather than a comprehensive list. 
Dimensions of reform
Instrumental
Lean, BPI/R, scorecards, 
benchm
arking, league tables, 
six sigm
a, 'transform
ation' 
N
ational Program
m
e for IT
Structural
M
erging health and social 
care, children's and adults' 
social services, pooled 
facilities
Market / role
Com
petition, contestability, 
com
m
issioning, service 
dem
and m
anagem
ent, CCT, 
BV review
s
People- or 
Staff-centred
Investors in People, Senn-
Delaney, change agent, 
cultural change, staff 
engagem
ent
Democratic / 
decisional / 
community
Foundation trust, m
ayors, 
scrutiny, participation, 
(double) devolution
Institutional
Local Goverm
ent Review
, 
public health transfer, agenda 
for change, clinical 
com
m
issioning groups
Financial
Gershon efficiencies, three Es, 
council tax, arm
chair auditors, 
service rationing, pooled 
budgets
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Table 4: Additional examples of each dimension  
Dimension Nature Examples 
Instrumental Changes focused on the use 
of a specific instrument or 
technique (these can often be 
applied to a range of areas), 
but the primary focus is the 
tool 
TQM, Lean, BPI/R, ISO9000, scorecards, 
benchmarking, league tables, Six Sigma, 
'transformation', Beacon Council, NHS 
National Programme for IT (NpfIT), Best 
Value Performance Indicators, national 
indicator set, business planning 
Structural Changes that focus on the 
structure of organizations or 
services 
Merging health and social care, children's 
and adults' social services, pooled facilities 
and equipment – link to markets and 
purchaser / provider split 
Market / role Changes driven by the overall 
role of the organization and / 
or changes to the relationship 
with the market 
Competition, contestability, commissioning, 
service rationing, demand management, 
CCT, Best Value reviews 
People- or 
staff-centred 
Changes that centre on people 
or personality traits, 
behaviours, or issues 
Investors in People, Senn-Delaney, Common 
Purpose, change agent, cultural change, staff 
engagement, core competencies 
Democratic / 
decisional / 
community 
Major changes to the nature of 
the democratic institution, or 
the way major decisions are 
made 
Foundation trust, free schools, mayors, 
scrutiny, participation, (double) devolution, e-
petitions, community calls for action 
Institutional Changes that affect the nature 
of the institution, beyond mere 
structural changes, including 
institutional value-driven 
changes 
LGR, public health transfer, NHS agenda for 
change, clinical commissioning groups 
Financial Changes driven by primarily 
financial goals, or that are 
financial levers (not including 
financial incentives for other 
changes) 
Gershon efficiencies, three Es, council tax 
and funding allocations, armchair auditors, 
pooled budgets, universal credit, 
 (Source, as Figure 1: Timeline analysis of reforms, page 56)  
It is likely that organizations will have composed their own rationales for the selection of tools 
and techniques used, and that these will form part of institutional narratives and myths of 
achievement.  Newman (2001) cites Corvellec’s (1996) terming of ‘narratives of achievement’ 
as ways in which organizations defend their position to external scrutiny bodies (e.g. the Audit 
Commission) through what are essentially performative statements of their achievements, 
rather than robust assessments of their strengths and weaknesses (aligning with the ritualistic 
or defensive uses of performance as discussed in Table 2: Uses of performance management: 
perspectives from literature on page 37).   
In this context, it may be that these narratives and myths also operate at an intra-organizational 
level and aggregate to comprise part of the organization’s culture and values associated with 
performance and service improvement activities.  These past experiences (good or bad) may 
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well influence the take-up and sustainability of future improvement tools, and define institutional 
acceptance and understanding. 
One of the major criticisms of private sector improvement tools is that many of them originated 
in the manufacturing or product-orientated sector, and thus fail to take account of the context 
of service delivery, rather than product delivery; this has been described as the need to move 
towards a public-service dominant logic (Osborne, 2010a; Osborne et al., 2013; Thomas, 2012). 
The dominant discourse of the 2010-2015 period was one of personalization or 
individualization, and this appears to have continued in the 2015 onwards Conservative 
government.  We might reasonably expect to see a strengthening of the rationale for customer-
orientated tools like Lean, which have a customer value dimension as their guiding ethos.  This 
research sought to address this question through exploring instrumental uses of performance 
management. 
 Interim analysis and development of research questions 
Private sector orthodoxies have become absorbed into the political and managerial way of 
thinking about public services.  As such they are generally considered unassailable when 
converted into reform policy – there is perhaps insufficient debate about whether we should 
treat service users as customers – this is simply absorbed as fact.   Without entering into a 
debate as to what extent the New Labour administrations continued this orthodoxy, it is 
generally held that these key principles have remained at the heart of a redefined centre ground 
of modern British politics, and provide an observable path.  This section of the thesis draws 
together some conclusions, but also poses a series of questions that will inform the research 
direction. 
All this paints a picture of a complex field of diverse reforms, with shaky theoretical foundations 
and limited guidance in how to implement them.  Many of the reform efforts were conceived as 
one-size fits all, and few, if any, took any meaningful notice of the political aspects of public 
service delivery and tended to focus on policy, not process (Rashman and Radnor, 2005).  The 
evaluation of Best Value, for example, highlighted the lack of engagement by politicians with 
performance planning in local government (Wilson and Game, 2011).  This research asked: 
Can we identify how these principles have been absorbed into the reality of public service 
delivery? How do organizations engaged in justifying their performance discuss and create 
meaning around their preferred way of doing things? 
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Performance management and improvement is accepted by most as one of the fundamental 
pillars of New Public Management.  Some have argued we are moving beyond an NPM age 
(Dunleavy et al., 2006b); others (Goldfinch and Wallis, 2010) that convergence around a norm 
is in fact a myth.  What, therefore, is the legacy in today’s public services of the last 30 or so 
years of imposed, recommended or suggested performance improvement or measurement 
tools?   
The New Labour administrations were characterised by a rhetoric of freedom, flexibility, 
empowerment and devolution, yet this was matched by a prevailing reality of centralization, 
regulation and control (Lowndes and Wilson, 2003).  The coalition government since 2010 has 
been altogether less clear on specifying methods and tools. The White Paper Open Public 
Services (Cabinet Office, 2011), for example, is remarkably light on details of any techniques 
to be used, whilst clear in its articulation of the problems found within public services.  Given 
the changes made since 2010, including the abolition of the Audit Commission (announced in 
2010, but still in operation in 2014, albeit in a much reduced capacity), in theory public 
organizations are now free to take control of the selection and use of any improvement tools 
they want, rather than having to conform to the expectations of externally imposed frameworks.  
The dismantling of some of the regulatory agency frameworks has also, in theory, freed up 
resources that would have been devoted to the bureaucratic machine of performance reporting, 
something practitioners have referred to as ‘feeding the beast’ in section 5.1.1 on page 139.  
The legacy that emerges should be indicative of how organizations conceive the legitimacy of 
performance improvement, as well as a measure of the benefit in improved performance 
outcomes or outputs.  How then will they ‘perform’ the ritual of demonstrating legitimacy, 
without the structure of organizational assessments previously imposed on them? 
This opens up a range of areas worthy of exploration in more detail.  How have organizations 
that feel they have progressed in improving service delivery responded to the overall headline 
changes?  Are the operational level activities (i.e. the tools and techniques used) still valid?  
That is to say, were performance management and improvement tools largely important 
because of their value or prestige within the NPM era or their intrinsic worth to organizations?  
Have the ‘excellent’ organizations in CPA terms created sufficient momentum and value in their 
use to sustain them, even if the investment they may require is a challenge in an austere 
budgetary climate?  What role has been played by emerging new governance structures and, 
in particular, structures for the governance of improvement? 
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It might seem a truism that the tools are desirable because they would be used to make savings 
and improvements, and this should be especially valuable in straitened times.  Yet, as has 
been observed, this is an overly simplistic view, and the discourse around performance 
improvement has often been an uncritical one, despite the relatively positivist, rational basis 
for many tools, which would naturally suggest the inclusion of valid evidence for their adoption.  
How well do organizations understand the conceptualization of performance and service 
improvement approaches and have they been able to engage with the different and sometimes 
unintended consequences of specific change efforts? 
Perhaps because many of the tools were statutorily imposed, national guidance around reform 
efforts has therefore relied significantly on anecdotal stories or micro-case studies (Pollitt, 
2013b) and narratives of achievement (Corvellec 1996, cited in Newman, 2001) for legitimacy, 
meaning that impact has been broadly difficult to assess objectively.  How, then, do 
implementing public sector organizations conceive, discuss, and make meaning with the tools 
in such a way that allows them to balance coercive pressures from the national level with 
citizens’ and partners’ wishes at the local level?  Does the typology presented allow a more 
focused analysis of the issues to emerge through evaluating the motivations and rationalities 
for their use?  
The overarching research question informing this study has been: How has the legacy of the 
1997-2010 UK administrations’ approaches to performance and service improvement affected 
post-2010 English public services? 
This overarching research question concerning the legacy of a particular interpretation of public 
management, as expressed through the policy agenda and regulatory systems of the New 
Labour era must consider how this interpretation influenced authorities by addressing a series 
of sub-questions that allow the effects to be unpicked.  These sub questions address different 
conceptual levels as highlighted in section 2.9.3: 
• How do organizations discuss and create meaning around their preferred ways of 
managing performance and service improvement? (i.e. the conceptualization of 
performance and service improvement) 
• How have the emergent governance structures affected the sustainability and legitimacy 
of performance and service improvement efforts? (i.e. the operationalization of 
performance governance) 
• How has the removal of statutory performance reporting impacted on tool selection, their 
operation, and the ways that organizations publicly justify their achievement? (i.e. the 
implementation of tools and techniques) 
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 This research focuses on a qualitative exploration of these issues at an organizational case 
study level that will be explained further in Chapter 3: Methodology.  The research questions 
will be re-examined in Chapter 6: Analysis, to explore how the empirical data has addressed 
the basis of inquiry.
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the literature used to develop the conceptual framework that 
explores the central research question and outlined the three sub-questions that emerged from 
the analysis of reforms.  This chapter outlines and discusses the methodological position that 
underpins the research, as well as detailing the development of the research questions.  It will 
provide an overview of the key debates and themes, thus giving a theoretical grounding for the 
selected methods, and provides justification for the methods selected. 
The chapter is structured in the following way: the early sections consider the philosophical 
and theoretical foundations of this research (section 3.2); epistemology and ontology are 
essential points of discussion here, and the chapter provides an overview of the general terrain 
and key debates within research methods, as well as locating the primary research within these 
debates.   
After this, the chapter moves on to questions of research design in section 3.2.5, again, both 
in general terms and in the specifics of this research: what does effective research design do 
and look like?  What is the design of this primary research, and how might one evaluate it 
against the principles outlined? 
 Section 3.3.8 considers what theoretical perspectives underlie the research, and articulates a 
view of the purpose of this type of research. 
The debate then moves on to generating (section 3.4.2) and analysing data (section 3.7.1), 
utilising the same general structure of considering the overall territory and then outlining and 
evaluating the specifics of this research.  This brings in the selection process for case studies, 
interviews, and focus groups, which are the selected methods. 
Section 3.5.3 considers the ethical implications of research, with a focus on the nature of ‘real 
world’ research, and some reflective considerations around my status as both ex-practitioner 
and academic researcher. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of assessing quality in qualitative research, a 
summary of the timetable for investigations, and a conclusion that seeks to draw together a 
contextual understanding of the research. 
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 Research philosophy / methodology 
 
Most research methods textbooks open with a chapter or two on understanding the 
philosophical position of the research.   This seems simultaneously helpful and limiting.  Helpful, 
because most argue that a proper understanding of the epistemological and ontological 
frameworks within which any project exists is essential in securing the most effective research 
design (Cresswell, 2014).  Limiting, because simply classifying one’s approach on a table of 
research paradigms and not unpicking the methodological implications is unlikely to 
significantly improve the quality of research.  That is not to say that every piece of research 
should replay the same discussion of fundamental principles, but rather that contextualising 
the viewpoint of the research, which is not necessarily synonymous with that of the researcher, 
is necessary for high quality research (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).  
Research is essentially a process of uncovering, obtaining, discovering, or perhaps creating 
knowledge (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997), although again, even the terms used, such as 
‘uncovering’, carry an implicit ontological value. These debates are operationalised through a 
series of theoretical models referred to as research frameworks, worldviews (Cresswell, 2014), 
paradigms or philosophies.  These frameworks generally differentiate through the medium of 
two defining characteristics: ontology and epistemology.  Ontology considers what we think to 
be true / real, or questions of being.  Epistemology is concerned with how we might go about 
gathering knowledge about it.  Each of these concepts contains a variety of positions.  Which 
of the positions is preferred is a perennial debate that cannot be resolved here, but can and 
should be discussed in order to give an understanding of the presuppositions that underpin the 
research, its limitations and any challenges that can be raised.  Each of these two 
characteristics can be located on a continuum, and the literature tends to define points within 
each continuum to form typologies that can be used to locate an individual piece of research.  
These positions, however, are not often clearly defined or uncontested, and there is rarely 
complete agreement on what, say, interpretivism means.  At the centre of these debates within 
social sciences lie questions around the privileging of the ‘scientific method’. 
Therefore, a brief discussion of the main debates within research philosophy is required to 
locate this research, to discuss its characteristics, strengths, and flaws and to acknowledge the 
existence of alternate positions. 
Although often used to refer to the practical means used to gather data, ‘methodology’ more 
properly refers to the philosophical grounding and frame that informs the research whereas 
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‘methods’ describe the means of gathering or generating data (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997).  
Cresswell (2014) highlights the philosophical worldview as one of the three main components 
informing the design of a research project; the other two are the research methods and the 
“selected strategies of inquiry” (2014, p.5). The methodology, and hence the methods 
employed, for a social science research project should be a synthesis of the research 
question(s) and the researcher’s philosophical position, i.e. amongst other things, their 
epistemological and ontological viewpoints (Cresswell, 2014).   
Crotty (1998) outlines a four-stage model.  He prefers to anchor research initially in 
epistemology, although others would define this as an ontological perspective.  This lends 
some support to the view that epistemology and ontology have to some extent ‘collapsed’ into 
each other, and the distinction between the two is less relevant (Guba and Lincoln, 2008).  
Crotty’s model has epistemology informing the ‘theoretical perspective’, a term he uses to 
include positivism / interpretivism and phenomenology, hermeneutics etc., which in turn 
informs the methodology.  This arguably more closely aligns with Cresswell’s ‘selected 
strategies of inquiry’, i.e. it includes an approach like experimental research, phenomenological 
research, or grounded theory.  These must be coherent with the theoretical perspective and 
then guide and define the method (i.e. sampling, focus groups, statistical analyses etc.).  
Crotty poses four questions that should define research: 
• What methods do we propose to use? 
• What methodology governs our choice and use of methods? 
• What theoretical perspective lies behind the methodology in question? 
• What epistemology informs this theoretical perspective? 
 
Sometimes these choices are presented as a binary division between quantitative or qualitative 
research methods; this a false dichotomy.  A combination of methods can be used at that same 
time and in the same contexts, and most of them can operate with a range of philosophical 
positions (Lacity and Janson, 1994).  Debates around mixed methods also problematize the 
status of this duality. 
This bifurcation of research into one of two main traditions is an historic one, and requires some 
contextual discussion if the research is to be effectively operationalised.  Moreover, neglecting 
the fundamental intellectual position of researcher and research questions risks weakening the 
overall quality of the research (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).  As Berg and Lune (2012) point 
out, debating the relative merits of quantitative versus qualitative methods in the abstract is 
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also a futile process.  This research takes the view that qualitative and quantitative refer to the 
methods used for data collection, rather than the underpinning philosophical paradigms. 
What matters is that the methods used are consistent with the guiding intellectual and 
theoretical perspectives, and that they are appropriate to the central research question.  
Numerous (competing) philosophical typologies exist, yet Cresswell highlights the limitations 
of attempting to codify the elements of interpretive frameworks as only a “partial description of 
possibilities” (Cresswell, 2013)  Again, it is less important to pigeonhole the research into one 
of the categories, and more effective to understand the assumptions that the researcher’s 
position brings to the research, blending epistemology, ontology, axiology and methodology 
into a worldview that encompasses these aspects (Denzin and Lincoln 2011, cited in Cresswell, 
2013).  Denzin and Lincoln (2008) argue that these positions define and are defined by both 
research and researcher, but also that there are clear tensions between different qualitative 
research assumptions. 
Whilst the qualitative / quantitative dichotomy is sometimes seen as a dividing line (e.g. Robson, 
2011), many sources use the epistemological continuum as the basis on which to define 
research, whilst accepting that this itself may be insufficiently detailed (e.g. Denscombe, 2002).   
Generally, however, research philosophies are discussed in terms of a series of continua.  
These are summarised in Table 5 below in deliberately polarised terms.  For example, this 
table does not claim that interpretivism and constructivism are identical, but rather that they 
occupy one end of a spectrum with positivism and post-positivism at the other:
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Table 5: Oppositional points on research continua 
Ontology: 
truth / reality 
is… 
Objectivist / realist – 
facts are facts 
Realism 
Subjectivist – people are people 
Nominalism - reality a product 
of our minds 
Epistemology: 
How we can 
know what we 
know 
Positivism  
Realism 
Interpretivism 
Constructivism 
Idealism 
Logic Deductive / hypothetic-
deductive 
Inductive 
Goal Explaining (Erklären) 
causal relationship, 
correlations 
Understanding (Verstehen) 
context and meaning,  
Process Verification Sense-making 
Researcher is Neutral, objective Engaged, embedded, empathetic 
Quality Verification, reliability, 
generalisability 
Credibility, coherence, plausibility 
Aims to Construct and test 
(causal) laws 
Generate theory and insight 
Gathers or 
generates 
Empirical data Lived experience (created, not 
collected) 
Perspective Outside, looking in Inside, looking around 
Sources: (Author and adapted from Berg and Lune, 2012; Bryman and Bell, 2011; Crotty, 1998; 
David and Sutton, 2011; Della Porta and Keating, 2008a; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Duberley 
et al., 2012; Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Gray, 2013; Hughes and Sharrock, 1997; Johnson 
and Duberley, 2000; May, 2011; Neuman, 2011; Robson, 2011; Silverman, 2013) 
The major dividing line within ontological concerns is defined by the objectivist / realist point at 
one end, and the subjectivist and nominalist points at the other.  The following sections explore 
these broad stances. 
3.2.1 Objectivist / realist perspectives 
The objectivist position holds that the world exists independently of our perceptions (May, 
2011), and that concrete facts can be established to verify our deductive hypotheses (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2012).  It appeals to the existence of universal laws and values experiential data 
over theoretical or purely conceptual knowledge.  This stance has its roots in classical 
philosophy and Aristotle and Plato are considered the earliest proponent of the method of 
observing the world and seeking natural circumstances.  Later philosophers, such as Bacon, 
developed notions of what is now called the ‘scientific method’, where empirical observations 
and logic were used to isolate causes of natural phenomena and test their validity.  This method 
gave rise to the so-called scientific revolution, tracing a path through to the birth of modern 
social sciences.  Thinkers including Comte, Durkheim and Weber wished to apply the values 
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and practices of natural sciences to the social world (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997); thus the 
early roots of social science are firmly embedded in a positivist tradition. 
3.2.2 Positivist epistemologies 
Positivism is an epistemological standpoint that is firmly located in the practices and paradigms 
of natural sciences (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997), where the goal is explanation of (causal) 
reality, or Erklären (Della Porta and Keating, 2008b).  It presupposes the existence of a 
concrete reality that can be described and quantified.  Positivist methods seek unambiguous 
hard data, verifiable ‘truths’ and operate by testing hypotheses. 
Giddens (1993) argues that positivism relies on several key principles:  
• What is real is what is available to the senses.  
• Philosophical discussions in the sciences should be avoided in favour of experience and 
experiment.    
• Natural and social sciences share methodological and logical principles.   
• There is a fundamental difference between fact and value, and science should only be 
concerned with fact. 
 
However, within the social sciences, this methodology has been challenged for its difficulties 
in capturing socially contingent or cultural forces.  Writing from a sociologist’s perspective, 
Hughes and Sharrock (1997) present a trenchant critique of positivism, although they articulate 
a subtle and balanced position based on the dominance of positivist thinking in sociology in the 
1960s and 1970s.  Within management research, positivism, and perhaps those worldviews 
operating in its shadow, i.e. empiricism, pragmatism, realism, still dominate.  Indeed, any 
discussion of research philosophy that is not positivist is required to justify its foundations and 
appropriateness in a way that is not often required of positivist research; it is with good cause 
that Hughes and Sharrock talk of the “orthodoxy of positivism” within social sciences (Hughes 
and Sharrock, 1997), although debate about interpretivist qualitative methods can be found, 
albeit perhaps more recently (Lee and Cassell, 2013).  Johnson and Duberley (2000) provide 
a more sympathetic reading of positivistic thinking, albeit this is likely coloured by their 
disciplinary backgrounds in organizational psychology, itself strongly positivist in tradition. 
Despite what some might argue (e.g. Robson, 2011), rigorous and scientific are not exclusively 
synonymous, or at least scientific carries at least two layers of meaning. The first simply refers 
to the object’s location within the disciplines of the (natural) sciences.  The second implies that 
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the scientific method has been applied, which in itself implies a positivist or post-positivist mind-
set.   
Crotty (1998) gives an effective explanation of the move towards what is now termed ‘post-
positivism’ inspired by Popper’s falsification, Kuhn’s ‘scientific revolutions’ and Feyerabend’s 
‘farewell to reason’.  In essence, it is argued that because of theoretical work such as quantum 
theory, science itself is less well grounded in absolutes than we previously imagined and whilst 
a concrete truth still exists, how we access that truth is somewhat cloudier than previously 
believed.  Positivism is still a dominant force in some parts of the social sciences, and this is 
true within the business / management domain, but it has undergone significant changes. 
Della Porta and Keating (2008b, p.33) echo this when they argue that there are three main 
ways to knowledge: 
• Paradigmatic, exclusive approach (only one right way) 
• Anarchist, hyper-pluralist approach (this is sceptical about ‘true’ knowledge and open to 
experimentation in approaches) 
• The search for commensurable knowledge (i.e. a position between the two former ones 
– awareness of strengths and weaknesses of each method, comparison process to 
select most appropriate one, dependent on the research question 
 
Criticisms of positivism largely lie in the first of these bullets (Crotty, 1998; Hughes and 
Sharrock, 1997): positivism is exclusive, blinkered and does not adequately explain 
phenomena outside its frame of reference.  However, positivist research seeks to be replicable, 
verifiable, and generalizable.  Validity is a key concern, and therefore effective research in the 
positivist tradition is well regarded within the academic community. 
3.2.3 Interpretivist epistemology 
Whereas positivism posits a world where a (more or less) concrete and independent reality 
exists and can be uncovered, interpretivist approaches conceive a reality where facts are 
constructed wholly or partially as social phenomena, generated by interactions between people 
(Hughes and Sharrock, 1997), and a focus on the uniqueness of human inquiry (Radnor, 2001).  
Within interpretive thinking, there are a number of differing stances such as symbolic 
interactionism, phenomenology, realism, hermeneutics, ethnomethodologies, constructionism, 
and naturalistic inquiry (Crotty, 1998; Gray, 2013; Neuman, 2011).  
These approaches are subjectivist – meanings are diverse and contingent and do largely not 
exist outside of the human world.  Therefore the goal of research is to interpret those 
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phenomena: to understand and explain human and social reality (Crotty, 1998, p.66-7).  The 
goal of interpretivist research is therefore understanding and meaning, or Verstehen, rather 
than the verification of knowledge and facts (Neuman, 2011). Crotty goes on to present the 
neo-Kantian view that natural sciences (and thus positivism) are most concerned with 
similarities and universals, i.e.  nomothetic (from nomos, meaning laws), whereas human and 
social sciences focus on individual cases and uniqueness, i.e. idiographic (from idios, meaning 
individual).   Weber conceives Verstehen as addressing both nomothetic and idiographic 
questions, i.e. both causal and interpretive perspectives (Crotty, 1998), although other 
interpretations of interpretivism reject a focus on causality (Silverman 1990, cited in Crotty, 
1998, p.69).   
For interpretive researchers, the focus on ‘meaning’ rather than ‘fact’ implies a degree of 
relativism, i.e. individual perceptions may be different, and that the purpose of research is not 
the reveal the truth, but to recognise and identify a multiplicity of ‘truths’.  From a constructionist 
perspective, one within the subjectivist tradition, all meaning is made in the interactions 
between people (Crotty, 1998).  Thus, interpretivist stances accept that interaction between 
researcher and subject is ‘natural’ and should be at least recognised and understood, if not 
embraced as a fundamental strength of the research, i.e. via ethnomethodologies, which, it 
can be argued, also includes much of action research. 
3.2.4 Qualitative and quantitative data collection 
A reductive view is sometimes taken that the predominant method of data collection can stand 
in place of an ontological or epistemological position, and that this generally comes down to a 
question of quantitative or qualitative methods. In this section, these terms should be applied 
solely to the methods used for gathering, and subsequently analysing, data, and not as 
shorthand for a research philosophy. 
Quantitative data collection relies on gathering or generating numerical, countable data.  This 
is primarily, but certainly not exclusively, found in the positivist tradition, which attaches a 
stronger value to statistical methods of data analysis (Gray, 2013).  To quantify something is 
to give it a mathematical value, to literally to ascribe a ‘true’ value or status.  This allows 
experiments or other research methods to be repeated, and allows a probabilistic 
understanding of the results; hence quantitative methods are strongly favoured in the positivist 
tradition.    
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Qualitative data collection extends to a broader variety of forms than quantitative, although in 
the context of social sciences, and particularly business school research, is arguably far from 
predominant.  Qualitative data can be verbal, written, visual or sensory, and describes 
perspectives rather than fact (Gray, 2013).  Section 3.4.2 (page 81) contains more detail on 
the data collection methods used in this research. 
Crotty suggests that “[w]e need to recognise that different people may well inhabit quite 
different worlds.  Their different worlds constitute for them diverse ways of knowing, 
distinguishable sets of meanings, separate realities.” (Crotty, 1998, p.64).  We should therefore 
be cautious about making assumptions based on the data collection methods, and similarly 
avoid using the qualitative or quantitative label as shorthand for a more nuanced discussion of 
philosophical stance or tradition. 
3.2.5 Summary 
The philosophy driving a piece of research is a co-product of the researcher’s stance, view and 
way of interpreting the world.  These inform the choices of methods, analysis, and questions, 
although this process is also more mutually reinforcing that sometimes is suggested.  The most 
important feature of research design and delivery is coherence between these points.  All 
research represents a series of choices and, provided that the strengths and weaknesses of 
the approaches chosen are understood, no one method or stance is inherently better than any 
other.  
 Research design (general) 
3.3.1 Methodology definitions 
As mentioned earlier, methodology is used here to refer to the philosophical underpinnings of 
the research, and ‘methods’ to refer to the “ways of acquiring data” (Della Porta and Keating, 
2008b), although Crotty (1998) prefers seeing it as the “strategy, plan of action, process or 
design”, perhaps aligning with the ‘strategies of inquiry’ model.     As has been discussed, good 
research design is a result of coherence between worldview, research question, and strategies 
of inquiry; choices made around these aspects help define the most appropriate research 
design.  For example, positivist research would attempt to test hypotheses or define a causal 
relationship between variables because verifying facts and establishing causes are 
fundamental parts of the positivist tradition.  Interpretivist research is more likely to wish to 
establish motivations or understand the context behind a situation. Variants exist between 
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these two broad categories, but we can reasonably classify most research into one of the 
following types: exploratory, descriptive, and causal or experimental. 
3.3.2 Explanatory research  
Explanatory (or causal / experimental research) is based around the principles of natural 
science research.  It seeks to provide explanations of events that address questions of 
relationships between quantifiable variables.  This assumes that such a relationship exists and 
can be uncovered, and is hence generally operating within the positivist tradition.  Causal 
relationships are those which are correlative, logical, and sequential, i.e. we can say that one 
thing happens, and then observe a particular result. When controlling for other variables or 
effects this allows the identification of a causal relationship.  Within this research type, this is 
generally expressed in terms of the probability of the event happening by pure chance being 
below a specified threshold.  Experimental research aims to create the opportunity for a 
hypothesis to be tested, as opposed to seeking instances of the event naturally occurring.  
Experimental or quasi-experimental conditions are tightly controlled and minimise external 
factors wherever possible.  When performed causal / experimental research is repeatable, 
verifiable and has strong internal validity.  Causal research often gathers a large number of 
cases or events and focuses on only a small element of the case (Neuman, 2011).  The greater 
the amount of data, the stronger the explanatory statistical power of the findings and hence the 
validity.  
3.3.3 Exploratory research  
Exploratory research often uses qualitative data (Neuman, 2011), and aims to discover more 
about unknown situations or issues, and to develop initial ideas.  This means that the research 
needs to be able to adapt to events that occur during the investigation; this is suited to an 
inductive logic (Robson, 2011), rather than a deductive approach that seeks to test hypotheses.  
Exploratory research aims to interpret meanings from within the texts used (documents, 
interview transcripts and recordings etc.), and thus facilitates emergent data analysis.      
3.3.4 Descriptive research  
Descriptive research aims to chart or classify a situation or problem by using qualitative or 
quantitative data  to “paint a picture” (Neuman, 2011).  Theories may be discussed, but are not 
directly being tested or examined.    Descriptive research operates best in fields where 
problems have already been identified, and where further information is needed to scope out 
the terrain of inquiry.  Thus descriptive and exploratory research naturally share blurred 
boundaries (Gray, 2013).  
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3.3.5 Cross-sectional research 
One of the other major divisions within research design is the timeframe that the research 
covers – most commonly described as either cross-sectional or longitudinal.  Cross-sectional 
research can be exploratory, explanatory or descriptive, although Neumann (2011) argues it is 
best suited to descriptive research.  Cross-sectional research describes investigations that 
provide a ‘snapshot’ of many cases, but at a fixed moment in time.  As a result, it is often easier 
and cheaper to carry out than longitudinal studies.  It is effective at capturing detail of a given 
situation, but not effective at capturing social change over time.  Cross-sectional research may 
also take place within a bounded setting; this is referred to as the case study method. 
3.3.6 Longitudinal research 
Longitudinal research describes investigations that cover more than one point in time.  
Sometimes this can include different cases or people at each point, usually referred to as ‘time-
series’, or it can follow the progress of a specific group of cases or people; this is called a panel 
study.  Panel studies are the most expensive and challenging to operationalise and carry out, 
principally because of the difficulties in maintaining contact with a range of cases or people 
over time.  Time-series research is easier than panel studies to carry out, and both are effective 
at tracking social change across time through examining or identifying patterns.  
3.3.7 Researcher engagement  
Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) also propose a two-axis model of epistemology and research style, 
using positivist to constructionist as one axis, and detached to involved as the second , giving 
quadrants within which research can be broadly located.  Objectivist and positivist traditions 
assume a researcher is outside of the phenomenon being observed.  Thus, there are no 
internally coherent research designs that are both positivist and involved in the Easterby-Smith 
et al. model.  This is important because it links to the practice / theory debate, which is a 
significant feature in both business and management research, and this research in particular.     
3.3.8 The approach selected for this research 
This research seeks to understand current attitudes towards performance management and 
service improvement in local government and to analyse the legacy of the changes 
implemented during the specified period.  This places the research within an interpretive mode, 
where the purpose is to interpret meaning; it is thus exploratory, rather than explanatory and 
accepts a high level of researcher engagement because of the author’s experience within the 
sector.   It is also phenomenological in approach, seeking to understand and explore the 
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situation through analysis of phenomena, in this case the assessment regimes facing local 
councils. 
Giddens argues for the existence of a ‘double hermeneutic’ (1993) - social events are 
interpreted by individuals, and the researcher then attempts to interpret those interpretations.  
Della Porta and Keating argue that “it is therefore impossible to understand historical events or 
social phenomena without looking at the perception individuals have of the world outside.” 
(Della Porta and Keating, 2008b, pp.24-5). 
This research would broadly tend to reject a positivist paradigm for several reasons, one of 
which is the belief that the researcher is easily separated from the research.  In the case of this 
research, it involved investigating social systems (i.e. performance management frameworks) 
that the researcher had previously helped design and operate in similar authorities.  Thus, it 
was possible to generate high quality access to actors and institutions because of credibility in 
the field on the basis of former professional positions and achievements, as well as because 
of access to other institutions’ practices.  This is highlighted by the fact that the participating 
institutions have all requested feedback, observations, and ideas from other local authorities.  
Secondly, a phenomenological approach requires generating a rich understanding of context 
and situation; this obviates a positivist concept of a single truth.  Each participant’s perception 
of their role, interactions, and understanding is both unique to them and equally valid.  Within 
an interpretivist tradition, knowledge comes from synthesising these individual perceptions into 
a wider picture. 
 Research questions  
The central research question is:  
• How has the legacy of the 1997-2010 UK administrations’ approaches to performance 
and service improvement affected post-2010 English public services?  
 
From this, three sub-questions have emerged: 
RQ1. How do organizations discuss and create meaning around their preferred ways of 
managing performance and service improvement? (i.e. the conceptualization of 
performance and service improvement) 
RQ2. How have the emergent governance structures affected the sustainability and 
legitimacy of performance and service improvement efforts? (i.e. the 
operationalization of performance governance) 
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RQ3. How has the removal of statutory performance reporting impacted on tool selection, 
their operation, and the ways that organizations publicly justify their achievement? 
(i.e. the implementation of tools and techniques) 
 
The central research question above, and the three sub-questions are largely concerned with 
the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of the legacy of 1997-2010 performance management and service 
improvement arrangements, rather than the ‘what’.  It seeks to address what Stake (1995, p.37) 
calls ‘happenings, not causes’, and addresses understanding, not knowledge, a dividing line 
between types of inquiry.  Some work on performance indicators (e.g. Andrews and Boyne, 
2012; Boyne, 1997) has been positivist and quantitative in nature, seeking to ascribe causal 
relationships and develop predictive capabilities, and focusing on generalizable, replicable 
findings to establish validity (David and Sutton, 2011).   
The focus of this research is on the experiential qualities of a social situation, and in particular 
how meaning is made and narratives of legitimacy are constructed by social interactions.  The 
central question does not seek an answer that gives a generalizable understanding of the 
current situation, i.e. what performance mechanisms are being used across the country, or how 
performance levels have been affected, although such a thing would be interesting and useful.  
Instead, what is at the heart of this enquiry is a desire to understand how (some) organizations 
make sense of a complex and shifting set of expectations from a range of different stakeholders, 
and how the contextual changes arising from the central political situation has affected the 
internal logics, narratives, and legitimacy of an organization’s approach.  Thus the driving 
concern of research quality is around plausibility and credibility (Bryman and Bell, 2011), rather 
than validity, which is driven by the strength of the theoretical construction of the argument and 
conceptual model in the remainder of this research. 
3.4.1 Setting the context of this research 
The research was inspired by personal and professional experience working in the field of local 
government performance, policy, and service improvement.  It takes as its starting point the 
existence of a classifiable approach to improvement, i.e. the existence of a form of 
improvement culture.  Although a critique can be made of this approach as reductive, 
nonetheless, this regulatory system played a key part in local government life during the period 
of its implementation.  The aim of the research was to explore the perceptions and opinions of 
staff working in local government through qualitative data gathering, and hence qualitative 
interviewing was selected as the primary method for gathering data.  The research questions 
also explore the changes over the last five years arising from performance and improvement 
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reforms, and interviewee opinions about the coming five years.  Quantitative methods were 
unlikely to be able to provide the richness of experiential data needed to form judgements about 
the impact of these reforms. 
3.4.2 Approach to data generation 
There are numerous approaches to gathering and generating data, although it should also be 
recognised that constructivist researchers would argue data are ‘produced’ not collected.  
Whilst some of these align methods more comfortably with a single methodological standpoint, 
epistemology is by no means a definitive guide to data collection.  As Crotty (1998) points out, 
most methods can be used within different traditions; the choice of method should be reflective 
of worldview, rather than directive.  
Some research may gather secondary data, i.e. use existing sources of information, and apply 
novel techniques or contexts to allow further understanding to develop.  Others generate the 
data through using the application of research methods themselves.  
3.4.3 Different types of data collection or generation 
There are numerous data collection methods that seek to obtain the views of individuals 
regarding social phenomena; each has particular features, advantages, and disadvantages.  In 
order to provide clarity on the preferred approach, the major types are listed below in Table 6  
and evaluated against the aims of this research.  This contextualization is important as no 
single method is either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ but rather more or less appropriate for the intended 
purpose. 
• Discursive methods (interviews, focus groups) 
• Interactive methods (ethnographic, action research) 
• Static methods (surveys, external observations, e.g. online) 
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Table 6: Evaluation of different research methods 
Method Strengths with regards to this 
research 
Weaknesses with regards to this 
research 
Personal 
interviews (face 
to face) 
Allows for good rapport building 
Able to observe behaviour as well as 
words 
Can take place in naturalistic setting 
High likelihood of good response rate 
Generates large amount of 
qualitative data 
Requires stronger interpersonal skills 
than other methods. 
Can be resource intensive time 
consuming for researcher in administering 
and transcribing / analysing data 
Telephone 
interviews  
Easier to arrange, especially when 
interviewing senior staff 
Requires fewer resources to 
organise and deliver 
Generates a large amount of 
qualitative data 
Could allow interviewee to feel more 
distanced from the research and thus 
more ‘open’ 
Harder to build rapport 
Likely to be shorter than face to face, as 
harder to secure commitment to lengthier 
telephone conversations 
More difficult to judge emotional levels, 
body language, interest etc.  
Physical 
surveys (i.e. 
hardcopy) 
Familiar to many people 
Can be conducted in participant’s 
own time 
Response rate often much lower than 
other forms of data collection 
Require scanning or converting to 
electronic format for analysis 
More likely to have missing / illegible 
elements  
Electronic 
surveys 
Familiar to many people 
Can be conducted in participant’s 
own time 
Input requirements ensure that 
incomplete surveys are not possible 
 
Response rate often much lower than 
other forms of data collection 
 
Participant 
observation / 
ethnographic 
Allows for very rich descriptive data 
of social experience 
May require researcher to interact with 
participants on peer level 
Needs strong observational and record-
taking skills 
Data collected are not easily verifiable, 
and thus not generally suitable for 
positivist research 
Focus groups Allows for very rich descriptive data 
of social experience 
Strongly dialogic – privileges the 
discussion between participants  
Conflict or issues between participants 
may interfere with the group 
 
Can be resource intensive time 
consuming for researcher in administering 
and transcribing / analysing data 
Action research 
(including auto-
ethnographic 
methods) 
Allows for very rich descriptive data 
of social experience 
Embraces concept that researcher is 
part of the research process 
Requires researcher to interact with 
participants on peer level 
Needs strong observational and record-
taking skills 
Data collected are not easily verifiable, 
and researcher position highly subjective, 
and thus not generally suitable for 
positivist research 
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The next section now outlines the methods selected for this research. 
3.4.4 Methods selected 
The previous sections have outlined the philosophical basis and design considerations for this 
research, concluding that an interpretivist, phenomenological approach is the most suitable for 
and exploratory investigation of the socialised aspects of an organization, in this case local 
government.  This would require a rich data set of interpretable responses from which an 
inductive approach could draw conclusions and developed theoretical propositions.  This is the 
research’s methodology. 
Therefore, this methodology and the research questions outlined at the end of section 2.10 
should guide the selection of appropriate methods.  This section (3.4) has developed an 
understanding of the main features in selected research methods. Considering these features, 
advantages and disadvantages listed in Table 6, discursive methods, i.e. face to face 
interviews and focus groups, were selected for this research as being the most likely to 
generate data of the required richness and depth, and to allow interaction between participant 
and researcher.   
Interviews were purposefully semi-structured (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012) in order to balance 
keeping a consistent flow, yet allowing space where needed for participants to divert.  The 
actual interview questions used are listed here: 
Table 7: Interview questions used 
• Tell me a little bit about your role in the organisation, and your background. 
• How would you describe your authority’s approach to performance and service management? 
• Since 2010, many of the statutory performance mechanisms have been removed.  What impact 
has this had on how you approach performance and service improvement? 
• To whom are you accountable?  What does that look like? 
• What are the most important things when managing performance and improvement within the 
organization?   
• How do you manage improvement across the organization and how do you maintain momentum 
and focus? 
• What are the key tools you use?  (How were these introduced? How have they developed?) 
• What’s changed over the last five years? 
• What do you think are the main challenges coming up with regard to how you manage 
performance and improvement over the next couple of years? 
• Is there anything else you’d like to add about how the authority handles things? 
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Further details, including ‘pick ups’ or reminders to go back and ask for further comment if the 
answers provided did not fully address the topic are included in Appendix v. 
Logistical arrangements for the interviews were organized by the lead contact within each 
organization, as a person familiar to them would be more likely to secure agreement and 
commitment to meet. 
An initial briefing, regular catch up sessions and a debrief giving some interim views and 
observations were carried out during each site visit.  Of the six case study organizations, three 
organizations were completed in a single site visit, and three had multiple visits. 
 Selecting organizations to participate in the research 
Whilst some broad scale studies on Best Value, CPA and, to a lesser extent, CAA have been 
carried out (e.g. Andrews, 2004; Centre for Local & Regional Government Research, 2006; 
Davis and Martin, 2002; Higgins et al., 2004; Keenan, 2000; Leach, 2010; Martin, 2000; 
McLean et al., 2007), far less attention has been paid to using authorities as a unit of analysis.  
This is perhaps surprising, given the individual and diverse nature of local authorities.  This 
research selects individual local authorities as the primary unit of inquiry, and therefore uses a 
case study approach.  Case studies are considered an appropriate way of gathering and 
analysing data (e.g. Dul and Hak, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hartley, 2004; Stake, 1995; Yin, 
2009), although difference exist between the views of these authors.  For example, the widely 
cited Yin (2009) employs a more positivist view of cases, seeking to develop more 
generalizable data, whereas Stake (1995) prefers a more interpretive approach, and hence a 
slightly more cautious one.  Others, notably  Eisenhardt (1989) and Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007), suggest case studies provide an excellent way of developing theory due to their ability 
to study phenomena in the “rich, real-world context in which the phenomena occur” (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007, p.25). 
3.5.1 Concerns about case study research 
One of the main concerns raised about case studies, however, is that they tend not to provide 
generalizable conclusions. This research was exploratory in nature, and a set of disparate 
organizations were selected as a theoretical sample (in this case a deviant sample approach), 
not a random one, to fill conceptual categories (Eisenhardt, 1989).  It aimed to develop 
theoretical propositions for future research, rather than testing hypotheses, and thus this 
limitation does not affect the quality of the likely conclusions.   
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Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) go on to suggest that individual cases can be compared to 
separate experiments, whereby each one adds to the ability to replicate and advance 
conceptualisation.  Operating inductively, this research may provide avenues for further 
research of a more quantitative nature, whereby generalizable hypotheses can be tested, 
although that is not explicit within the research design used in the study.  Again, this criticism 
arises from a positivist perspective where as “interpretivists, on the other hand, will select cases 
on the basis of their inherent interest (for example paradigmatic cases), not because they are 
typical of a category but for what they tell us about complex social process” (Della Porta and 
Keating, 2008b, p.29).  Della Porta and Keating identify the most common methods associated 
with different research traditions. 
Table 8: Research methodologies and methods 
 Positivist Post-positivist Interpretivist Humanistic 
Which 
methodology? 
Empiricist, 
aiming at 
knowing the 
reality 
Mainly 
empiricist, 
recognizing 
context 
Relative focus 
on meanings, 
context 
Focus on 
values, meaning 
and purposes 
Which 
method/s? 
Imitating the 
natural method 
(experiments, 
mathematical 
models, 
statistical 
analysis)  
Based upon 
approximations 
to the natural 
method 
(experiments, 
statistical 
analysis, 
quantitative 
interviews) 
Seeking 
meaning (textual 
analysis, 
discourse 
analysis) 
Empathetic 
interactions 
between 
researchers and 
object of 
research 
Source: taken from Della Porta and Keating (2008b, p.32) 
Drawing on Table 8, this research sits in the interpretivist tradition, and hence does not attempt 
to provide a generalised conclusion on the basis of a large number of case studies or test 
hypotheses.  Instead, it uses a smaller number of case organizations that are, within the 
bounds of a limited pool, self-selecting.   The rationale and method for identifying and selecting 
case organizations is explained below in section 3.5.2. 
3.5.2 Sampling methods 
The unit of analysis is the English unitary local government body, usually referred to as a local 
authority or council.  This is a municipal administrative and democratic body responsible for 
delivering a wide range of services at a ‘local’ level, both on behalf of central government, and 
with legislation that constructs a level of sovereign identity and power for itself.  Versions of 
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local authority boundaries have existed since early history, and were more or less fluid over a 
long period; the most recent changes were enacted in 2009 via the Local Government and 
Public Involvement in Health Act 2007.  The modern conception of the local authority, however, 
can be traced back to the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, which replaced the mediaeval 
boundaries (Wilson and Game, 2011).  Local authorities are not coterminous with 
parliamentary constituencies, and tend to have several MPs per authority. English local 
government contains a range of organizational forms, but can be broadly split into ‘unitary 
authorities’, which have control of the full range of powers and duties given to local government 
in a single area, and ‘two-tier’ areas, where a ‘county council’ has responsibility for some 
services (e.g. social services, libraries, highways, education), and a series of smaller ‘district 
councils’ have responsibility for others (such as planning, waste, etc.). 
The decision was taken to restrict this research to unitary councils, as they are responsible for 
the full range of services and can thus be considered as the key municipal body for an area, 
responsible (organizationally) only to central government and regulatory bodies.  Therefore, 
they have the most control over their performance and service management framework, 
whereas district councils are accountable for some services to counties as higher 
administrative and democratic bodies.  For the purposes of this research, no distinction is 
drawn between the unitary authorities, metropolitan borough councils (unitaries created out of 
the dissolution of metropolitan counties in 1974) or London boroughs, who took on status as 
unitary authorities after the dissolution of the Greater London Council in the Local Government 
Act 1985.  Despite the development of the London mayoral arrangements in the Greater 
London Authority Act 1999, which gave some coordination powers to the new Greater London 
Assembly (GLA), London boroughs still retain a de facto unitary status.  In the eight English 
core cities (Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, and 
Sheffield), city region arrangements have been developing over the last 15 years.  These are 
in some ways analogous to the GLA in that they are formed from representatives of the 
individual authorities in the sub-region, and have largely coordination and influencing roles, 
rather than powers in primary legislation. 
As this research does not seek to make generalizable conclusions, a non-probabilistic 
sampling method was deployed.  Probabilistic sampling is a defining characteristic of 
quantitative research (David and Sutton, 2011) in that it seeks to select a sample that will stand 
the greatest chance of representing the whole population, based on key characteristics (Gray, 
2013).  The larger the sample, the greater is the likelihood that the sample reflects the general 
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population, and hence any conclusions drawn from testing the sample can be generalized 
(Robson, 2011).  Probabilistic sampling can be of the following types: random, systematic, 
stratified, clustered, multi-stage or a mixture of these.  It attempts to minimise the probability of 
the results of the statistical tests used being the result of random chance.  Random sampling 
is only possible when the entirety of the population is known (Gray, 2013) and may use a 
random number chart or website; each participant is selected at random.  System sampling 
takes an initial random selection as the starting point, then selects every nth member on the 
list, where n is the sample size / the total population.  This is open to selection bias if the list is 
not assembled in a randomized order.  A stratified sample breaks down the population into 
groups using a defining characteristic that is relevant to the research question.  Each level, or 
stratum, is a discrete group within the population (e.g. ages 10-19, 20-29, 30-39 etc. or 
geographical location).  Randomized sampling can then be used within each stratum.   
However, sampling can be carried out using non-generalizable methods, i.e. the sample is 
selected for reasons other than attempting to represent the general population.  This method 
is possible when the results do not need to be extrapolated to the overall population.  This can 
include samples of opportunity (or convenience sampling), quota sampling, purposive sampling, 
snowball sampling, and special case sampling (adapted from Bryman and Bell, 2011; Gray, 
2013; Robson, 2011).  Opportunity sampling takes the most easily available group as the 
sample.  It can be considered an unsatisfactory method, as it is not generalizable, nor does it 
allow selection on the basis of desirable criteria (Gray, 2013, p.275).  However, these concerns 
are not applicable to exploratory research. 
Therefore, this research utilised a deviant case analysis (David and Sutton, 2011) approach to 
selected organizations to participate.  The research is not seeking to make generalizable 
conclusions about all local authorities; thus, whilst randomised sampling is possible, it was 
considered inappropriate for addressing the research questions outlined in section 3.4.  The 
phenomenological stance taken means that purposes sampling of case studies is acceptable 
and in order to address Gray’s (2013) concerns around desirable criteria, selection of case 
studies was based on relevant data around authority performance.  Because this research 
explores attitudes towards the improvement regimes implemented during 1997-2010, the 
2007/8 and 2008/9 external assessments were used.  These are both the most recent 
assessments available, and in fact the last ever assessments, as the CAA regime was removed 
in 2010, prior to assessments being published.  All available data on unitary authorities was 
used (Audit Commission, 2015) having been taken from the National Archives website for the 
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Audit Commission, as the commission formally closed in March 2015.  This comprised 114 
authorities, as not all had reported data, and an average overall performance score for each 
authority was compiled using the weightings for corporate block scores in the CPA and CAA 
frameworks.  This used scores for the corporate assessments, star rating, and use of resources 
for CPA, and the scores for managing performance, overall organizational assessment, and 
overall use of resources for CAA as proxies for combined performance and financial 
management.  These combined averages were used to identify those authorities with the most 
improvement and least improvement from 2008 to 2009.  This generated a list of 24 authorities.  
It should be noted that this analysis selected authorities based on their improvement levels, 
not absolute performance levels.  Table 9 below provides the data used to construct the 
selection criteria for the selected authorities, i.e. it does not list the authorities in the middle that 
were not put into the overall pool.   
A review of the information available on each council’s website generated of a list of contacts 
to approach.  Wherever possible, the most senior officer with explicit responsibility for 
performance and improvement was selected as the appropriate person to approach.  In some 
the authorities showing most deterioration in CPA / CAA scores, no clear responsible lead for 
performance was identifiable, which may have been indicative of the authority’s approach.  In 
these instances, the most appropriate corporate director (or in one or two cases, the chief 
executive) was selected. 
A letter outlining the research proposal, the researcher’s background and the research’s 
methods was drafted, agreed with the supervisory team, and sent as hard copy to each named 
officer, along with a one-side sheet explaining the intellectual background.  The letter indicated 
that the recipient would be contacted within three weeks to discuss the proposal.   
In fact, ten councils approached the researcher requesting to participate, meaning that no 
follow up was required to secure participants. Robson (2011) expresses concerns around the 
impact of delivering research in organizations and the likelihood of poorly implemented 
research causing difficulties for future researchers in the same organization.  As a matter of 
tact, authorities were not directly told that they had been selected as representing the worst or 
best improving councils, but rather that they had an interesting performance story to tell. 
One authority pulled out shortly after agreeing to participate without giving a reason.  Another 
also declined without giving a reason, partway through the scheduling process.  In the case of 
the remaining two, arrangements were fully complete.  One authority dropped out because of 
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the loss of the senior officer (head of service) responsible for performance meant that the 
relevant corporate director wished to implement a restructure and felt that participating would 
interfere with that process.  The main contact expressed some frustration and felt that having 
an independent person provide an overview of what was working or not working would have 
been useful but was unable to convince senior management.  The final authority pulled out the 
week before the start of data collection in their authority, citing the demands of a peer review 
as the cause, and suggesting that the data collection would be difficult to manage.  The result 
of this process was that there was a split of authorities with three in the Northwest (including 
the pilot), one in London, one in the South East, and one in the South West.   
This left six authorities, which was felt would be sufficient in terms of generating data.  As the 
research did not seek to use a random sample to provide a generalizable result, and instead 
sought to generate theoretical insights from cases that could then be further developed or 
tested, this was felt to be a reasonable position.
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Table 9: Deviant case study analysis 
Council 
Direction of 
travel 2008 
Star 
category 
2008 
Corporate 
assessment 
2008 
Use of 
resources 
2008 
Overall Org. 
Assessment 
2009 
Managing 
Performance  
2009 
Use of 
Resources 
(Overall) 
2009 
2008 
Average 
2009 
Average 
2008-9 
change 
Kirklees 2 4 4 3 2 2 2 3.25 2.00 -1.25 
Telford and 
Wrekin 3 3 4 3 2 2 2 3.25 2.00 -1.25 
Waltham 
Forest 3 4 3 3 2 2 2 3.25 2.00 -1.25 
Warrington 3 4 3 3 2 2 2 3.25 2.00 -1.25 
Knowsley 3 4 3 4 2 2 3 3.50 2.33 -1.17 
East Riding of 
Yorkshire 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4.00 3.00 -1.00 
Middlesbrough 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4.00 3.00 -1.00 
South 
Gloucestershire 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4.00 3.00 -1.00 
Sutton 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4.00 3.00 -1.00 
Walsall 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3.00 2.00 -1.00 
Hammersmith 
and Fulham 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3.50 3.67 0.17 
Harrow 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2.50 2.67 0.17 
Hillingdon 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2.50 2.67 0.17 
Plymouth 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2.50 2.67 0.17 
Medway 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2.75 3.00 0.25 
Milton Keynes 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 1.75 2.00 0.25 
Tameside 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.75 4.00 0.25 
Thurrock 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.75 2.00 0.25 
Windsor and 
Maidenhead 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2.75 3.00 0.25 
Liverpool 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2.25 2.67 0.42 
Nottingham 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2.25 2.67 0.42 
Redcar and 
Cleveland 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2.25 2.67 0.42 
Newcastle-
upon-Tyne 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2.50 3.00 0.50 
Swindon 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2.50 3.00 0.50 
Source: Audit Commission cached performance reports from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150421134146/http:/www.audit-commission.gov.uk/  
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3.5.3 Interviewee stratification 
As discussed earlier, interviewees were selected primarily by each authority’s contact person 
responsible for performance.  Because local authority structures are heterogeneous, it was not 
possible to provide a set of job titles and request interviews with these, and asking authorities 
to attempt to fit their own structures against a notional single type seemed unsatisfactory.  
Instead a set of general guidelines were given to contacts responsible for arrangement 
interviews and focus groups.  These were that interviews should comprise 6-8 staff with 
responsibility for leadership of performance management systems in the widest sense, and 
that this should include both corporate staff and senior departmental staff, preferably including 
Children’s and Adults’ services where possible, and ideally including the elected member with 
cabinet portfolio for performance.  Focus groups should involve staff with a more ‘hands-on’, 
operational role within performance, again with a mix of corporate and departmental staff. 
Inevitably, some interviewees withdrew from interviews due to workload pressures.  Efforts 
were made to replace these with other staff where possible.  Interviewees there were drawn 
from a range of levels within the organization.  Table 10: Level of case study interviewees 
provides a description of the hierarchical level of interviews within each organization.  
‘Corporate’ signifies anyone who sits on the most senior management team in the organisation, 
i.e. usually the chief executive and (executive) directors.  In this instance, this also means the 
cabinet member for performance.  ‘Departmental’ indicates the next layer down within the 
organization, i.e. the management team of individual departments (assistant directors, heads 
of service), and ‘Service’ is used to identify the next level down again, usually individual service 
managers.  Interviewees are given the label of the most senior group or level they work at.  For 
example, and executive director both sits on the corporate management and their departmental 
management team, thus would be given the ‘corporate’ label.  This is slightly more problematic 
for staff who have corporate responsibility for a service or area, such as head of performance, 
or head of communications.  These staff sit on departmental management teams, but may 
have a wider remit than, say, head of planning.  To avoid the suggestion of over-estimating the 
level, these staff were given the departmental label. 
Case studies were given a code name.  These were: 
• Bell Tower (B) 
• Castle Gate (C) 
• Long Reach (L) 
• Merry Park (M) 
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• Rudgeway (R) 
• Stocks Green (S) 
 
Interview participant were given a randomly assigned interview number and a single alpha 
code to identify the authority, e.g. Rudgeway had seven interviews, coded as R1, R2, R3 etc. 
The interview numbers were random and do not indicate seniority or chronological position. 
Table 10: Level of case study interviewees 
 Long 
Reach 
Rudge
way 
Merry 
Park 
Castle 
Gate 
Stocks 
Green 
Bell 
Tower 
Total 
Corporate L4 R5, R6 M1 C1, C4 S1 B2 8 
Departmental L1, L2, L3, 
R1, R3, 
R4, R7 M3 
C5, C6, 
C7 
S3, S4, 
S5 
B1, B3, 
B4, B5 18 
Service  L5 R2 M2, M4, M5 C2, C3 S2 B6 9 
Total 5 7 5 7 5 6 35 
 
The process of self-selection means that participation from the different levels was not evenly 
distributed, and Table 10 demonstrates that the departmental management team level is 
perhaps overrepresented.  Given the focus on the individual local authority for this research, 
this was considered acceptable, as the majority of staff interviewed work at a corporate level 
or could be equally be considered part of the corporate capacity for performance and 
improvement. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 the terms ‘corporate’, ‘departmental’ and ‘service’ 
are appended to the interviewee codes to give an indication of hierarchical position each time 
they are directly quoted (e.g. L4 CORPORATE, or S3 DEPARTMENTAL.) 
 Ethical practices and concerns 
A core part of research involving human subjects is complying with ethical procedures required 
by both the host institution and, more generally, as expected through professional academic 
practice.  Failing to comply with these rules not only risks invalidating the findings and their 
acceptability for publication and hence their contribution to academic debate, but also harming 
the chances of other researchers seeking to engage with the same participating organizations.  
3.6.1 General ethical debate 
Punch, cited in David and Sutton (2011) proposes four primary ethical principles for research: 
• Do no harm 
• Do not deceive 
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• Informed consent 
• Right to withdraw 
 
Complying with these principles is a key requirement of good research.   
As Stake highlights (1995, p.45) qualitative research carries substantial risks of ethical 
concerns and resource implications.  This research needed ethical approval as it utilised 
human subjects.  The university’s ethical procedures were followed, and ethical approval was 
given in June 2015.  Agreement was sought from participating institutions between June and 
August 2015.   Primary ethical questions are generally held to be: informed consent, right to 
withdrawal, privacy and anonymity, and protection from harm (David and Sutton, 2011).   
3.6.2 Complying with ethical principles 
As mentioned previously, encouraging research participants, including key decision-makers, 
to reflect on their organization’s approach to performance carries with it several risks, namely: 
a desire to avoid making negative judgements about one’s own organization or job 
performance, a desire to put the organization or self in the most positive light, perceived conflict 
between layers of management or between management and members of governance bodies, 
such as trustees, board members, councillors or community representatives, or social 
desirability, i.e. telling the researcher what the participant thinks they want to hear. This needed 
to be addressed by sensitive formulation of interview and focus group questions, which were 
piloted in Castle Gate.  Each case study organization had a lead contact in order to facilitate 
and if possible, champion the research within their own organization.  These contacts provided 
a useful resource for developing questions and other materials as part of future research. 
Organizations have been given a code name that allows discussion of the research and 
findings in as natural a way as possible.  Individuals within the councils are referred to by codes 
in the thesis to maintain anonymity, as job titles do not provide a sufficient level of protection 
at the senior level.  Good practice in terms of emphasising this and the right to withdrawal was 
followed both during consent procedures and before actual contact for interviews / focus groups.  
Interview data will be kept for an agreed period of no longer than 10 years, and digital data was 
kept securely on university computers or password protected laptops once transferred from 
recording devices. 
As has been highlighted in section 2.8, public services are facing restricted budgets under the 
espoused need for ‘austerity’, a code for the reduction in general public expenditure and the 
size of the state.  It is also possible that this will generate resistance to participating in the 
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research if the organizations decide that the benefit of participating is not worth the likely 
resource requirements; this may have been the case in the authorities that withdrew prior to 
data collection.  Efforts were made to minimise the impact on participating individuals and 
organizations in order to minimise any possible harm, and there may be opportunities for some 
of the outputs of the research to inform organizational practices and thus generate benefit for 
participants; it is felt that the feedback sessions after data collection were helpful, and three of 
the case studies requested feedback to a more senior group, and all six indicated they would 
be interested in a longer-term relationship around improving performance management.  This 
may also present a conflict with confidentiality, although this can be addressed.   
 Data collection 
The core data for this research was provided through qualitative interviewing of participants 
within case study organizations.  As described in section 3.4.4, the primary method of data 
collection is via interview recordings and transcripts.  All interviews and focus groups were 
digitally recorded and transferred to a password protected laptop. Field notes were also taken 
and these, along with general observations, documents provided, and conversations with 
organizational contacts form the basis of the data from which conclusions have been drawn. 
3.7.1 Assessing the quality of data 
The question of research data quality is one that transcends philosophies, worldviews and 
methods.  Lincoln and Guba (1985) outline initial criteria for assessing qualitative research.  
They suggested a framework for translating the key criteria from positivist, generally 
quantitative research into terms more suited to naturalistic (i.e. qualitative) methods: 
Table 11: Criteria for assessing quality of data 
Positivist term Naturalistic 
term (e.g. here, 
Interpretivist) 
Explanation 
Internal validity Credibility What is the degree of congruence between what has been 
said and ‘truth’ (or ‘truths’)? 
Generalizability Transferability To what extent can conclusions or observations be 
addressed to alternate but similar contexts?  Can we draw 
out theoretical perspectives that can help understand other 
situations? 
Reliability Dependability Could the investigation be repeated? Has the research 
been well planned? 
Objectivity Confirmability How confident can we be that the conclusions are based on 
participants’ views, not researcher bias? 
Source: Adapted from (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Seale, 1999; Shenton, 2004) 
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This has been challenged, including by Lincoln and Guba themselves, as the terms are still 
grounded in a positivist world, and because they focus on the method as the primary means of 
ensuring quality, i.e. believing that the more rigorous the methods used, the more credible the 
claims (Symon and Cassell, 2012, pp.207-8).  It could be argued that attempting to justify the 
quality of qualitative research using the discourse of quantitative methods is to admit defeat 
before the debate has even begun. 
As Shipman observes, “it is easy to detect subjectivity in social research.  It is impossible to 
confirm objectivity” (Shipman, 1997, p.18).  ‘True’ detachment or objectivity would be 
considered an impossibility within the worldview that underpins much qualitative research, and 
indeed undesirable, as broadly speaking, constructionist qualitative research considers 
meaning to be subjective and co-constructed; thus, interactive methods are more appropriate 
and more credible in bringing participants’ views to the fore.  
It is also difficult to discuss quality without touching on the politics of qualitative research.   
Denzin and Lincoln take a clear view of the need for qualitative research to make a (political) 
contribution to issues such as “social justice, equity, nonviolence, peace, and universal human 
rights” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p.11).  Denzin goes on to suggest that this is closely linked 
to discourses around standardization, guidelines, and the rise of the “evidence-based model”  
(Denzin, 2011, p.645).  Radnor (2001) also argues that developing and maintaining trust 
through the data gathering process is the primary way that credibility is enhanced in qualititative 
research. 
The primary methods used to establish or demonstrate data quality for this research related to 
the inductive nature of the data analysis, the use of Audit Commission selection criteria, 
Radnor’s (2001) trust / rapport building, the self-selecting by organizations of interview 
participants, and the semi-structured nature of questions (see section 3.4.4 and Appendix iv).  
The selection criteria explicitly used data on performance trends rather than ‘absolute’ 
performance level data.  This intentionally avoided selecting only high-performing or poorly-
performing authorities to maximise the diversity of insights generated from case studies. 
The researcher’s professional career (see section 1.2, page 23) provided an ability to generate 
rapport through a shared history of dealing with the regulatory frameworks and challenges, and 
the ability to tell ‘war stories’, i.e. sharing experiences to elicit a response from interviewees 
about how similar events transpired (Robson, 2011).  Often these were outside of the 
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recordings and in the initial conversations with the primary contacts within the 
authorities.(Radnor, 2001)  
As this research sits within an interpretive tradition, it does not seek a single ‘truth’. Individual 
authorities will represent different views of performance and responses to the challenges 
presented by austerity and national policy, and intra-organizational differences are also to be 
expected.  Managing the performance of children’s services is different to managing an asset-
based, environmental service, for example. Credibility relies on congruence between 
interviewees within the same organization for cross-case analysis, or between any 
respondents for theoretical generalising. 
3.7.2 Authority case studies 
The selected authorities that form the research are referred to by anonymous code names and 
represent a mixed picture in terms of overall deprivation / affluence (DCLG, 2015a). Table 12 
below provides a breakdown of the relative position within the deprivation rankings. 
Table 12: Relative deprivation of case studies 
  IMD overall quintile Region No of 
interviewees 
Deprivation 
level 
Merry Park 5th 80-100% South West 5 Most affluent 
Rudgeway 4th 60-80% London 7  
Long Reach 4th 60-80% South East 5  
Bell Tower 3rd 40-60% North West 6  
Stocks Green 1st 0-20% North West 5  
Castle Gate 1st 0-20% North West 7 Most deprived 
Source: DCLG (2015a) 
These authorities were not equally distributed across the country, because of the self-selecting 
nature of the sample.  There was a predominance of North West authorities (three out of six), 
and two authorities are in the same quintile for deprivation.  This may prove a potential limitation, 
although there is no regional structure or body to impose a unified approach, and no evidence 
emerged from the discussions to suggest any isomorphic pressure (none of the authorities, 
including Stocks Green and Castle Gate could be considered geographically neighbouring 
authorities). 
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A brief pen picture of each authority is provided below to give a sense of context.  Statistics on 
size, deprivation, demography etc. have been made deliberately more vague to avoid making 
any of the councils identifiable. 
3.7.3  Merry Park 
Merry Park is a unitary authority in the South West of England.  It is in the top (fifth) quintile for 
deprivation (i.e. within the 20% most affluent).  It therefore is characterised by a largely wealthy 
population, although there are also small pockets of deprived wards.  The population is around 
90% White, with a South Asian population of between 4 and 7%.  The borough is split over two 
main towns, surrounded by rural areas, and has had a stable Conservative council for around 
10 years. The borough has several significant historic features of interest, and is well served 
by transport links to major cities.  
3.7.4 Rudgeway 
Rudgeway is a London borough of relative affluence when compared nationally.  It is in the 
fourth quintile for deprivation, i.e. more affluent than between 60-79% of all authorities.  Despite 
this, the borough does have some areas of concentrated deprivation, and like many London 
boroughs, it has a diverse population, which brings challenges around service delivery and 
community cohesion.  It has a small Labour majority council, and has recently had changes to 
the council leadership. 
3.7.5 Long Reach 
Long Reach is a unitary authority in the South West of England.  It is in the fourth quintile for 
deprivation, i.e. it is more affluent than 60-79% of other authorities.  It has a small Conservative 
majority council, and has been fairly stable for a decade or so, before which no party had 
overall control (NOC).  It is based around a single large town, with a series of smaller, satellite 
towns and rural areas. The population is not highly diverse, and in the last census just over 90% 
of residents identify as White or other White. 
3.7.6 Bell Tower 
Bell Tower is a unitary authority in the North West of England.  It is centred on a single large 
town, but also includes some smaller towns and rural areas.  It is in the third quintile for 
deprivation, i.e. it is more affluent than between 40 and 59% of all authorities.  Despite this, it 
contains some areas of significant deprivation and societal challenges.  The borough is not 
particularly diverse in terms of population ethnicity, and is between 91% and 94% white, 
although there is a set of growing Asian communities; the population is approximately 200,000.  
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The council is Labour controlled, although it has also been subject to no overall control (NOC) 
previously.   
3.7.7 Stocks Green 
Stocks Green is a highly deprived unitary authority in the North West of England.  It is in the 
bottom (first) quintile for deprivation, i.e. it is more deprived that 80-99% of all other authorities.  
It comprises a main town, and a series of smaller, satellite towns.  The borough has high levels 
of unemployment, and poor health compared nationally.  It performs better in educational 
attainment than other, similar areas.  The borough is part of a section of post-industrial land, 
and is located on the outskirts of a major city. 
3.7.8 Castle Gate 
Castle Gate is a highly deprived unitary authority in the North West of England.  It is in the 
bottom (first) quintile, i.e. is more deprived than 80-99% of all other authorities.  It has a stable 
Labour majority council and has been under single party control for some time.  The borough 
has high levels of unemployment, poor health, and poor educational attainment when 
compared nationally.  The borough encompasses three main towns, and sections of rural 
greenbelt that cover 70-75% of the borough’s area, although it is also on the outskirts of a 
major city. 
3.7.9 Timetable 
The data collection phase of research was carried out during late 2015 and early 2016, in line 
with a timetable agreed with participating organizations.  Because of the nature of researching 
within organizations, i.e. in the ‘real world’, it is important to both conduct the research ethically, 
but also have an eye on ensuring that the experience is beneficial for both sides, and that the 
participating organization was left happy for future collaboration.  As Robson (2011, p.16) puts 
it, “False moves can inoculate a firm, school or wherever against future involvements, not only 
with you, but also with other potential researchers”.  
To improve the quality of the data collection, Castle Gate was used as a pilot authority, and 
interview questions and context / scene setting discussion was trialled there. From this pilot, 
minor changes to question wording were made. The timetable for interviews and focus groups 
with the six case study organizations is listed below: 
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Table 13: Case study data gathering timetable 
Organization Interviews Focus group 
Castle Gate 23/10/2015 
13/11/2015 
23/10/2015 
13/11/2015 
Bell Tower 23/11/2015 
30/11/2015 
23/11/2015 
30/11/2015 
Merry Park 17-19/11/2015 17-19/11/2015  
Long Reach 4-5/11/2015 5/11/2015 
Rudgeway 28/10/2015 
02/11/2015 
02/11/2015 
Stocks Green 24-26/11/2015 24-26/11/2015 
 
 Approach to data analysis 
Whilst a range of data analysis methods are available, these are largely guided by the 
overarching research philosophy and the operationalisation of the research.  Thus for 
qualitative data collection, forms of qualitative data analysis are requried. 
This research uses inductive thematic data analysis (Cassell and Symon, 2004; Corbin and 
Strauss, 2014; Miles and Huberman, 1994).  Transcripts were considered and relevant, key 
statements highlighted manually.  These were reviewed and organised into a series of 
qualitative statements, which were then grouped together into first order codes, and then 
further grouped into a smaller number of aggregated dimensions, representing higher level 
concepts.  This coding approach has been demonstrated elsewhere (e.g. Zimmermann et al., 
2015) and broadly follows Radnor’s six-step approach (Radnor, 2001, p.71). 
The first line of analysis is the questioning during the interviews themselves (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2014, p.69).  These aimed to generate a diverse set of answers, rather than 
encouraging respondents to conform to an existing set of theoretical or practical ideas.  
Therefore, the primary goal in analysing the data was to identify items of ‘interest’ that could 
provide support for theoretical development; i.e. not just a comparative understanding of 
similarities and differences between cases, but incidents, perspectives and comments that are 
uniquely interesting in their own right.  In part, this is due to the divergent nature of these 
organizations.  Whilst the statutory duties facing each local authority are the same (all case 
studies being unitary / single tier authorities), the local context of each area – the demography, 
geography, political control etc. – means that authorities are distinctive organizations, with 
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divergent structures, cultures, staff etc.  In some cases, the processes should be similar yet 
can still have discrete goals.  Whilst quantitative methods often seem to highlight similarities 
between the data, qualitative research provides a route to identifying difference.  This research 
purposefully used a deviant case approach to generate the potential to stimulate divergent 
responses to the questioning, and then aimed to use this as a basis for theoretical development 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
The primary focus was not on establishing specifically each authority’s individual approach, 
although a certain degree of cross-case analysis is helpful.  Similarly, semi-structured 
interviews guided participants to discuss certain areas rather than allowing free rein over any 
topics interviewees wished to discuss, whilst still allowing for diversions and deviations. 
Interview data was bounded in terms of specific domains of discussion, but equally the 
interviewee was allowed to interpret the relatively open questions in whichever way they wished.  
Qualitative codes unify themes and topics across interviews, and thus an inductive approach, 
based on codes that emerged from reading the texts, was preferred. 
To best achieve this, transcripts were read in a randomised order, i.e. not in the same order as 
the interviews took place, and not grouped together by organization.  Individual transcripts were 
read and hand-coded by manually highlighting key phrases that appeared relevant to the 
overall research questions, and where consistent themes were emerging, i.e. the use of 
‘conversations’ as a term to describe face-to-face performance evaluations.  Examples of this 
coding can be seen in Appendix vii Samples of transcript and coding on page 323.  Transcripts 
were annotated by hand, and these annotations provided the basis for the first level of coding 
structure.  This structure was allowed to emerge, rather than being imposed on the data, and 
manual coding facilitated the inductive nature of the data.  Annotations and highlighting 
included inter alia the following types: 
• Direct selection of pertinent quotes (highlighted in yellow and orange) 
• Evaluative judgements by the coder around features of note in the authority’s approach 
• Interesting use of language (e.g. ‘conversations’ or ‘us and them’ morphology) 
• Judgements on the tonal nature of language 
• Tensions, conflict, connections with other interviewee responses 
 
These were entered into a coding framework adapted from Zimmermann et al. (2015)  and 
used to build up a picture of the relational aspects across transcripts (this can be found in 
Appendix ix: Interview coding analysis sheet, page 328).  This grouped together statements of 
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similar nature into clusters, then summarising these into the first line of analysis ‘qualitative 
statements about’. These statements were reviewed and placed in a table and clustered again 
around conceptual headings aligned into ‘first order codes’.  These codes were reviewed and 
statements re-evaluated to explore whether they comprised meaningful aggregation of 
empirical statements, and then these statements were developed into a series of ‘first order 
codes’.  These were finally collapsed into a set of aggregate dimensions, the term used by 
Zimmermann et al. (2015) to describe the highest level of abstraction.  
The qualitative statements and codes were interpreted throughout the analysis phase and the 
writing of the finding and discussion chapters, which involved a repeated review and discussion 
around the credibility of the conclusions until a more parsimonious set emerged that had 
sufficient empirical weight of data to demonstrate usefulness.  This is often presented in the 
literature as a cascading, linear process.  Qualitative data like that which this research uses is 
generally ‘messier’ than this. Sense-making is a continual re-evaluation and contextualisation 
of the layers of meaning embedded within transcripts, supplemented by researcher knowledge, 
field notes, and academic literature (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Radnor, 2001).  
The analytical cycle was carried out several times in a non-linear fashion to critically appraise 
the resultant structure, which is provided here in Table 28, section Appendix ix, page 328.  For 
example, a fifth and sixth aggregate dimension initially emerged from the data.  The fifth, which 
concerned the operationalisation of services, did not have sufficient critical mass to justify an 
explicit dimension of its own and was collapsed into two of the other dimensions.  The sixth, 
which concerned the use of language, provided some insights, but was not necessary to be 
able to answer the research questions and was shelved for future research as an explicit theme.  
There was sufficient reference to linguistic concerns made throughout the rest of the findings. 
It should be recognised, however, that the inductive and interpretive nature of this research 
meant that this process was not as structured or linear as a quantitative, hypothesis-testing 
approach, and hence resulted in a messier, but perhaps richer set of data. Critiquing and re-
critiquing the interpretation of the data finally provided a set of four aggregated dimensions, 
and a series of first order codes that support each dimension.  This structure, if is felt, has 
sufficient theoretical and empirical coherence to support the development of some future 
propositions and theoretical development.  
Qualitative, interpretive analysis is always a subjective process, and relies on establishing a 
credible narrative, supported by sufficient empirical data.  Yet it is difficult to specify what 
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‘sufficient empirical data’ means in this context.  Additionally, the analysis was performed by a 
single coder and therefore did not provide an opportunity to assess inter-coder reliability, a 
common technique to enhance the data quality.  The emergent analysis was discussed at 
several points with the supervisory team to mitigate this. 
 Chapter summary 
This chapter has discussed a range of research philosophies that should be considered when 
developing a research project.  This research takes a consciously interpretivist stance to 
exploring the way that staff in local authorities perceive the impact and legacy of the New 
Labour performance assessment reforms; this is considered appropriate to the research 
questions.  The research questions outlined were operationalized into a series of semi-
structured interview questions that allowed participants sufficient space to develop the 
conversation around the nature of their organization’s approach.  This research purposefully 
does not develop hypotheses for testing, but rather takes an inductive stance to reviewing the 
data and allowing conclusions and theoretical propositions to emerge. 
Authorities with improving and declining records in performance as assessed by the regulatory 
regime were chosen through theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) to facilitate 
theoretical development and propositions.  Data from these cases has been analysed to 
provide an empirical base from which a theoretical discussion can be developed.  This analysis 
is intentionally structured to allow meanings and interpretation to emerge from a reading of the 
directly gathered data, i.e. interview transcripts, along with field observations and perceptions 
of the interview and data-gathering activities.  The semi-structured nature of the interview 
questions, along with the interpretive nature of the analysis provided a rich but messy data set.   
In order to provide a credible interpretation of the data, a process of reading and re-reading the 
data facilitated the imposition of a structured, hierarchical format with qualitative statements, 
first order codes and aggregated dimensions.  This data structure was reviewed and the 
transcripts revisited to ensure that there is sufficient empirical support on which to base the 
analysis and emergent propositions.  These are described in further detail in chapter 4: 
Findings: Organization, politics, and performance and Chapter 5: Findings: Inspection, 
accountability, and austerity. 
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Chapter 4. Findings: Organization, politics, and performance 
 Introduction and structure of findings chapters 
This chapter and the following one draw together the findings from the empirical data 
gathering, and use some analytical steps to summarise and condense the qualitative data 
into meaningful categories.  As has been mentioned earlier, this research is purposefully 
not generalizable, although part of the analytical stage work is to draw out some themes, 
patterns and contradictions that are used to formulate both recommendations for practice, 
and future research propositions; these are covered in more detail in Chapter 8.  Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5 are therefore a summary of key themes driven by the inductive analysis 
and emergent aggregate dimensions.   
As described in section 3.8, the empirical data were inductively analysed to highlight 
themes and patterns – these are presented in Table 14 below.  Whilst seven a priori 
dimensions were identified through the conceptual development stage, the interpretive 
stance taken by this research facilitated an inductive reinterpretation of the data, rather 
than a testing a series of specific hypotheses or seeking direct evidence of these 
dimensions, therefore these data are not presented against the original dimensions.  The 
original dimensions are then re-evaluated on page 178, section 6.3 
Because of the individualistic nature of the different case studies, care must be taken to 
draw conclusions from across the data without generalising from a small evidence base 
that may not have sufficient weight of evidence to support this.  This does not mean, 
however, that conclusions, propositions, and theoretical abstractions are not achievable; 
this is certainly possible and this research aimed to do so. 
As described in section 3.8, direct portions of the transcripts were coded into qualitative 
statements - analytical propositions anchored in the textual material itself.  These were 
reviewed as they emerged inductively and aggregated into first order codes, which were 
reviewed and condensed in a more parsimonious set.  First order codes have been given 
a two-character code that links to the aggregate dimension, and a number to differentiate 
them (e.g. OP1, PM2). 
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Table 14: Aggregate dimensions and first-order codes 
Aggregate dimension and first-order codes Code 
Organizational and political challenges: 
Politicization of performance OP1 
Corporate, departmental, and external relationships  OP2 
Staffing and expertise  OP3 
  
Performance management frameworks 
The ‘death of improvement’  PM1 
Renewal of performance management frameworks PM2 
Authentic performance management PM3 
  
Inspection and accountability 
Responses to deregulation IA1 
Differing forms of accountability IA2 
Residual external and peer inspections IA3 
  
Austerity and finance 
Dominance of austerity financial targets AF1 
Value for money in an age of austerity AF2 
Commissioning and insourcing / outsourcing AF3 
 
These dimensions have been split into two chapters.  The structure of these is presented 
in Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3: Structure of findings chapters 
 
Overall findings in 
analysis chapters
Chapter 4: Organization, 
politics, and performance
Organizational and political 
challenges (OP1-3)
Performance management 
framworks (PM1-3)
Chapter 5: Inspection, 
accountability, and austerity
Inspection and accountability 
(IA1-3)
Austerity and finance (AF1-3)
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These dimensions and codes are considered in turn in the following chapters and sections.  
Quotations are provided as support for the coding and analysis.  Each individual response 
has been given an anonymised reference comprised of the first letter of the case study 
code name and a randomly assigned number, e.g. R1 is the first listed respondent from 
Rudgeway etc., (n.b. not the first interviewed or necessarily the most senior).  Table 10: 
Level of case study interviewees in section 3.5.3 provides a breakdown of each 
respondent by hierarchical position in the organization, and the hierarchical level is 
provided with each transcript reference, e.g. S1 CORPORATE.  
Table 15: List of case study codenames and interviewees 
Case study organization Respondent codes 
Bell Tower B1-6 
Castle Gate C1-7 
Long Reach L1-5 
Merry Park M1-5 
Rudgeway R1-7 
Stocks Green S1-5 
Total: 35 
 
 Organizational and political challenges: 
As is perhaps to be expected, the level of financial challenge facing all authorities 
presented a range of political and organizational problems that featured heavily in the 
interviews.  Most of the staff interviewed were at a senior level, where daily contact with 
elected members was a common occurrence.  The following first order codes emerged 
as most significant from the data: 
• Politicization of performance (OP1) 
• Corporate, departmental, and external relationships (OP2) 
• Staffing levels, and the loss of individual expertise (OP3) 
 
4.2.1 Politicization of performance (OP1) 
Political and democratic reform was a significant part of New Labour reform, but this 
addressed mainly the systems and process, rather than political ambitions.  Whilst local 
authorities have always been politically-led organizations, NPM is viewed as a 
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managerialist perspective (Clarke and Newman, 1997), which also strongly informed 
performance management.  During the period of reforms covered by this research, i.e. 
1997-2010, the organizational assessment regimes exerted a substantial influence over 
performance targets, measures, and priorities – these are coercive forces in the 
institutional sense (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  The Best Value regime included roughly 
1,500 actual performance indicators, and each of these had a definition, contained in the 
BVPI manual. Historical performance was statutorily reported via several mechanisms, 
including the Best Value Performance Plan (BVPP) that every authority had to produce 
annually, as well as data returns made directly to central government and government 
departments.  The Audit Commission was tasked with both collecting this data, assuring 
its data quality, and producing comparative data on performance measures and 
aggregated performance ‘blocks’.  Calculating the ‘stretch’ against each performance 
measure was a key part of auditing processes done by external bodies (i.e. the 
commission and, latterly, private sector companies working on behalf of the commission) 
and was a required component of the internal auditing and performance management 
arrangements expected by authorities themselves. 
The result of this was an enormous degree of prescription in terms of what was measured, 
how this was defined, and how it was expected to be collected, calculated, and compared.  
This clearly suggests a tension between the espoused rhetoric of authorities having to  
understand and address local needs and ambitions (Audit Commission, 2002, 2005, 2009) 
and the reality of what was actually measured (Leach, 2010).   
Here, the rhetoric of political will expressed through local determination came into conflict 
with the clear expectation of continuous improvement in delivery against the entire gamut 
of performance measures included in the Best Value system. Whilst documents such as 
the corporate plan could express a series of objectives for an individual local authority 
these were unlikely to vary significantly as they were often written at a high level of 
abstraction, and the overall purposes and services offered by local authorities do not vary 
significantly.  These documents were clearly bounded by the expectations of central 
government in terms of delivering central policy, the range of statutory services, and the 
assumptions of continued growth built into the assessment regimes.   
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Reforms to this system appeared to be moving in a more positive direction in 2007 with 
the creation of the much-reduced National Indicator Set, which brought down the number 
of performance indicators to a much more manageable 198, and a clearer sense of 
‘agreeing’ targets via mechanisms such as Local Area Agreements, as outlined the Local 
Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, which introduced 
Comprehensive Area Assessment.  However, the decision to dismantle this entire 
apparatus was taken soon after the Coalition Government was formed in May 2010. 
An explicit sense of political ambition was expressed in performance management 
frameworks; often in the form of political ‘pledges’ in manifestos.  Whilst this could be 
seen as an indicator of stronger political control, this politicization of performance was 
fairly pervasive throughout all the case studies.  The bounding of service delivery ambition 
as described above meant that during the 1997-2010 era, it was harder for clear political 
expressions of ambition to emerge.  However, the removal of the regulatory regimes 
appeared to have facilitated a more explicit sense of politicization within performance 
management.  Rudgeway in particular had made this a key feature of their revision to 
their performance management framework (PMF), which was built around a series of 
explicit political manifesto pledges, and a new officer and member governance group held 
departments to account for delivery against those pledges.   
So, it’s about showing our values as an administration, of framing those decisions that we’re 
making. (R6 CORPORATE) 
We also have performance measures around the corporate plan and the corporate priorities – 
how to achieve the objectives in the manifesto, the manifesto pledges (R2 SERVICE) 
Others also saw it as part of the landscape of organizational goal setting in a 
straightforward way.  
So, that kind of corporate top level in terms of the pledges, priorities, that basically we feed the 
information that is needed for that (L2 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Whilst statutory responsibilities for services endure, there was acceptance of the 
importance of political ambitions and leadership in the strategic planning arena, both in 
terms of creating the culture required and in providing the detail of the content.  The 
language used referred to pledges, promises etc. and did not reflect the more corporatist 
managerial language of objectives and goals. 
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 I think there are two or three strands. One is around clear plans, whether that’s a council four-
year strategic plan, which reflects the manifesto ambitions as well as our statutory obligations. 
(M3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
I think our performance management culture or improvement culture is there through various 
mechanisms, strong political leadership on it, strong senior officer leadership on it (S2 SERVICE) 
So, our vision is accompanied by thirty pledges (L5 SERVICE) 
Perhaps somewhat contradictorily, Merry Park’s cabinet member for performance felt that 
the manifesto commitments should be viewed as a “collateral achievement”. 
Although I have a number that directly lead to me, I am an enabler for many, many of the 130 
or something that we’ve got. I completely understand that and also, I don’t feel myself 
constrained or limited by the – the purpose is not the manifesto commitment. The manifesto 
commitment should be embedded into and a collateral achievement for actually doing a good 
job (M1 CORPORATE) 
There was also a sense of how these ambitions were being tempered by the financial 
situation facing local authorities.  Previously, i.e. under the CPA / CAA regime, this would 
have been characterised by a drive for excellence, but now a more realistic sense 
emerged, as interviewees from Stocks Green and Bell Tower suggest. 
Therefore, when you know your own priorities and you’re allowed to set your own priorities, 
you will be more innovative, you will be more imaginative, you will take more of a risk, strongly 
just defending what you know to be right, whereas before you had to defend everything across 
the full key line of enquiries3. (S2 SERVICE) 
But I’m not sure there’d be a drive to be the best council in England.  I think you know, and I 
have heard it said… you know do we need to be the best at everything?  Is good […] good 
enough? (B4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
In Merry Park, though, views differed slightly.  Merry Park as a very affluent authority (in 
the top quintile for affluence) had faced much less severe cuts to its financing, as it relies 
much less on central government funding than the more deprived authorities. 
A member aspiration that says ‘no, we’ll be good or outstanding. We don’t want to be just 
satisfactory. We don’t just want to be adequate. We want to be good or outstanding. We want 
to do that for our residents. Our residents deserve those sorts of services’. I think they would 
say they’re taking into account the demographic mix and the high expectations and the need, 
therefore, to meet members’ ambitions to satisfy residents’ expectations. (M4 SERVICE) 
3 Key lines of enquiry (KLOE) is the term given to the assessment criteria used as part of CPA.  
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These concepts also tie in to a sense of political or democratic accountability (IA2, and 
discussed further in section 7.2, page 223), and how that sense of democratic 
accountability interacted with the way managers felt accountable through broader 
interpretations of governance, i.e. relating back to RQ2.  This tended to address the 
operationalization level, or how policies were put into practice.  When asked about 
accountability, officers were split as to whether they were accountable to elected 
members, or to the public, or both. 
Taxpayers, members of the public.  I think I’m also accountable to the Cabinet, to help them 
deliver what they have set out to deliver and what they’re judged against on the doorstep […] 
Yeah, pledges, priority, and the vision generally.  I don’t think you can take people’s money 
without telling them what they’re getting for it. (L5 SERVICE) 
Well obviously, I’m very accountable as the statutory officer, very accountable to them that’s, 
you know chief exec, a direct line to the chief exec, but you know whether it’s the social worker 
in me or not, I don’t know, at the end of the day I must not lose sight of the service users, and 
that’s part and parcel of what social work is. Now that poses some challenges but mainly that’s 
what the senior officer is all about! (C4 CORPORATE) 
Castle Gate and Stocks Green respondents located accountability in the context of 
outcomes, although both later recognised the challenges around the short-term versus 
long-term nature of outcomes. 
So, [...] in terms of how it's written in my contract, I am accountable to the chief executive and 
to the chief medical officer.  In terms of what that actually looks like, I am measured by…on my 
job and my success by my work plan and on the public health outcomes framework.  (C6 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
So really my accountability is about outcomes, in terms of end of key stages and Ofsted grades. 
(S5 DEPARTMENTAL) 
However, a general sense emerged that whilst accountability to the public was generally 
recognised as important, this accountability was often largely mediated through elected 
members, and that whilst officers (particularly senior officers and those in customer facing 
departments or services) were cognizant of this as a key element of their role, the 
relationship between elected members and the community was perhaps felt to be the 
more important one by officers.   
But actually, this sense of accountability to members and hence helping them to …And we are 
helping them to discharge their responsibility to the public. (L1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
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However, the most senior officers were also felt to be accountable for the achievement of 
overall outcomes. 
And there will be balance in all of this stuff, but my view is that managers should be managing 
the business and elected members and the exec team should be managing the outcomes. (C6 
DEPARTMENTAL)  
The lack of performance information to accompany debates with managers was 
considered an issue by Castle Gate’s chief executive (C1) 
It sometimes feels like you’ve sort of got your eyes closed a little bit and you know you don’t 
really see everything as clearly as you might.  But one of the things I struggle with I suppose, 
the … where I miss it, if I miss it at all, is when I’m stood in front of the members and I’m giving 
them a presentation on how things are going, there’s not a lot to go on. (C1 CORPORATE) 
Staff within social care or education tended to talk about outcomes most frequently, and 
outcomes as goals for them and their services felt part of a natural dialogue.   
Staff within corporate service roles tended to see their relationship as one step removed 
from the public, and saw primarily their customers as internal ones, i.e. those staff in 
service departments that the corporate teams supported.  This was problematized in part 
by the acceptance of the ‘twin role’ nature of a performance and improvement team, that 
is: one part of the role is about supporting improvement activity, and another part is about 
‘policing’ performance in terms of holding departments to account for either their levels of 
performance or their achievement of improvement activities.  This dual role was also a 
source of frustration to many of the internal performance teams and is discussed further 
in the next section, OP2. 
Key finding 1: politicization of performance 
Since deregulation, greater use of political pledges and manifesto commitments has 
made performance management become increasingly politicised. 
 
4.2.2 Corporate, departmental, and external relationships (OP2) 
This was an area of considerable focus.  Interviews included both senior departmental 
and corporate staff, and as might be expected, attitudes differed between these two 
groups.  The intensive nature of the regulatory systems meant that significant teams had 
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developed to service the requirements of the regulatory regime.  Both departmental and 
corporate staff referred to this as ‘feeding the beast’ or ‘feeding the machine’.  
Deregulation, however, coupled with the harsh financial environment, has served to 
challenge the role played by corporate performance teams. Interview questions 
deliberately placed performance management and service improvement side by side in 
order to allow an honest evaluation of these two roles to emerge. 
Corporate teams themselves had reduced in size overall, although this is perhaps 
unsurprising given the overall staffing level reductions witnessed by all councils.  Most 
case studies had either retained a centralised performance team, or were in the process 
of centralising or recentralising teams.  Notable exceptions to this were found in most 
children’s and adults’ social care and education services, where the ongoing data 
requirements from Ofsted and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) and the relevant 
central government departments have meant the retention of resources in those areas.  
These staff, however, did not tend to see themselves as part of the organization’s 
corporate performance capacity. This was also visible in the focus groups, which mixed 
corporate and departmental performance staff. 
As mentioned above, the split role played by performance staff meant that an ‘us and 
them’ divide was still clearly visible in interview responses where one part of the 
organization retained an inspection or policing role.   
“Exactly, it is a bit of an us and them…they still use the phrase, which is central services.” (B2 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
For example, the SENDA in the 0 to 25 agenda. Now, we have to work with it but we didn’t write 
it, but of course very quickly schools can get into the ‘us and them’ mindset with the LA, as 
though the LA is the DfE [Department for Education]. We’re not. (S5 DEPARTMENTAL) 
This was generally recognised as a negative facet, and served to diminish the sense of a 
single organization; something particularly crucial therefore to unifying efforts around 
achieving corporate objectives, and it was something that staff wished to tackle.  In at 
least one or two cases, there was an espoused effort to break down this ‘us and them 
divide’, although this generally came from the corporate services. For example, an 
interviewee from Castle Gate on a corporate team said, 
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You know we don’t work in isolation because it isn’t ‘us and them’, we’re all on the same team, 
and we just, we’ve got to make sure that that’s the consistent message that we’re sending out 
there, we’re there to aid support and to guide and to steer in the direction so that what’s the, 
you know, the old golden thread. (C3 SERVICE) 
We’ve got a small but good team, and we’ve got good relationships across the organization. 
Which I think, generally, are worked in such a way that people don’t, I’m not saying they look 
forward to us pitching up, but it’s like we could be a lot worse. (R3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Stocks Green also felt that they had moved towards a more supportive model, but still 
articulated a sense of division between corporate and departmental staff.  In the case of 
Bell Tower, this was part of a conscious plan to strengthen the centre, although this was 
made more difficult by the scale of financial savings required. 
We do a lot of work where we present to management teams, we’ve sort of made the offer out 
there and then we work on the basis that, “You do the work, we advise and support because we 
can’t do it for you. If we do it for you, it won’t be right.” I think people in the past it was like, 
“Either stay out of it or do it for me,” but actually where we’re at now is; “I can’t do it for you 
because that wouldn’t work. I’m not going to stay out of it and you know that because you 
actually want the support.” I think we’ve got that offer where we’re saying, “We’ll be in there. 
We’ll be holding your hand and supporting you and we’ll point out…” and now they feel like the 
Corporate Centre is on their side, helping them achieve that. (S2 SERVICE) 
It’s a bit up and down really because I think we’ve had this aspiration since I came here, […] to 
have a more centralised service.  I suppose if I was being honest, I think that there’s politics at 
the directorate levels about what people are willing to give up and times are quite difficult now 
and everybody’s got budget reductions to make, so you know the conversations are difficult. 
(B4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
[…] and I don’t know whether she’s [Long Reach corporate HR manager] … that, that … that link 
between corporate and service isn’t as good as it could be … yet. (L5 SERVICE) 
When asked, some departmental staff said they largely felt more inclined to engage with 
corporate team as a supportive resource; this was generally the result of negotiations, 
however, and the departmental interviewees and focus group members did not always 
reflect the same sense of engagement as corporate team members did.    A member of 
the Long Reach corporate team expressed frustration at the dismantling of the corporate 
resources staff in terms of helping the organization to improve. 
[…] it’s probably the, the change of focus from it being within services to it being … I think part 
of it is moving it back into a corporate function. The council, like most councils, dismantled most 
of its corporate functions …and ran them down so that they barely existed. And suddenly they’ve 
realised that it’s hard to make an engine run if you haven’t got a bloody driver!  So I think it’s 
that, that realization that … and you know we were kind of forced into this; I blame Pickles. (L1 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
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Whilst most interviewees in departmental roles were broadly positive about the role of the 
performance team in the centre, Rudgeway’s social care performance lead felt that the 
centre cost too much money and that this should be diverted to protect ‘priority areas’, for 
which we can reasonably assume meant social care.  
[…] but again, you need to maybe shrink the centre so that the priority areas can be protected 
as much as possible. (R1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Given the difference in scale of budgets, this seems somewhat unlikely to be effective as 
a mechanism.  This supportive role was also discussed as a linking, ‘business partner’ 
type role.  This is a relatively common structure whereby central resource teams such as 
HR, finance or IT have nominated ‘business partners’ who link with a specific directorate 
or service, generally at a supervisor / team leader level, where they can liaise and manage 
the provision of resources from the corporate team.  For example, an HR business partner 
would advise the departmental management team on recruitment, employee and 
industrial relations etc., and the actual work putting out job adverts and managing 
application process would be done by a centralised team of HR admin support.  This 
model of experienced liaison staff with specific responsibilities was also emerging in 
performance teams.    
[Talking about the corporate reporting team] They also support the other two directors on the 
council as well, but that’s less about management of data and more about the business partner 
role as well, they don’t, the council tends to, those directorates tend to produce their own data, 
but we would report it through corporately, so there’s less kind of data management in [the 
corporate] team, there is some but not as much as [department’s] (B4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Rudgeway also had a similar ‘deployed’ staff model, although this was more integrated 
into departments and members of the central performance team sat physically in 
departments, although they reported to the central team leader within the hierarchy, and 
had a ‘dotted line’ of accountability to functional management.  L1 also suggested this 
had, in their experience, been a cyclical tendency – that is, centralization and 
decentralization of performance resources. 
 As somebody said to me, corporate performance has a habit of coming and going! (L1 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Teams from across the case studies were at different points on a centralised-
departmentalised spectrum.  These are listed in Table 16 below: 
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Table 16: Structured spectrum of corporate & departmental performance models  
Corporately-led Centrally-
provided, locally 
managed 
Departmentally-
managed, central 
coordination 
Departmentally-
led 
Centralised 
performance team 
with business 
partners managed 
from centre 
Central team with 
deployed central 
staff with dotted-
line to departments 
Smaller central 
team linking to 
departmentally 
managed staff 
Largely 
independent 
departmental staff 
passing info to 
central team 
Bell Tower Long Reach Castle Gate 
Rudgeway 
Stocks Green Merry Park 
Source: author 
This analysis of the spectrum of performance team delivery models is presented to help 
aid understanding of the case studies.  There was insufficient data available to suggest 
that anyone model is more effective than another, and hence this is descriptive, not 
evaluative.  However, this approach deserves further discussion and research, although 
this thesis cannot devote sufficient further space here to this question, and will be the 
subject of future research. 
As discussed in section 4.3.1, overall most corporate interviewees felt that performance 
teams (in the sense of those corporate teams charged with coordinating corporate 
performance reporting and interfacing with the Audit Commission) had obviously lost a 
key part of their role: the interface with the regulatory mechanisms.  This gave rise to a 
sense of existential reflection, i.e. what was their purpose now? Corporate performance 
reporting was continuing in most authorities, although with reduced numbers of indicators.  
Corporate team leads tended to discuss departments getting ‘ownership’ of their own data.  
As L1 put it, corporate teams cannot ‘do it for’ service teams. This view was supported by 
L3 (corporate performance lead) 
But what they [the corporate performance team] do is push that ownership to where it needs 
to be. (L3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Rather than having to ‘push’ ownership, Rudgeway’s performance lead felt this was being 
led by the chief executive, who had joined the organization within the last few years and 
who was pushing a ‘one council’ perspective. 
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[The chief exec’s] view on culture is one of one Council, we work as a team, we don't work as 
individuals, collective ownership, collective responsibility.  We say sorry, we put residents 
first, all of those sorts of things which are all brilliant in principle but they’ve got to be the thing 
that if you cut the stick of rock in half you see some of that all through it. (R4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Long Reach also described a journey around repositioning corporate performance that 
had yielded improvements, but still needed further development.   
Pulling it all together but then it really helped me understand where the ownership and the 
interest was in the business around that information.  It wasn’t quite where I thought it would 
be but actually we moved it quite a long way in a way into such a good place that now the 
business has had another slight reorganization and created a more corporate performance hub 
as well, which has now taken that and spring-boarded it into the next phase (L3 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Castle Gate’s performance lead also articulated the same tensions between the centre 
and the departments in terms of complying with corporate performance requirements and 
departmental ownership. 
it’s how you get that balance, so that the performance or the policy team don’t do everything.  
And then you’ve not got that ownership, you need to have the ownership in that service area, 
don’t you? (C7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Bell Tower’s performance lead saw a clear distinction between the way in which the 
business improvement team and the performance team were accepted by services. 
They [the business improvement team] get more of a welcome into services because they’re 
quite helpful and involved…will pick a bit of a mess up and make it right and kind of work with 
people deliver a project.  So, we kind of use those (laughs), those ins, so they are working on 
something then, you know, we’ll link in some of the performance team (B2 DEPARTMENTAL) 
The separation between performance teams and improvement or change teams was a 
clear pattern that emerged from the research interviews.  Whilst most central team 
interviewees either accepted the need to bring the two closer together, or felt that they 
naturally supported each other, the strong message was that change or improvement was 
focused on reducing costs.  Performance information might be part of the data context to 
some of that work, but in reality, corporate performance reporting was largely felt to be 
an activity distanced from this agenda.  The financial environment dominated discussions 
about performance, and it was felt that the historic levels of performance reporting (i.e. 
the CPA / CAA period’s number of indicators) would now only serve to highlight the 
reductions in performance due to financial constraint.   
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Some of the same patterns emerged when considering external partnerships and 
relationships.  The focus on outcomes as a repeated theme naturally brings with it a sense 
of working in partnership, and from a governance perspective, across partnerships.  This 
was articulated most clearly by staff working in social care and education settings, but 
was also commonly found where authorities were establishing economic regeneration or 
growth plans (see section 6.3.2, on page 184). 
However, a view emerged that formalised partnerships such as the Local Strategic 
Partnerships (LSP) had become unproductive as broad-scale governance mechanisms, 
though it should be recognised that not all LSPs were previously considered effective. 
Yeah, well we have One [Long Reach] here but it’s, but there’s no … people could walk away 
from that tomorrow, obviously, it’s not, yeah, it’s not like the LSP was. (L1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
[what does partnership working feel like?] Well I think it becomes very a, either a bit non-
existent, or a bit tokenistic. [RG: And what’s it like here, just out of interest?] Oh great. I think- 
I mean, I’m not saying it doesn’t work, but it, you know I’ve certainly worked places where 
there’s more robust partnerships. Here it’s a bit…it can be quite antagonistic. (M4 SERVICE) 
Castle Gate’s head of corporate performance also felt that there had been a drift away 
from partnership working, which had also served to weaken institutional capability, as well 
as to reinforce perceptions that the LSP was unsupportive. 
I suppose there’s, you need to overlay a few things, so there’s probably some drift.  I think you 
have had … people … you lose the corporate memory, you lose the partnership memory, there’s 
not that many people who have been around for the whole duration, and maybe some of the 
ones who have are the ones who just saw it as bureaucratic. (C7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
However, partnership in delivering social care was still considered a priority for Castle 
Gate’s senior adult social care officer.   
I mean when I came into post you know, I’ve got three priorities haven’t I, my workforce, quality 
of provision service and partnership. (C4 CORPORATE)  
The same interviewee also suggested that they considered commissioned staff to 
effectively be part of the workforce. 
And my workforce doesn’t just end here, it’s all those provider services that I commission, they 
are my workforce as well. (C4 CORPORATE) 
This was the strongest perception of a wider definition of workforce.  Generally, 
interviewees were clearer on the necessity of working in partnership.  For example, Castle 
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Gate’s chief executive was clear that working in partnership at the local level would be 
critical to achieving more sustainable public services and meeting the budget cuts 
required, as did Stocks Green’s senior financial manager (S3). 
Oh the … the massive issue for me is partnership.  Just whether it’s acute, primary, RSLs 
[Registered Social Landlords], police …And that’s the opportunity.  Devolution I suppose but we 
haven’t gone quite as far as Manchester, but the opportunity for devolution is, do you know 
what, is there a model here that gets those various bits … of public sector talking to each other? 
(C1 CORPORATE) 
We support a number of non-academy schools in the borough as well. We're also now starting 
to work with other partner agencies and exploring opportunities around shared service 
provision with some of our [city-region] neighbours. (S3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
The discussion above in OP2 highlighted working across organizational boundaries as a 
key part of the work of corporate performance and change teams.   Both Long Reach and 
Rudgeway had made use of outsourced arrangements for key services, described as 
‘partners’.  In both cases, those partnerships had recently been dismantled.   
So, for ten years, we’ve had a corporate transformation partner, who were in to identify things 
that they felt could be done more efficiently, cheaper, better use of technology to support us in 
implementing them. Now, that’s changed because that partnership has then dispersed. But it 
was part of that, “How do you improve?” approach. (R5 CORPORATE) 
Seven years ago, we moved to quite an outsourcing and wanted to be a commissioning 
organization and very lean.  The world’s changed. So, in five years we’ve gone from being 
outsourced and arms’ length company, so like our direct labour organization and support 
services, to bringing it all back in-house.  So, we are now a deliverer and a commissioner again. 
(L3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
This state of being ‘deliverer and commissioner’ may relate to the need to control both 
the expenditure and nature of services delivered in the climate of austerity.  This is further 
developed in section 5.2.1 (page 156) regarding the dominant position of austerity in 
interviews and section 5.2.3 – outsourcing; here it relates to the move from ‘managing 
austerity’ to ‘governing austerity’ (section 6.3.4, page 188).   
This discussion of partnership was broken down into historic partnerships (LSPs), which 
were considered to now be ineffective, intra-organizational working between the 
corporate centre and service department, outsourced partnership arrangements, and 
working across the public sector.  External ‘strategic partner’ arrangements described 
either consultancy expertise brought in to the authority, or an outsourced service.  A 
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strong rhetoric around partnership exists, although in some cases, e.g. outsourced 
services, this appears unlikely to be considered a ‘real’ partnership.  Services were being 
insourced back to the local authority, at least in part to allow the authority to claim more 
of the savings.  These changes also reflect a move from operating in a hierarchical, 
managerial model to a facilitative one with external agencies, but this raised some 
challenges. 
You know the transformational stuff and then you, on the back of that you say, well actually 
we’ve identified this, it’s changed probably or something for you to do that could, you know 
deliver this outcome or they say, well off you go and then they just completely remove 
themselves from that.  Because it was, you know, it was too difficult because it meant engaging 
with lots of different people as opposed to being told, you’ve got to say this. (B2 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Authorities were subject here to a series of tensions.  On one hand, working across the 
value chain for delivering public services should be a route to managing demand in a 
more holistic fashion, as Castle Gate’s chief executive, C1, suggests.  However, 
corporate change teams report difficulties in engaging some service departments in the 
discussion and debate around service change.  Additionally, the lack of consistent 
performance management and analysis capacity described by several authorities had led 
to a sense of ‘cutting what can be cut’, rather than more considered service reductions; 
again, this may be due to the scale of the cuts, which have meant no service has escaped 
the requirement to reduce costs.  An interviewee from Merry Park’s children’s social care 
department also suggested that the loss of the national policy framework called Every 
Child Matters had made it more difficult to engage partners from across other agencies.   
But it also, for me it meant you could engage your partners much better than what you can do 
now.  […] Health could actually see they were a part of this. You know the old careers / 
connexions.  They could see they were a part of ‘Economic’. Youth Service could see they were 
part of ‘Positive Contributions’.  You know I think it was a really good mechanism for engaging 
partners. And we’ve kind of lost that.  (M4 SERVICE) 
Also, recognising that if we are to have a sustainable social care system in [Rudgeway], if we 
are to have a sustainable voluntary community sector in [Rudgeway], is the current role of the 
council sustainable in that?  Actually, the opportunity cost is we continue doing what we're 
doing and we end up bankrupt. If we end up bankrupt nobody wins. So, the risk of doing nothing 
gets bigger. (R3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
They know that I don’t have an anti-academy agenda. They're clear about that. My 
responsibility is for all the children in [Stocks Green].  Because, equally, the legislation relating 
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to this is in one sense clear but in other senses vague. Because we are responsible for the 
outcomes as a local authority, and yet of course if it’s an academy it’s a bit of a no-go area. (S5 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Clearly not all local authority services are the same, and those services that are more 
directly under the control of officers did not tend to describe partnership challenges or 
needs, and were much more focused on meeting their savings requirements.  However, 
again, children’s and adults’ social care staff discussed partnerships more extensively 
when describing their approach.   
Key finding 2: Corporate and departmental  
CPA and CAA exerted a strong influence on structures and behaviours in performance 
teams.  Deregulation is now causing divergent structural forms to emerge, and 
highlighting differences between ‘performance’ and ‘transformation’ teams. 
 
4.2.3 Staffing levels, and the loss of individual expertise (OP3) 
Local government employment levels are now at the lowest levels ever recorded (Office 
of National Statistics, 2016).  Observations and discussions outside of the interview 
process confirmed that all local authorities felt there had been a large reduction in the 
number of staff working, and this included both central and departmental teams.  Within 
that process, Stocks Green’s corporate finance lead saw staff being drawn away to work 
for partners who still had staff development opportunities, causing gaps to emerge in 
Stocks Green.   
If you think of the resource that we've lost, there's an imbalance.  [RG: You've lost a lot of 
experience to counter investment?]   Yes, we have. That's natural. I think the volume is the 
worry. Many have gone into the health sector because, obviously, they've seen that that's a 
protected environment. The opportunities are there around professional development etc. (S3 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Early voluntary redundancy or severance (often called EVR) also played a key part.  One 
focus group consisted of six members of staff, all of whom were waiting to hear that day 
about whether their voluntary severance had been approved.  This process was having 
an impact on people’s motivations.   
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The team have lost a lot of experienced colleagues and what have you. There is a lot of 
disillusionment, particularly as we've gone through this voluntary severance process. A number 
of our officers have applied for voluntary severance, but because we're going through a service 
review, their applications haven't been approved.  We now have to pick them back up a bit 
where, in their heads, they were going. It was made clear, if you apply, there's no guarantee 
you'll get it. But in people's heads, once they apply, psychologically, they think they're going. 
(S3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Castle Gate, Bell Tower, and Stocks Green expressed concerns about the loss of skills 
that voluntary severance was having – especially given the self-selecting nature of EVR 
processes. 
So, we had a certain skillset. With an issue of people who wanted to go on voluntary redundancy 
or early retirement going, you lost a huge amount of experience. And then the people who were 
in the middle haven’t got those ones above to learn from, and we’ve got more newer and 
greener people coming in, who are more idealistic. (C5 DEPARTMENTAL) 
For Liverpool [NB not one of the case study organizations], to go from a, you know first class 
national profile Trading Standards Service, you know, to one that has six employees now from 
eighty-six … you know it’s just incredible.  Yeah, so I think you know nationally we’re struggling.  
And when we look to kind of recruiting, you know, we’re trying to recruit some planners at the 
moment but we’re struggling to get people to apply.  You think, you know in today’s day and 
age that there would be lots of people out there, and I think what’s happening is that you know 
the kind of the brain drain, you’re losing good quality experienced staff who are moving on to 
other things. (B3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
We're currently in a process where we've got recruitment freeze anyway because of the 
financial issues that all local authorities are facing. (S3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Within Merry Park, there were also concerns expressed about the gaps in skills and 
knowledge being created by a loss of staff as part of a process of attrition due to budget 
cuts. 
[Discussing impact of voluntary severance with personal anecdote] there was a hole left 
because I ran the computer systems and I understood the planning, yes. Well it sounds big 
headed, I added value in a way that I couldn't articulate when they said, "Well what would 
happen if you went?" You can talk about all the added value but you know your job description 
says that so actually, we can get rid of that team leader and that team leader can look after 
support. (M5 SERVICE) 
This was felt to be true, even if those cuts had created a ‘leaner’ set of staff responsibilities 
and staffing structures.  The loss of staff expertise in specific service areas was 
considered a gap, and was creating potential for future problems. 
I think we've not necessarily suffered significantly from a rush to get rid of expensive old timers, 
the colloquial phrase. The bit that does concern me perhaps more has been the loss of 
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understanding of all the things that were previously done. […]  One of the consequences I see 
of the leaner, broader portfolios of responsibility is a loss of some of those specialisms, which 
you can't always make up for by just having experienced managers per se. You need 
experienced managers in those areas of specialism. (M3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
The lead for regulatory services in Bell Tower (B3) was concerned about the loss of 
professional skills, the use of young apprentices, and the lack of organizational 
commitment to them. 
Yeah, but it’s actually, you know, will we have that kind of moving forward?  How do we 
succession plan is a challenge for us at the moment, you know, because there isn’t budgets for 
trainees and we’re using the Young Apprentice scheme now but you kind of get someone 
trained up and after two years you have to let them go.  And so you know I am worried moving 
forward and certainly very worried as a profession, you know, in a kind of professional capacity, 
you know the Trading Standards Service is a shadow of its former self (B3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
In Castle Gate, the corporate performance lead (C7) suggested that politicians had given 
clear direction to avoid compulsory redundancies.  This did not mean no reductions in 
staff levels, however, and use of early voluntary severance had created gaps.  C7 also 
highlighted the impact of these cuts, pointing out increasing levels of stress and capacity 
questions, although the central policy and performance team was still fairly well resourced 
compared with others. 
Yeah, but we do seem to, you know, and there was a very clear political steer of no redundancies 
and all the rest of it and you know, yes, quite a lot of people did go through you know early 
retirement and so on … Yeah, I think we have hit the pinch point because you’ve noticed it in 
the last year probably where people are getting more stressed and more fractious and there’s 
not enough people … to go around, but I still think we’re in a better place when you look, you 
know if I said I’ve got a policy and performance team of thirty odd people, I mean … it’s a lot 
isn’t it, you know? (C7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Coupled with the staffing level issues, a range of different skills were articulated that were 
also needed to deliver against future requirements.  These tended to cluster around the 
skills required to work in a more commercial or commissioning-focused manner, and 
weakened the domain of professional expertise.  This also links closely with OP2 above 
in terms of spanning professional boundaries. 
Yeah, I think flexibility in terms of you know if there’s a way of having a more multi-disciplinary 
approach to the types of training and professional development that we offer.  So rather than 
it being exclusively, I am an educationalist, I’m a social worker, I’m a … health worker, you know 
[…] I think commissioning skills I think, you know, project management skills.  I think that some 
of the expertise is professional expertise.  Whereas I think increasingly we’ll need less of that 
and more of commissioning project management skills, quality assurance, because we won’t 
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be delivering school improvement as … as such, we will be facilitating and brokering that. (B1 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
To meet these requirements, new management development activities were being 
created, including generic management skills, certainly in Rudgeway and Long Reach.   
Well, we’ve been doing some quite generic leadership development work with a senior manager 
group, and with a middle manager group, and, actually, with a front-line staff group. That has 
all been about generic leadership skills, yes, through a period of uncertainty. I think that’s 
probably quite a big thing, what we’ve done. We’re making quite a big shift towards taking 
more commercial approaches to things, and yes, it’s very different, but some of what we’re 
doing is just bringing in point expertise in different places (R5 CORPORATE) 
 […] it’s not about the product, it’s about the culture that you have to engender to use the 
product, so … and we’re not there.  So, the other thing that we’re doing to try and address that 
is something called [Long Reach] Manager, which is about supporting managers to understand 
and to, not comply with but to follow … and to fulfil the competencies of, the basic competencies 
of the manager, so … And that’s very early days but … Because we’ve never, we’ve never 
explicitly said, if you are to be a manager, this is what you have to do, these are the eight things, 
you know, management of risk, management of people, various things, management of money.  
And we’ve never done that, and so I’m starting to introduce that now, which means that we 
can hold people to account for … Because I think what we’ve done here a lot is we’ve made 
technical, people who are really technically proficient managers. (L5 SERVICE) 
Long Reach was also attempting to link individual performance to pay – something that 
local authorities have generally not engaged with closely in previous years (OECD, 2005)  
– and about which concerns were raised in terms of ‘realistic’ appraisal. 
And the way I’ve been describing it to our managers and I’ve been talking to them about it, it’s 
like if you’re a shit manager it’s alright, but if you’re a shit manager and your manager’s a shit 
manager, then we’ve got a real problem and if we have to … And unfortunately, I don’t think 
there’s been enough of a focus […]. So, we’ve got two things, one is we’re introducing an, 
hopefully introducing an individual performance framework, which my boss is currently doing 
his dinger about because I’m saying you can’t link it to pay, because currently people are so 
uncomfortable having the conversation that you’ll end up busting your budget! [laughs] (L5 
SERVICE) 
If you looked at last year’s performance appraisals from the organization as a whole, one might 
reasonably expect there to be a variation, at least, of a normal commitment distribution 
between people who are rated at one end and who are rated at the other end. We had a seven 
stage category from inadequate to unsatisfactory to satisfactory to good to excellent to 
outstanding or not been here long enough to be appraised. There weren’t very many in the 
inadequate or unsatisfactory and there was an over-population in terms of the excellent or 
outstanding. That, probably, indicates that the manager perspective of assessing performance 
against short-term objectives isn’t as systemised as it needs to be. I put myself in the same 
category. It’s actually quite hard. It’s quite labour intensive doing that really well but, as an 
organization, I don’t think we've been terribly good for many years in terms of performance 
appraisal. (M4 SERVICE) 
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Other discussions in Castle Gate and Long Reach involved the sorts of different skills that 
would be required to manage in a very different organizational climate. 
I think obviously supporting the council going through massive change in terms of 
mutualization, so for instance we’ve got the leisure, going over to a TACL [community trust 
arrangement], so it will be kind of supporting in terms of the staff going through that sort of 
process.  Making sure that our managers and leaders are fit for purpose really in order to deal 
with the change. (C3 SERVICE) 
I can see quite a few challenges.  I think we need…another challenge we’ve got is setting the 
skills and the workforce to deliver that as well. [RG: Right, OK, and what do you think are the 
gaps that you’ve got in those regards?] Ehm … technology as an infrastructure, but also 
technology in its usage and being able to understand how we could do things differently. (L3) 
They need project management skills, they need that good organization to see something 
through from start to finish and make sure everything gets picked up along the way.  They also 
need change leadership skills, they need that ability to go into a room and read the mood and 
adapt to that, you know, their presentation and what they’re saying.  And they need to be good 
listeners because they need to actually pick up on, not just what people are saying but what 
they’re not saying … (L4 CORPORATE) 
It was not just skills that were considered difficult.  Affective commitment or engagement 
was also mentioned, along with a sense of the challenges presented by operating in a 
climate of change and unpredictability – several observations outside of the interviews 
suggested staff, especially those corporate roles, were finding it difficult to maintain 
enthusiasm and motivation given the tensions they were presented with when faced with 
organizational resistance to change. 
But I think the graduate programme we had and the way, you know, and we had some good 
managers who nurtured people on for when [name of manager] was here for example, he did 
a good job and you know he really…he brought people on and we’re still benefiting from that.  
Where we maybe lost it is we brought in some managers who were just generic managers and 
you can see where some things didn’t quite, you know, the discipline or the purism wasn’t, 
wasn’t there (C7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Specialist skills within the change and improvement arena were also needed, but Long 
Reach’s L5 (health and social care performance manager) felt that their recruitment had 
caused issues within the teams they worked with, perhaps replicating some of the 
challenges around the relationship between central performance teams and departmental 
staff discussed in section 4.2.2, this time from the perspective of a departmental resource. 
For all my job is brilliant, […] my appointment has caused quite a lot of problems for many 
people, including myself, and I think I’m seen as a bit of a problem […] But (sighs) I think it’s 
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unsettled quite a lot of people.  I think it was absolutely the right thing to do.  But I think what 
I’ve not realised is that I’ve taken quite a lot of people’s work and … and I’m now sort of asking 
questions about process because part of what I do sit with me and part sit with other people, 
but that causes some people some discomfort.  And it’s just, in terms of performance, it’s 
fascinating that I’m being described as the problem.  And I don’t think, I don’t even think it’s 
personal, I think it’s …… it’s, yeah, we’ve got the [L5] problem, that’s how somebody described 
it the other day.  I was like thanks very much for that, yeah, great.  It’s a bit lonely. (L5 SERVICE) 
This links closely with the questions of capacity and capability of the corporate teams to 
support improvement work – Castle Gate’s public health lead felt central teams were 
important but were not being fully utilised, citing the lack of domain-specific skills or 
knowledge. 
I think a corporate intelligence function is really, really important, but I would say we don't 
massively use them.  And we use it within our own kind of resource... 
expertise.  Probably because they haven't got the capacity to support us, and in some senses, 
haven't got the expertise around public health-type indicators to support us either. (C6 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Overall, the reduction in staffing numbers was taken for granted, and in conversations 
outside the interviews, almost every participant made reference to the size of these 
reductions, particularly during tours around the council facilities, where many empty seats 
were visible. 
I think the number of heads of service that we’ve got, the number of directors we've got, we've 
got three directors and 15 heads of service, compare that to even four years ago when I think 
there were five directors and 25 heads of service. There were over 30 and we’re now 18 (M3 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Key finding 3: impact of cuts on staffing and skills 
Financial pressures are driving authorities to shed experienced staff, particularly in the 
mid-level, creating gaps in key parts of the organization’s delivery structure and corporate 
supporting infrastructure. 
 
 Performance management frameworks 
Performance management frameworks (PMF) were a fundamental part of the New 
Labour CPA / CAA regulatory system, and authorities were required to develop a 
performance management framework that captured the statutory and discretionary 
performance data, as well as being part of the formal judgements made by the Audit 
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Commission (Audit Commission and I&DeA, 2002).  Therefore, examining the notion of 
a PMF formed a significant component within the research questions (see Appendix v), 
and one of the key findings for this research emerged from this aggregated dimension, 
namely, PM1: the ‘death of improvement’.  From the analysis of the qualitative statements 
three first-order codes emerged under the aggregated dimensions.  These are: 
• The ‘death of improvement’ (PM1) 
• Renewal of performance management frameworks (PM2) 
• Authentic performance management (PM3) 
 
4.3.1 The ‘death of improvement’ (PM1) 
As is discussed in a later chapter (section 7.1, page 206), the contextual set up for New 
Labour performance improvement tools assumed a continual growth in performance, and 
brought in a series of contractual style arrangements, including local public service 
agreements and local area agreements (LPSA and LAA respectively).   
And you know I kind of think back to the LPSA days you know when we had an LPSA target that 
was selected from my service area, you know, and it was incredibly exciting times, you know, 
there was … the kind of development work that went on, it was, and the achievements, the 
outcomes that were delivered, were fantastic, all for relatively small investment. (B3 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
The combined effect of these mechanisms was a clear and unchallenged assumption of 
continual performance growth, although the demands of this were softened in part by 
specific additional funding mechanisms.  These mechanisms clearly coupled 
‘performance management’ with ‘improvement’, and the financial position of local 
authorities was much stronger.  
[…] CPA and CAA it was all about managing in good times. In managing in good times to a large 
extent any fool can do that because no one is switching off the money […].  Whereas in the old 
performance regimes it was about sovereignty and everyone working together and there was 
cash there through LPSA or LAA or other neighbourhood funding… (R4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Since that point, deregulation of local authorities has gone hand in hand with significant 
reductions in budgets, as outlined earlier, and the fracturing of the link between 
performance management approaches and continuous improvement, despite the Best 
Value duty to secure continuous improvement being reaffirmed in guidance in 2011 and 
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2015 (DCLG, 2015b).  Several interviewees referenced the process-driven, incremental 
improvement nature of the older regime, and how that has changed. 
Our chief officers would set targets that were based on the upper quartile and why should 
[Castle Gate] residents you know be any worse off than anywhere else in the country and all 
this sort of stuff, in terms of the support they get.  So that was the starting point.  And I think 
some level of decline, relative decline, from that position is acceptable really. (C1 CORPORATE)   
I mean, historically, some targets we used to just increase by 1% a year.  Those days are gone. 
(R2 SERVICE) 
It [CPA]worked and it put a great focus on performance improvement, so the principle of it 
worked, but I think maybe for everywhere, like all processes it became a bit too much about the 
process. (S2 SERVICE) 
The result of this can be seen in responses to questions posed to all interviewees around 
the nature and ‘feel’ of the authorities’ approach to performance management.  These 
tended to draw fairly clear distinctions between performance management, seen as a tool 
of monitoring or accountability, and ‘service improvement’, which was almost universally 
seen as a tool of financial restraint or budgetary reductions.   
Performance management, probably do the minimum and service improvement is completely 
financially driven. […] Legislation apart, so we do what we have to do […] … the rest of it is, 
yeah, is driven entirely by finance.  So we have various strategies and plans but the decisions 
are based around money. (B6 SERVICE) 
Within the same authority, there was a feeling that improvement was now largely driven 
by personalities, instead of being systematically initiated by corporate discussions based 
on performance and other data. Additionally, the stated desire to manage by outcomes 
presents challenges for some services that cannot readily demonstrate their outcome 
achievements. 
I wouldn’t suggest that our performance management system aids improvement.  I think 
improvement is very much down, again, to individual personalities, to ensure that they are you 
know challenging, testing and driving their services forward.  […]  So, I would say that in terms 
of helping to make sure it … is it something which drives forward improvement, I would say no.  
Is it something that makes sure that you, you know, you are actually giving some focus 
periodically to performance management?  Yes, to a degree.  But it’s only as good as the suite 
of PIs that you tend to have.  And what, certainly in my area, you know, it can be incredibly 
difficult to develop effective outcome measures for some of the work we do.  Things like tobacco 
control, you know, you look at the prevalence rates, it’s a good measure to the effectiveness, 
it’s not always that easy to demonstrate that a particular intervention has led to a step change 
in terms of … (B3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
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Another respondent felt that the scale of the cuts had tended to polarise services, as 
highlighted in OP2, into frontline and back office or resourcing teams.  It is thus much 
harder to justify expenditure on these latter functions, when the scale of frontline services 
is considered, ironically creating capacity problems in addressing challenges for frontline 
services themselves. This has led to performance management becoming more reactive, 
and ‘problem-led’.  This could be termed a ‘deficit’ model of performance. 
I don’t think, well I don’t know if we’ve got one approach really.  I … (sighs) I think one of the 
consequences of the cuts we’ve faced since 2010 has been we started by sort of hammering, 
[…] what you need to do is you need to cut your back office and, to protect the frontline but sort 
of resource management and back office and performance management as a function isn’t as 
valued perhaps in relative terms as it was seven years ago or so.  And what that means is, we’ve 
got fewer people to spend on standardising things across what is a very complex organization, 
so you know I quote this number all the time, but 771 individual services either delivered or 
facilitated by a metropolitan council like us, and you … you’ve got to have a resource if you want 
to standardise something across all 770 bits, and we haven’t got that anymore.  So, I think, I 
would characterise our approach to performance management as disparate, and much more 
responsive than it was […] (C1 CORPORATE) 
A few years ago performance almost because a dirty word in some people’s mind.  Prior that it 
was all about performance – performance investing in building things up to be the best and 
looking at the benchmarking data, you had to submit data left, right and centre to different 
national websites, and then when the credit crunch hit, it was more about doing more with less.  
So, it’s not look at performance as such, let’s look about service improvement.  Similar sort of 
work but just badged in a different way. (R2 SERVICE) 
[…] and an understanding of when you pull a lever, what difference does it make.  Because I 
think there’s an awful lot of output driven activity here, there’s some very, very hardworking 
people, and what they tend to think is, well as long as I’ve done that, improvement will happen. 
(L5 SERVICE) 
Here, ‘improvement’ meant different things to different people.  Arising from the findings 
in section 4.2.2, the assumption that continued growth and increasing productivity are to 
be expected and that failure to achieve this is as a result of poor management or strategy 
is, on a superficial level, difficult to argue with, and forms part of the hegemonic view of 
economics today, often referred to as neo-liberal capitalism (Chang 2002).  We can argue 
that public services, however, do not operate within the same strategic domain as private 
sector businesses and possess different values(Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011).   
Their goals are thus widely divergent and largely exogenous.  When considering the 
extreme levels of budgetary restriction (Local Government Association 2015), it seems 
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clear that ever-increasing performance growth is at the very least incredibly unlikely.  
Whilst there was agreement generally across the board that budget restrictions had 
increased efficiency and forced (some) services to reduce waste, for almost everyone, 
the limits of service redesign, technology and demand management were either visible or 
had been broached, especially when factoring in the demographic changes facing 
services. 
When you’ve got a demand-led service where everyone knows there’s picture and demography, 
even the great thing about our improving health service and medications, making people live 
longer. The only problem is that that means for us, they are living longer when they do come to 
us. And things like reablement, that does help stop people coming to you at an earlier stage, 
but when they do come back, they come back more complex, and older, and frailer and with 
more than one long-term condition. You know, the cost of those care packages can be 
phenomenal (R1 DEPARTMENTAL)  
Both Bell Tower and Castle Gate raised the notion of ‘salami slicing’, i.e. incremental 
budget reductions each year, and suggested that this has been a conscious strategy, but 
was now becoming unsustainable.  This provides an interesting comparison with 
incremental and step change in terms of improvement. 
because people talk about outcomes but they don’t necessarily make, you know, in the context 
of commissioning, we don’t necessarily make the connection between outcomes and the 
performance and the service improvement or delivery improvement. So we have kind of worked 
to try and make those connections, so we’ve had what we call outcomes based budgeting […] 
Which was you know a stealth way of getting people to think about the kind of performance 
and delivery side of things, alongside just doing salami slicing budget cuts. (B2 DEPARTMENTAL) 
I think we have changed quite considerably during that period of time. A lot of the time, that’s 
more of a- we’re consciously taking a salami slice, so it’s been incremental change rather than 
big game-changes. But I think we are at a stage now where we’re recognising that incremental 
change isn’t sufficient, and it will need to be significant organizational change if we’re to 
continue to deliver at the pace that we want to deliver, and have to deliver for the residents 
here. (C5 DEPARTMENTAL) 
This concern about budget cuts having reduced organizational capacity to improve served 
to challenge the direction of the link between performance, improvement, and budget.  
Change was primarily being driven by financial imperatives, rather than the need to 
improvement performance.  This was a view shared by five of the corporate performance 
teams in the case studies, with Merry Park, the most affluent authority, preferring to 
generate improvements in order to reduce council tax for residents.  
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I’m not quite sure they’re [performance management and improvement] linked. I think that 
would be one of my issues, which is I think there’s definitely a rigour to improve. I think that, in 
the main, for the last, probably, five or six years, that’s very much been driven by savings rather 
than performance. And that’s the main driver for that change. (C5 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Beyond this challenge to the link between performance and improvement, many 
interviewees described the level of challenge around actually delivering improvements in 
services, and that a range of services were being trying to just stay at the same level, or 
scaled back: what has been called ‘managed decline’. 
I do think increasingly we will not be able to do improvement; it will almost be a little bit about 
evidence base and surety of decline, for want of a better word. (S2 SERVICE) 
It’s incredibly tough, and to be honest I spend more time now, Russ, managing decline than I do 
improving what we do. (B3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
[T]here’s certainly a shift from a gold-standard service to a bronze-standard service. (S4 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Some targets we’re having to think about relaxing a little bit, because they were set in times 
when there was great investment in the services, so now it seems unfair to give them the same 
target. (R2 SERVICE) 
And getting into those conversations with Cabinet.  So, one of our priorities is around clean and 
safe streets, and that obviously fills all of their postbags but bearing in mind how much money 
we have, helping them to see that a clean and safe street, remaining as we are now, is an 
achievement… (L5 SERVICE) 
Some saw this concept of managed decline as part of an overall strategy looking at 
differential prioritization of services, although accepting this brought substantial 
challenges, particularly when the day-to-day experiences of complaints to members 
around service levels or service failures are brought in. 
Yeah, and that’s where we’re heading moving forward with less money, it’s where are the areas 
we need to have to improve performance, where are we happy where it is and where are we 
quite prepared to drop it because we’re putting less money in and there’s a rationale for that.  
But that won’t be easy … (C7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
For some, the scaling back of services risked introducing a snowball effect, essentially 
presenting a ‘slippery slope’ logical argument. 
I think that’s what, you know, far be it for me to apologise for this government, but what they’ve 
said since the recession and the crash and everything else is, look, we can’t afford for everybody 
to be gold-plated and you’re getting too much money and do you know what your people, your 
residents don’t really need their benefit claim assessed in ten days, thirty days is probably 
quickly enough.  So, you’re managing down from ten to thirty.  My problem comes when you’re 
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managing, when thirty’s unaffordable and you’re saying, well actually it’s going to take two 
months. (C1 CORPORATE) 
So, we are shrinking, and the service provision is being drawn back, but some of the 
expectations are not reducing. For example, and it comes back to them, OFSTED are not 
reducing their expectations of how Children’s Social Care function should work. In fact, much 
broader than that, Early Intervention Services, everything around that, you know. They’re 
raising the bar every single year, and that could just lead to people becoming demotivated and 
fatigued, frankly. So, that’s a really big issue, and that goes for some areas of central 
government as well. (R3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Decline in services was accepted, but differing arguments were presented for ‘scaling 
back’ those services that were environment or asset-based, compared with people-
focused services such as education or social care.  Whilst service reduction was clearly 
present in these areas too, this was often characterised as either changing the thresholds 
to access services or transforming services.   Sometimes this presented itself as a focus 
on new ways of working such as co-production or commissioning portals.   
Other features of changing discourses around performance included the need to 
synchronise budgets and what performance those budgets could purchase.  Bell Tower 
had been through attempts to deliver ‘outcome-based budgeting’ with varying success in 
different parts of the organization.  Again, the logic for approaching the balancing of 
performance (in the wider sense) with budgets was well supported, yet interviewees 
reported it being fraught with operational difficulties. 
So, I do think within [Bell Tower], one of the things that I’ve actually been supportive of, it’s not 
been wholescale you know across the council, it’s been received in the same way, but actually 
outcome based budgeting I saw as a very healthy approach. (B1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
[Managing in a context of reduced budgets] Yeah, it’s very, yeah, it’s very difficult Russ, yeah, I 
mean it is difficult.  I mean we’ve had a programme of outcomes based budgeting for about 
eighteen months now and it is hard to keep the organization focused on that because I think 
many people prefer the ease of cuts. (B5 CORPORATE) 
In part these problems may have been due to difficulties in prioritising services, leading 
to decoupling of the process from evidence or failing to take account of some of the 
explanations for performance issues. 
We’ve just had an Ofsted inspection; it could be that there are more children who need help.  
Yeah, so there has been a noticeable change in that area.  That has a massive impact in terms 
of demand on finances.  So that, that’s when you can be caught out really when your outcomes 
and your money fall out of sync.  But I don’t see why they, you know, as long as you’re using the 
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outcomes to prioritise … But that’s the thing, we struggle with priorities, we like to do 
everything! (B6 SERVICE) 
Long Reach were also working towards a more integrated finance and performance 
planning process, and seeing that as a move away from performance as a tool for 
accountability. 
We’ve also tended to use performance as blame so you’ll get senior managers who won’t put 
forward indicators who, when they think it’s going to be red, because they know they’ll get 
pilloried for it.  That’s all changed.  We’ve got a new lead member who’s taken on the role for 
performance and [he] is now responsible for performance.  I think performance used to sit in 
service delivery and that didn’t seem to work terribly well.  Taking it out and putting it within a 
wider resources function seems to me that the council’s focus is starting to change and that it’s 
becoming much more on performance’s improvement rather than performance as in 
accountability … (L1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Key finding 4: 'Death of improvement' 
The ‘death of improvement’ is used here to suggest that the assumption of continuous 
improvement across all areas has now fallen away, despite remaining a statutory legal 
duty, not to suggest that no improvement activity is taking place.  This links to the concept 
of ‘managed decline’ in some services.  
 
4.3.2 Renewal of performance management frameworks (PM2) 
The findings above highlight that ‘performance management’ as a term is highly 
polysemic, that is, it contains levels of meaning that are multiple and varied (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 2008) and respondents used the same term to refer to a variety of techniques, 
approaches, and purposes.  In fact, this will provide another avenue of investigation (but 
one that will not be explored here): the linguistic and semantic values attached to key 
terms within the performance debate, e.g. performance, improvement, change, 
transformation etc.  All of them are terms with subtly different meanings, and for which 
commonly accepted meanings are difficult to pin down.  One of the weaknesses of the 
academic literature concerning performance management is a tendency to overlook the 
implicit assumptions that underpin performance management.  It tends towards a 
rationalist and positivist interpretation of what performance management ‘means’ and is 
thus more concerned with definitional debates about what it does, as opposed to what it 
means; this was explored in more detail in section 2.7, and in particular Table 2: Uses of 
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performance management: perspectives from literature, on page 37.  As the findings 
show, assumptions around performance management’s core purpose of continuous 
improvement have been challenged, and the link between performance management and 
improvement has been significantly altered.  Despite this, or perhaps because of this, all 
case study authorities were in the process of renewing their PMF, or had recently done 
so.   
The key focus of much of this work was not on managed decline, but rather reflexive 
discussions around the role and purpose of local government, and how best to capture 
the ambitions of local government, be they political or organizational.  Some of this 
discussion, however, still felt naïve or unrealistic when compared to the stark realities of 
the future shape and nature of local government. 
Well I think it comes back to a lot of the stuff I’ve already said really about, you know increased 
collaboration, joint commissioning, you know looking at ways where we can identify shared 
outcomes, you know looking outward rather than inward. (B1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Troubled Families was a good example of working together and Troubled Families in this second 
phase have developed an outcomes framework, because again, I don’t know if you know the 
second phase of Troubled Families is building on the standard national outcomes and how you 
put your own in there. (C7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
And we’ve also got a new performance framework that’s being developed and about to be 
rolled out in April. (L4 CORPORATE)  
Castle Gate’s chief executive (C1) saw performance management as reflecting the 
accountability of senior officers, and also pointed to the legacy of negative inspections 
that Castle Gate had received.   
We need to re-launch the senior management accountability framework and then, and then 
cascade that down the organization.  So, and that’s what I go back to.  […] So children’s social 
care, I’m getting swamped with PIs at the moment because we are focused on children’s social 
care, not necessarily sure we’re focused as much on adult social care, you know, so it’s about 
there but … But I don’t think we’re ever going to get to a point where we’ve got the same 
performance management framework around grass cutting. (C1 CORPORATE) 
There was a legacy effect observed, where even the residual performance reporting was 
felt to have become too onerous, or where a sense of organizational ‘baggage’ lingered.  
This ‘baggage’ from previous inspections and performance regimes affected 
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organizational acceptance that performance management could have legitimacy iwthi8n, 
or benefits for, the organization. 
So, yes. I mean for me I think –  and I do get, and I mean I’ve worked in corporate performance 
so I do know that some of these things take on a life of their own. And my sense is that [the 
corporate performance report] has, you know, has got a- has become a beast on its own, and… 
(M4 SERVICE) 
And yeah, feeding machines, they all still think of it as feeding the corporate beast. (L1 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Nonetheless, there was little outright rejection of the need to manage performance, 
although some cynical views postulated that for some services, few might notice if 
performance reporting were missed. 
what we’ve got is a very disjointed approach from DCLG, DEFRA, BIS, Uncle Tom Cobley and all, 
direct government directorates, all kind of, who’ve not got a good history of working together 
anyway… and because of the kind of, the white noise that comes from there, you know again it 
creates this kind of, almost uncertainty about what exactly you should be measuring and kind 
of delivering.  And to be quite frank Russ, if I decided that we would do no performance 
management, I think I could probably get away with that for quite a while. (B3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Overall, the efforts to renew the frameworks had to balance several competing factors: 
the need to manage services in decline, and those where significant cuts were needed to 
expenditure, yet also to sustain service levels; a desire to reference the political ambitions 
of the organizations; and a developing understanding, encouraged by the removal of 
statutory mechanisms, of what makes effective performance management.  This often 
implied a sense of developing more ‘authentic’ modes of performance measurement and 
management, which is discussed in the next section.  
Key finding 5: Renewing performance management frameworks 
Deregulation, politicization, austerity and the ‘death of improvement’ have triggered 
authorities to redevelop their performance management frameworks, and they are still 
struggling to balance longer-term outcomes with shorter-term operational performance 
management. 
 
133 
 
4.3.3 Authentic performance management (PM3) 
The removal of organizational assessments and the level of financial challenges facing 
local authorities have clearly had a significant impact on the ways in which performance 
is managed and reported.  A series of qualitative statements emerged that were clustered 
into a first order code around ‘authentic’ performance management.  This included two 
main aspects: firstly, that a wider view of what counted as performance indicators should 
be used, with some specific comments about greater use of qualitative data collection, 
narrative and user ‘voice’.  This was strongly felt within Rudgeway: 
[performance management since 2010] I’d say more the qualitative has become more 
important than the statistical […] More narrative, more case studies to really give people a feel 
what it is that Adult Social Care actually delivers […]. Hopefully, I think the voice of the user 
comes through. So, our local account is very focused on, as you can see, lots of pictures, lots of 
narrative, lots of descriptions. A little bit about how the organization is performing. (R1 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
[…] therefore the outcome side of things is a much more qualitative aspect, using survey data 
and also experiential data as well. In the old world having a place survey and having the budgets 
to be able to commission some of those things, we're not in that position where we've got the 
ability to do that.  So, we've got a lot of systems set up to measure outputs and limited things 
set up to deliver that real view of experience and outcome. (R4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Including the voice of the customer was important for Merry Park when carrying out 
strategic planning, again linking with performance outcomes rather than targets, although 
this did not mean a technological solution. 
We used three pieces of A1 sheets, so we don’t bother with too much technology. We sit around 
and we use flipcharts and we end up with three pieces of A1 where nearly everything you need 
to know, the voice of the customer, opportunities, threats, high level objective, significant 
beneficial outcomes, performer systems paradigm, inputs and outputs and some ratios and 
some metrics are all on one piece of paper. (M1 CORPORATE) 
Long Reach also discussed the use of wider data sources in terms of developing a fuller 
picture of what was happening organizationally, in this instance talking about the 
management of human resources and organizational development. 
And so, triangulating what I…the mood music I’m getting from the Unions, which is the other 
thing and you know where our disciplines and griev … (laughs) where our grievance processes 
and some of the stuff that’s coming through there says to me that there is factual evidence to 
support, to support … quantitative evidence to support qualitative evidence that we’ve got a 
problem there.  And that’s … and I find that quite easy but I don’t know that the organization is 
used to that level of enquiry. (L5 SERVICE) 
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Another Castle Gate interviewee drew an analogy between making performance 
meaningful and thus being able engage with communities by understanding their agendas 
and reacting to those.  
And to use another quote and I apologise in advance, but you know, Kevin Costner Field of 
Dreams, if you've seen that film, which is a fantastic film.  And the people come out of the kind 
of corn fields...and he's had this dream of building a baseball pitch... and the people kind of 
come out of the corn fields and they say to him:  'if you build it, they will come'.  And I always 
use that analogy, because that's the biggest load of rubbish there is.  If you build something, 
they won't come.  People have to have a reason for going and using something.  And there has 
to be a vested interest and they have to understand it.  And again, that’s just part of the public 
narrative.  So applying that kind of thinking…to outcomes and to performance 
information...why is this...why does this matter?  Why does it matter to me?  Why does it 
matter to my population? (C6 DEPARTMENTAL). 
Whilst the volume of performance indicators has reduced considerably, triangulation of 
performance still remains a valid concern.  Rudgeway’s elected member for performance 
outlined an example where their data from residents seemed to contradict the ‘official’ 
data collection. 
So, we have an independent monitoring system judging the cleanliness of our streets. It came 
back saying it’s fantastic and there are no issues and we’re almost like 100% or something. It 
just didn’t match up with the feel.  And we know that fly tipping is increasing and we know that 
last year we took some money out of the system and that has had an impact, blah, blah, blah. 
So, you can just tell, based on the number of complaints that you’re getting and based on just 
walking around the borough, that actually there is a disconnect between the independent 
reporting and what you’re actually seeing. (R6 CORPORATE) 
This reflects a fairly deep-grained suspicion about performance indicators, namely that 
they do not measure the ‘right things’, or that they are open to gaming or other behaviours 
intended to hide the ‘true’ level of performance.  This comment above, from a senior 
elected member, also felt somewhat dismissive about the impact that cuts made may 
have had on the service – note the “blah, blah, blah”.  This could be open to challenge as 
the councillor was part of the cabinet that made the decision to cut resources from the 
department charged with collecting bulky waste. 
You need to become almost a salesman, you know, I’m a local government officer, I’m not a 
salesman.  But it does require you to actually you know a) develop the measures but b) to 
promote your delivery of those and performance in a way that kind of sets you apart and 
actually you know makes people take note.  Because at the moment, you know, we’re in a kind 
of dog eat dog situation, you know, all budget holders are … clamouring to retain their budgets 
(B3 DEPARTMENTAL). 
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Rudgeway’s corporate services director connected the notion of authenticity to being able 
to relate to partnership delivery and to the ostensible mission and guiding values behind 
public service, as measured by outcomes.  
I think what we have to be, given the level of change going forward, is focused on outcome, 
which outcomes we can support, which we can’t, how they can be supported in the borough, 
how we lead the support of them, because sometimes what you’re talking about is a devolution 
of interventions being delivered within other organizations, within the fabric of the community, 
rather than via the council, but that’s where the big change for us comes in. If you’re relying on 
your values and your outcomes, that’s how you manage it. (R5 CORPORATE) 
Another aspect of the authenticity debate centred on having the right indicators monitored 
at the right place in the organization, and feedback suggested that the highly-integrated 
approach (i.e. the golden thread) had not been effective in terms of being able to make 
management or political decisions.    
And I think what we did after 2010 was we’d moved away from you know the minutiae of all of 
the indicators and everything that you had to do for an LAA to an outcomes approach, and I 
think the outcomes approach was too high level probably, we had outcome indicators and 
intermediate indicators, but the actual service delivery indicators got lost, they were there in 
the day to day stuff but there was a tier of management within the council that wasn’t seeing 
them.  So they weren’t getting to where they needed to do (C7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
We used to have what we called a magazine, a performance magazine, that was, did some case 
studies as well, did some … kind of little updates about where different projects were up to but 
we’ve stopped doing that, we do more of a narrative report (B4 CORPORATE) 
Authentic performance management, as described here, involved a more sophisticated 
approach to performance management, although some authorities, e.g. Bell Tower and 
Merry Park, still felt that they had not developed mature systems and processes.  
Rudgeway and Stocks Green had moved to incorporate mixed officer and member 
governance of performance mechanisms, although again, there was some discussion 
around whether at times this was pragmatically focused or ritualistic in nature – what we 
might term the ‘performance of performance’, where public presentations of performance 
management are rehearsed and planned, rather than spontaneous discussions, and 
where ‘genuine’ discussions focused on understanding poor performance and taking 
action are replaced by ritualistic performance for performance’s sake.   
Prior to their removal, the statutory frameworks for local authority performance had 
required more substantial activity, as well as a much tighter framework of indicators.  Now, 
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authorities were largely benefitting from deregulation in terms of being able to be ‘masters 
of their own destiny’, although the removal of these regulatory frameworks was not 
without challenge, as the next section discusses in more detail. 
Key finding 6: Authentic performance management 
The drive to renew performance management frameworks has included the ambition to 
highlight user voice and alternative forms of performance data as part of a move towards 
more ‘authentic’ performance management, now that the statutory indicators have been 
removed. 
 
 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter examined the initial findings and explored two of the four inductive codes, 
which relate to organizational and political challenges (OP1, OP2, and OP3) and to 
performance management frameworks (PMF1, PM2, and PMF3).   
Authorities reported an increasing use of more politicized forms of performance 
management, particularly in the context of manifesto commitments and electoral pledges.  
These were driving changes in performance management governance arrangements, 
particularly for Rudgeway, where performance boards with mixed officer and elected 
member compositions were tasked with maintaining an overview of performance against 
the pledges.  In Long Reach and Stocks Green, too, pledges formed part of performance 
management arrangements, which fed into the accountability findings in section 5.1.2 
(page 143) and the discussion of accountability types in section 7.2 on page 223.  These 
pledges may have developed in response to the removal of the statutory performance 
indicators included within the Best Value regime.  Some views that support this are 
discussed in section 5.1.1. 
The data suggest that deregulation has had an impact on organizational structures that 
has generated a series of tensions between corporate and departmental or service-based 
staff – staff in Stocks Green and Long Reach in particular discussed this.    Whilst these 
divisions have been around for some time and can perhaps be seen in part as a more 
local replication of the administration / politics split (Svara, 2008), the development of the 
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substantial regulatory regime under New Labour served to give legitimacy to corporate 
staff structures and roles.  This has been unpicked by the subsequent deregulation under 
the Coalition.   
The centrally controlling, coercive force generated by regulation has also effectively 
disappeared, giving local politicians more space to implement locally-determined 
priorities, yet this has been undermined by significant budget cuts (see section 5.2. 
Austerity and finance on page 156 for a full discussion of this).  The impact of meeting 
austerity budgets has resonated across the organizations discussed, and has left a 
significant legacy in the loss of staffing and expertise, the subject of a key finding. 
Crucially, performance management frameworks have had to adapt to austerity, and the 
resultant change in emphasis from ‘continuous improvement’ to ‘managed decline’, at 
least in some parts, is also serving to influence divergent forms of performance.  This 
abandoning of the statutory duty to continually improve has been termed the ‘death of 
improvement’ and is a key finding for this research.  This is not wholly negative, however, 
and authorities are developing new and more authentic forms of performance 
management in order to better engage with citizens, businesses and other stakeholders. 
Chapter 5 will now move on to discuss the findings that relate to inspection, accountability 
and, crucially, the impact of austerity on organizational behaviours, values, and actions. 
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Chapter 5. Findings: Inspection, accountability, and austerity  
The previous chapter articulated the findings as they relate to organizational and 
institutional issues examining democratic processes and engagement, impact on staffing, 
structural concerns and finally the use of performance management approaches.  This 
chapter continues developing the findings with a focus on the financial, decisional, and 
regulatory elements of the research. 
 Inspection and accountability 
Accountability is a fundamental part of management of public services, and specifically 
performance management.  Three first order codes emerged, which are: 
• Responses to deregulation (IA1) 
• Differing forms of accountability (IA2) 
• Residual external inspections and peer or sector-led improvement (IA3) 
  
Responses to deregulation – the removal of the organizational regulatory processes of 
CPA / CAA, and the removal of the supporting performance management arrangements 
– provoked nuanced responses.  Initially the coding structure separated positive and 
negative responses into different first order codes.  More detailed analysis of the findings, 
however, suggested that responses were rarely wholly positive or wholly negative.  Whilst 
some interviewees were more critical of the existing frameworks than others, most 
recognised that their removal raised problems around performance management and 
accountability, but that it also increased authorities’ ability to control the agenda for 
service delivery – sometimes termed being ‘masters of our own destiny’.     
5.1.1 Responses to deregulation (IA1) 
The most common positive response to deregulation was around the removal of the 
reporting burden.   Where this was referenced, the metaphors used tended to be around 
‘feeding the machine’ or ‘feeding the beast’. 
Yes, so the removal of CPA/CAA, the focus often became too much about CPA and CAA and the 
evidence and it really was a process you were feeding to a greater degree. (S2 SERVICE) 
A little bit because in my role at HR there were contributions to make in terms of feeding the, 
the various inspectors with information. (B6 SERVICE) 
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I think sort of CPA and CAA help to raise standards and yet people think in a different way, I 
think it probably went too far! (laughs) So it was a bit of a monster, wasn’t it? (B2 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Merry Park’s cabinet member for performance (M1) related the experience of taking over 
control of a system that they felt had developed out of an understandable desire to 
manage things but where the process drove action, and not the values behind it. 
 […] when I came in, we sort of inherited the legacy of the previous government and I understand 
why Tony Blair and others went down that line of putting lots of performance indicators in. But 
it became, like it always does, a tick box exercise and the process was the master and the 
performance was the servant… (M1 CORPORATE) 
If I'm honest, it gave you a bit of a focus when they're in there, because you have no choice. It 
focused the organization's attention on it. Because it was then relaxed, because it went, and 
then you're left to your own internal devices, I suppose it's keeping that momentum and keeping 
that emphasis going. It's been quite a big challenge, I would say.  It's only really because of the 
requirement to deliver efficiencies that has focused the attention more on making sure we are 
still doing that. If we hadn't, I personally think it would have dropped off the radar. (S3 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Rudgeway’s performance lead for health and social care had seen reductions in the 
performance burden, particularly in adults’ social care. 
[…] nationally, things like the ASCOF [Adult Social Care Outcomes Framework], it is a reduced 
version of the reporting that we used to do, statutory reporting. We’re no longer regulated and 
inspected at the moment. […] Again, ADASS [Association of Directors of Adult Social Services in 
England] were very key (R1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Merry Park’s social care performance manager (M4), on the other hand, felt that little had 
actually changed, and that the statutory returns to central government departments had 
meant that the burden had not actually reduced. 
I think the, you know, the so-called reducing the burdens by removing the performance 
management stuff, actually has just come in through the back door. Because you’ve still got to 
do it in terms of the statutory returns. (M4 SERVICE) 
One respondent from Bell Tower, who had worked for the Audit Commission before taking 
up a local government role, felt that the overall inspection regime had been unnecessarily 
burdensome, but that the lack of a replacement mechanism left authorities without a 
reference point to assess their delivery for local residents. 
[…] because having sat on both sides of the fence, it’s certainly burdensome for local authorities, 
having a CPA or whatever.  Massively burdensome.  And I think that could have been simplified.  
So I agree with the reforms that were done.  But I think by not replacing it with anything, it kind 
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of leaves us a little bit, we’re not really sure, we’d like to be sure that we’re doing a good job 
and that we’re delivering the best for our residents, but I’m not sure we really know. (B4 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
This raises some important questions about the tension around the political importance 
of the data collected (linking with section 4.2.1: Politicization of performance (OP1)on 
page 105), what might be termed ‘small p’ versus ‘large P’ political significance, or the 
classical politics / administration split (Svara 2008): i.e. to what extent ‘real’ data is being 
used for decision-making, and the extent to which politicians use that data for 
management or achievement of political purposes, assuming those do not coincide.    
They went on to suggest that the lack of independent view meant authorities would 
construct their own narrative, and that there was little likelihood that authorities would be 
challenged on these views. 
But all the local authorities are saying, ooh we’re excellent, we’re an excellent authority, 
because there’s nobody there to challenge it, so there’s nobody there to say …well you might 
be good at this, this and this, but what about these other things that you’re not doing so well 
at? (B4 DEPARTMENTAL)  
Another interviewee from the same organization went on to suggest that the established 
level of performance and commitment to continuous improvement would directly influence 
the likelihood of successful performance management continuity within organizations or 
teams. 
So we’ve got a good track record of delivery, and I think that’s down to you know the great 
team I’ve got.  So that commitment continued, you know it wasn’t kind of a, oh great, the 
shackles of BVPIs have been now lifted, we can just basically do nothing.  But I think then, you 
know, if you’re not committed, if you’re not kind of high achieving and you’re not committed to 
continuous improvement, then it’s an easy way out for us in departments I think.  And you know 
because who cares, you know, I mean as long as you kind of, your complaints database isn’t 
kind of growing then who really cares? (B3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Not all services would have this “easy way out” open to them, and this interviewee 
perhaps contradicted themselves earlier when talking about the sense of overreaction 
senior officers to what they felt were minor problems. 
You know and I think it’s difficult for services like mine to feature, you know, particularly on the 
corporate you know … agenda, when you know they’re not being measured particularly.  And 
you kind of see that, you know when for instance periodically we’ll get a letter from the Office 
of the Surveillance Commissioner, you know it’s, and they kind of raise some minor issues with 
performance, and I say minor because of my experience will lead me to interpret that as minor, 
however, because it lands on the chief exec’s desk it becomes major. (B3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
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This suggests that visibility at the corporate and external level was one of the aspects of 
the regulatory system that some services are now missing.  The CPA / CAA regimes 
highlighted a large number of services, and in the view of managers, the concomitant lack 
of visibility post-2010 may be causing either good performance to go unrecognised by 
corporate organizational and political decision-makers, or to lead these decision-makers 
to feel that the service is a suitable target for cuts, if it were generating few complaints.  
Boyne (1996) suggests that internal competition for resources could be considered a valid 
mode of competition for public services, and this sense of missing the external validation 
of service ‘value’, coupled with a lack of visibility within corporate performance reporting 
may be ultimately harmful for longer-term viability or sustainability. 
And I think that’s what’s happened, you know, at the end of that it’s taken us then a few years 
to think, OK, we’re on our own now, but what does that mean for us and what does … I mean I 
think we welcome it in the sense that we are now masters more of our own destiny, I mean 
obviously we’ve still got Ofsted and CQC […] (L1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
I’m not sure the overall CPA type thing really was of great use. I think it was probably more to 
the government to say, “We’ve got the system by which we’re going to hold them to account. 
We’ve got a system by which we can understand good or bad.” (S2 SERVICE) 
Overall, a fairly balanced picture emerged of the perceptions of deregulation.  
Respondents balanced the view that the regulatory mechanisms had become overly 
burdensome, an awareness of now lacking clear direction and priority that CPA / CAA 
brought.  When considering the scale of the financial cuts facing local government, there 
were some views that the historic performance management framework would have 
highlighted the fact that many services are facing reductions in performance levels, and 
the ways in which performance reporting services can enable accountability.  
Key finding 7: Deregulation of performance regimes 
The removal of the regulatory regimes has had a significant impact on attitudes and 
motivations towards improvement in a climate of austerity.  This has included both 
negative and positive aspects.  One positive feature is the feeling of being ‘master of 
one’s own destiny’, as deregulation has removed the tight central control over 
performance goals and allowed the politicisation of performance discussed in section 
4.2.1.  One concern is whether the government has a clear view of local authority 
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performance and hence the impact of austerity, or even whether local authorities 
understand their own performance sufficiently. 
 
5.1.2 Differing forms of accountability (IA2) 
Whilst the subject of a specific first order code, accountability also emerged as a facet of 
the findings in section 4.2.1: Politicization of performance (OP1) on page 105, where 
deregulation had facilitated an increasing sense of politicization of performance, i.e. the 
remove of centrally imposed targets has allowed politicians to develop stronger political 
pledges and manifesto commitments that had subsequently been translated into the 
performance management framework; this then can become an instrument of managerial 
accountability.   All council officers were clear that they were hierarchically accountable 
to their line of management.  That is to say, that they were tasked with action by their 
management, or in some cases, by other managers more senior to them but not within a 
direct line of authority, such as commissioners.  This accountability for the ‘day job’ sat 
alongside other specific accountabilities, such as for key change or transformation 
projects. 
There is this big project underway, if you like, around the [integrating health and social care] 
that in some ways is quite exciting in the world that we're in, because we're looking at bringing 
two different sectors together […].  Alongside that we've still got the day job to do, so there is 
a bit of a capacity issue for that whole service around that. (S3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
So, where everyone’s busy with their day job, sometimes it’s difficult for them to step back and 
look at the whole thing and take time to evaluate it properly, whereas we can go in and have 
the time to say, right, we’ll do that work for you, we’ll identify where you are now and what 
steps you need to … and free up some capacity for you to actually make those changes. (L4 
CORPORATE)   
Castle Gate’s communication manager saw this as a regular occurrence when looking to 
engage with services about their communications.   
So, if it’s just us sending the messages out, it won’t work, yes, we are there to kind of gather 
some of that information and disseminate it, but it’s senior managers to kind of expand on that, 
then to feedback, it has to be more than just us.  That’s hard because people have got their day 
job to do and sometimes comms to them isn’t a priority. (C2 SERVICE) 
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Communications activity was increasingly focused on sharing messages about changes, 
or attempting to mediate the reputational fallout of service changes.  A senior social care 
manager from Rudgeway highlighted the tensions between delivering external change 
activity and daily responsibilities for service management. 
This year, it was becoming a little bit more difficult because there are other projects, activities, 
shifts in the sector that means that we’re having to spend other time, that maybe we wouldn’t 
have in previous years, doing other work that has then stopped us actually getting on with the 
day job. So, all a challenge. (R1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Castle Gate were seeking to introduce a new accountability framework to address 
organizational issues that had occurred, including poor external inspection results, but 
again this notion of the ‘day job’ of managerial line accountability comes into conflict with 
transformation or more significant changes to the organization.  
So that, so hopefully the new accountability framework will make a difference, I think it’s just 
taken a long time coming because [the head of service] will tell you she designed a bit of a 
framework for [the chief exec] in about November but he’s not got round to doing it yet because 
other things, the day job gets in the way, as it were. (C7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
One senior manager at Castle Gate also highlighted a sense of accountability down the 
managerial line as well as up: 
But that’s about me as sort of the director ensuring that that staff below me and then that …It’s 
about that sort of very clear message being cascaded down, whilst in the same time not 
removing sort of innovation and creativity for people.  I’d say that’s the trickiest (laughs) part! 
(C4 CORPORATE). 
Although they went on to demonstrate that accountability for staff was also in reality 
because of a reliance on those staff to provide the delivery against which they themselves 
would be held to account – a sense of looped accountability.  
Yes, it’s about that constant communication, saying actually you’re … I keep reminding them, 
you know, you are my staff team and you will either make or break me as a director because 
my success is actually dependent on your success, you know. (C4 CORPORATE) 
Castle Gate’s chief executive articulated well the challenges around multiple sets of 
formal and informal accountabilities, particularly in an environment of financial cuts and 
service reductions, and doubly so where the local political party is not the same as the 
national governing party. 
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So you know they, they pointed at the national Government and blamed them, and that’s fair 
enough, but they see their role as protecting their people from the ravages of the Government.  
And what that means is deterioration isn’t an option for them, you know, so yeah, they know 
they’re being forced to do it by somebody who they didn’t elect and nobody up here voted for 
and everything else. (C1 CORPORATE) 
They went on to add that the relationship between executive (here ‘senior’) members and 
ward members represented tensions that needed to be resolved if the authority were to 
be able to meet its statutory duty to meet a balanced budget.  
But still that’s no excuse.  So the challenge is, you know I … what we’ve been talking about for 
the last half an hour or so about sort of understanding that there’s a tipping point and it’s, the 
tipping point’s moved considerably over the last six years or so.  That’s not a conversation … I 
could sit here with our senior members and say that and they’d say, yeah, yeah, yeah, and then 
they’d say, but don’t go down the tri-weekly route and by the way get the grass cut, because at 
the end of the day they’ve just got to do the … So there’s a hell of a lot of pressure. (C1 
CORPORATE) 
This raised issues about how to best communicate with residents around service 
reductions or loss in order to protect the elected members. 
The members aren’t in the same boat, which is yes, we’ll accept those tipping points moving 
because we are logical and we understand.  And my job is to explain to them the inevitability of 
that, and try and get the communication strategy right so you explain to the public that it’s not 
the local member’s fault. (C1 CORPORATE) 
Other interviewees expressed similar tensions between what members of the public were 
interested in and what elected members were most concerned with.  Stocks Green’s 
cabinet member focused on the services that most directly affect tangible quality of life 
for most people, e.g. more universal of services. 
For all the years I’ve been knocking on doors and talking to people, nobody has ever said to me, 
“I think you should improve your adult services. I think you should spend more money on 
children’s services.” I’ve never had it yet. What they do say is, “The streets are dirty and you 
don’t empty my bins. What about my library?” Those sort of services are the services that are 
going to be cut. (S1 CORPORATE) 
Officers from Bell Tower and Rudgeway, on the other hand, saw members as being the 
drivers of setting priorities for cuts. 
The members are quite… The dialogue with them is all about… We’ve just been through more 
than 100 individual proposals with them to make a financial change, and what the 
implementation of that would involve. That could be about people, it could be about 
restructuring, it could be about technology. That’s where the political interface and officer 
interface has been taking place, and actually, it’s happened through a set of summits.  Not 
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summits, but commissioning panels. That’s what’s going to drive the change once the political 
side of life has decided that’s what they want to go ahead and do. (R5 CORPORATE) 
But I think having had the grass cutting, I think members are less keen and we do have […] have 
a process, won’t you, there’s a process there where we go and agree budget proposals with 
members every year and they’re quite unwilling to accept proposals like the grass cutting 
anymore because they know what happens.  So they’re looking more for transformation rather 
than, what they call transformation, which is the same for less, more for less. (B4 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
A Stocks Green service manager suggested that this reduction in services could lead to 
a democratic deficit at the local level. 
The council is going to be left with very few – they are going to be left probably back where they 
started about the drains and the… which is fine maybe, but where is the democratic 
accountability to the most enormous part of the public sector, which is education and health? 
It will have no democratic accountability except for at a national level. (S2 SERVICE) 
Whilst it would appear appropriate and desirable for elected members to express political 
ambitions and to have those reflected in organizational plans and strategies, as identified 
in CPA and CAA guidance, there were some concerns expressed that this was at times 
driven by political concerns rather than identified needs. 
And dare I say that I think some indicators have been put in there because they’re particular 
hobby-horses of lead [executive] members.  Rather than because, actually that’s such a killer 
service, if we don’t keep an eye on it, you know, we’d be falling by the wayside. (M4 SERVICE) 
This reflections tensions outlined in OP1 around increased political intervention in 
organizational performance management since 2010, and ties into tensions between 
managerial and political accountabilities.  Merry Park provided some clear views here in 
this regard. 
But yes, I think accountability’s a funny thing in this context, I have to say. I mean the lead 
members would say they want to know because they’re accountable to the residents.  And it is 
a heavily…that’s a heavy driver for them, in everything, is about residents first, what the 
residents think about this. (M4 SERVICE) 
I think there are hobbyhorses. I think there are differences of opinion, to be honest, in some 
things as to what the members see as more important relative to what officers might see as 
important. An example of that might be the number of foster carers we've recruited, which is a 
KPI. We were, I think, averaging between four and eight a few years ago and they decided that 
we needed to take that to 20. It was an overnight shift. (M3 DEPARTMENTAL)  
It should be noted, however, that Merry Park represents an example of strong political 
control over services.  This was the subject of several comments from council officers 
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interviewed about the level of political involvement in more operational decisions, 
particularly around where this circumvented managerial accountabilities. 
There is still quite a lot of intervention from them [members]. […] Is there time being taken out 
by constant interruption from members? Do you need to say, "Right, we need to restrict their 
access on to the floor?" I mean there are some authorities, and we did have it I think at [a former 
authority] where members didn't come into the department without going and okaying it with 
the head of service. They weren't naturally accessible. (M5 SERVICE) 
Another facet of accountability related to legislated accountabilities.  This included the 
‘statutory’ roles.  These are explained further in section 7.2.4: Legislated accountability 
on p.236, but in brief are roles that are enshrined in law and each authority must have a 
person responsible for those roles.  Merry Park’s monitoring officer (senior legal and 
democratic officer) suggested a weakening of the professional basis previously expected 
of staff in this role. 
 [C]ertainly when I attended a monitoring officer how-to-be course probably three or four 
months ago now, about half the people in the room weren’t legally qualified. The guy delivering 
it said, “If I’d asked that question three years ago, I’d have had the odd hand”. (M3 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
This officer went on to suggest a similar role change within children’s services may have 
taken place. 
I think I only know what I know but I suspect that I’ve seen in children’s services the move away 
necessarily from specialisms. I was head of education for over two years and, all right, I've got 
a Post-Graduate Certificate in Education, I haven’t actually ever taught. I certainly haven’t had 
a career in teaching, let’s put it that way. (M3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
In Bell Tower, the two resources statutory officers report to the deputy chief executive. 
Sure, well I’m the deputy chief executive here at [Bell Tower] and I’ve been here since 2009.  And 
I’ve got a very wide ranging portfolio of a whole range of back office services, like finance, HR, 
legal, partnerships, performance and I’m also very much involved in our joint commissioning 
work with health and social care and police and community safety.  And I’m the deputy to the 
chief executive, so I get involved in a lot of issues around democracy and member issues and 
elections and general running of the council. [RG: Sure, you’re monitoring officer or …?].  He 
reports to me.  [RG: OK, as does Section 151?] They do. (B5 CORPORATE) 
Conversely, in Castle Gate, the Director of Adult Social Services (the statutory role, or 
DASS) reports directly to the chief executive, and blurs the lines of accountability; they 
felt that responsibilities to the people of the borough were driven in part by professional 
disciplines and values. 
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Well obviously, I’m very accountable as the statutory officer, very accountable to them that’s, 
you know chief exec, a direct line to the chief exec, but you know whether it’s the social worker 
in me or not, I don’t know, at the end of the day I must not lose sight of the service users, and 
that’s part and parcel of what social work is.  Now that pose some challenges but mainly that’s 
what the senior officer is all about! (C4 CORPORATE) 
The other form of legislated accountability present was that of existing external 
inspections.  Whilst this is discussed in more detail in section 5.1.3, the main features 
observed were a strong sense of data and outcome accountability from Ofsted, and a 
much lower level of challenge from the Care Quality Commission (CQC), which was felt 
to be less demanding and to have fewer sanctions than Ofsted.  Many service areas are 
now deregulated and hence not held to forms of legislated accountability.   
OK, I’d say it’s quite … service specific.  So in some areas where there’s still a high number of 
national regulation I think you’d find a good deal of sort of commonplace approaches and you 
would find a rigour in performance management and in counting of metrics and understanding 
of the business performance through the use of performance management.  I think in other 
services, say in sort of our environmental services, where there’s no real national regulation any 
longer, it’s much more fluid, more project oriented, more on delivery of programme to 
resources, and I think that the fact that they have very little national regulation for a good deal 
of the work in that area has led to, I would say it’s more difficult now to ascertain the impact of 
those services. (B5 CORPORATE) 
Generally, Ofsted was considered to be very detail focused, and thus demanded a 
significant amount of statistical evidence and observational evidence. 
Ofsted tries to be about outcomes, but a lot of it’s still about things that you can come in and 
observe. (R5 CORPORATE) 
I think the obligation on us still to provide Appendix A data [Ofsted statistical return] at 
potentially very short notice. (M3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
I think […]  the so-called reducing the burdens by removing the performance management stuff, 
actually has just come in through the back door. Because you’ve still got to do it in terms of the 
statutory returns […] Ofsted’s still measuring us on those old indicators. And that’s in a sense 
where you feel accountable to. […] You know it’s- so I think that there are different 
accountabilities. So there’s that sense of ensuring that the lead member is very clear about 
where the problem areas might be. So there’s an accountability that way I would say. That’s 
less measured by performance indicators than by issues, I would suggest. (M4 SERVICE) 
There was general agreement (e.g. B2, L1, R5, M3) that the CQC was not significant in 
terms of how people viewed the externally imposed accountability.  In fact, no 
interviewees offered any detailed views on the effect or impact of CQC inspections, 
whereas the Ofsted regime was considered a significant threat (and two authorities were 
148 
 
coming out of significantly negative inspections), demonstrating more clearly Lindberg’s 
(2013) principle of sanction as a fundamental part of accountability. 
II think it will end up being a lot easier to make those cuts in Adults than in Children’s, because 
of the weaker inspection process. (R5 CORPORATE) 
I’ve always said it for adults, CQC were not inspecting. As soon as they stopped, the thing is with 
the white paper they always ignore it but there is a little bit in there which says they may well 
start. That is what they have to keep in mind. I mean I think the inspections by Ofsted are very 
intensive. I mean even so we knew they were coming back in. That build-up of the six months 
where we were thinking, “Right it is this week. It is next week”, it can harm. But it also gives 
them a means that they actually know they need to improve. They don’t have that struggle in 
adults. You have kind of different struggles trying to keep things consistent. (M2 SERVICE) 
Castle Gate had recently had negative children’s and adults’ inspections and the 
response to the children’s inspection informed the way improvement in adults’ services 
was approached in terms of independent governance mechanisms to drive improvement 
and a ‘layering up’ of accountability.  This was well supported by the chief executive (C1). 
Children’s services for example, we’ve got an independently chaired improvement board, it was 
given to us (laughs), the Department for Education decided you will have an improvement board 
and it will be independently chaired and you need to find somebody and we suggested 
somebody and he’s great.  And when … when that improvement board closes because we’ve 
got ourselves out the hole, I would want to carry on with an improvement board, and I might 
well want somebody independent to chair it because it’s been a hugely impressive discipline, in 
terms of managing the overall performance and improvement of children’s services.  Having to 
go every six weeks or so to somebody who’s an expert in his field, and be tested…you know it’s 
a ball ache, but do you know what it’s hugely important and it’s got us where … We have done 
immeasurably better over the last twelve months particularly.  So I like that model.  And we’re 
doing the same thing with adult social care, although it’s not independently chaired, and I might 
decide I want it independently chaired (C1 CORPORATE). 
External accountability was often expressed in terms of accountability and transparency.  
Whilst those concepts are not synonymous, there was a blurring of the two when 
discussed in terms of accounting for past action to members of the public and accepting 
service failure, as well as attempting to mitigate it. 
I’m very interested in accountability and transparency to the public.  And then as I said the 
people bit, so how we deliver it through our people, which is fascinating and that’s fairly new 
to me, and then I have the engagement bit, how we tell people how brilliant we are or try and 
help the council save face when we don’t do it … (L5 SERVICE) 
I think what I would say is that generally, the general public in their own mind don’t care about 
performance, they care about their experience. (C2 SERVICE) 
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However, there were some questions around the meaningfulness of using performance 
data account to the public, particularly around the risk of compliance-based thinking. 
 [..] the danger is the internal accountability will resort to 'have you balanced your budgets and 
did the teams check in before nine and check out after five?' type approaches, rather than is 
the activity we’re doing fundamentally making a difference to the populations we serve? (C6 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
We publish for the benefit of the public to know if they choose to want to see it more 
information than ever before. That’s seen very much in terms of transparency, the 
administration saying, “We’ve got nothing to hide”. I think, in terms of performance, it’s about 
saying this is what we've achieved. (M3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
In part, this relationship is swayed by the perception that members of the public are 
‘customers’, ‘buying’ something through their council tax payments.  This relationship was 
felt to be a challenging one, and again we see the relationship between elected members, 
the council, and the public as a tripartite one.  Members are accountable democratically, 
but officers are accountable from a legislated perspective.  
 […] if I announce, not that we are, but if I said, right, ‘we’re going down to tri-weekly bin 
collection’, “well last year I was paying the same amount of money council tax and it was 
fortnightly, so am I going to get a council tax refund?”  And the answer to that is no, because 
the revenue support grant, which comes from Government has been cut, no one gets that.  “I 
pay my council tax…”  No, your council tax pays for 20% of the council services.  “No, I pay my 
council tax.” (C1 CORPORATE) 
It was also recognised by Castle Gate that businesses were included in public or civic 
accountability frameworks. 
you know I’m working really closely with the private sector, we are working as enablers to get 
them to kind of lead the charge on telling people how great [Castle Gate] is.  So I’m not 
accountable to them in terms of they don’t pay my wage, but if my level of service wasn’t 
appropriate, they wouldn’t be so willing to join in.  So for us, our accountability is broadening 
as what we do is changing so dramatically, it must be different in different service areas, but 
for me, the list feels endless sometimes! (C2 SERVICE) 
But you wanted to be able to say, you know, we were talking earlier about going to the Labour 
Party conference, I went to a property conference in October and it was about saying, come to 
[Castle Gate] … We had a meeting last week, we had a thing called The [Castle Gate] 
Ambassadors, which is about businesses in [Castle Gate] talking [Castle Gate] rather than me 
doing it. (C1 CORPORATE) 
Stocks Green had attempted to engage with members of the public to involve them in 
budget consultations but this had not worked well.  It was not clear to what extent this 
may have been an attempt to shift responsibility onto the public for decisions around cuts, 
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or whether it was a genuine attempt to be more transparent and base decisions on 
feedback, but neither approach was served well by the public response. 
You’d be aware we’re doing the budget consultations? [RG: Yes].  Very limited. We’ve just done 
a consultation on the council tax support scheme. We sent out 58,000 letters, we’ve had 20 
people respond. (S1 CORPORATE) 
Again, this reinforces the perception that accountability to the public is largely about 
backwards-looking accounting for performance.  Rudgeway outlined this clearly and 
suggested that CPA offered an ineffective mechanism to share the reality of service 
provision.  They further stated that operating in an environment of service restrictions and 
cuts meant that the accountability mechanism as envisaged by New Labour approaches 
would have been even less effective.   
 In terms of service delivery, it was pretty much probably in the good category if you looked at 
it from the old CPA world, yet reputationally the Council was suffering.  So, there is this 
disconnect, I think, between a local authority being able to say, "Aren't we brilliant because 
we're delivering all of these outputs and some sense of measurement of outcomes", and the 
reality of what public perception is of what the local authority is doing and their satisfaction 
with that. (R4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
You can run an election every year about it and have your say and criticise it, but nobody is on 
Twitter slagging off the NHS all day long but there is a vast amount of spending there and there 
is plenty of potential for improvement. It’s not just the democratic accountability of elections 
and councils, people go on and can criticise councils because of the elections. It’s not just they 
haven’t got an elected official; it also means the public ignores it to a degree. (S2 SERVICE) 
Civic accountability therefore, unlike, other forms may rest more heavily on reputational 
impact, ethical obligations from officers, as well as democratic obligations from members, 
and perceptions of what the public feel is ‘owed’ to them in return for their participation in 
tax raising.  Another type of civic accountability, however, may also run alongside this, i.e. 
individual recipients of more actively consumed public services, such as social care, or 
education, for example.     
Different accountability types such as professional, civic, political, managerial, or 
regulatory may draw on different value bases, and thus be enacted in different ways.  This 
is discussed further in section 7.2, p.223.  Returning to deregulation, as discussed in 5.1.1, 
the removal of the CPA and CAA regimes may have changed the dynamic of external 
accountability.  Whilst previously authorities had to submit public performance data on a 
range of statutory indicators, this appears to have been replaced by an increasing 
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politicization of performance (see section 4.2.1, p.105), meaning that the ways in which 
authorities need to engage with the public presentation of information is also changing.  
Section 7.1.3 proposes a new performance zones model that articulates these changes 
via legitimacy and accountability zones. 
 
Key finding 8: differing forms of accountability 
Accountability remains an important concept in public service delivery.  Findings here 
suggest that different forms of accountability have emerged, and that austerity is making 
new demands on local authorities, particularly around the expectations of the users of 
public services, when faced with service reductions and cuts.   
 
5.1.3 Residual external inspections and peer or sector-led improvement (IA3) 
When we examine accountability as discussed above, the most frequent references to 
were to Ofsted and the Care Quality Commission (CQC).    Numerous interviewees 
reported that Ofsted inspections were onerous, challenging, and a source of some anxiety 
in terms of managerial accountability and potential reputational damage.  In those case 
studies that had received poor inspection results, particularly Castle Gate and Merry Park, 
the requirement to act was much more explicit at the corporate level. 
Well it probably comes back to the answer to this. Because actually, Ofsted’s still measuring us 
on those old indicators.  And that’s in a sense where you feel accountable to. So you kind of get- 
it’s interesting because we had our inspection last March. So everything has always been 
preparing for inspection. And you get past inspection and it’s kind of like, oh. So what do we do 
now then? (M4 SERVICE) 
Rudgeway’s corporate commissioning lead (R4) articulated a sense of organisational 
anxiety driven by Ofsted experience, but exacerbated by public sentiment around emotive 
issues of child protection. 
Then there is always this sense that we are afraid of- so Ofsted, it's a fear culture created largely 
by the fact of central government being fearful of the backlash on it of these things. So, Ofsted 
fearing that it can't give a judgement that if in two weeks' time there happens to be a child 
death or big case of child sexual exploitation or something like that with the media sniffing 
around all of the stuff all the time, you're guilty unless proven innocent.   I just think the culture 
that that’s kind of breeding is one where actually you're not interested necessarily in 
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performance anymore, you're interested in reputation management and the management of 
what would they think. (R4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
R4 went on to place these sorts of inspections in the context of sanctions and punishment 
for poor performance, and the concerns this had generated for organizational behaviours, 
especially around risk. 
I just think it shifts the confidence in local government, which creates a much more different 
leadership dimension to how…because, you know, the Ofsted guidelines saying basically, "Chief 
Executive, if anything goes wrong you're liable. DCS, you're liable. Legal Counsel, you're liable." 
You're all completely liable in an Ofsted failure and we expect heads to roll because that’s what 
the public mood is, without recognising what does that do for recruitment, what does that do 
for leadership, what does that do for risk taking? (R4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Rudgeway, in particular, felt that the cuts were more likely to be easier to implement in 
adults’ services, because of the comparative weakness of CQC against Ofsted. 
Well, I think we are about to go through, in all local authorities, two, three, four years of quite 
draconian cuts. I think it will end up being a lot easier to make those cuts in Adults than in 
Children’s, because of the weaker inspection process (R6 CORPORATE) 
External inspections were not only viewed negatively, however.  They were also seen as 
an opportunity to validate and improve services, and as a mechanism for improving the 
‘fit’ between a service and the corporate centre.  The impact of this was seen in Castle 
Gate, which had received a poor Ofsted inspection result, and the corporate performance 
lead’s view was that the departmental performance staff had not engaged well with the 
corporate performance team.  This negative inspection, however, had allowed the 
corporate team to change the nature of the relationship with departmental staff. 
Yeah, I think we, over the years it’s, our input’s varied and I think if you’d look at the team and 
at the officer level, a lot of people get involved in doing that work, but depending on, you know, 
if you look at the Children’s Services inspection and all, you know what happened a year or so 
ago, that was led very much by Children’s Services, so their own people were coordinating it 
and we’d provide them intel, but that was it.  I think where we’ve made a difference more 
recently, is that members of the performance team have actually come up with some sharper 
performance management frameworks (C7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Whereas Bell Tower’s corporate performance manager reported that the rigour of Ofsted 
inspections had had a positive effect in their view. 
I think that’s probably what the savings culture has done for us […] it’s driven out that kind of 
thing where people are a bit, you know complacent, unwilling to change, unwilling to take up 
the barrier.  I suppose the only other thing might be, is our capacity to understand where we 
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are.  I mean children’s obviously driven by Ofsted, very keen to get a good result, so massive 
amounts of you know kind of performance culture in there. (B4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Merry Park’s cabinet member with responsibility for corporate performance also reported 
that Ofsted accountability and the level of expertise and challenge was a positive factor 
in developing the organization. 
[…] we do need to be accountable to other organizations and those other organizations that 
have expertise come and have a conversation, like OFSTED is very useful. (M1 CORPORATE) 
However, the view of Merry Park’s children’s performance manager provided a 
contradictory perspective on the impact of inspections, and was probably closer to the 
detail of the inspection.   
[I]t’s interesting because we had our inspection last March.  So everything has always been 
preparing for inspection. And you get past inspection and it’s kind of like, oh. So what do we do 
now then? Because we haven’t got that, we’ve got at least probably another three years before, 
unless something- oh God, touch wood, nothing goes. You know it’s- so I think that there are 
different accountabilities. So there’s that sense of ensuring that the lead member is very clear 
about where the problem areas might be. (M4 SERVICE) 
Residual inspections, therefore, present a managerial challenge for authorities in their 
implementation, and a political and public challenge in the event of negative inspection 
results.  The impact of these results was observed strongly in Castle Gate and Merry Park, 
who had received relatively recent poor results.  One interesting observation was that 
these two authorities had been able to draw the departmental performance teams and 
departmental management teams closer into the corporate centre, and used the negative 
inspection to leverage this rapprochement with the intention of gaining stronger 
managerial and political control.  However, where inspection results have been strong, 
for example, Rudgeway or to a lesser extent, Stocks Green, departmental social care 
teams were more strongly independent of the centre.  This may have had an effect on the 
ability of corporate teams to support or drive improvement.   
Peer inspections within social care were also listed as a mechanism for developing 
improvement action within departments – this was part of a shift in preference for sector-
led improvement, as opposed to corporate-led, particularly in Castle Gate. 
I think what we’re looking to do for, on the North West footprint, is make it that there’s, it’s the 
value, it adds value to the system.  And as a sort of cohort of DASS’s I guess.  It’s … you know 
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we have to try and make that happen […].  I think it’s that external scrutiny.  And I think 
sometimes if maybe your view of your service is maybe out of kilter with the organizational view 
of the service for example, well it does give some sort of external challenge really if you like and 
scrutiny that you know, well either challenges your view or supports it and underpins what 
you’re looking to do. (C4 CORPORATE) 
Yes, so benchmarking and peer reviews. I’m very much in favour of that approach rather than 
an internal-looking approach. (C5 DEPARTMENTAL) 
What I think...that compliance framework stuff has broadly been replaced by kind of peer 
review type stuff, hasn't it?  And you get your friends in to have a look and...I think that's 
useful... (C6 DEPARTMENTAL) 
You know, we have various peer reviews, I only yesterday was involved in a peer review involved 
… with other […] local authorities. (B1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Long Reach staff linked the resurgence of benchmarking to part of the overall sector-led 
improvement activity taking place 
So the [regional] benchmarking club started up a couple of years ago, we used to find it became 
a talking shop, so everyone just got fed up with it, and then they relaunched it through the DCS’s 
as part of sector led improvement. (L5 SERVICE) 
Another Long Reach interview suggested that one side benefit of the (re)development of 
this form of discipline-based benchmarking was a strengthening of networks and contacts. 
But also actually, I’m not sure how much they really told you because councils collected the data 
differently and reported it differently, so you can never be absolutely sure, it was a very vague 
guide.  But actually you can, you can still get hold of the information you need but it just, it 
perhaps takes a little bit longer because you’ve actually got to contact the councils and …yeah, 
talk to them and identify and have a conversation about how they do things and what … So I 
suppose in that way it’s made a bit of a difference, but actually I think sometimes it’s probably 
more positive … [laughs]…because you get a better … if you actually pick up the phone and talk 
to someone, you get more information out of them, it’s just the time, it just takes longer. (L4 
CORPORATE) 
However, when reflecting on the actual value of this information, they suggested it did not 
give much more information than the organization should already know. 
I suppose it, it does give key indications of where perhaps we need to focus our resource, but I 
think it doesn’t tell you anything you don’t already know. (L4 CORPORATE) 
Key finding 9: Impact of external inspections 
Overall, residual external inspections continued to exert a strong influence over council 
attitudes to performance management, although the focus was largely limited to social 
care and education.  A palpable culture of fear, driven by expectations of sanctions 
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emerged.  Peer inspections and sector-led mechanisms were, however, starting to 
perhaps fill some of the gaps left by the loss of council-wide inspection regimes. 
 Austerity and finance 
The single most prominent feature of the discussion was the financial context in which 
local authorities were operating.  Financial discussions took in the severity of budget 
constraint, which in turn informed value for money propositions and the role played by 
commissioning and outsourcing: 
• Dominance of financial targets (AF1) 
• Value for money in an age of austerity (AF2) 
• Commissioning and insourcing / outsourcing (AF3) 
 
5.2.1 Dominance of austerity financial targets (AF1) 
Whilst not the subject of an explicit interview question, the matter of financial 
considerations exerted a considerable influence over interviewees’ views on the planning 
and management of public services.  Local government is no stranger to being expected 
to generate organizational efficiencies.  In 1998, Sir Peter Gershon was asked to conduct 
a review of government procurement in which it made several recommendations about 
how central government and local government purchased goods and services.  In 2003 
he was asked to conduct a review of operations across all public services, resulting in the 
Gershon Efficiency Review, which recommended a series of changes to organizational 
processes and structures across central and local government to generate savings.  For 
local government, these savings requirements were integrated in the Comprehensive 
Spending Reviews, i.e. the agreement of three-year funding plans for local authorities.  
These savings requirements were embedded into local authority medium-term financial 
planning, and outlined as part of the key lines of inquiry in CPA.    
However, the political and funding environments changed significantly in 2010. The 
austerity regime imposed by the Coalition government (2010-2015) as part of their deficit 
reduction programme was continued by the Conservative government from 2015 onwards.  
The Department for Communities and Local Government accepted the largest cuts in 
percentage terms of any government department.  For local government, this equated to 
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around 51% cuts in real terms between 2010/11 and 2015/16, with additional cuts 
imposed for the remaining years of the 2015-2020 Conservative parliament.  It was 
therefore predictable that this would be a serious issue, but the scale of impact of financial 
stresses on public services was surprising. 
Well, I think we are about to go through, in all local authorities, two, three, four years of quite 
draconian cuts. (R6 CORPORATE) 
What tends to happen then is, you finance your adult services, you finance your children’s 
services, not a lot left for anything else to do with. (S1 CORPORATE) 
This level of cuts is unlikely to spare any public service delivered by a local authority, and 
authorities were clear that this was a significant challenge.  As one of Stocks Green put 
it, this level of radical change has required councils to reconsider some of their 
fundamental purposes and boundaries. 
What you’ll find, anybody at my level now, our day job has become delivering the unthinkable. 
What we might laugh at now in this interview could be the business plan next year. We just 
don’t know. (S4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Interviewees discussed the impact of the cuts in various ways and a common theme was 
the linking of financial monitoring to spending cuts. 
I have to account for my spend.  You know, on a periodical basis. And it’s every period, it’s every 
month. We report 12 times a year, really. It’s a case of me sitting down every month with our 
resources and finance team and finding out what we’ve spent, where it’s gone, what impact 
that’s had, what changes we need to make. Based on what we plan to do going forward and 
what the costs coming in are, I make the strategic changes to the service to- we’re trying to 
exceed our savings expectations. (S4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Staff from Bell Tower, Merry Park, Rudgeway, and Castle Gate discussed the long-term 
sustainability of their services, and the impact on notions around improvement.  As 
discussed earlier, the size of cuts needed had driven the emphasis away from improving 
effectiveness and towards reducing inputs, i.e. the cost of service provision. 
 [Austerity and diminishing financial resources] Oh it’s a- I mean, that whole kind of- it’s a key 
driver. You know what I mean, that whole financial savings bit is. I mean this authority hasn’t 
put council tax up for God knows how many years. (M4 SERVICE) 
If the crisis is money, which it is...the starting point from a fin...it's interesting for me.  The 
starting point from a finance person’s, or from an accountant is: what’s the least you can spend 
on this? The starting point from a social care, a social care worker, a social worker might be 
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what’s the most we can spend on this?  The answer has to be in the middle, somewhere.  What’s 
the framework that allows us to get to that?  (C6 DEPARTMENTAL) 
A head of service in an environmental services department felt that the pain of the cuts 
had gone so far as to require a shift in thinking, and that critical mass had been lost in 
some services. 
I think there’s a recognition that we need performance to lead the business now, rather than it 
being savings… and the reason for that is that I would say you almost- it’s the wrong term. But 
you almost had to hit rock bottom before you realised, “Oh, hang on a minute. We’ve gone too 
far.” And I would say that’s probably where we’ve got to. We’ve probably hit the point where 
we cannot deliver any more, and therefore, you have to re-look at, “Well, what do you want to 
reinvest in?” So, it’s almost, “Have your cuts in some areas gone so deep that they’re the wrong 
cuts, and therefore you have to reinvest?” (C5 DEPARTMENTAL) 
There was a marked difference between the way that corporate staff described the 
financial situation, and the way that staff within social care did.  Generally speaking, social 
care (children’s and adults’ combined) account for the majority of council spending, in part 
driven by an ageing population and high profile child protection issues such as those in 
Rotherham. 
I wouldn’t say that … the problem’s very much there, you know nationally there’s, you know 
because of all the issues around Rotherham, Rochdale…you know there’s definitely a rise in 
terms of children that are becoming, you know, fitting the criteria of child protection.  So it’s 
not like we’re waiting you know for these issues to emerge, those issues are there, they’re real, 
you know, nobody’s like making those up. (B1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Whereas here it’s much more about the change programmes, so we’ve identified that obviously 
you know we need to change the way we do things and to balance the budget, you know like 
62% of our spending goes on adult social care, so it’s obvious that that’s where we need to be 
spending most of our resource (L4 CORPORATE) 
And I think this whole thing with the- I think the big issue will be whether they [politicians] put 
council tax up this year with the adult precept.  Because that I think, the ones that are more 
understanding will recognise if they don’t, we are on an absolute hiding to nothing. You know 
we, our demographic is so much of an aging population […] (M4 SERVICE) 
Adults’ and children’s services were cited by interviewees as generally accounting for a 
large part of council expenditure and Rudgeway’s corporate performance lead R3 
suggested this was over 60% of the council’s expenditure.  Adults’ and children’s services 
are ‘low volume’, ‘high variation’, and ‘high variety’ services, i.e. from a traditional 
operations management perspective (Slack et al., 2010) in that they deliver a smaller 
number of more intensive transactions, where demand is unpredictable and the nature of 
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the services varies significantly (as compared with high volume, low variation operations 
such as refuse waste collection).  Given this is the case, we might expect the matter of 
cost savings to be mentioned prominently.  Instead, this is cast more as an issue of 
balancing performance and cost. 
It is, indeed. It is a challenge. Obviously, we do have to balance, for example, delay discharges. 
We have to balance performance against cost. (R1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Castle Gate’s senior adults’ social care lead framed this discussion around empowering 
staff to have budget delegation, but balancing the needs / demands of the staff.  
Reductions in costs were associated with changes in ‘mindset’, rather than an outright 
discussion of reducing the costs of service provision to hand money back to the centre, 
with a suggestion of inefficient procurement. 
So one of the things we’re doing at the moment is sort of delegating some of the budget 
responsibility, so that those people, those team managers know what they’ve got to spend that 
month and can actually start to understand, well say Joe comes in on Monday, if I give him too 
much because I’m … then by the time Joe 2 …comes in on a Friday, I’ve nothing left for him!  
what we’re looking to move towards is that asset based approach, so it is about what else is 
out there in the community that you’re not even looking at or touching.  And we’ve got 
examples of where we’ve got care packages that have cost us £100,000 a year, and because 
we’ve reassessed but reassessed with a different mindset, it’s come down to £35,000 a year. 
(C4 CORPORATE) 
This contrasts with a different perspective from an environmental service in Bell Tower. 
Now it’s about how do we constantly look at prioritization, you know and that kind of 
prioritization that we have to do on a daily basis is not kind of supported by our performance 
management agenda, you know, it’s kind of separated almost.  So this is more about kind of 
intelligence management, so we more … it’s more like the way the kind of police operate now 
in terms of you know you get a thousand requests for service intervention, you can only deliver 
200 of those, how do you deal with the 800?  And that’s what it’s like these days. (B3 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Whereas in Bell Tower’s children’s social care context, a very different view of demand 
emerged that did accept that there are legitimate concerns around some of the more 
environmental quality of life issues, but again highlighted the differences in how financial 
cuts were considered within the social care context. 
I hope this isn’t controversial, but I do think that if you’re talking about children’s lives, then 
obviously that’s quite a powerful argument, and it should be, and it has to be the forefront of 
everything that we do.  But you don’t want to go down that whole shroud waving you know 
way of looking at things because I think then you start to lose the argument.  I think that actually 
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we have to ground that in a way that’s accessible to all.  And I think that one of the tensions 
currently, I imagine, in all councils, is how do you … how do you balance demand and impact on 
children, vulnerable children, with the more, you know grass cutting, waste management…the 
issues that members, councillors, get engaged around.  And actually I think that to do that, you 
have to be clear about your message and how do you make communities have a resonance with 
outcomes for children.  (B1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
A member of Long Reach’s improvement team who worked closely with social care also 
highlighted the need to manage demand, but expressed frustration with the inability to 
fully engage with these services, a feeling that was replicated in other contexts and 
discussions outside of the interviews themselves.   
Managing demand in adult social care, and children’s services, those are the two key things.  I 
mean we’ve already got a programme of work in place which will get all of the kind of getting 
our house in order things sorted, getting a basic standard of performance across the 
organization, but those are the key areas where we’ve really got to make some changes 
because the budget’s getting smaller, the demand’s getting bigger and we’ve got to look at 
different ways of doing things.  And, as I said before, they’re the slightly more difficult areas to 
really get involved in. (L4 CORPORATE) 
This was reflective of a distanced position for adults’ and children’s social care with 
reference to cuts.  Whilst other services (e.g. largely environmental, regeneration or 
cultural services) accepted the overall imperative for council reductions in expenditure, 
social care staff tended to see this as either a demand problem or a need to deliver 
services in a more engaged, co-productive manner, rather than a need to cut expenditure 
as the primary goal, as was expected of other services. 
One being the improvement board, as I say, which is a quarterly improvement reporting. So, 
everything from our people side, you know, iPads and everything else, through to our 
complaints, through to our performance. Everything is channelled through that, which 
obviously can be quite challenging. It’s members-led, so it is a challenge back to us. Obviously, 
a big part of that is our finances and budgets, which in this period of austerity, is very 
challenging at the moment. (R1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
This translated into a specific focus on prevention, efficiency and improving outcomes or 
managing demand.  However, whilst in other services this came across as reducing 
demand and thus expenditure, a different discourse tended to operate in social care, 
where this moved towards what is called ‘reablement’, i.e. investing in early intervention 
with social care services after, say, a fall to get (primarily older) people ‘re-abled’, i.e. 
supported to be able to continue to live independently, as opposed to waiting until they 
develop critical care needs before qualifying for an assessment for supporting services. 
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This notion of distance or separation from the primary discourse of budget saving was 
reflected in interviews with staff in social care departments, and in how the corporate 
teams viewed those departments themselves.   
I think it’s about showing the evidence of, OK, that, what you’re saying is perhaps true but 
actually if we can make these changes and we can do this stuff, then you’ll be able to support 
more people in a more efficient way.  That’s the thing, if you’re doing things efficiently and 
there’s no waste and everything is working as it should be and you’re reducing demand, so 
you’re targeting some investment into prevention, intervention and prevention, so that actually 
you’re supporting people before there’s a problem, which … which reduces demand here and 
enables you to focus your resource on helping more people that have already gone beyond that, 
that sort of cut-off point. (L4 CORPORATE) 
One of the corporate responses to the financial challenge was to attempt to ‘grow their 
way out of financial problems’ by channelling inward investment to encourage more 
people to move to the borough, in theory a version of the Tiebout effect (Tiebout 1956, 
John 1997). Castle Gate outlined this ‘growth agenda’. 
[RG: Okay. I suppose I could be- if I was cynical, and I probably am a bit cynical, is that 
essentially-? Is it actually, “Here’s what we want the borough to be like,” or is it, “Here’s how 
we think we’re going to grow our way out of some of the financial pressures,” or a mix of both? 
What does the balance feel like, maybe, for you?]  I think it’s a bit of a mix of both. I think when 
we started off on that route of identifying the local plan, it started off from a, “What do we 
want the borough to be?” Quite idealistic. During the period of time, that has also merged with, 
“By us being like that, it will also deliver these additional benefits of council tax and business 
rates.” But it didn’t start like that. (C5 DEPARTMENTAL) 
I suppose part of what we’ve tried, we’ve been doing this for a number of years, is we talk about 
the sustainability of the borough, so we push in the growth agenda in terms of the housing in 
particular, to get more council tax in. (C7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Bell Tower, too, were trying to grow their way out of the cuts, although this was seen as 
the ‘right’ thing for the authority to be doing in terms of improving outcomes for local 
people, and not just a route towards financial sustainability. 
I think the drive’s different now, it’s around you know we know we can, we know we can be a 
strong economy, we know we can do that and there is investment in those areas to … You know 
when I say investment, I mean people to generate businesses coming in, massive financial 
investment in [Bell Tower], I think you’d be surprised if you look at our, you know, budgets and 
things like that … the money that’s being put into you know the town centre for example, […] 
all being supported by the council finance.  So I think there is a massive drive. (B4 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Long Reach’s vision was driven by economic development and this was being used to 
drive other services. 
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You know things, you know, but the passage of time means that you mean you know hindsight’s 
a wonderful thing and all of that, but currently we’re in a terrible situation with our regen, we’ve 
got a region JV [joint venture] whatever, a regen partner, which we said to ourselves … a 
company called [NAME], which sits over, not very far away … [RG: So an inward investment 
vehicle?]  Yeah, but they also, yeah, they’re doing quite a lot of our regen work, so they’ll project 
manage small you know investment stuff.  And bearing in mind, and all of our vision is about 
economy really, you know driven, if we can get the economy and education right, everything 
else will follow, is basically the principle. (L4 CORPORATE) 
The relationship between finance and performance has often been a difficult one to unpick.  
Whilst pre-2010 assumptions of continued improvement were supported with additional 
financial compensation, either as general funding, targeted funding such as 
neighbourhood renewal funding, or contractual style financial incentives such as local 
public service agreements, the post-2010 period was characterised by interviewees as 
being dominated by the stark reality of wide-scale cuts to local government finances.   
This was not wholly negative, however.  Authorities reported that this had forced them to 
become more risk-taking and had prompted both efficiencies and innovation. 
I think this is more about getting the organization ready for the fact that it is changes in delivery 
model as it becomes, again, more about what the outcome is more than obsessed about who 
is doing it and what it is that is being done.  Therefore, you can almost pause to some extent 
what the performance- how do we maintain performance? The old CPA world that was- and in 
probably the last parliament that was how do you maintain performance in this transformative 
way, where you're making efficiencies and capacity. I just think we're about to edge into a new 
dawn where ultimately we might be measuring different things. (R4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
I think certainly through…there’s been a lot of efficiencies, so through the changing 
transformation and business improvement there have been efficiencies that have been made in 
quite a number of services and you know better use of IT and all of those sorts of things that 
we’ve done. (C7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
I think it’s a … yeah, I think it’s an absolute need because I don’t think, with the efficiencies that 
we’re making at the moment, I think it calls for transformation, I don’t think that we can 
continue to deliver less of the same, I think we have to be much more radical than that.  And 
actually I think it creates a climate for us to be much more innovative and creative.  And I feel 
that the mistake that a lot of councils are making is that they’re trying to still do the same but 
less of it. (B1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Financial savings targets dominated the discussion around change and improvement, 
and this has been reflected in the analysis of performance management frameworks in 
section 4.3.2 of the previous chapter.  Section 5.2.2 goes on to discuss how the two issues 
are drawn together in the pursuit of ‘value for money’. 
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Key finding 10: Austerity dominated the interviews 
Austerity in budget cuts has had an overwhelming effect on local authority planning and 
service provision.  Whilst this has driven out some efficiencies, every interviewee was 
highly concerned about the sustainability of their service or the local authority. 
 
5.2.2 Value for money in an age of austerity (AF2) 
Value for money now represented a challenging concept for authorities to understand, 
deliver or demonstrate.  The prior regulatory value for money assessments were not 
considered particularly helpful by Rudgeway. 
The value of money assessment, which was not really value for money at all, was spread and 
far and wide. (R7 DEPARTMENTAL) 
The VFM stuff that’s gone, I mean, we’re driving so much cost saving and so many cuts out of 
the organization, then at such a rate, that’s the task and naturally we’re saving money and we 
become more efficient. The VFM process was always too out of date, and never sophisticated 
enough to offer any serious insight into it. (R6 CORPORATE) 
Painful, hard, detailed as it was, there are, like the value for money stuff, there is a recognition 
that actually Best Value reviews, there’s probably a place for something of that nature that 
that’s exactly where we’re heading with that approach. (B6 SERVICE) 
However, Stocks Green and Bell Tower were concerned about the ability to tell a story 
around value for money now that the mechanisms had been removed, and that the focus 
was again on cutting costs, rather than value in the broader sense. 
Yes. Again, have we got much reassurance in what that data is telling us? It's the best that's 
out there in some cases. Can we really make some key decisions? (S3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
[RG: So essentially your service challenge is a form of value for money review, shall we call 
it?] I think we anticipate it evolving into that …But right now … no, right, now it’s just a…can 
you find some money? (B6 SERVICE) 
Stocks Green’s S2 also discussed the importance of comparative information, but that 
this was tempered by what was available now. 
“What’s our trend over time? What’s our trend over time for comparators?” whichever’s the 
most appropriate comparator, GM, statistical enablers, whichever is there. (S2 SERVICE)  
The dominance of the cuts agenda was clearly felt in Stocks Green in terms of the impact 
on how value for money was perceived.  This is explored more in section 7.3 
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(reconceptualising value for money), but S2 outlined a lack of capability to consider future 
investment, and felt that VFM was predominantly a backwards-looking tool. 
If the situation changes in a few years’ time and the funding situation becomes stronger, I think 
that will be interesting to see we will respond to that and how we can make wise decisions on 
investing money. So where we’re good now at understanding that if we take money out, what 
is the impact of it, how do we make decisions safe and can we improve within it, if somebody 
says you’ve got five million pounds to spend on something, would we be able to make sound 
decisions on investment that would get value for money because we’ve lost that skill, because 
that’s a whole different – that would be interesting. (S2 SERVICE) 
As with performance, pre-2010 conceptions of value for money centred on comparative 
performance against statistical nearest neighbours, and a generalised goal of driving 
down unit or beneficiary costs compared with these peer group authorities.  Interviews 
began to express doubts about the validity of benchmarking, although it should also be 
noted that former mechanisms like the PriceWaterhouseCoopers benchmarking club 
were being revisited, driven by the lack of current comparative data held by central 
government, apart from selected social care and education data.   
But I think by not replacing it with anything, it kind of leaves us a little bit, we’re not really sure, 
we’d like to be sure that we’re doing a good job and that we’re delivering the best for our 
residents, but I’m not sure we really know.  We still do some benchmarking but that’s quite 
difficult when you haven’t got, you know … [RG: Is that mainly APSE or through AGMA or …?] 
We do the, the LGA Inform website and we have a CIPFA benchmarking club for some nearest 
neighbours and we can still do it across children’s and adults. (B4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
you need to have an Ofsted type inspection regime which keeps you on your toes, but there is 
this whole argument about you know peer review type processes and I do wonder whether there 
is, you know, I know benchmarking data is incredibly useful, but I’m not sure that we’re always 
benchmarking the same stuff. (L5 SERVICE) 
Within the discussions around scaling back services, and the relationship between council 
tax and expectations from the public (which will also be discussed in section 7.2.3 civic 
accountability), the focus has therefore shifted onto justifying the cuts proposed and made, 
and developing ‘new delivery models’, such as commissioned services, mutuals, and 
trusts etc.  
Bell Tower’s executive director responsible for performance (B2) also felt that the nature 
of the relationship between the centre’s performance teams and departmental services, 
as discussed in section 4.2.2: Corporate, departmental, and external relationships (OP2), 
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meant that central teams needed to negotiate this relationship when looking at 
redeveloping value for money intelligence around new delivery models. 
 I mean there are, making everybody sound really bad, you know there’s service managers out 
there that you know are really engaged and want to do this, so you know some of it’s about 
working with them and kind of creating that network at that level.  Adjusting what we do, I 
suppose in these value for money reviews now, hopefully we can get people to see you know 
how we can provide more assistance and in providing intelligence to inform future models and 
then working alongside help develop business cases. (B2 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Interviewees also tended to focus on some of the negative consequences, framing some 
of the interview discussion around ‘survival’, and not continuous improvement.  
So the first thing is going to be survival as, I mean quite literally if you were to ask [name of 
director] that will we be, you know would we be here in five years?  Will we be swallowed up 
by a neighbouring authority? (L1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Actually, the opportunity cost is we continue doing what we're doing and we end up bankrupt. 
If we end up bankrupt nobody wins. So, the risk of doing nothing gets bigger. […] Yes. So, from 
that and I think yes there is a risk that we might be passing more onto the community but in 
the world that we're looking that feels like the safest option to deliver statutory duties. (R4 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Rudgeway’s senior performance lead for social care (R4) also articulated a sense of 
having to balance ambition and realism with regards to comparative performance.  This 
was linked to a more constrained view of desired performance levels. 
We don’t want to be first in [our sub-region], or nationally, for getting people out of hospitals 
because that would mean, actually, that we’re spending money that we probably don’t need to 
spend. You know, we try and balance that. We try and want to be in the top quartile of things 
like that. We wouldn’t want to be number one. It costs too much money. (R1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Another aspect of value for money and differing delivery models concerned generating 
more income from non-traditional sources. 
The other aspect is that we're going into more of a commercial mind-set where some of the 
ways in order to cross subsidise those services that are either statutory or non-income 
generating in their nature, with greater income from other sources. (R4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Castle Gate’s workforce development lead (C3) translated this pressure into changing 
workforce skills and behaviours. 
[the chief exec] expects a flexible and responsive workforce, who’s flexible enough to move into 
a [leisure trust] or you know flexible enough to also do income generation, as well as provide a 
service to the core staff. (C3 SERVICE) 
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Bell Tower’s regulatory services lead also discussed generating more commercialised 
approaches to income generation in existing services. 
However, in kind of building control, the income that we generate through this service, which is 
not like planning, you know planning you deal with the applications in your area alone, some 
little bits and pieces you can do to generate more income, but it’s very much demand led, 
whereas building control you can develop that demand, you can develop your customer base 
and you can trade externally. (B3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Stock’s Green’s head of service for environmental services (S4), on the other hand, 
perceived the managed decline as a clear example of reducing value for money, 
particularly when taking council tax into account. 
People are still paying the council tax. You know, there’s been no reduction in council tax, has 
there?  I’m not saying to you, you know, “You might take your kids to the park but the grass is 
a little longer and it looks a bit untidy, so we’re going to charge you a little less.” We’re not. 
We’re charging you exactly the same or more, but you’re going to get less for your money 
because- it’s not all about council tax, is it? Because we get it from Central London grants. (S4 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
 And the planning service lead for Merry Park (M5) presented a sense of perverse 
incentives provided by additional charging for previously ‘free’ (i.e. at the point of delivery) 
services, using bulky waste collection and fly-tipping as an example. 
Yes, like [previous authority], they introduced picking up bulky goods at £10. It was costing them 
£30 to process that payment. Why are you charging them? Why don't you make a big thing; 
we're not going to charge you because unless you're going to charge them £30 or £31, there's 
no point in doing it. (M5 SERVICE) 
Not only is the individual using the service receiving a more expensive service, i.e. 
charges now apply, but also the general populace is receiving a worsening service overall 
because fly-tipping is being left uncollected to retain the incentive to pay for this service.  
This is a good example of problematizing the principle of ‘consumer pays’ in a public 
service context.  This was supported by a comment from Long Reach’s corporate 
performance lead. 
because we’ve just started charging for removal of big waste or green waste and therefore 
people don’t pay for it, they fly tip it, but we are not removing it because then if we remove it 
for nothing, they’ll never pay for it. (L1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
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In M5’s previous authority, the disparity between the full economic cost of waste collection 
and the public charge suggested that this may well not be value for money either, and 
could represent a sub-optimal situation for both parties. 
 
Key finding 11: Value for money 
We can see that value for money is a complex subject.  Whilst insufficient data was 
generated from the interviews to establish a clear theoretical perspective on value for 
money, sufficient challenge was presented to suggest that current policy and academic 
interpretations need to be adapted to better reflect the reality of practical VFM issues in 
contemporary public service provision.  Simplistic unit or beneficiary costs neither take 
into account recent scholarship around service experience, nor reflect the reality of 
delivering public services in a climate of austerity.  This is discussed in section 7.3.5, 
although further empirical research would also be beneficial. 
 
5.2.3  Commissioning and insourcing / outsourcing (AF3) 
A key part of the discussion around value for money was whether local authorities should 
deliver services or simply commission them.  There was a fair degree of discussion 
around the need to become a commissioning organization, but this rarely took account of 
the statutory service provision and the bulk (in terms of numbers of services) received by 
the population, i.e. the high volume, low variety, lower visibility services such as 
environmental, streetscene, libraries etc.  Rudgeway’s senior corporate services officer 
interviewed saw commissioning as a principal mechanism for developing a new form of 
service delivery in order to achieve the required budget cuts. 
I’m not sure what the answer to that question is, because it’s happening very locally. The 
members are quite… The dialogue with them is all about… We’ve just been through more than 
100 individual proposals with them to make a financial change, and what the implementation 
of that would involve. That could be about people, it could be about restructuring, it could be 
about technology. That’s where the political interface and officer interface has been taking 
place, and actually, it’s happened through a set of summits.  Not summits, but commissioning 
panels. That’s what’s going to drive the change once the political side of life has decided that’s 
what they want to go ahead and do. (R5 CORPORATE) 
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At a lower level within a service, Bell Tower was using a “commissioning-led approach” 
to focus school improvement work on areas of greatest need, and a second interview 
there also tried to draw a connection to commissioning as an improvement mechanism 
to better outcomes, as opposed to way of making cuts. 
So what I’ve adopted is a commissioning led approach to school improvement, where I’ve talked 
to schools about your, the funding is going directly to you, so in terms, to enable you to support 
better outcomes for your most vulnerable children, you need to be working with your 
communities, you need to be working with health, you know so we’ve got health profiles for 
each of our schools, so we’ve, we’re not exclusively looking at performance data, i.e. GCSE 
progress, we’re looking at how many of your children are children in care, how many of your 
children fit the criteria for free school meals (B1 DEPARTMENTAL) 
I mean we tried over the last couple of years to make the strong connection to the budget and 
get people to think, because people talk about outcomes but they don’t necessarily make, you 
know, in the context of commissioning, we don’t necessarily make the connection between 
outcomes and the performance and the service improvement or delivery improvement. (B2 
DEPARTMENTAL)  
In contrast, Long Reach interviews reflected a more generalised (political) ambition to 
outsource and commission services.  This had not been as successful as anticipated. 
Seven years ago, we moved to quite an outsourcing and wanted to be a commissioning 
organization and very lean.  The world’s changed.  So, in five years we’ve gone from being 
outsourced and arms’ length company, so like our direct labour organization and support 
services, to bringing it all back in-house.  So, we are now a deliverer and a commissioner again.  
So, that’s the biggest change, which has made us look differently at what we do.  It’s built some 
great benefits around having ownership of the end to end process and line of sight. (L1 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
I had a great relationship with somebody from Capita at [another authority] and was like it’s 
just your mess for less, that’s what we … that’s what you’ve done in the contract that you’ve 
put out, you haven’t gone, this is absolutely brilliant.  Because otherwise we’d have been saying 
to you, it will cost you X to get into this standard and then we’ll start …pulling money out (L5 
SERVICE) 
Rudgeway also provided views on commissioning and co-production where the implicit 
assumption was around cutting costs. 
That is often the context on which we’re discussing it. It’s like, we’ve got to save money, so let’s 
do some co-production, let’s do some volunteering. (R3 DEPARTMENTAL) 
The same interviewee went on to add a note of cynicism around the practicalities of 
relying on volunteers to deliver council services.  
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I was never sure whether I just didn’t see his [Richard Selwyn – a practitioner/ academic who 
writes about commissioning and co-production] vision, or whether he was just lacking the 
scepticism that is, kind of, necessary sometimes. I just thought my neighbours were a long way 
from, I’m one of the ones who will get involved in stuff, and we have a street party every year, 
but the jump from that to actual co-production of council services is kind of huge. (R3 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
Another Rudgeway employee also saw commissioning as a tool for service development 
or reduction. 
I think in some regards that comes down a bit more to the commissioning side of things because 
I think the big issue at the moment is that we're at the cusp of, or maybe even have gone further 
than it. If we look back in a few years’ time at the journey, where the things which delivered in 
the world we were in and delivered well, will have gone…unaffordable systems.  So, we need to 
be breaking those down and rebuilding new ones at the same time as maintaining performance 
or managing its decline slightly. (R4 DEPARTMENTAL) 
Finally, Rudgeway’s senior corporate performance lead reflected on the moves towards 
commissioning via disbursing funds to individuals, i.e. personal independence payments 
or individual care budgets, as shifting the relationship between state (central government), 
local authorities and individuals. 
It actually puts a slightly odd role for the state, which is to dole out money. (R5 CORPORATE) 
Key finding 12: Insourcing services  
The level of savings required is pushing authorities to keep services in-house, so that 
they can ‘bank’ savings made through service efficiencies.  Commissioning was also 
being used as a tool to generate savings or service improvements, particularly in social 
care, and was seen as a different process to outsourcing. 
 
 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter has explored the findings that relate to inspection, accountability, and 
austerity.  Financial savings targets dominated the discussions with interviewees, and set 
the context for almost every other action in the organization.   
Clear divisions began to appear between how targeted, non-universal services such as 
social care are behaving, such as Rudgeway’s developments (R1) or Castle Gate’s (C4), 
where new approaches to commissioning and co-production were potentially changing 
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the relationship between services and the people they serve.  Whilst cost containment 
was clearly evident, the focus was on service ‘transformation’. 
This is in stark contrast to the more generic, universal service provision of refuse 
collection, or environmental management of the street scene, as explored by Stocks 
Green’s head of waste services (S4), or Bell Tower’s head of regulatory services (B3).  In 
both these services, budget cuts were resulting in ‘managed decline’ – cost and service 
reductions were both evident.    
Accountability emerged as an area of interest, with multiple and sometimes competing 
forms of accountability being discussed; these need to be better understood and 
contextualised within a theoretical framework.  Castle Gate’s head of social care (C4) 
outlined a sense of managerial accountability, as well as referring back to accountability 
to service users, which they contextualised via their sense of professional discipline.  
Castle Gate’s chief executive, on the other hand, outlined some of the difficulties in 
engaging in difficult conversations with elected members on which services to protect, 
and which to cut. Stocks Green’s cabinet member (S1) also explained how difficult it had 
been to engage communities in the same type of conversation.  
 Here, linkages to the politicization of performance outlined in section 4.2.1 begin to 
generate tensions around accountability directly to community and to elected members.  
Traditional forms of performance management were being replaced with political pledges 
and manifesto commitments, especially in Rudgeway, Long Reach, and Bell Tower.  
Responses also introduced the notion of moving towards a model of governing austerity, 
rather than managing it.  This raises the question: are traditional models of accountability, 
focused on principal / agent theory and a sanctions-based approach, suitable to embrace 
the complexities of governing austerity?  This is considered further in section 7.2 
Accountability: five types on p.223, where differing types of accountabilities are proposed 
and explored. 
Finally, the chapter explored commissioning and conceptions of value for money in a 
climate of austerity.  Again, current thinking may be inadequate to best understand the 
impact of austerity on contemporary local authorities and their service provision. 
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This research began with an initial series of dimensions against which changes or reforms 
to local government bodies could be attributed or understood.  The dominance of financial 
questions has meant responses to the interviews did not provide sufficient scope to 
respond to the model, and thus a new inductive set of dimensions has emerged that 
stratifies the findings into a more appropriate structure.  
Chapter 6 will now provide an analysis of the emergent and initial dimensions, and then 
develop thinking more fully around the areas of theoretical development highlighted in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 6.  Analysis of findings  
 Introduction: 
This research sought to explore the experiences of six case study local authorities coping 
with a post-2010 environment characterised by severe austerity and a deregulated 
performance environment.  Chapters 4 and 5 outlined the findings from the interview data 
and, through a cyclical process of coding and re-coding, developed four aggregated 
dimensions to structure the findings and allow patterns and connections to emerge. 
The analysis of the interview data as described in section 3.8, Approach to data analysis 
on page 99 enabled a structured format to the emergent data that resulted in four 
aggregated dimensions as per the Zimmermann et al. (2015) model, which for this 
research are:  
• Organizational and political challenges (OPC) Section 4.2 
• Performance management frameworks (PMF) Section 4.3 
• Inspection and accountability (IA) Section 5.1 
• Austerity and finance (AF) Section 5.2 
 
These codes cover a range of areas of conversation arising out of the primary data 
gathering, and a discussion of these codes requires a more selective view to be taken, 
rather than attempting to discuss every element of the findings.  This chapter draws 
together the findings from the empirical data gathering, and interprets them against the a 
priori dimensions developed from the consideration of the literature in Chapter 2: 
Literature review and conceptual background, as well as revisiting the existing research 
questions, which are addressed in further detail in Chapter 7. 
This research is purposefully not generalizable, although the purpose of the analytical 
stage is to draw out themes, patterns and contradictions that are used to formulate both 
recommendations for practice and future research propositions; these are covered in 
more detail in Chapter 8. 
The structure of this chapter is driven by an analysis of the seven previously established 
dimensions and the four aggregate dimensions that emerged from the previous chapter.  
It then develops thinking around three key areas of development, and a cross-cutting 
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issue around observed phenomena in the language used by interviewees. The original 
dimensions were established from the literature prior to data collection and are described 
fully in section 2.9.3 on p.58.  This table is replicated in part here: 
Table 17: Summary of seven original dimensions 
Dimension (in original 
order) 
Nature 
Instrumental Changes focused on the use of a specific instrument or 
technique (these can often be applied to a range of areas), 
but the primary focus is the tool 
Structural Changes that focus on the structure of organizations or 
services 
Market / role Changes driven by the overall role of the organization and / 
or changes to the relationship with the market 
People- or staff-centred Changes that centre on people or personality traits, 
behaviours, or issues 
Democratic / decisional / 
community 
Major changes to the nature of the democratic institution, or 
the way major decisions are made 
Institutional Changes that affect the nature of the institution, beyond 
mere structural changes, including institutional value-driven 
changes 
Financial Changes driven by primarily financial goals, or that are 
financial levers (not including financial incentives for other 
changes) 
 
This research has also sought to explore these dimensions and the resulting research 
questions through a three-stage segmentation of the level of effect (the conceptualization, 
operationalization, and implementation discussed in section 2.10: Interim analysis and 
development of research questions, p.642.10).     
 Original research questions: 
The original research questions that drove the primary data collection are repeated here 
for clarity.  The overarching question explored the legacy of the approaches to 
performance management and improvement initiated during the New Labour 
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administrations in the UK, i.e. covering the period from 1997-2010.  This headline 
question was broken down into three sub-questions:   
RQ1: How do organizations discuss and create meaning around their preferred ways of 
managing performance and service improvement? (i.e. the conceptualization of 
performance and service improvement) 
RQ2: How have the emergent governance structures affected the sustainability and 
legitimacy of performance and service improvement efforts? (i.e. the operationalization 
of performance governance) 
RQ3: How has the removal of statutory performance reporting impacted on tool selection, 
their operation, and the ways that organizations publicly justify their achievement? (i.e. 
the implementation of tools and techniques) 
Together these three questions explored the residual impact of the New Labour 
administration’s approach to local government reform on local authorities, by examining 
the status quo and attempting to unpick the case study organizations’ individual 
approaches to the management of performance and improvement in the current climate 
of austerity.  A deliberately open approach to the interpretation of key terms such as 
performance management, or accountability, etc. was taken in order to allow the fullest 
responses from interviewees, who were encouraged to interpret those terms in the way 
that was most meaningful to their role and organization.  A one-page flyer (Appendix iv) 
was shared with each organization prior to the research interviews, and this contained 
the conceptual model identified in section 2.9.4, page 62.    However, no explicit attempt 
was made to encourage or force answers to fit into any of the conceptual model elements. 
Table 18 summarises some of the most relevant findings against the initial dimensions.  
Inevitably, a set of conceptual and theoretical propositions derived from the literature is 
not going to align seamlessly with inductive data drawn directly from primary research; 
this is to be expected.  When we compare the two sets, however, we can observe that 
some of the relationships outlined in the section above are stronger than others.  This is 
described more fully in Table 19: Analysis of a priori and inductive codes on page 180. 
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The discussion that follows provides a comparison of the two sets and highlights some 
key areas that merit further discussion and suggests where additional theoretical 
development can take place.  These areas are developed further in sections 7.1, 7.2, and 
7.3. 
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Table 18: Summary of findings against seven dimensions (original order) 
Type Nature Examples Developments from findings 
Instrumental Changes focused on the 
use of a specific 
instrument or technique 
(these can often be 
applied to a range of 
areas), but the primary 
focus is the tool 
TQM, Lean, BPI/R, 
ISO9000, scorecards, 
benchmarking, league 
tables, Six Sigma, 
'transformation', Beacon 
Council, NHS National 
Programme for IT 
(NpfIT), Best Value 
Performance Indicators, 
National Indicator Set, 
business planning 
Frequent bit of use of benchmarking, and / or repeated 
concerns raised where benchmarking is no longer used.  
Whilst some tools were used, largely approaches to 
improvement were largely bespoke and project specific.  
Some service assessment frameworks were used. 
Structural Changes that focus on 
the structure of 
organizations or 
services 
Merging health and social 
care, children's and 
adults' social services, 
pooled facilities – link to 
markets and purchaser / 
provider split 
Some structural changes had taken place.  In one case a 
merged health and social care organization was being 
developed.  Little in the way of formalised pooling of budgets 
was identified.   
Market / role Changes driven by the 
overall role of the 
organization and / or 
changes to the 
relationship with the 
market 
Competition, 
contestability, 
commissioning, service 
rationing, demand 
management, CCT, Best 
Value reviews 
Withdrawing from non-statutory services, transferring assets 
to community groups, increased commercialization in almost 
every case (income generation) – these were starting to 
influence the relationship with residents 
 
Lots of commissioning approaches were discussed.  Some 
attempts to develop thinking around what this might mean, 
but this was often under-developed in areas. 
 
Real differences between social care and other services 
such as street scene emerged.   
People-
centred or 
staff-
centred 
Changes that centre on 
people or personality 
traits, behaviours, or 
issues 
Investors in People, 
Senn-Delaney, Common 
Purpose, change agent, 
cultural change, staff 
engagement, core 
competencies 
Loss of staffing, expertise, competence 
More political engagement around service cuts, leadership, 
or politicisation of performance  
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Type Nature Examples Developments from findings 
Democratic / 
decisional 
Major changes to the 
nature of the democratic 
institution, or the way 
major decisions are 
made 
Foundation trust, free 
schools, mayors, 
scrutiny, participation, 
(double) devolution, e-
petitions, community calls 
for action 
Links to the politicisation mentioned above 
Less use of scrutiny emerging, but more member and officer 
shared working 
Less public transparency around performance or 
performance discussions (a growing sense of resolving 
problems behind closed doors?) 
Institutional Changes that affect the 
nature of the institution, 
beyond mere structural 
changes, including 
institutional value-driven 
changes 
LGR, public health 
transfer, NHS agenda for 
change, clinical 
commissioning groups 
Social care and health integration in one case study, but 
discussions in others 
Splitting of children’s and adults’ services appears to be 
emerging in some authorities but this was not universal. 
Financial Changes driven by 
primarily financial goals, 
or that are financial 
levers (not including 
financial incentives for 
other changes) 
Gershon efficiencies, 
three Es, council tax and 
funding allocations, 
armchair auditors, pooled 
budgets, universal credit, 
Dominance of austerity and financial cuts driving 
transformation programmes (cost-cutting) 
Managed decline of some services 
Source: Author and research findings.
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This chapter will now consider each original dimension in turn, linking answers to the 
emergent, aggregate dimensions that arose out of the inductive analysis.  After this it will 
then move on to consider the interrelationship of the two different sets of dimensions.  
 Comparison of emergent codes and previously established codes 
This section carries out a comparison of the original dimensions and emerging codes, 
and provides a discussion under each of the seven existing codes that further unpacks 
the relationship between the two sets. 
Table 19 below provides a qualitative assessment of the a priori codes and the emergent 
first order codes.  This cross-referencing analyses the impact of each of the emergent 
codes on the initial seven dimensions. 
It does so by making qualitative judgements on the frequency of relevant comments within 
the interviews and the significance of such comments.  For example, austerity and budget 
restrictions came up in every single interview, and the views expressed by participants 
were explicit that the budgetary restraint was having a very significant impact on the ability 
of services to deliver against either political, managerial, or community expectations, 
especially for the financial, instrumental, democratic / decisional / community, and people- 
or staff-centred dimensions.  Institutional questions or issues were evaluated as emerging 
primarily in connection with ‘responses to deregulation’ (IA1), ‘differing forms of 
accountability’ (IA2), and ‘residual external inspections and peer or sector-led 
improvement’ (IA3).  Therefore, challenges to inspections and accountability from across 
different institutional boundaries and responsibilities (especially with reference to health 
and social care) and thus these intersections were scored as ‘high’.  Whilst ‘politicisation 
of performance’ (OP1) or the ‘death of improvement’ (PM1) were significant topics, these 
only related to institutional issues in a more detached or tangential way, i.e. the challenges 
around the ‘death of improvement’ were not facilitating significant changes to the 
institution, although they were stimulating a shift in the focus of performance teams or 
staff towards ‘transformation’ as opposed to improvement, and thus changing the focus 
of their role at the team level.  Hence, these codes were scored as ‘medium’ impact on 
the institutional dimension.  However, there were few comments that addressed 
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institutional concerns that related to the authenticity of performance management, 
meaning this intersection was scored as ‘low’. 
The degree of interaction for each intersection was scored on a three-point scale, where 
low=1, med=3, and high=5.  This allowed each of the two axes to be summed and then 
ranked.  The table was then reordered to place each set of headings (e.g. the existing 
dimensions and the inductive first-order codes) in descending order of significance / 
relevance in order to focus the analysis. 
As can be seen from Table 19: Analysis of a priori and inductive codes (below), the most 
significant relationships were between the financial, performance and accountability 
codes.  This is reflected in the development in this chapter of three areas of value for 
money, performance management, and accountability (see Figure 4, page 203).  The 
following top six first-order codes emerged as the most significant.   
• AF1 Dominance of austerity financial targets 
• PMF2 Renewal of performance management frameworks 
• IA2 Differing forms of accountability 
• IA3 Residual external inspections and peer or sector-led improvement 
• PMF1 The ‘death of improvement’  
• AF2 Value for money in an age of austerity 
 
The other findings are still meaningful, and will form part of future research, but in order 
to focus the remaining portions of the thesis, the six most relevant first-order codes are 
placed centrally in the ongoing analysis and discussion, and will be consolidated into 
three headings in Chapter 7 Discussion: performance as governance system:  
• 7.1 Performance management frameworks: models, theories, and practices 
(PMF1 and PMF2) 
• 7.2 Accountability: five types (IA2 and IA3) 
• 7.3 Value for money: reconceptualising VFM for public services (AF1 and AF2) 
 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to reinterpreting the original seven dimensions 
against the four inductive, aggregated dimensions.  These seven dimensions have been 
reordered to rank them from the strongest association to the weakest.
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Table 19: Analysis of a priori and inductive codes (reordered by level of significance) 
Aggregate 
dimensions Code First-order codes Financial Institutional Instrumental 
Democratic / 
decisional / 
community 
Structural 
People / 
Staff-
Centred 
Market / role  Agg. Score 
Austerity and 
finance AF1 
Dominance of austerity 
financial targets H M H H M H M 
 29 
Performance 
management 
frameworks 
PMF2 
Renewal of performance 
management 
frameworks 
H M H M H L L  23 
Inspection and 
accountability IA2 
Differing forms of 
accountability H H M H L L L 
 21 
Inspection and 
accountability IA3 
Residual external 
inspections and peer or 
sector-led improvement 
H H M M L M L  21 
Performance 
management 
frameworks 
PMF1 The ‘death of improvement’  H M H M L L L 
 19 
Austerity and 
finance AF2 
Value for money in an 
age of austerity H M M L M L M 
 19 
Organizational 
and political 
challenges 
OPC1 Politicization of performance  H M L H L L L 
 17 
Inspection and 
accountability IA1 
Responses to 
deregulation H H L M L L L 
 17 
Austerity and 
finance AF3 
Commissioning and 
insourcing / outsourcing H M L L L L H 
 17 
Organizational 
and political 
challenges 
OPC2 
Corporate, 
departmental, and 
external relationships  
H M L L H L L  17 
Performance 
management 
frameworks 
PMF3 Authentic performance management M L H M L L L 
 15 
Organizational 
and political 
challenges 
OPC3 
Staffing levels and the 
loss of individual 
expertise 
M L L L L H L  15 
            
   Aggregated score 56 40 34 34 24 22 20   
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The original dimensions established sought to synthesise perspectives from across both 
Public Administration and Public Management domains, as well as integrating Public 
Value and New Public Governance ideas.  
These broad reform efforts were plotted on a timeline (see Appendix viii) to show their 
relationship and begin to establish a more comprehensive picture of the fields relating to 
local government.  As has been shown by the emergence of New Public Governance, the 
two existing domains show only a partial picture (Osborne, 2006), and further 
investigation is needed to better understand the impact of changes to the local 
government environment.   
6.3.1 Financial dimension 
The financial dimension in the literature largely considered value for money, financial 
stewardship, and budgeting processes.   The financial domain had the strongest observed 
relationship with the inductive codes, primarily because of the overbearing pressure of 
financial cuts on authorities.  Most of the first order codes were classed as having high 
impact on the financial dimension, including: 
• Dominance of austerity financial targets (AF1) 
• Value for money in an age of austerity (AF2) 
• Commissioning and insourcing / outsourcing (AF3) 
• The ‘death of improvement’ (PM1) 
• Renewal of performance management frameworks (PM2) 
• Responses to deregulation (IA1) 
• Differing forms of accountability (IA2) 
• Residual external inspections and peer or sector-led improvement (IA3) 
• Politicization of performance (OP1) 
• Corporate, departmental, and external relationships (OP2) 
 
Secondary effects were also observed in: 
• Authentic performance management (PM3) 
• Staffing levels, and the loss of individual expertise (OP3) 
• Corporate, departmental, and external relationships (OP2) 
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Practically speaking, very few interventions or tools that were primarily financially-focused 
were used.  Nevertheless, almost every action or change described in interviews and in 
general conversations across all the case studies had a financial motivation.  The levels 
of savings required cannot be underestimated, and even in Merry Park, an affluent 
authority, finance remained a battleground between members and officers.  M4, the 
authority’s monitoring officer, described anxiety around whether members would take the 
opportunity of the 2% social care ring-fenced council tax rise.  The affluence of the 
borough made this more financially beneficial than, say, Stocks Green, where a much 
larger proportion of homes were in council tax bands A-D, and the 2% would apparently 
equate to around £1.9m, against a social funding gap of at least £6m.  Merry Park, 
however, had reduced council tax over the preceding years, using the mechanisms as a 
way of demonstrating value for money to residents.  
Even in this affluent authority, officers felt that they were approaching the limits of what 
could be done with diminishing budgets.  More deprived authorities like Stocks Green or 
Castle Gate were expressing concerns about whether they could meet even their 
statutory duties in future years.  
Within all this, a clear divide exists between attitudes of staff in the corporate centre and 
those in the social care and education departments.  This divide was also mediated by 
recent inspection results.  Castle Gate had received significant negative results for both 
children’s and adults’ social care inspections, and as a result C1 reported being able to 
renegotiate the relationship between centre and department.  Rudgeway, on the other 
hand, was considered a strong performer in social care, and R1 went so far as to suggest 
that the corporate centre (particularly for performance) would need to shrink.   
As regards formal financial mechanisms, both Castle Gate and Bell Tower had recently 
(i.e. within the last one to two years) implemented outcome- or performance-based 
budgeting (OBB).  Although writing from a US perspective, where attention is more 
predominantly focused on program(me)s than on delivering services and outcomes-
based budgeting was a legislated requirement,  Heinrich (2002) suggests that whilst OBB 
had a small positive effect on performance, the complexities of the organizational goals 
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and the service environment meant that information coherence was difficult to achieve – 
a complaint reflected in some American studies (Radin, 2000, 2006). 
These American experiences with outcome-based budgeting have thus not been 
completely successful (e.g. Radin, 2008; Radin, 2000, 2006) despite the US 
programmatic focus, as opposed to the organizational basis of UK budgeting.  These 
challenges were echoed in Bell Tower and Castle Gate, neither of whom had particularly 
positive comments to make about outcomes based budgeting as a process, particularly 
in the context of austerity, as Bell Tower’s respondents highlight.  
I mean we’ve had a programme of outcomes based budgeting for about eighteen months now 
and it is hard to keep the organization focused on that because I think many people prefer the 
ease of cuts. (B5 CORPORATE) 
So, we have kind of worked to try and make those connections, so we’ve had what we call 
outcomes based budgeting…one or two other people have mentioned that!  Which was, you 
know, a stealth way of getting people to think about the kind of performance and delivery side 
of things, alongside just doing salami slicing budget cuts. (B2 DEPARTMENTAL) 
The only point I'm making there is...if we assume that everybody: officers, chief execs, elected 
members, and the general public will automatically understand what performance and what 
outcomes are important, and what ones aren't important, we're wrong. (C6 DEPARTMENTAL)  
As C7 (section 4.3.1) and B3 (section 4.3.1) suggest, prioritization is a challenge for local 
authorities who have to deliver over 600 different services, and the financial climate only 
serves to make that more difficult.  Outcomes-based budgeting was not felt to be the 
answer, although this was due to the challenges around implementation, rather than the 
concept itself; bringing finance and performance together was a common goal in the 
discussion.   
Attempts to better understand the balance of performance and finance was something 
many case studies were attempting to do, often through benchmarking.  This was 
seemingly deployed out of a sense of lacking external reference data from regulators 
such as the Audit Commission.  It may be that authorities were seeking to test the extent 
to which they could ‘get away’ with reductions in service levels by establishing 
comparisons with other comparable authorities, although there was a preference from 
within social care teams for peer inspection and feedback as supplementing external 
regulation and perhaps replacing corporate feedback.  This was not explicitly discussed 
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but seems a plausible interpretation alongside the more traditional view that 
benchmarking is around identifying potential improvements. 
The financial dimension, therefore, had a high degree of contact across the emergent 
codes, but this is largely due to the pressure of savings.  Conceptions of performance 
against budget were a key topic of conversation – this was not always expressed as ‘value 
for money’, but conversations were aligned with this topic, which is explored more in 
section 7.3: Value for money: reconceptualising VFM for public services, p.243. 
6.3.2 Institutional dimension 
Institutional interventions within the original dimensions considered changes that affect 
the nature of the institution, beyond mere structural changes, including institutional value-
driven changes. 
The primary relationships between this dimension and the emergent codes are: 
• Differing forms of accountability (IA2) 
• Residual external inspections and peer or sector-led improvement (IA3) 
• Responses to deregulation (IA1) 
 
Secondary relationships were observed between the institutional dimensions and: 
• Dominance of austerity financial targets (AF1) 
• Value for money in an age of austerity (AF2) 
• Commissioning and insourcing / outsourcing (AF3) 
• Politicization of performance (OP1) 
• Corporate, departmental, and external relationships (OP2) 
• The ‘death of improvement’ (PM1) 
• Renewal of performance management frameworks (PM2) 
 
Institutional questions are concerned with the sociological aspects of organizations – the 
values and wider forces that affect them, and the rules, informal structures, and 
relationships within and between them.  It seems relatively self-evident from the 
interviews that the relationship between local and central government has undergone a 
significant change, and that the nature of local government as an institution has been one 
of a state of flux.  In effect, the psychological contract between the two has been altered 
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by central government by the reduction in core funding, i.e. the government grants.  This 
has been done under the goal of making local government ‘sustainable’, which in current 
political parlance means reliant on locally derived taxation.  Ostensibly this is a perfectly 
reasonable sounding aspiration, yet the consequence of this is significantly reduced 
budgets.  The percentage of income that a local authority generates from local taxation 
can vary between roughly 14% and 75%, meaning that more deprived authorities, which 
raise far less income due to their low taxable base, are much more severely impacted by 
government grant reductions. 
The pressure of savings has challenged the inter- and intra-organizational relationships 
at a point where wider public sector funding cuts make these relationships more important 
than ever.  A sense of retrenchment into institutionalised roles was observed, other than 
in health and social care, and Stocks Green was a notable example of this.  Institutional 
change is most likely to be initiated as a result of externally imposed conditions; for 
example, city deals are only being opened for discussion where participating authorities 
agree to have an elected mayor.   
Internally, this translated into tensions between service departments and the corporate 
centre around responsibility and support for service improvements and cost savings (see 
sections 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 5.1.1).  There were still divisions between improvement staff, 
whose roles in most cases centred on supporting the service departments to implement 
process changes with an espoused rationale around improving service delivery, and 
performance management staff, whose roles tended to focus on performance 
accountability.  Corporate performance staff tended to be very aware of this tension, and 
despite attempts to reinforce their supportive role, were concerned about skills, 
acceptability, and legitimacy of their teams.   
Many of the interviewees from corporate (performance) roles (e.g. R3. C7, L1, B5) were 
still coming to terms with the loss of legitimacy associated with the corporate assessment 
regimes (CPA, CAA), although there was a growing sense of shifting focus to change and 
improvement work, as well as renewing performance management frameworks to meet 
current information requirements, and be more sustainable with the staffing resource 
available. The scale of change facing authorities may have disrupted previously stable 
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hierarchies and power structures – losing senior management figures, external 
inspections, differing levels of savings requirements, and changes in political control may 
all be factors in this destabilization of institutional norms. 
Wider institutional change as a response to austerity was still largely in a deliberative 
phase.  Several interviewees (e.g. S4, M4) felt that local authorities were facing an 
existential crisis – what could or should be the role of local government?  S1 and L4’s 
comments serve as good examples of the pressure of social care costs.  These services 
account for a huge amount of overall local government expenditure, and conversations 
tended to circle around the need to ‘do something different’, or move to ‘alternative 
delivery models’.   
Long Reach staff described traversing the route from being an outsourcing or 
commissioning council to taking things back in house, and as described in section 5.2.3, 
others had also brought services back in house.  The question therefore revolves around 
whether councils should continue to deliver services, or whether they should outsource 
or commission them from the private, public or third sector.  Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) 
controversial but noteworthy contribution to this debate was to suggest that local 
authorities were impeding local economic growth and should thus limit themselves to 
steering (commissioning), rather than rowing (delivery). 
The rationale behind Conservative ambitions to remove reliance on state funding for local 
government aligns well with this mindset: by removing the grant funding, authorities will 
have a greater incentive to work to develop the economy of their local area.  The policy 
flaws in this are myriad, and not for this thesis to unpick.  Yet Castle Gate, Bell Tower and 
to a lesser extent Merry Park were all relying on stimulating economic activity as a way 
of growing their way out of financial constraints.  This is similar in some ways to the ‘place-
shaping’ role of local government that was popularised during the 1997-2010 era, but with 
a much more explicit focus on growing the tax base.  This is likely to have significant 
social implications as well as service implications, and may require a change to the values 
of the institution if plans are to be achieved.     
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6.3.3 Instrumental dimension 
In this research, the term ‘instrumental dimension’ of change was used to refer to changes 
to the structure, processes or people within the organization that were initiated through 
an instrumental or tool-based approach.  From the literature, this focus on tool-driven 
reforms is common amongst public management inspired literature (e.g. Bourne et al., 
2003; Furterer and Elshennawy, 2005; Magd and Curry, 2003; Mi Dahlgaard-Park et al., 
2006; Radnor and Osborne, 2013; Van Dooren and Van de Walle, 2011), and 
performance management is a relatively common topic within this domain.   
In the instrumental dimension, the strongest associations with the emergent findings were 
in the three first order codes relating to the aggregate dimension of performance 
management frameworks - i.e. 
• The ‘death of improvement’ (PM1) 
• Renewal of performance management frameworks (PM2) 
• Authentic performance management (PM3) 
• Dominance of austerity financial targets (AF1) 
• Commissioning and insourcing / outsourcing (AF3) 
 
 Secondary impacts (e.g. medium rating in Table 19) were also observed in: 
• Differing forms of accountability (IA2) 
• Residual external inspections and peer or sector-led improvement (IA3) 
• Value for money in an age of austerity (AF2) 
 
The instrumental approaches most discussed in the interviews included performance 
management (universally discussed), benchmarking (discussed by at least one or two in 
each authority e.g. M4, B4, C7, L5, R3, S3), systemic approaches such as lean 
management (mainly Merry Park’s M1 and M4 and Rudgeway’s R5, Bell Tower’s B1 in 
terms of system thinking), process improvement and ‘transformation’ methodologies (this 
arose in 18 interviews, most strongly in Bell Tower and Long Reach with four interviewees 
each bringing up the transformation programme).  Whilst these vary in scale and 
implementation, they were prominent in every authority examined.  The balance and 
importance of each one was affected by two factors: firstly, the context of financial cuts 
dominated every discussion, as highlighted in the findings section; and secondly, the 
187 
 
individual context and history of each organization tended to guide the deployment of their 
tools and techniques.    
All authorities were either actively renewing their performance management, or had 
recently done so.  The focus, however, for performance teams tended to be split between 
corporate performance reporting, challenging services regarding their performance, and 
improvement projects.  Use of performance management tools was often discussed in 
instrumental terms.  For example, Merry Park’s use of their performance report 
demonstrated a sense of performance as artefact or ritual (e.g. discussion with M1), or 
what this research calls ‘the performance of performance’, that is, a ritualised stage of 
activity more focused on organizational legitimacy than on driving improvement. M4, in 
particular, accepted that the form of the performance report was much too big, and 
interestingly raised criticism from the cabinet member as rationale for changing it. 
There were differing approaches being used across authorities.  Those that were focused 
more on larger change or transformation projects (e.g. Bell Tower: B2, B5, B6, Long 
Reach: L1, L2, L4, and Stocks Green: S2, S4) discussed the use of a business case 
approach, with a corporately managed format or template.  
This highlights the significance of performance reporting, which is discussed in more 
detail in section 7.1.   
6.3.4 Democratic / decisional / community dimension 
This dimension considered changes to the democratic and decision-making apparatus.  
This encompassed both political and officer decisions, as well as the interface between 
the two. 
The primary impacts on this theme were found in: 
• Dominance of austerity financial targets (AF1) 
• Commissioning and insourcing / outsourcing (AF3) 
• Politicization of performance (OP1) 
• Differing forms of accountability (IA2) 
 
Secondary impacts were observed in: 
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• Renewal of performance management frameworks (PM2) 
• Residual external inspections and peer or sector-led improvement (IA3) 
• The ‘death of improvement’ (PM1) 
• Responses to deregulation (IA1) 
• Authentic performance management (PM3) 
 
The austerity question again proved dominant.  Here, though, the focus moved from 
managing austerity to governing austerity.  From one perspective, elected members are 
accountable for decisions regarding service delivery, although the reality is somewhat 
more complex.  In half the case studies, an elected member was interviewed – these were 
cabinet members with responsibility for performance management.  Additional research 
would be required to explore the perceptions of a wider range of members, and this would 
be a valuable avenue to explore. 
The main features observed showed an increasing political confidence in driving the 
performance objective-setting process compared with under the old CPA / CAA regime.  
Whilst a rhetoric of local determination existed within the modernization programme, in 
reality, much of the terrain was heavily prescribed by central diktat – this was delivered 
through the creation of a list of government departmental objectives for which local 
government was the delivery agent, called public service agreements (PSAs).  These 
were further developed into contractual performance arrangements where local 
authorities agreed to deliver a ‘stretched’ performance (i.e. achieving better levels of 
performance than would have been already expected) in return for additional funds.  
There were several of these mechanisms, including local public service agreements 
(LPSA), local area agreements (LAA), and multi-area agreements (MAA).  Additionally, 
under the 1997-2010 system, the performance indicators were created and defined by 
central government, and the assumptions of continual performance growth tended to 
dominate the target-setting agenda.   
Legislative (i.e. coercive) requirements were also applied.  Beyond the statutory services 
that all authorities must deliver, the Local Government Act (1999) imposed the duty of 
Best Value and continuous improvement, and the Local Government Act (2000) imposed 
the duty to improve the economic, social, and environmental well-being of an area.  The 
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Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act (2007) mandated additional 
performance, partnership and regulatory actions including, for the first time, 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment.  Authorities were thus largely directed as to 
what to achieve, how to measure that achievement, and what sort of levels of 
performance were acceptable. 
One of the more positive reactions to the deregulation of some of this apparatus was a 
sense of being ‘masters of their own destiny’ from authorities (e.g. L1 and S2).  This 
relaxation from central control was welcomed by many, although some interviewees 
expressed some concerns about this allowing some services to drop off the priority list, 
due to a lack of external regulation (see section 5.1.1 and for example, B3, S3).  Stocks 
Green, for example, had interviewees who were positive about deregulation (S2), but also 
those who expressed concerns (S3). 
Deregulation, then, has provided an opportunity for authorities to be more confident in 
expressing their local ambition through the performance management system.  
Rudgeway in particular had a clear set of manifesto pledges that officers were expected 
to operationalise in the performance system, and the performance of these were reviewed 
by improvement boards.  These boards were mixed officer member groups, but led by 
executive members.   
Stocks Green also had mixed member officer performance boards, which met behind 
closed doors.  This is significant because there was a requirement for members to discuss 
performance in cabinet meetings, which must be open to the public.  Stocks Green’s 
cabinet member for performance therefore outlined the process of non-public meetings 
(corporate performance group, cabinet) before going to public meetings (executive 
cabinet and full council). 
[Q: how does overview of performance work?] Corporate Performance Group, if there are any 
issues, we can report that through the cabinet. The cabinet then goes to executive cabinet and 
that goes to full council. So, there is that trail there that it can be audited. (S1 CORPORATE) 
Whilst S1 states there is an auditable trail, it is not unthinkable to consider that these 
closed meetings where problems are discussed may not fully minute those discussions.   
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Informal meetings to discuss performance problems have probably always existed, but 
the removal of requirements to externally publish performance via BVPPs, and the lack 
of external assessment of the performance management framework and associated 
review mechanisms, have allowed authorities the freedom to move towards more locally 
determined approaches, both in terms of setting objectives and managing the 
performance of the council towards achieving them.  
Setting organizational goals and dealing with austerity raises questions of accountability.  
A simplistic response would be that members are responsible for decisions and officers 
manage the council – a version of the classical NPM exhortation to be ‘steering not rowing’ 
(Osborne, Gaebler 1992).  However, this cannot take account of the complexities of 
managing a complex set of public services, particularly in the context of austerity.  The 
scale of savings required means that services are being badly hit, and this carries with it 
political fallout.   
Democratic and governance changes were taking place, but as a result of other changes, 
and not as a driver.  This provoked changes to accountability processes, and as is 
discussed further in section 7.2 Accountability: five types, divergent forms of 
accountability were observed and need to be understood in the context of financial cuts, 
and of who can and should be held accountable.   
6.3.5 Structural dimension 
Structural questions concern changes made to the internal structure of local authorities 
to shape the way services are delivered.  Whilst the local authorities examined have 
undergone some limited changes to their structures, this has primarily been as a response 
to the reductions in overall staffing levels, and not because of intentional structural 
developments. These staffing reductions have affected both front line and managerial 
cadres, and have thus influenced the decision-making structures and hierarchical control 
of services.  For example, Castle Gate, Merry Park, and Bell Tower had restructures 
within the last 12 months that had influenced the split between corporate and 
departmental performance teams, and there have been attempts to centralise 
performance team members.  Stocks Green was undergoing an inter-organizational 
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change around health and social care (the details of this may allow the case study to be 
identified and thus should not be discussed in detail).  
Integration of health and social care (which could be considered both structural and 
institutional) was a significant feature in discussions, not least because of the significant 
levels of expenditure on these services, often accounting for over 60% of total council 
spending. 
The main impacts on structural questions were observed in: 
• Renewal of performance management frameworks (PM2) 
• Corporate, departmental, and external relationships (OP2) 
 
There were also secondary effects observed in: 
• Dominance of austerity financial targets (AF1) 
• Value for money in an age of austerity (AF2) 
• Commissioning and insourcing / outsourcing (AF3) 
 
PM2 and OP2 are interrelated here due to the nature of divided performance 
responsibilities across departments and the central team.  Rudgeway’s improvement 
boards were developed to follow broader organizational structures rather than traditional 
departmental ones, with a number of staff having to provide data (a similar reporting 
structure can be found in Merry Park and Stocks Green).  Corporate performance staff 
essentially operated within governance structures that included elected members, and 
were not simply hierarchical management structures.   Castle Gate centralised the 
performance team and were creating a “stronger” structure, whereas Long Reach’s L2 
reported that they were in a ‘central’ team between social care and education in children’s 
services.  Clearly role changes that fit within the staff- and people-centred dimension may 
well also have an impact on structural changes, and vice versa. 
Centralization was, at least in part, driven by financial motivations as people reported that 
every part of the council was being compelled to make savings.  Bell Tower, Castle Gate, 
and Long Reach had all begun to constitute specific change or improvement teams, with 
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a remit around improving value for money, or supporting parts of the council to reduce 
the cost of service delivery.   
6.3.6 People-centred or staff-centred dimension 
This was one of the weaker categories in terms of strong connections with the inductive 
codes.  The main points of contact were: 
• Staffing levels, and the loss of individual expertise (OP3) 
• Dominance of austerity financial targets (AF1) 
• Commissioning and insourcing / outsourcing (AF3) 
 
There was a secondary connection with: 
• Residual external inspections and peer or sector-led improvement (IA3) 
 
In the case study organizations, like most others, staff are the main resource for service 
delivery.  This is a truism, and almost all changes, techniques or intervention would thus 
have an impact on staffing, including cognitive, behavioural, structural (i.e. staffing 
establishment) or skills bases. This domain considered interventions that aimed primarily 
at influencing or changing staff, rather than the institution itself.  Clearly the necessary 
reductions in budgets can only have been achieved by losing staff.  These losses had 
occurred across all parts of the organization and all levels.  Anecdotally, simply walking 
around the council offices suggested that occupancy levels were very low, and empty 
desks were notable.  Informal conversations with staff outside of interviews confirmed this.  
Losses had been deployed through early voluntary severance, i.e. voluntary redundancy, 
in many cases, such as Castle Gate, Stocks Green, and Long Reach.   
These concerns covered three main areas: capacity of staff to deliver, particularly given 
the delivery challenges raised by the extent of the cuts; staff skills or capabilities; and 
affective commitment to working in local government.  
Unsurprisingly, staffing reductions had caused morale problems.  The workload has not 
significantly reduced, and ‘customer’ expectations continue to rise, creating pressure on 
staff, hence comments from C5, C7, and B3 to that effect. 
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One of the effects of this staffing loss was that an experienced core of staff in the middle 
of the organization’s hierarchy had been lost – what is being called here the ‘competent 
middle core’.  Long-served staff and experienced middle management have left the 
organization, creating knowledge and competence gaps.  Graduate trainees, apprentices 
and volunteering were all being used to various degrees to fill those gaps where funding 
permitted, and each of those three groups would be considerably cheaper, albeit less 
effective, than experienced staff.  Local authorities have a series of established 
professional disciplines (planning, engineering, lawyers, HR staff, social workers, 
teachers etc.) and there was concern from B3 that these skills were being lost, and that 
young apprentices were being brought in that required training, but to whom the authority 
were not committed.  B4 suggested that more advanced training and development had 
started to wane (e.g. Master’s degrees), and that junior staff were effectively being given 
greater responsibility.  S3 also mentioned that financial certification progression (e.g. from 
AAT to chartered accountant) had been frozen for staff.  This could be argued to be a 
false economy, given the severe financial circumstances facing the authority, and had 
only served to hasten the loss of staff, as other partner organizations such as NHS bodies 
were seen as providing more stable and secure working environments, with better 
prospects.  Not only do inexperienced staff lack the professional skills, but also the skills 
to navigate the organizational and institutional challenges, especially around working with 
elected members.  This is not wholly negative, however, and fresh perspectives 
sometimes allowed a challenge to the status quo.  
One unexpected finding was that several case studies were implementing a new 
management or leadership development programme (Rudgeway, Merry Park, Castle 
Gate, Long Reach).  This was unexpected because there is an historical view that training 
and development is the sort of activity that is often cut early, as there is no direct impact 
on the quality of service delivery, and management or leadership development would 
seem to have a less direct impact than, say, front line developing in customer care skills 
etc.  Whilst in part some of these management development programmes were 
addressing what might be considered basic management competencies (and establishing 
a clearer common understanding of what those were), some interviewees started to 
articulate the changes in skills required.  Strategic and change management skills were 
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a key area, but commissioning skills and project management also emerged, as did 
training in more specific methodologies around improvement and transformation.  Focus 
groups also suggested that manipulation of big data, geo-data and web development 
were areas where skills development was needed.  
6.3.7  Market / role dimension 
Markets and / or contestability of public services has been a key part of New Public 
Management since the 1980s, and formed a core of both Conservative and New Labour 
reforms.  Initially the Conservative Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) obligated 
all authorities to market test a specified range of blue collar (i.e. ‘manual’ labour such as 
refuse collection etc.) services, with a presumption that external provision, i.e. outsourcing, 
would be the ‘default’ preference; some local authorities resisted this, and others did not.   
The New Labour Best Value (BV) regime extended this to all council services, but 
weakened the compulsion to outsource services.   
The primary connection with the interview data was with: 
• Commissioning and insourcing / outsourcing (AF3) 
 
Secondary connections were observed in: 
• Politicization of performance (OP1) 
• Dominance of austerity financial targets (AF1) 
• Value for money in an age of austerity (AF2) 
• Commissioning and insourcing / outsourcing (AF3)  
 
Again, results varied according to the views of local authority elected members’ desire to 
retain or outsource services.  Within this dimension, three main areas of discussion 
emerged: 
• Contestability and commissioning 
• Narratives around political preferences for internal versus external delivery 
• Commercialization and the income-generation drive 
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A meta-narrative exists around the role for local government, particularly, but not 
exclusively, in health and social care and what sort of services a local authority should 
deliver – this also links to the institutional dimension.   
Merry Park, for example, had a clear emphasis on reducing the burden of taxation on 
local residents, and thus had sought to reduce council tax at the expense of service 
delivery for the last few years.  Merry Park is in the top 20% most affluent authorities, and 
thus had avoided some of the biggest impacts of public funding cuts.  More affluent 
councils derive a larger percentage of their income from local taxation, i.e. council tax, 
and hence any cuts to government funding such as revenue support grant have a 
proportionately smaller effect on overall council funds. It may be that this ‘down gearing’ 
effect of the ratio of central to local funding has an impact on political ambitions around 
the role of the council; this is hard to disentangle from the correlation between wealthy 
areas, Conservative control, and lower levels of socio-demographic demand, which 
translated into comparatively lower levels of funding during the 1997-2010 period, and 
which may have generated resentment in affluent councils towards more deprived 
authorities.   However, whilst the ambition to lower council tax was, within these case 
studies, unique to Merry Park, the internalised debate around the role of councils now 
and in the future was not.  
A Bell Tower interview (B2) also referenced ‘soft market testing’, which was described as 
a form of replacement for Best Value reviews, whereby service areas would be put 
through internal reviews and at the end of that review, a form of ‘soft’ market test, i.e. not 
a formal tendering or procurement process, would be carried out, generating some ideas 
around ‘delivery models’.  B2 described the borough as being ‘obsessed’ with soft market 
testing. This was felt to be a management team imperative more than a political one. 
Commissioning was a clear area of discussion.  Again, social care services were heavily 
invested in commissioning approaches across all authorities.  From discussions within 
interviews and without, commissioning was felt to be the answer to financial challenges, 
although no clear rationale was advanced as the basis for its likely success.  Within social 
care, commissioning was often interpreted as a form of outsourcing, and closely linked to 
individual budgets, i.e. the authority agrees a care budget based on need and the 
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council’s access criteria, and that individual then purchases the care themselves from a 
portal or constrained market place.  This was viewed as part of integrating health and 
social care (e.g. R1, C4, S2) and the phrase ‘delivery model’ was being used as shorthand 
for commissioning.  Castle Gate mentioned the need for an ‘alternative delivery model’ 
(C4) and Rudgeway discussed the need to explore delivery models with regard to 
commissioning (e.g. R4).  
Castle Gate had established a clear political preference for reviewing alternative delivery 
models that started with in-house or ‘mutual’ style creations of organizations from existing 
staff teams.  Outsourcing directly via the market was unpopular politically.  This perhaps 
reflected a generalised concern about how likely it was that outsourcing a service would 
make the savings required.  As L5 put it, the danger of “your mess for less” is that 
outcomes and outputs associated with the services may well not improve, and that 
secondly, the ability to make additional savings is much diminished, and was focused 
largely on contract renewal.  In a climate of extreme austerity, this is an unacceptable risk 
for services. 
This shift in language from ‘outsourcing’ to ‘alternative delivery models’ and use of 
‘commissioning portals’ etc. is characteristic firstly of authorities who have had poor 
experiences of outsourcing significant services and who had pulled these services back 
in-house at contract break points (Rudgeway, Merry Park, Long Reach), and secondly of 
the need to consider any and all tactics available to authorities when looking to make 
costs.  Whilst the normalised narrative behind New Public Management suggests that the 
private sector can deliver services more cheaply (and this may well be true in many areas), 
it does not follow that those savings will translate into sufficient reductions in core 
expenditure, as the profit motive encourages private sector organizations to retain as 
much of those cost savings as possible. 
Another avenue being explored was that of income generation, from charging for services 
that were originally free; bulky waste collection was one example given by Long Reach 
(L1).  The corollary of this is that it generates fly-tipping, and if the fly-tipped items are 
removed for free, then the incentive to pay for the collection service is reduced.  This is 
similar in effect to reducing service quality (e.g. grass cutting) but still charging the same 
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council tax (S4), both of which have the potential to generate negative perceptions 
amongst residents or businesses. 
A further example involved offering or competing to deliver services for other councils.  
Merry Park had an example of a ‘shared service’ with neighbouring authorities, although 
the ability to generate income depends largely on who leads the service.   
Added to these two types was a more entrepreneurial version of commercialization of 
council services; this was a focus in Merry Park, Rudgeway and Castle Gate, although in 
Castle Gate this was more of a proposition than a fully-fledged approach. 
Given the strength of competition, choice, and market-based approaches in NPM (Ferlie 
et al., 1996; Hoggett, 1996), the interviews suggest that these were surprisingly lacking 
in power within the context of budget savings required.  Authorities were either focusing 
on integration with other parts of the public sector like Stocks Green, bringing services 
back in house, such as Long Reach, Rudgeway, and Merry Park, or expressing political 
objections to outsourcing as a principle, such as Castle Gate.   
6.3.8  Reading across the existing dimensions 
One of the weaknesses of the initial conceptual model was that it assumed each of the 
original dimensions were of a similar ‘level’ of detail to each other; both the findings and 
additional exploration of the literature would suggest this is unlikely to be fully accurate. 
Table 20: Analysis of original dimensions against three levels of application below offers 
a qualitative judgement by the researcher based on the literature in section 2.4 and more 
general reading of the interviewees’ experiences in order to express the likely point of 
impact or locus of interventions against each of the dimensions, e.g. as shown below, 
interventions or reforms that are aligned with the financial dimension are likely have a 
high degree of impact on all three levels of organizational arrangements, and the findings 
confirm this.  But is this the case for the other dimensions? 
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Table 20: Analysis of original dimensions against three levels of application 
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Conceptualisation High Med High High High Low Med 
Operationalisation High Med Med Med Low Low Low 
Implementation High High Low Low Low High Low 
(Source: Author) Note: dimensions have been reordered to show strongest association to the 
weakest. 
If we consider the market / role dimensions, changes to the nature of the relationship with 
the market are likely to have a ‘high’ impact on the conceptualisation of the organization 
– for example see L3’s comment about the organization returning to the state of being a 
‘deliverer and a commissioner’.  Yet the activity in question would not have changed at 
the implementation level, and outsourcing services would ordinarily transfer existing staff 
under TUPE legislation, hence a ‘low’ rating under implementation. 
Instrumental approaches, on the other hand, tend to be localised at the implementation 
interface, for example, benchmarking, or customer flow mapping. These would thus be 
unlikely to have a high impact on the conceptualisation of the organization, i.e. its overall 
vision and sense of meaning-making.  Arguments about the implementation of lean by 
Radnor and others (Radnor et al., 2012; Radnor and Johnston, 2013; Radnor and 
Osborne, 2013) would seem to support this, essentially arguing that an instrumental 
approach differs from one where the organization embraces lean as a philosophy, with 
the former approach alone delivering only limited benefit. 
The seven a priori dimensions represent points or levers of change that had been 
established from the literature.  A synthesising approach was used to assemble different 
perspectives from across the broad paradigms of the context of local authority studies, 
including New Public Management, Public Administration, Public Value, and New Public 
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Governance.  Whilst connections can clearly be drawn between the two sets of concepts, 
the initial proposal behind the research was to consider a very exploratory view of the 
case studies that might be able to go further than these connections and establish a series 
of archetypes (Hood, 1998).  Ultimately, this proved to be difficult to develop from the 
interview data, not least because of the dominance of financial considerations.     
The weight of austerity’s influence on the authority’s approaches to performance and 
service improvement is difficult to overestimate.  Coupled with this, the original conception 
of seven dimensions did not easily facilitate a comparative view being taken as when 
considered empirically, the seven dimensions tend to interact differently at the different 
levels subsequently proposed for this research, i.e. conceptualization, operationalization, 
and implementation.   
Instrumental reforms by necessity tend to be located in the implementation of tools and 
practices.  Here, the rebalancing of change, performance, and transformation, and the 
interactions with the ‘death of improvement’ and austerity, are triggering changes to 
performance management approaches.  There is perhaps insufficient space here in this 
thesis to fully discuss this, but a shift is visible in moving from continuous improvement to 
step change, or transformational approaches.  Continuous improvement was a key 
feature of Best Value and remains a statutory duty on local authorities, yet the ‘death of 
improvement’ suggests that this generic focus on improving all services has been 
replaced with a specific and targeted focus on key areas where ‘transformation’ is desired.  
What ‘transformation’ actually means is never fully explained, and the Open Public 
Services White Paper (Cabinet Office, 2011) relies on articulating some broad policy 
ambitions about personalization and individualization, as well as returning to the well-
trodden notion of competition.  Arising from the research, a model of new performance 
zones is proposed that allows a variety of approaches to handling the tensions outlined 
here.  This model is discussed in section 7.1.   
The notion of governance and democratic, decisional, or community questions arose in 
sections 4.2.1: Politicization of performance (OP1) and 5.1.2: Differing forms of 
accountability (IA2), where stronger politicisation of performance emerged as a reaction 
to austerity.    Community engagement remains a challenge, however, as the experiences 
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of Stocks Green demonstrate when attempting to engage residents in a discussion 
around priorities for protecting or cutting services.   
Differing forms of accountability, and the relationship between political and operational 
attitudes to budget cuts, are discussed in section 7.2: Accountability: five types.  Here, 
we may begin to question whether the established methods of accountability are sufficient 
to enable the governing of austerity, as authorities begin to scale back some services and 
have to cope with the increasing demands being made by social care.  We may also ask 
how the presumption of an individualised relationship between individual and service can 
embrace the wider sense of public value and public goods that is arguably central to the 
core of public service delivery.   
Finally, conceptual and institutional notions of what authorities are for begin to emerge 
from discussions around value for money, and whether this concept remains valid in a 
climate of austerity.    This is the subject of discussion in section 7.3 Value for money: 
reconceptualising VFM for public services.  
This chapter ends with a brief summary in Table 18 of the findings as related back to the 
original dimensions, and Chapter 7 moves to present the discussion of the findings and 
analysis, entitled: Figure 4: Findings - performance as system of governance.
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Chapter 7. Discussion: performance as governance system 
The aim of this research was to understand the legacy of the 1997-2010 New Labour 
regulatory and policy system for achieving continuous improvement in the delivery of 
public services.  It was necessary for that to examine performance management in its 
widest sense, i.e. not simply the mechanistic processes of gathering and reviewing 
performance information, but the idea of the performance management system or 
framework as an intellectual construct within a local authority.  Many of the findings thus 
directly address the nature of this ‘system’ (here again this refers to the theoretical system, 
not an IT system).   
The three sub-questions (RQ1, RQ1, and RQ3) addressed different facets of that idea at 
different levels of abstraction; this was outlined in section 2.9.3, where the three questions 
addressed the conceptualization, operationalization, and implementation of public sector 
reforms on page 61.  Section 6.2 Original research questions: returned to these questions 
and compared the findings that emerged from the interview data with the original 
dimensions, and thus highlighted six primary areas of significance that are then grouped 
into three blocks.  
Table 21: How the key findings have been used 
Key finding First order 
code 
How the key finding has been 
used 
Key finding 1: politicization of 
performance 
OP1 Future work – section 8.8, page 
288 
Key finding 2: Corporate and 
departmental  
OP2 Future work – section 8.8, page 
288 
Key finding 3: impact of cuts on staffing 
and skills 
OP3 Paper submitted to Australian 
Journal of Public Administration 
Key finding 4: 'Death of improvement' PMF1 Implementation of performance 
management frameworks 
Key finding 5: Renewing performance 
management frameworks 
PMF2 Implementation of performance 
management frameworks 
Key finding 6: Authentic performance 
management 
PMF3 Implementation of performance 
management frameworks 
Key finding 7: Deregulation of 
performance regimes 
IA1 Conceptualisation of public value 
for money 
Key finding 8: differing forms of 
accountability 
IA2 Operationalisation of accountability 
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Key finding First order 
code 
How the key finding has been 
used 
Key finding 9: Impact of external 
inspections 
IA3 Operationalisation of accountability 
Key finding 10: Austerity dominated the 
interviews 
AF1 Conceptualisation of public value 
for money 
Key finding 11: Value for money AF2 Conceptualisation of public value 
for money 
Key finding 12: Insourcing services  AF3 Future work 
 
The findings of this research conceptualise performance management as a system of 
governance that incorporates levels of conceptualization, operationalization, and 
implementation.  This is shown Figure 4 below: 
Figure 4: Findings - performance as system of governance 
 
(Source: Author) 
The three sub-questions, therefore, guide the discussion that emerges from the findings.  
Whilst the original three questions were framed as breaking down the overarching 
research question, and are presented here in that order (in Figure 4), they are addressed 
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in the following sections from the bottom up, i.e. from implementation to conceptualisation.  
This allows the discussion to build upwards from the more concrete and empirical to the 
more abstract and theoretical positions, which can then, in turn, draw on support from the 
previous level(s). 
Research Question 3: How has the removal of statutory performance reporting impacted 
on tool selection, their operation, and the ways that organizations publicly justify their 
achievement? (The implementation of tools and techniques) 
The nature and deployment of performance management tools and techniques has 
emerged as a primary concern at the implementation level.  External frameworks have 
been removed through deregulation (section 5.1.1), and authorities have sought to 
develop newer, more authentic forms of performance (section 4.3.3) that link performance 
and budgets, and respond to the challenges of austerity (section 5.2.1). The previous 
notion of the ‘golden thread’ no longer drives the implementation of performance 
management, and the ‘death of improvement’ (section 4.3.1) has challenged the very 
basis of the duty that drove public service reform in 1997-2010, and continues to be part 
of the statutory environment for local authorities now.  A new model of more fragmented 
performance management is outlined in this chapter that addresses some of the concerns 
about performance 
Research Question 2: How have the emergent governance structures affected the 
sustainability and legitimacy of performance and service improvement efforts? (The 
operationalization of performance governance) 
Accountability emerged as a complex and sophisticated challenge to public service 
delivery in the post-2010 period at the operationalisation level, in how authorities need to 
‘govern for austerity’ and poses questions about different types of accountability in this 
context.  The ‘death of improvement’ again raises real challenges for local authorities 
faced with severe budget restraint and the need to make choices about scaling back 
services, reducing investment, or prioritising delivery that balance managerial, political, 
civic, legislated, and professional demands.  These five differing forms are discussed in 
section 7.2: Accountability: five types, and section 7.2.6 goes on to advance some 
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propositions and conclusions that draw on the findings to examine the governance, 
legitimacy, and sustainability of accountability. 
Research Question 1: How do organizations discuss and create meaning around their 
preferred ways of managing performance and service improvement? (i.e. the 
conceptualization of performance and service improvement) 
Finally, the overwhelming shadow cast by austerity across the data collection and the 
experience of local authorities (section 5.2.1) presents a challenge to improvement as an 
end goal (section 4.3.1), as well as problematizing the notion of value for money (section 
5.2.2) in the post-2010 context. Most practitioners and regulators would agree that value 
for money remains a necessary concept, yet it may be limited in how it reacts to shifting 
paradigms of public management and the values on which each is based.  These 
limitations may pose an existential challenge to both local authorities and regulators.  
What is their purpose in the current climate?  How can a richer conceptualisation of value 
for money move beyond NPM’s short-term focus on efficiency above other concerns?  
Section 7.3.5 advances an idea of public value for money that seeks to address these 
conceptual limitations. 
Figure 4: Findings - performance as system of governance  does not suggest that these 
are the only, or even primary, components of a performance management framework; 
this research does not aim for a normative discussion of that sort.  Rather, these are areas 
of significance that emerged from within the research findings and that relate to a systemic 
view of performance management in the wider sense.  They enable propositions for future 
research and theoretical development to emerge that will hopefully continue the trajectory 
of this research. 
These points represent areas of both significance and distinctiveness observed from 
within the research findings.  The following sections explore these areas in further detail, 
and provide a discussion of their nature in practice compared with the literature and what 
might have been predicted or expected prior to the research.   
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 Performance management frameworks: models, theories, and practices 
As stated in section 4.3.1, New Labour modernization was predicated on the objective of 
continual growth in performance; however, whilst this might have been practicable during 
the 1997-2010 era, the findings from this research suggest this presumption of continual 
growth in performance is now neither realistic nor practical.  This section establishes the 
previous dominance of ‘continuous improvement’ assumptions in local government policy 
and legislation.  Austerity has now effectively undermined these assumptions, and 
findings suggest a radical shift has occurred in the focus for local authorities, termed here 
the ‘death of improvement’.  A response by local authorities is thus probably needed in 
order to retain the commitment to continuous improvement in some form. 
During the New Labour administrations, the primary focus of the regulatory and 
performance regimes was continuous improvement.  This is expressed as a legal duty to 
“make arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the way in which its functions 
are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness” 
(DETR, 1999).  This required the regulatory system to put in place performance measures 
for all functions, including both the mandatory BVPIs, but carried an expectation that the 
local authority would further develop its performance management framework to include 
other services not covered by BVPIs but that the authority felt were significant to the 
achievement of local ambitions.  Individual indicator levels of performance (outturns) were 
classified in quartiles (e.g. a relative ranking from the best performing authority down to 
the worst performing), as well as forming part of the heuristic judgements within the CPA 
and CAA mechanisms.  Another key part of the assessment frameworks was the 
‘direction of travel’, which attempted to measure (and compare) rates of improvement 
across the authority as a whole and within specific services.  When put together, these 
requirements and expectations resulted in a systemic assumption that all services 
(statutory and non-statutory) would be expected to generate improvements in their outturn 
each year, and hence targets for indicators in future years (each BVPP contained a rolling 
schedule of targets for the next three years as well as the last year’s outturn) should 
demonstrate continued improvement.   
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Additionally, a range of financial incentives were deployed, including local public service 
agreements (LPSA), local area agreements (LAA), and multi-area agreements (MAA).  
These were attempts by central government to incentivise performance improvements in 
key indicators by agreeing a quasi-contractual arrangement. Initially, in the case of LPSAs 
(2001-2004), this was more directed, in that central government (via the agencies of 
regional governmental bodies (e.g. Government Office North West or GONW) ‘agreed’ 
targets with local authorities from a pre-approved list of national priorities via negotiation, 
but where the starting point was provided by central government.  Later iterations, 
including local area agreements, were more consensually formulated, and the Local 
Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 included the expectation that 
local authorities would be considered primus inter pares, and that LAAs would be the 
primary mechanism through which central government would agree targets with “local 
authorities and their partners. 
Responsibilities for local authorities include both provision of specific services (e.g. the 
Public Libraries Act 1964), and generalised duties such as the requirement for continuous 
improvement, the social, economic, and environmental well-being duty arising from the 
2001 Local Government Act, the power of general competence from the Localism Act 
2011, or the now abolished Every Child Matters framework.  
This journey from centrally-imposed to locally-negotiated performance goals and 
reporting is one of the key areas of interest in the empirical data gathering.  The research 
questions considered what is being measured, how and why.  Findings have 
demonstrated that shifts in the organizational context and strategy for performance have 
triggered changes in performance management frameworks.  These developments are 
reflected in the discussion here, which will cover: 
• New frameworks, and narrative and numerical data tensions in performance 
management 
• Challenges to traditionally structured performance reports 
• A proposed new performance zones model 
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7.1.1 New frameworks, and narrative and numerical data tensions in performance 
management 
As discussed in section 4.3.2, p.131, all authorities were revisiting their performance 
management frameworks, either via step change like Castle Gate and Bell Tower, or in 
more incremental fashion for Rudgeway, which had carried out a formal review 2-3 years 
ago.  Notably, discussions tended to focus strongly on performance management as 
artefact (Sanderson, 2001; Simons, 1995) – the format and process of sharing 
performance information was more dominant in responses to interview questions, and 
quite often interviewees needed follow-up questions to bring the discussion back to 
performance management at a systemic level .  There was reasonable discussion around 
narrative, strategic outcomes etc. (Heinrich, 2002) and reducing the content and scope 
of corporate plans.  These have become smaller and more aligned to either political 
pledges, and / or have acted as tools for reputation management (L'Etang, 2007); this is 
considered important given the reduction in services and the negative publicity or 
reputational damage that could ensue.   
Clearer differences emerged between children’s and adults’ social care, which still have 
formal inspection regimes from Ofsted and the Care Quality Commission.  Traditionally 
operations management theory classifies services by reference to the 4 Vs: volume, 
variety, variation in demand and visibility (Slack, Chambers et al. 2010).  Here high 
volume, low variety services (e.g. waste collection, grass verge cutting, etc.) are 
undergoing what has been called ‘managed decline’, i.e. a purposeful reduction in service 
levels, which is antithetical to the continuous improvement imperative (Bourne et al., 2007; 
Bourne et al., 2000).  
However, the low volume, higher visibility, and high variety services such as children’s 
and adults’ social care were consuming an increasing proportion of council resources, 
providing a shift from community services to individual services.  These services form a 
dividing line between politically acceptable cuts and publicly acceptable ones.  As the 
Stocks Green respondent S4 suggested earlier, managing public services was now an 
exercise in “delivering the unthinkable”.  
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Arising from the findings chapters, a series of influences have converged to change the 
way that performance management has been conceived and developed in the post-2010 
environment.  These were classified in Chapter 5 as: 
• The ‘death of improvement’ (section 4.3.1), 
• The search for more ‘authentic’ forms for performance management (section 
4.3.2), and 
• Renewal of performance management frameworks (section 4.3.3). 
 
Together these three codes describe the shifts observed across the case studies.  There 
was a varied discussion around performance measures, which viewed measures through 
the prism of New Public Management view: inputs, outputs, and outcomes.  Most tended 
to argue that outcome measures were useful in terms of legitimacy and a sense of ‘what 
the council should be delivering’, yet also accepting their limitations in terms of managing 
declining services and budgets.  
The fracturing of the link between performance management and continuous 
improvement was simultaneously highly visible and yet overlooked in conversations – 
revealing a dichotomy.  At one level, there was acknowledgement of the challenges facing 
authorities in simply meeting statutory requirements, and that a range of services were 
being scaled back.  At another level, there was a perception that authority-wide 
performance management should be focusing on achieving improvements in a wide 
range of outcomes; these two positions would appear to be at odds.  It may be that the 
level of financial savings required have shifted the discourse from one of continuous 
improvement, with a focus on incremental improvement in performance (Neely and 
Bourne, 2000), to one of step change, or transformation, and hence the explicit focus on 
outcomes (Heinrich, 2002). 
There was some acknowledgement of the problems with measuring outcomes.  Several 
discussions (e.g. with L5, C7, C1) articulated the challenges around measuring the 
building of a new school by outcomes, i.e. General Certificate of Secondary Education 
(GCSE) success.  This story came out of an unrecorded conversation and was put to 
several interviewees when felt appropriate to the conversation.  GCSE outcomes don’t 
tell you, for example, if the construction is going to budget, or how well it has been 
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designed. The discourse around outcomes and public value risks assuming that a single 
measure of success is sufficient (Espeland and Stevens, 1998), particularly for 
performance management implementation models that cascade objectives down in the 
classical ‘golden thread’ formulation.   
Despite this, the attachment of value to directing the organizations towards long-term 
outcomes was significant.  This supports the general orthodoxy within service operations 
management of the importance of balancing outcome and experience as mediated by 
processes (Johnston, Clark et al. 2012), although more senior interviewees tended to 
focus more on outcomes, and those involved within public health, social care, or 
education were also more likely to discuss things in these terms (e.g. R1, C4, C6, M4, B1, 
etc.).   
This represented a further dissonance between espoused perceptions of the role of 
performance and the reality of performance management practices within the 
environment facing councils (Micheli and Neely, 2010; Neely and Bourne, 2000).  One 
the one hand, interviewees were clear on the need to manage the long-term outcomes 
that authorities were seeking to achieve (or felt compelled to achieve) and tended to view 
the weaknesses of performance management through that lens.  On the other hand, it is 
unclear from discussions if this form of longer-term, more strategic is either affordable or 
likely to be effective approach (Melnyk et al., 2014).  There was little explicit discussion 
of what was previously called ‘invest to save’, although it is possible to observe some of 
this in discussions around ‘transformation’.   The main focus, rather, was on budget 
savings (Hoggett, 1996). 
Generally, most interviewees felt that within the processes for assigning budget savings, 
children’s and adults’ social care often overplayed the emotional narrative of ‘people will 
die if you cut our budgets’ (excluding managers of those services, naturally).  Corporate 
performance staff in Castle Gate, Long Reach, Stocks Green, Rudgeway and Bell Tower 
(C7, L1, S2, R3, R4, B4, B5) reported that it was still very hard to gain access to those 
services to understand the reality of performance in these expensive, high visibility and 
low volume services.  Therefore, these highly emotive narratives became difficult to 
challenge, particularly given the level of variety, which served to individualise the 
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interactions between service users and providers.  For authorities that had experienced 
recent, negative inspection results in social care, this had reduced the barriers to gaining 
performance data and intelligence.  Again, here we began to see tensions between 
narrative and numerical forms of performance management. 
Numerical data-driven performance management evidently did take place in adults’ and 
children’s services (Ofsted inspections in particular are highly data-dependent), but the 
reported discussions intra-organizationally tended to appeal to emotion, or operate 
defensively (Oliver, 1991) – presenting a service that was either performing well, so 
should be left to make its own budget savings (Long Reach and Bell Tower), or was 
pursuing innovative methods of service redesign and should be thus left alone to innovate 
(Rudgeway, Merry Park). 
Numbers of corporate performance team staff had seen some reductions as part of 
overall council staffing cuts, but perhaps not as much as anticipated (for example, Castle 
Gate’s head of performance C7 spoke of retaining a significant performance and policy 
team – see page 4.2.3, p.119). Generally, authorities were centralising resources, rather 
than deploying ‘hub and spoke’ or ‘centrally provided, locally managed’ models (see Table 
16 on page 114), although the notional allocation of staff to departments as liaising 
officers was commonplace. Again, this largely served to problematize relationships 
between the centre and departments (particularly children’s and adults’ services). 
Common criticisms of corporate performance monitoring (raised by both corporate and 
departmental staff) were that it was too slow, had lagging data, and that by the time it 
entered the accountability mechanisms, problems had often either been resolved or 
circumstances had changed.  This meant that much corporate performance monitoring 
became ritualised around legitimacy or prestige (Hartley and Downe, 2007; Sanderson, 
2001), or perhaps focused on informing future or current resources allocations (Hoggett, 
1996; Wilson and Hinton, 1993), rather than ‘managing’ the journey of the organization 
(Behn, 2003) or the experience of service users (Hennala and Melkas, 2016). 
One of the features of discussions with operational performance staff, and particularly the 
focus groups was around the systematization of performance – i.e. replacing the 
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structures that had developed to service the requirements of the regulatory system and 
instead focusing on the performance management framework as a whole system, working 
in partnerships, and joining up intelligence systems.  For example, all six case studies 
had a public health intelligence team, who were often perceived to be outside of the 
corporate performance and intelligence functions.   
There may be two reasons for this: firstly, public health responsibilities were transferred 
to local authorities, but only within the last few years.  Thus, teams may have legitimately 
not yet been integrated.  Added to this, there was an observable view, particularly in Long 
Reach, Bell Tower, and Rudgeway, that the duties, skills and responsibilities of corporate 
performance teams and public health teams were different.  Public health staff specifically 
tended to frame their work around ‘intelligence’, and longer-term demographic and 
epidemiological planning, whereas ‘intelligence’ work in corporate teams tended to relate 
to economic development and planning.  This may be due to conflicting value sets, e.g. 
high volume, low complexity services versus low volume, high complexity, e.g. refuse bin 
collections versus social care, or inward investment versus planning cancer care. 
Both sets of responsibilities, however, were changing in relation to deregulation and the 
desire to work on longer-term outcome planning.  The historical performance reports were 
no longer required; more ‘authentic’ forms of performance were required, and corporate 
performance teams themselves had generally reduced capacity. 
It should also be recognised that very different interpretations of performance exist within 
authorities, as well as between them.  As highlighted in Table 2: Uses of performance 
management: perspectives from literature, page 37, no single, instrumentally rational 
understanding of performance management exists.  Within the interviews and discussions 
outside the interview process, several differing operationalizations of performance 
management were observed: 
o The ‘deficit’ model (highlighting problems) exception reporting (often punitive) 
o The ‘political’ model – performance as delivering pledges and commitments 
o The ‘opportunity’ model – where can we make changes? This was linked to 
commissioning at some points 
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o The ‘accountability’ model i.e. how services are held to account for what they 
deliver (against their budgets) 
o The ‘concern’ model – flagging issues for consideration (but often used in a 
defensive manner) 
o The ‘narrative’ or ‘telling the story’ model – reputation management and 
minimising the public impact of poor performance 
o The ‘what went wrong’ model – understanding the reasons in order to correct 
future problems 
 
It would be simplistic to attempt to ascribe these modes of operationalization to single 
authorities – there were multiple and conflicting presentations within individual authorities.  
Rather, these different perspectives all begin to challenge the established, reductive 
notion that performance management is simply about highlighting poor performance and 
taking corrective action (e.g. Behn, 2003); rather, it has socially constructed layers that 
operate in different ways (Moynihan, 2008; Radin, 2006). 
7.1.2 Challenges to traditionally structured performance reports 
When examining these initial findings, we can observe that the traditional concept of a 
unified corporate plan, used to communicate future promises of outcomes or demonstrate 
achievement of past performance, still remains (Bourne et al., 2000).  However, the 
detailed performance data that has previously accompanied these documents has begun 
to drop away, leaving a more outcomes-focused and less process-focused plan as an 
artefact to generate political or organizational legitimacy (Sanderson, 2001).  This is 
subject to critiques around its worth as an informational document for the majority of 
citizens, most of whom, it was felt by interviewees, tended to judge the authority on daily 
service interactions (Grönroos, 2007; Needham, 2006).  The corporate plan was still 
being used internally as a management tool to motivate staff by illustrating their position 
in achieving the goals of the plan (the anecdote about John F Kennedy visiting Cape 
Canaveral in the 1960s development of the space programme was used five or six times.  
In this apocryphal story, JFK asks an older staff member who is sweeping the floor what 
his role is.  The man replies, ‘I’m helping put a man on the moon’.)  Radin’s critique, 
however, is that this sort of goal congruence is largely illusory (Radin, 2006). 
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As is obvious by this point, all authorities were facing significant budget cuts and were 
largely struggling to make the required savings.  As has been described, some direct 
services were undergoing ‘managed decline’ where service standards were set to reduce, 
rather than increase – these needed a different type of performance management 
compared with more ‘strategic’ services.  A sense began to emerge from authorities that 
expectations needed to be managed both with communities and elected members.  
Performance management could play a part in this via integrated financial and 
performance models (Osborne et al., 1995; Redburn et al., 2008).  However, this required 
difficult conversations with elected members, who often relied on pet projects or activities 
for institutional and democratic legitimacy.  Ritualistic performance management review 
also took place – what has here been called ‘the performance of performance’ – as an 
expected activity (Pollitt, 2013c).  Accountable managers often used several strategies to 
minimise exposure to criticisms and negative feedback.  These strategies were also 
effectively approved by institutions, who were sensitive to accusations of reducing public 
service quality due to budgetary restraint, but were unwilling generally to discuss this in 
terms of addressing Realpolitik. 
Furthermore, the statutory duty to produce corporate reports as specified in the legislation 
and guidance around Best Value has now disappeared.  Authorities are no longer obliged 
to externally publish the statutory documents like the Best Value Performance Plan 
(BVPP) or annual performance returns (Audit Commission and I&DeA, 2002).  These 
documents encouraged a sense of the ‘golden thread’ – the cascading set of objectives 
and targets.  Whilst it is debatable as to whether evidence for this thread can be found  
(Micheli and Neely, 2010), or indeed whether it is desirable even to have a golden thread, 
it is clear that the guidance anticipated being able to implement, observe and evaluate 
one (Audit Commission, 2005).  It was also mentioned by some of the interviewees (e.g. 
C3, L1) as an explicit artefact, and the concept was raised by other interviewees as part 
of narratives around strategic planning (e.g. C7, R4, M3), often as part of the reduction in 
effort around performance reporting that reflected a move away from glossy performance 
reports, and an acceptance that members of the public are either less interested or benefit 
less (or both) from the provision of performance reports than the New Labour policies 
anticipated (Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012). 
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RQ3 asked: How has the removal of statutory performance reporting impacted on tool 
selection, their operation, and the ways that organizations publicly justify their 
achievement? (i.e. the implementation of tools and techniques)  
In answer to this, two primary reasons may indicate that traditional tools for performance 
are no longer suitable: a) the deregulation of the CPA / CAA performance regime, and b) 
financial pressures forcing changes to the operating context for local authorities as 
suggested above. 
Additionally, every authority was struggling with the tensions of justifying performance in 
an environment where ‘managed decline’ in services that are often universal and well-
regarded by residents and businesses, such as street cleaning or parks.  This feature 
also emerges in the accountability codes discussed in section 7.2, as well as in the value 
for money discussion in section 7.3.   
Section 5.1.1: Responses to deregulation (IA1) on p. 139 discusses the mixed responses 
to deregulation.  Corporate performance staff felt the loss of the performance frameworks 
more keenly than those in service (i.e. non-corporate) departments, although even 
service department staff such as Bell Tower’s head of regulatory services (B3) and Castle 
Gate’s public health lead (C6) acknowledged the helpful nature of direction provided by 
statutory indicators, particularly when having to negotiate with elected members, which 
had historically proved problematic (Leach, 2010). The enduring and almost universal 
view was that deregulation allowed authorities to become ‘masters of their own destiny’ 
and hence have a different conversation with members about priorities.  Bell Tower’s 
narrative of the tensions between performance staff and improvement staff, and how each 
was received differently by services, accords with the experiences of Long Reach, Merry 
Park, Castle Gate, and Stocks Green.  As outlined in section 6.3.3: Instrumental 
dimension, page 187, the instrumental focus observed began to highlight ‘transformation’ 
based around operational service management as a significant development (Hartley, 
2005).  Yet, NPM and performance management have failed to provide the promised 
revolution in performance or efficiency (Neely, 1999; Pollitt; Pollitt and Dan; Radnor et al., 
2016) 
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To some extent, criticisms of NPM and performance management have been partially 
addressed through the development of public value / networked governance as 
negotiated processes (Newman, 2002; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 2006).  Whilst public value 
emerged in response to NPM weaknesses, its focus on systems, and networks may be 
insufficient to address the requirements of sustainable performance management 
frameworks in the post-2010 era.  New Public Governance approaches (Osborne, 2010b) 
and the development of public service dominant logics (Osborne et al., 2013), which 
embrace the distinctive nature of service processes compared to manufacturing ones, 
may hold insights into how to balance service management with corporate and policy 
management.   
The thesis now moves on to propose a model of performance management that builds 
on these principles. 
7.1.3 Proposed new performance zones model  
This research proposes a model developed from the empirical findings that challenges 
the established notion of cascading objectives, and addresses the tensions around use 
of performance management at the implementation level outlined in RQ3. It describes a 
fragmentation of the way performance information is used, and proposes a series of 
aggregated performance ‘zones’. From case data, the model identifies a zone of service 
control, where management information is used for operational service and management 
and should be focused more closely on service users, customers, or citizens.  This is 
compared with overall corporate performance reporting against corporate / departmental 
objectives (corporate management zone), and (comparative) data used for internal and 
external legitimacy (accountability zone). Alongside this, are zones of excessive control, 
where the granularity of the data is misaligned with the level at which it is reviewed or 
used, i.e. local government collects data either absent-mindedly or via central government 
demand yet the information is barely used; it effectively enters a ‘black hole’, unless there 
is some form of acute service failure such as the death of a child.  This type of high-profile 
failure would result in a measure or measures (or perhaps more accurately, the service 
they represent) being dragged into the accountability zone, where additional scrutiny is 
applied.  This resembles the mechanism that operates between the service control zone 
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and the corporate management zone as shown in the diagram below,  
Figure 5, which maps out these performance zones. 
This model plots the information on two axes: the position within the informational 
hierarchy, equating to the ‘locus’, and the modality of information usage, here the ‘focus’.  
It synthesises a conceptual performance management system derived from the empirical 
data that describes a ‘fragmented’ system, rather than the traditional ‘golden thread’ or 
cascading objective system. Here, the ovals represent areas of performance 
management activity and their relationship to the performance management system.  This 
model separates this activity into five zones: 
• Service control 
• Corporate management 
• Excessive control 
• Legitimacy 
• Accountability 
 
Figure 5: Performance zones model 
 
Source: Author 
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Micheli and Neely (2010) examined whether the ‘golden thread’ was observable in two 
case studies, finding questionable evidence of the existence of such threads, in part 
confounded by the multiple stakeholders and priorities evident in public services. Their 
conception of the golden thread – that a golden thread is only present if objectives, targets, 
and indicators are consistent throughout the different levels from central government to 
service delivery – becomes a hard test to meet when the range and nature of such 
services are considered. Clearly the term ‘golden thread’ has currency within both policy 
and practice domains and was recognised by many interviewees, perhaps referencing a 
sense of internal cohesion within their performance management framework.  However, 
case evidence challenged this normative integration ideal and may support ‘decoupling’ 
(Brignall and Modell, 2000).  Although some (e.g. Johnsen, 2005) accept that ’central 
planning’, for which we can read cascading objectives from a top down perspective, has 
fallen out of favour, within a considerable amount of the literature it is considered a key 
component (e.g. Ballantine et al., 1998; Bourne et al., 2000; De Bruijn, 2002; Heinrich, 
2002; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Kloot and Martin, 2000).  
This could be explained in part by the bounded set of strategic objectives open to local 
government.  Many services are statutory, such as provision of a “comprehensive and 
efficient library service”, as outlined in the Public Libraries and Museums Act 1964.  
Multiple strategies for the delivery of such a service can be conceived, but the duty to 
deliver a service endures.  To an extent, the need to have appropriate mechanisms for 
managing performance at different levels could be considered common sense, and has 
been discussed previously (Osborne et al., 1995 Tricker & Waterson 1995), yet this has 
remained a challenge for organizations to implement.  This research suggests two 
reasons for this at least: firstly, the regulatory assessment explicitly demanded an 
integrated performance management system, and secondly, established practice and 
thinking from the private sector saw performance management as a tool of strategy 
deployment (Kaplan and Norton, 1992).  Despite a paucity of evidence supporting 
integrated performance management approaches, they have remained a dominant form 
in local government, that is, until the twin forces of deregulation and austerity have 
combined to derail the established practices. 
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One consistent finding was that all six organizations were in the process of renewing or 
revitalising their performance management framework.  This took different forms in some 
authorities, but some themes and patterns began to emerge.   Rudgeway, for example, 
was refocusing the performance management framework around political pledges, and 
established a series of mixed boards to oversee this governance.  Castle Gate were 
attempting to establish better links between finance and performance, as well as 
establishing a stronger set of performance control after poor inspection results. 
Overall, authorities were attempting to focus their performance management more clearly, 
and most were doubtful about the value of publicly communicated performance data.  
What seemed to matter most to people who contacted the council was the specific 
service-based interactions they had with the council; within the service management 
literature, service value is generated at the point of service contact (Vargo and Lusch, 
2004), the ‘moment of truth’ (Normann, 2000).   Consequently, efforts to develop 
compelling narratives based around performance data had been primarily of interest for 
external regulation or for political purposes.  Case study authorities were moving towards 
narrative-based, more promotional or reputational material, in order to communicate 
priorities, rather than rely on traditional numerical performance data, the publishing of 
which had previously been a legislative requirement.   
Within some authorities, particularly Castle Gate, Long Reach and Stocks Green, there 
was support for more substantial ‘sandboxing’ of performance measures.  A ‘sandbox’ 
within software development refers to a mechanism allowing an application to run as 
standalone, separate from the main operating system to avoid slowing the system down.  
Here, we use this term to refer to establishing a sub-system of performance measurement 
that does not attempt to integrate with a ‘full’ performance management system in terms 
of regular reporting up a hierarchical chain at numerous points (e.g. departmental, 
corporate, executive / cabinet, and scrutiny etc.) 
Whilst the budget for delivering all council services had shrunk, the range of services had 
not.  Democratic mechanisms such as scrutiny committees were in all cases struggling 
to engage effectively with performance management without simply duplicating executive 
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roles, and for Rudgeway and Merry Park, alternative mechanisms such as performance 
challenge panels were being used that risked usurping the backbench scrutiny role.  
As was articulated earlier, differences were observed between statutory and discretionary 
services, and between high volume / low variety and low volume / high variety services, 
which homogenous or integrated performance delivery often failed to differentiate 
sufficiently for the purposes of control and management of resources.  Visibility, too, 
played a part in this relationship.                                
Involuntary / non-contestable service delivery (i.e. most statutory services) is sometimes 
presented as having a captive audience, but it can be argued that the coercive aspects 
of the service are reciprocal – the service deliverer is compelled to deliver that service, 
irrespective of level of take-up, just as the citizen is largely restricted to single provider for 
many services.   This is subtly different to the rights of citizens to have services provided 
to them, and addresses some of the more insular concerns presented when discussing, 
say, local taxation and its relationship to service expectations.  Many practitioners, if 
asked, will be able to tell tales of citizens arguing: ‘I pay my council tax and expect to 
have my rubbish bin collected weekly, the grass cut, potholes filled, or whichever 
preferred service’ – S4 suggested they heard this once a week.  The relationship between 
citizen and statutory body is, as many have accepted, multi-dimensional and is affected 
by the nature and type of service delivered; as others have pointed out, one-size rarely 
fits all (Radin, 2000; Stolt et al., 2011), e.g. some citizens may want (or demand better) 
recycling provision; others may never use it, but it still has to be provided out of everyone’s 
council tax contribution.  
In theory, the requirements on local authorities to report performance (as opposed 
perhaps to ‘manage’ performance) have changed dramatically and it would be reasonable 
to expect to see this reflected in the current situation; this is largely the case.  This 
deregulation, however, has served to both increase divergent forms between authorities, 
and also to change the nature of the relationship between the state, local government, 
and key stakeholders, including citizens. Nonetheless, some patterns emerged that can 
be identified.  
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The performance zones model suggests that a differential approach is needed to optimise 
the use of performance management as a practice.  The accountability and legitimacy 
zones indicate that the socialised, defensive perspective of performance management 
(Oliver, 1991) is actually a legitimate practice, and that to embrace the politicization of 
performance (section 4.2.1), more narrative forms of performance discussion would be 
more appropriate.  This emerged particularly in Rudgeway and Merry Park around the 
narrative and visual documents explaining to residents and businesses how key promises 
had been met or addressed.  Bell Tower was also developed a new mechanism for 
sharing outcome achievements with residents, particularly at a community or 
neighbourhood level.  Here, accountability zones operate to provide an opportunity for 
external accounting for the overall performance, vision, and achievements of the authority; 
the political level pledges and manifesto commitments primarily operate here.  Action 
within the legitimacy zone serves to establish the rationale for service development, by 
engaging with internal stakeholders and external publics, but on a more specific level than 
the accountability zones. 
Service control zones allow for fast-moving data analysis such as customer contact data, 
missed bin collections, and benefits application processing backlogs to be monitored and 
managed at the operational level without forming part of the corporate performance 
management zone.  The ‘golden thread’ approach would have integrated such measures 
into corporate performance reports, potentially creating a significant time-lag, as 
corporate performance reporting rarely occurs more frequently than monthly.  This type 
of ‘on the ground’ performance reporting is likely to be happening already – certainly the 
case studies suggested this.  However, the ‘sandboxing’ of such performance measures 
was being actively developed in Castle Gate, Long Reach and Rudgeway, with the 
flexibility to ‘promote’ measures to being monitored at a higher level within the 
organizational hierarchy if poor performance continued.    
Excessive control zones represent levels of granular data still required by central 
government, including, but not limited to, education and social care data.  This set of 
performance measurement activities represented a considerable, continuing burden for 
some operational performance teams, and was highlighted particularly by Long Reach, 
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Bell Tower, and Castle Gate, particularly by the operational staff in the focus groups.  This 
data is either collected absent-mindedly, i.e. through institutionalised habit (Oliver, 1991) 
or because of demand from members or central government, which may itself be the 
result of an institutionalised process.  This control is ‘excessive’ because the use of the 
data does not appear to justify the effort in gathering it.  A recent comment from the 
Director of Local Government at the National Audit Office suggested that DCLG collects 
40,000 pieces of data each day, yet does not make significant use of this data (Murphie, 
2017).  Evidence cited in an earlier section (2.9.3, on page 58) suggests that high profile 
service failure results in increased scrutiny of that area of delivery.   
Merry Park staff also indicated that there was an unnecessary level of control by elected 
members around what one of the focus group members called ‘pet projects’, and M3, M4 
and M5 shared experiences of members generating numerical performance targets 
without reference to advice from officers, and thus creating unintended consequences for 
services and their use of resources. 
Finally, the corporate performance zone would contain the performance management 
activity necessary to manage the business of the authority via higher-level service 
management (i.e. at a level above the service control), as well as what might be termed 
‘corporate health’ indicators, such as sickness absence, budget control, staff turnover, 
and other indicators of corporate infrastructure performance. This should not be fully 
integrated as a cascading set of objectives.  Measures or targets (which may be projects 
as much as indicators) in the accountability zone may not be completely aligned with the 
most appropriate measures to manage the core business of council services.  
The analysis presented here synthesises a new framework for understanding and 
development more effective performance management frameworks, and articulates the 
‘snipping’ of the golden thread (Audit Commission, 2002) leading to the decoupling of 
formerly integrated frameworks.  Future propositions for the performance zones model 
are explored in section 8.3 Table 25: Performance management recommendations on 
page 271. 
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This brings implications for the use of performance management as a tool of 
accountability, which is now discussed further in section 7.2.   
 Accountability: five types 
Table 2 in section 2.7 discussed a series of potential uses of performance management 
on p.37, and suggests that a more nuanced understanding of the rationalities of 
performance is needed beyond the relatively simplistic notion that performance is 
concerned solely with improving the quality of services.  Section 7.1 took this need for 
more nuance and the empirical data in section 4.3 and developed it into a proposed new 
performance model.   
Holding public services to account is often purported to be one of the key purposes of 
performance management, particularly within a New Public Management perspective or 
rational choice perspective (May, 2007; Radin, 2006), i.e. if service managers know they 
will be asked to account for performance problems, they will be motivated to maximise 
performance, and that it is desirable to set performance measures to benefit from this 
accountability.      
One of the areas of questioning, therefore, within the research examined to whom people 
felt accountable, and what form that accountability took, in order to explore how 
performance management, regulation and accountability interacted. 
Lindberg provides a useful summary of the key aspects of accountability from a principal 
/ agent theory perspective (Braun and Guston, 2003), in which he describes the 
intellectual construction of accountability as requiring the following steps: 
• An agent or institution who is to give an account (A for agent);  
• An area, responsibilities, or domain subject to accountability (D for domain);  
• An agent or institution to whom A is to give account (P for principal); 
• The right of P to require A to inform and explain/justify decisions with regard to 
D; and  
• The right of P to sanction A if A fails to inform and/or explain/justify decisions 
with regard to D. (Lindberg, 2013) 
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This perspective represents a sanctions-based model, which focuses on punishment, 
enacted through principal / agent theory.  Whilst this is not the only model for 
understanding accountability, it is a common one within public services, especially 
through the mechanisms of regulation and accountability to politicians by officers (Behn, 
2001; Bovens et al., 2014).   
Section 4.2.1 in the findings chapter described a sense of increasing politicization of 
performance.  Whilst the role of members in guiding local authorities and setting priorities 
is relatively well accepted (Rhodes, 1997) – their fundamental role in a representative 
democracy such as the UK is to provide democratic leadership to local authorities – this 
‘politics / administration’ split has been subject to challenges from Public Administration 
perspectives (Svara, 2001; Svara, 2008) and from American New Public Management 
approaches in particular (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Osborne and Plastrik, 1997).  
Public Value literature, particularly (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011; Denhardt and 
Aristigueta, 2011) has criticised NPM for refocusing services on customers, rather than 
citizens.  Behn (2001), too, has criticised the ‘fiction’ of the politics / administration split, 
coining the phrase “separation of responsibility” (2001, p.66), whilst retaining the focus 
on accountability for delivery of results.  This attention to results is a common theme 
amongst policy and accountability, particularly in the US context, which tends to consider 
programmes rather than services (e.g. OECD, 2004; Radin, 2008; Radin, 2000, 2006).  
Behn is clear, however, that accountability is less simple than its descriptions would often 
suggest.  
This view is supported by evidence from the transcripts, where different perceptions of 
accountability started to emerge.  In part, this is due to the differences in both the strength 
and nature of political control in authorities, but this is neither the only nor the dominant 
factor.  Merry Park has a strong Conservative majority, and employs what might be 
described as a ‘muscular’ or robust set of politics – member ambitions were paramount.  
Each of the four officers interviewed and the focus group made reference to the strength 
of politicians’ direct influence on services.  Castle Gate, on the other hand, has an equally 
strong but Labour majority, and here the chief executive (C1) talked about a much more 
dialogic relationship, although the head of regeneration and housing (C5) discussed the 
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challenges in getting members to accept that they had less control around private sector 
regeneration plans.  Rudgeway has a slim Labour majority, but here, too, politicians were 
attempting to place stronger emphasis on the achievement of political ambitions through 
the performance system.  This all begins to indicate a more complex set of dynamic 
relationships around accountability.   
The analysis of the qualitative data and the existing literature resulted in the proposition 
of a model of five types of accountabilty, which is detailed in Figure 6 below.  The next 
parts of this section then provides some background to the concept of accounability 
before moving on the expore each of the five types in sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.5, and 
consolidating these in section 7.2.6.  
Figure 6: Five types of accountability 
 
Source: Author and drawn from Romzek (2000); Sinclair (1995) 
One of the interview questions (Appendix v) primarily focused on to whom people felt 
accountable.  This was then followed up in questioning by asking what this accountability 
felt or looked like.  Interviewees were encouraged to interpret ‘accountability’ in whichever 
way they wished, so as to allow the most divergent set of answers to emerge. 
Romzek (2000) advances a model of accountability that can be used to begin to separate 
differing forms of accountability.  She proposes four types of accountability: 
• Hierarchical 
• Legal 
• Political 
• Professional 
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According to Romzek, the four types can co-exist, and multiple presentations of differing 
accountability types can come into conflict.  One weakness of Romzek’s model is that it 
overlooks accountability to the public as a distinct grouping – this is surprising, given that 
her focus is on public services in reform.  Here, she collapses ‘the general public’ into a 
wider group of stakeholders within political accountability. This thesis contends here that 
services to the public represent the sine qua non of public management.  Without a public 
to serve, there would be no need for public management.  This emerged from both the 
interviews (section 5.1.2 on page 143) and the literature.  A growing body of work around 
co-production has emerged (e.g. Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012; Durose and Richardson, 
2015; Osborne et al., 2016; Osborne and Strokosch, 2013; Radnor et al., 2014) that draws 
on services marketing theory (Grönroos, 1984, 2007; Heskett et al., 1994; Lovelock and 
Gummesson, 2004; Lovelock, 1983; Lusch and Vargo, 2006a) that draws attention to the 
importance of the user / service interface, yet differences need to be drawn between 
individual users and system processes (Osborne et al., 2016). 
Another distinguishing feature is that Romzek draws largely upon the US context for her 
understanding of accountability processes, although some examples are drawn from UK 
politics, examining Westminster and the senior civil service.  The US federal and city 
bureaucratic system is very different to the UK central / local government, in terms of the 
political processes, the nature of services delivered and the relationship between central 
and local institutions. American research, too, tends to focus on the delivery of 
programmes, rather than services. 
Sinclair (1995), writing from an Australian perspective, identifies five ‘forms of 
accountability’ in her research with 15 Australian public sector organization chief 
executives: political, managerial, public, professional, and personal.  Here legal 
accountability is replaced by personal – a sense of holding oneself to account against a 
moral or ethical code – what she refers to as ‘personal conscience’.  As Sinclair observes, 
however, accountability appears not only to defy definition, but actively becomes fuzzier 
the more one attempts to do so.  Nonetheless, there are compelling reasons for wishing 
to provide a typology of accountability, and Romzek’s and Sinclair’s models have merit in 
this regard.  Not all forms of accountability are homogeneous in nature, or equal in 
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standard or result.  Secondly, different stakeholders have asymmetrical power 
relationships and thus differing ability to hold individuals to account.   
Therefore, this research proposes adapting both Sinclair’s and Romzek’s models, 
separating out the public (here called ‘civic’) accountability from the political type, 
including ‘professional’ as a category from Romzek’s model, and integrating the sense of 
personal conscience from Sinclair as part of civic and professional accountabilities. 
At the heart of this is the debate between public goods and private or individual goods 
that forms one of the distinguishing features between Public Administration, Public Value, 
New Public Governance, and New Public Management.  Political accountability 
addresses management’s accountability to the political cadre for delivering against 
political objectives or commitments, whereas civic accountability addresses the rights of 
citizens to have fair and equitable treatment and services delivered in return for their 
contribution, i.e. taxation.  This research will argue that this latter type of civic 
accountability would also be sub-divided into individual civic accountability (i.e. as 
customers), and a wider sense of civic accountability for public goods, i.e. as citizens, or 
the demos. 
It is hoped that this goes some way to addressing some of the challenges around the 
multiple identities of members of the public as citizens, consumers, customers, clients, 
service users etc. by offering different lenses through which to view their different 
contributions.  However, this thesis will not conclusively address this, and further work will 
be needed to explore these different accountability modes and how they can and should 
be addressed.  
For most officers interviewed, the different modes of accountability varied according to 
who held them to account, how they accounted for things, and what they were required 
to account for.  The corporate level officers (e.g. R5, C1, C4, M3, B2) were most likely to 
see accountability as being to the leader and cabinet.  The interviewees managing front-
line services (e.g. C5, M5, S4, S5, B3) and the three councillors (R6, S1, and M1) 
interviewed saw accountability as to the people, via the ballot box. The analysis of the 
differences has grouped them into different types. Interviewees’ responses were 
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interpreted as reflecting managerial, political, regulated, or civic accountability.  In practice, 
this translated into interviewees saying they were accountable to their organizational line 
management, local politicians, regulatory bodies, or the ‘people’, either in a general sense 
of the demos, the body of citizens to whom services were provided, or in a more specific 
sense of service users (or potential services users).  Synthesising Romzek and Sinclair’s 
typologies with the findings suggests five main types: 
• Managerial 
• Political 
• Legislated 
• Civic 
• Professional  
 
Each of the five types of accountability is now described in further detail. 
7.2.1 Managerial accountability 
In many ways, this accountability for those tasks or actions staff are formally employed to 
do was the least complicated and easiest to understand.  Interviewees were clear that 
there was a set of more explicit expectations that would inform performance management 
– both in terms of how their individual performance would be judged, and the performance 
of the services they were responsible for.  This form of accountability is therefore less 
worthy of extended discussion as it reinforces the traditional view of accountability as 
outlined by Lindberg’s model.  
This interpretation of managerial accountability reflected notions of professional and 
managerial practices in which the agent tasked with enacting the delivery is clear (the 
member of staff), the domain is specific and embedded within organizational practices, 
and the right of the principal (the manager) to hold the agent to account and sanction if 
performance is not acceptable or suitably justified is enacted through HR policies, 
practices, and employment law.  This accords with Romzek’s hierarchical mode, which 
she suggests occurs where there are low levels of autonomy and is largely similar to 
Sinclair’s managerial form.  This form of accountability rarely needed explaining or 
justifying. 
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Managerial accountability aligns closely with incremental performance management 
because of the focus on achievable outputs, as well as with budgetary responsibility, i.e. 
for not overspending, and for making required budget savings; here it diverges from 
Romzek’s autonomy thesis.  Officers, particularly those at more senior levels and 
especially those responsible for social care or education services, tended to be more 
likely to discuss performance in terms of outcomes (e.g. C4, S5, B1), and expressed more 
autonomy and control in terms of addressing those outcomes.  But, yet again the 
dominance of financial savings meant that this overshadowed the debate around 
performance for most interviewees.  Interviewees in more regulated areas like adults’ and 
children’s social care also had more to say on legislated accountability, and for them this 
was largely data and inspection driven.  
7.2.2 Political accountability 
A genuine political tension emerged from the interviews for contemporary local 
government service provision in austerity: services that are ‘easier’ to cut managerially, 
i.e. those that affect the physical environment (e.g. parks or highways) rather than directly 
affecting people (e.g. social care), are also those that generate the most political fallout 
because they are often those that are universal in their application, i.e. high volume and 
thus their impact is felt by the largest number of people.  Here questions of visibility and 
local community priority come into conflict with the budget realities facing local 
government, and the professional / social discourses of priority.  These local political 
priorities can emerge from ward member political accountabilities, which are discussed 
below.   
Non-universal (targeted) services such as social care, on the other hand, may be highly 
visible to service users in the classical operations management sense, but are largely 
invisible to the majority of users.  This matters because of the relationship between 
taxation and public services, where ‘purchasing’ a service is more often a coercive, 
legislated requirement than a conscious choice.  As C1 highlights, dissatisfaction for 
users of public services will have a detrimental effect on political success, as well as 
raising concerns about future democratic accountability; this dichotomy is acutely 
important when considering public service cuts.  To establish political legitimacy and 
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palatability, both the needs of the council as institution and the individual democratic 
accountability of individual members need to be considered and balanced.  This is 
becoming increasingly difficult, and C1’s comments were the most reflective of this (C1 is 
the chief executive). This debate is also reflected in the need to divide civic responsibility 
into public and individual (section 7.2.3). 
Political accountability tended to operate in three main ways: leader or cabinet 
accountability, i.e. accountability to the decision-making apparatus for general 
achievement of goals and targets, including savings targets; cabinet member 
accountability, i.e. the executive elected member with responsibility for the service area; 
and local member accountability, i.e. individual service-based relationships with members 
around ward or constituent issues.   
Lindberg’s model (2013) argues that there are five pre-conditions needed for 
accountability to be established.  This model, however, presumes a linear and somewhat 
individual or one-to-one relationship between agent and principal. Romzek is more open 
to “multiple, overlapping accountability relationships” (Romzek, 2000, p.37), and the 
multiple and sometimes conflicting lines of accountability in political organizations such 
as local government make the dyadic principal / agent view problematic.  As discussed 
above, managerial accountabilities as identified from research findings align more closely 
with Lindberg’s view, and these relationships are relatively direct and easily understood.  
Respondents’ views concur with this, although the hierarchical nature of managerialism 
means it is not strictly linear, but networked, i.e. it is a mistake to view the chain of 
accountability as if it were a train line, where you must pass through one station to get to 
the next one up the line.  Castle Gate’s chief executive (C1) felt able to directly intervene 
with managers without going through the managerial line.  Long Reach’s L5 felt 
managerially accountable to multiple lines – working to commissioners.  For staff within 
corporate services who served ‘internal customers’, this accountability was also more 
complex.  Romzek places professional accountability within field of codes of work 
‘professionalism’ or expected behaviour, but here it can be argued that the professional 
disciplinary accountability enacted through certification or professional registration 
(qualified teacher status, certificate of qualification in social work, Chartered Institute of 
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Public Finance and Accountancy etc.) needs to be more fully considered within its 
category.   The differing forms of accountability beyond the managerialist perspective, on 
the other hand, challenge it. 
Political accountability to democratically elected representatives is problematic because 
of the potential for conflict with managerial lines of accountability.  New Labour democratic 
renewal reforms encouraged councils to adopt an cabinet and scrutiny split, mirroring 
national political arrangements (DTLR, 2000), and most authorities followed this model. 
The overall result was that the cabinet and backbench model concentrated power in the 
hands of a small number of ‘cabinet’ or ‘executive’ members.  Whilst cabinet members do 
possess legitimate democratic authority, they are extremely limited in sanctions that they 
can invoke, and their own authority is delegated from whole council authority via a formal 
‘scheme of delegation’ document that outlines what decisions cabinet members can take 
on their own, and to a lesser extent, what some officers can do under their own authority.  
Some matters – setting a balanced budget, for example – can only be agreed by the 
whole council, which by definition includes opposition members.  The scheme of 
delegation must be agreed by the whole council, as well as being subject to oversight by 
the governance committee (a mandatory democratic mechanism).  This creates a tension 
between allowing more empowered action to be taken (and thus speeding up decision-
making), and balancing the concentration of power in a few hands and thus narrowing 
democratic engagement.   
Whilst elected members might be criticised by an external inspection, they cannot be 
subject to sanctions themselves unless they have breached the code of conduct and 
standards (other than, naturally, if they have broken any laws, in which case they are 
subject to the same sanctions as ‘ordinary’ people).   The Localism Act (DCLG, 2011b) 
removed the Standards Board for England, an external body created by the Local 
Government Act 2000, which provided an external route for the accountability of elected 
members, as well as establishing a range of internal mechanisms to do this (Greasley, 
2007).  Councils now must publish a code of conduct, although the details of this are left 
to individual authorities, members are obliged to declare pecuniary conflicts of interest, 
and councils must appoint an independent person who can investigate complaints 
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(Sandford, 2016).  These arrangements are widely accepted to be less rigorous, and 
certainly represent diminished legislated accountability under the guise of enhanced 
localism. 
Authority is thus a defining feature of political accountability, and indeed other forms.  
According to Sandberg’s model, unless authority is delegated for a service or function, it 
is, in practical terms, hard to hold anyone to account; Romzek considers situations where 
no individual sanction is applied, but this merits further unpacking to better explain the UK 
local government context.  Table 22 on p.241, at the end of this section, explores the 
values and potential for sanctions within each of the five accountability types. 
When we consider political accountability, we see that ward members have even less 
formal authority, beyond that of their role as members of the whole council, which must 
by law formally agree a number of key decisions, including setting a balanced budget.  
Ward members, however, are a common route for residents or businesses in a borough 
to escalate service complaints or issues, and ward members may often raise these 
directly with service managers, circumventing both formal complaints procedures and the 
political or managerial hierarchy.  Particularly within the domains of environmental and 
regulatory services, a strong tradition of responding to ward member concerns was 
demonstrated, despite ward members lacking formal authority to demand an account or 
invoke sanctions.  Ward members, however, are also part of party political arrangements, 
and may well wield much more significant informal power within that context.  At times a 
sense of Realpolitik emerged in which it makes little sense to ignore ward member 
concerns as this would simply result in the complaint being escalated to the executive 
member (this is simpler if both members are from the same political party), and thus a 
more ‘legitimate’ complaint being raised.  
Operations management classically views services as being located along a series of low 
to high axes: volume, variation in demand, variety, and visibility.  High visibility usually 
means the process is open to view.  For public services operations, we can suggest that 
visibility should focus more on the visibility of the end result, particularly where users have 
a more passive relationship with the service.  For instance, road surface maintenance is 
highly visible to anyone using the road, be they car user, pedestrian, cyclist or via public 
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transport.  The process of maintenance may be hard to see if it is carried out at quiet 
times or in the evenings, but the end result is clearly visible.   
Discussions within the domain of political accountability included responsibility for 
agreeing service cuts or the scaling back of services.  Within New Labour modernization, 
democratic reform or renewal was primarily focused on changing forms of governance 
away from historic committee-based models and moving towards the leader and cabinet 
model.  Coalition reforms, on the other hand, had opened up possibilities of returning to 
the former committee-based models of political management, perhaps out of concerns 
around concentration of power in a small number of politicians, or perhaps a sense of 
nostalgia.   This research therefore attempted to secure interviews with cabinet members 
with responsibility for performance, and three were carried out: Merry Park, Rudgeway, 
and Stocks Green (M1, R6, and S1). 
Political accountability is complex and provokes real tensions when working to mitigate 
service cuts within local authorities.  It represents a potential source of conflict with 
legislated and managerial accountability, whilst claiming alignment with civic 
accountability.  Politicians (and officers) claim the existence of a mandate for leading local 
government that is derived from democracy and the electoral process, and thus 
responsibility for all aspects of service delivery.  This has a strong logic, but in terms of 
managing service provision in volatile and challenging circumstances, it raises questions 
about the strength of a mandate where only one real sanction exists, i.e. deselection at 
the ballot box, and that is only achievable once every four years.  
7.2.3 Civic accountability 
Accountability to the people of the borough was articulated through a sense of moral 
obligation or duty, compared to the managerial accountability outlined above, which was 
more driven by professionalism and hierarchical expectations.  Again, this feeling of 
responsibility was more strongly felt in both social care domains and high-volume services 
such as waste collection, although almost every interviewee talked about the need to 
deliver high-quality services (presumably to somebody).  For those staff working on 
internal performance improvement or change teams, accountability in this sense also 
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included notions around ‘internal customers’, i.e. mediating the relationship with ‘external’ 
customers through the service departments themselves. 
In reality, however, beyond the ballot box and complaints – either to council officers or via 
elected representatives – there are few mechanisms open to members of the public to 
hold the council to account.  This influences civic accountability towards an outwards-
facing moral or ethical dimension – the requirement to account to the public, rather than 
being held to account by the public.  Some other levers do exist, such as appeals to the 
regulator or ombudsman and the role of the press; these can be powerful forces, but are 
also reserved for significant events or complaints. 
In the British democratic tradition, councillors (or MPs) are chosen to be the 
representatives of the people and thus have a domain for which they are accountable.  
This places the people in the role of principal, and councillors as agent – yet the people 
are both recipients of, and principals for, public service.  Neither does this process allow, 
however, for any significant sanction or mechanism to withdraw that responsibility beyond 
local elections, as highlighted before.  Council officers are slightly more accountable on 
an individual basis in that formal complaint mechanisms exist to reinforce required 
behaviours from officers, and there are employment law mechanisms to ensure legal and 
officially sanctioned behaviour. 
NPM’s obsession with a focus on costs and efficiency and hence viewing citizens only as 
customers places them firmly in the category of individual civic accountability, and sees 
them as either willing or unwilling recipients of services.  The job of public services is 
therefore to attempt to satisfy or delight customers; this is an almost impossible task 
where a monopoly exists or where public service operate in a regulatory capacity.  
Approaches such as the citizens’ charters in the 1991-1997 era (Drewry, 2005) start to 
blur this divide – using the label ‘citizen’ as a move away from ‘customer’.  Public Value 
literature (e.g. Alford and O'Flynn, 2009; Benington and Moore, 2010; Denhardt and 
Denhardt, 2011; Moore, 1995; Stoker, 2006) attempted to address NPM’s abandonment 
of the public and civic value of public services.  Denhardt and Denhardt (2011, p. xi) argue 
that “public servants do not deliver services; they deliver democracy”.  This reaffirmation 
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of public value is encouraging, although many people would hopefully agree that, in some 
cases at least, public servants do deliver services; they deliver democracy as well. 
The abandonment of Comprehensive Area Assessment and the Audit Commission 
(Walker, 2011) mean that there is no externally published validation of council corporate 
performance, or the impact of funding cuts; this may not be coincidental.  Some 
interviewees felt that CPA and CAA, and thus reinforcing accounting to the public via the 
Best Value regime’s artefacts and external accounting was at best ritualistic, and at worst 
meaningless (section 5.1.1 p.139); a view examined by some academics (Broadbent, 
2003; Wilson, 2004b).  Others felt the missing framework of guidance and rules meant 
that it was harder to maintain or justify a focus.  A corollary of this, however, can be 
observed in the quest for more ‘authentic’ forms of performance management, i.e. more 
narrative forms of performance management that enable accounting to the wider public 
on pledges and commitments, rather than performance targets. 
Looking once more to central government, it is hard to reconcile the Coalition and 
Conservative governments’ ambitions around making public services financially 
accountable to the public with the deregulation of legislated accountability that had been 
enacted through the Audit Commission and assessment regimes.  It can be argued that 
making local government solely reliant on locally-raised taxation is a mechanism for 
reinforcing accountability to the public.  Yet it is unclear what the sanctions would be if 
this were to occur, or how this addresses wider Public Value notions of equity and justice 
(Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011; Stoker, 2006), especially as it seems clear that this 
funding arrangement would (severely) disadvantage authorities with the most deprived 
communities, where the relationship between deprivation and poor performance has 
already been established (Andrews, 2004).  Mechanisms such as ‘armchair auditors’ 
(DCLG, 2011a) appear to attempt a relocation of accountability from legislated to civic, 
yet seemingly offer little in the way of sanctions other than reputational damage caused 
by exposure within the social and mass media.  Certainly, it would appear unlikely that 
the ‘army of armchair auditors’ would be as skilled or as successful as a cadre of trained 
auditors from the Audit Commission (Ferry et al., 2015). 
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NPG (Osborne, 2006) and public service dominant logic (Osborne et al., 2015; Osborne 
et al., 2013) also begin to feature more prominently.  These draw on services theory (e.g. 
Lusch and Vargo, 2006b; Normann, 2000; Vargo and Lusch, 2004) to consider notions of 
service quality; this relates to the service chain, i.e. members of the public are interested 
in their experiences with services.  Within the concept of accountability, we see that this 
relates to more individualised notions of experience accountability, whilst it also seeks to 
address the quality of service systems.  Nonetheless this connects more closely with 
some services than others, as debates around co-production have demonstrated (Durose 
and Richardson, 2015; Osborne and Strokosch, 2013).  Therefore, we need to have a 
sense of differentiated accountability and accounting for those services, based on a more 
transactional footing than a series of structured performance reports that contain progress 
against targets etc. It is also necessary to consider the differences between wider public 
value and individualised experiential value; both are important, yet a more balanced 
approach between the two is needed. 
7.2.4 Legislated accountability 
This research has identified ‘legislated accountability’, that is, externally imposed 
assessment frameworks that impose demands on services, rather than individuals.  In 
these cases, the organization is expected to nominate a principal agent either as the 
nominated member of staff responsible – sometimes this is one of the ‘statutory’ officers 
that are outlined in legislation rather than being nominated.  These statutory roles are:  
• Head of paid service: chief executive responsible for overall delivery and 
standards;  
• Section 151 officer: the primary finance officer responsible for, amongst other 
things, the authority setting a balanced budget and legality of expenditure and 
procurement;  
• Monitoring officer: responsible for legal and democratic matters including probity, 
elections, member standards and legality of decision-making; 
Director of adults’ social services (DASS) and director of children’s services (DCS): 
responsible for standards and outcomes in adults’ and children’s services 
respectively.  
  
Whilst there are nominated individuals, the regulator can only sanction the organization, 
although the case of Sharon Shoesmith, the Haringey Director of Children’s Services, 
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came up in one interview as an example of politically-enacted accountability resulting 
from the desire to be seen to do something.  Shoesmith was sacked after Haringey were 
found to have failed in their duty of care for Peter Connelly (referred to as Baby P) 
Arguably this was not an expression of the fifth type discussed here, professional 
accountability; Shoesmith’s sacking resulted from direct intervention of a national 
politician, Ed Balls (then Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families) rather 
than from a professional body.  This can be compared with the approach to the two 
doctors who also treated Peter, GP Dr Jerome Ikwueke, and paediatrician Dr Sabah Al-
Zayya, who were investigated by the General Medical Council. 
If something goes wrong at a local level in terms of a child death- if you look at either the 
Victoria Climbié or the Baby P, something like that, central government doesn’t feel like it can't 
get involved. So, the fact that Ed Balls at the time sacked Sharon Shoesmith, which was illegal, 
he couldn’t do that but the sense that he had to be acting.  [RG: Something had to be done, 
yes.]  Yes, there is the pressure on central government to intervene in local government failure. 
Whereas if you look at other models across Europe or in the States, that just doesn’t happen. It 
has to be a state of national emergency before the federal government would… [step in] (R4 
DEPARTMENTAL) 
There are two main forms of legislated accountability remaining: statutory officer roles 
and residual inspections.  The statutory officer roles (Head of Paid Service, Section 151 
Officer, Monitoring Officer, DCS, and DASS) remain mechanisms for holding individuals 
to account for legislated action.  Whilst this research did not include all the statutory 
officers in every council, there were sufficient discussions with and about statutory roles 
to formulate this as a key element of legislated accountability. 
Organizational structures have been changing, at least in part due to budgetary cuts, and 
some authorities were changing the reporting position of the statutory roles.  Local 
authorities had previously kept these statutory roles on corporate management teams, 
but the move to alternative organizational leadership structures had served to push some 
of these roles downwards in the hierarchy.  Whilst no direct negative comments were 
associated with these changes, their result is to dilute the influence of the statutory roles 
in senior management teams and may represent the effect of deinstitutionalization (Oliver, 
1992) – the weakening of institutional norms and values driven by challenging 
circumstances and the reduction in inertial forces.  There may be consequences of this 
for the relationship between corporate teams and service management teams when 
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resolving differences in how performance is discussed and understood.  This connects 
questions of accountability with the corporate and departmental tensions discussed in 
section 4.2.2, and the staffing and expertise implications in section 4.2.3 
Merry Park had appointed a monitoring officer who was not legally trained.  Although 
there is no legal requirement for the holder of this post to be a qualified lawyer (the section 
151 officer must be a qualified accountant, for example, and there are professional 
accreditations for DASS), this post has historically most often been held by the most 
senior lawyer in the organization.  Changes to executive management structures, 
however, suggest that this relationship has changed, as perhaps have other statutory 
roles. 
Further change that emerged was driven by the deregulation of the council performance 
inspections, and the concomitant shift from this legislated accountability to a specific form 
of professional accountability.  Ofsted and CQC clearly remain significant players in the 
field of external inspection. The dissolution of the Audit Commission and CPA / CAA 
regime had effectively removed the integrated external inspections.  The Audit 
Commission performed both ‘corporate’ and ‘service’ inspections, but was accountable 
to DCLG and was hence centralised.  This left only the specific service-based inspections, 
which are accountable in different ways: CQC reports to the Secretary of State for Health, 
whereas Ofsted reports directly to parliament.  As discussed in section 5.1.3, sectoral and 
peer-led improvement activity was starting to fill some of the perceived ‘gap’ caused by 
the deregulation of external performance inspection.  This brings a different focus to the 
question of accountability, as most interviewees (e.g. M4, B4, C7, L5, R3, S3) saw this 
work as part of the improvement agenda, perhaps implicitly drawing a distinction between 
this work and the regulatory or compliance agendas that may have driven CAA or CPA.  
In part, these changes may be shifting the focus from legislated to the next type of 
accountability: professional. 
7.2.5 Professional accountability 
Romzek’s last type of accountability is ‘professional’, which she interprets as complying 
with professional standards and expectations.  This research has developed this type into 
two sub-types of professional accountability.   
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Firstly, many of the occupations within local government require a formalized professional 
certification to practice, such as lawyers, accountants, planners, social workers, teachers, 
licensing officers etc.  Whilst on the surface this seems related to the statutory officer 
roles discussed within legislated accountability, there are differences.  Meeting 
professional licensed standards is a part of only some of the statutory roles; the section 
151 officer must, for example, be a chartered accountant, but the monitoring officer does 
not have to be a qualified lawyer.  In legislated accountability for statutory roles, the very 
existence of the nominated accountable roles is a prerequisite for a functioning council, 
and their legally enacted responsibilities provide a framework for how to hold them to 
account for at least some of their roles, i.e. a statutory role is necessary but insufficient 
part of what a senior officer may do. 
Professionalized accountability differs because the normalized behaviours and ethics that 
arise from the professional standards associated with certification may compete with 
managerial accountability for the delivery of the role’s function, i.e. tensions arise between 
what is desirable for the organization, and what may be considered undesirable from the 
processional perspective.  Accountability here against the professional standards is 
facilitated by a sense of internalised professional ethics, that is, the individual holding 
themselves to account for their actions and behaviours against the expected standards 
inculcated through their professional training; Romzek calls this “individuals who base 
their decision-making on internalized norms of appropriate practice” (Romzek, 2000, 
p.26).  Professional roles are thus generally only held to account externally after failure in 
one of the other domains, i.e. as a result of a complaint or managerial investigation. 
Romzek sets this sense of accountability in the context of staff with significant role 
autonomy.  Whilst there is a logic to this, it should be recognized that professional 
accountability also implies a set of internalized constraints and externally imposed role 
and behaviour expectations that may limit both thinking and behaviour, as well as 
institutionalized norms and practices from the organization’s local culture.   
Similarly, some degree of autonomy must be necessary for accountability in any 
meaningful way.  Other than ‘sham’ forms of accountability, e.g. ‘kangaroo courts’ in 
dictatorships, most reasonable definitions of accountability rely on the person being held 
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to account having some ability to sway the outcome of the processes in question; Behn 
(2001) has this as a fundamental component of accountability, as well as a distinguishing 
feature between US and European forms of NPM, and it forms part of the ‘minimal 
consensus’ around accountability for Bovens et al. (2014).   
The second aspect of professionalization is the professionalization of ‘management’ itself 
as a discipline or domain.  In the US or European contexts, ‘public management’ schools 
exist to provide professional development and training that is more general in nature, 
compared to the professional disciplines, such as law or social work.  There is a stronger 
sense that public management (e.g., sometimes the ‘Public Administration’ part of 
Master’s in Public Administration or MPA degrees) as a profession or discipline.   
Another point of distinction here between the US and other representations of 
professional accountability may lie in the notion of professionalization as a competing 
discourse to managerialism.  This may partly explain the gap between corporate teams 
and health and social care / education within the case studies.  Social care and education 
have very strong discourses of professionalization, including formalised educative 
processes and knowledge domains, formalised certification to practice, and high levels of 
professional autonomy (Healy and Meagher, 2004; Weiss‐Gal and Welbourne, 2008), 
whereas performance management lacks most of these aspects, and hence has 
struggled to assert itself as a discipline, certainly once the legitimising practices of CPA / 
CAA had been removed.  
7.2.6 Consolidating accountabilities 
The sections above have articulated the five different types of accountability, adapting 
Romzek (2000) and Sinclair’s (1995) models of accountability, and using the summation 
by Lindberg (2013) as a starting platform.  A single definition of accountability remains 
elusive, and would probably prove overly reductive - Bovens et al. (2014, p.4) call this a 
“minimal conceptual consensus”.  The findings from this research have demonstrated that 
multiple forms of accountability can be observed, and that not all forms are equal in how 
they operate, or how they engage with the complex social and hierarchical dynamics.   
Table 22 below captures the synthesised five types and provides some initial views on 
how these accountabilities are enacted, and how they might provoke tensions. 
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Table 22: Five different accountabilities in local government  
Type Values Sanctions available? 
Visibility of 
accountabilit
y processes 
Examples from 
case studies 
Enacted 
mode 
Paradigm 
most 
closely 
associated 
Managerial Compliance with hierarchy 
Readily available but 
reliant on 
institutional culture 
and power dynamics 
High 
Castle Gate’s chief 
executive’s (C1) 
response to poor 
inspection results 
Hierarchically 
within 
organization 
New Public 
Management 
Professional 
Working within 
professional 
ethical 
framework 
Theoretically 
available but in 
practice are limited – 
e.g. decertification 
Low 
Bell Tower’s head of 
regulation – impact of 
cuts on regulatory 
services. 
Professionally 
from outside 
organization 
New Public 
Management 
Legislated Compliance with rules 
Systemic, not 
individualised High 
Merry Park’s 
monitoring officer 
(M3) 
Heuristically, 
outside looking 
in 
Public 
Administratio
n 
Political Primacy of political process 
Deferred, 
Foucauldian self-
disciplining, informal 
power 
Low 
Merry Park’s 
‘muscular’ 
politicisation; 
Rudgeway’s 
improvement boards 
Culturally 
Public 
Administratio
n 
Civic 
(individual) 
Delivering value 
in terms of 
private goods 
Reputational 
damage, customer 
redress 
Generally low 
but can be 
higher e.g. 
social media 
Various references to 
co-production, 
especially Rudgeway 
R1, Long Reach’s L2 
Socially, 
complaints, 
reputation 
New Public 
Governance 
Civic 
(public) 
Delivering value 
for public / 
societal goods 
Diffused – 
reputational damage 
Low apart from 
extreme cases 
(e.g. public 
demonstration
s like Stop the 
War marches 
etc.) 
Stocks Green’s 
unsuccessful attempt 
to engage in public 
debate around budget 
cuts 
Socially Public Value 
Source: Author and adapted from (Behn, 2001; Bovens et al., 2014; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011; Romzek, 2000; Sinclair, 
1995)
241 
 
Civic accountability presents a particular challenge as to whether it actually allows any 
‘real’ sanctions to operate beyond a performative sense of accountability through 
democratic action.  Certainly, this accountability is exercised more through narrative / 
discursive mechanisms in the public sphere, and there does not seem to be much 
evidence of civic accountability through mechanisms such as armchair auditors, as the 
government has proposed.  The lack of regulated accountability means authorities may 
stop delivering some services (or attaining some levels of service output) that the public 
or elected members may wish to see continue.  This may exacerbate the problems of 
civic accountability at the ‘public value’ level, as well as the individual service level. 
CPA and CAA made the assessment of a local authority public, although the extent to 
which this provides accountability to the public is debatable, and it seems much more 
likely that this was intended to hold authorities to account for delivering national policy 
objectives, much like LPSAs and LAAs, whilst appearing to fit within the discourse of 
localism.  Whilst freedom from this level of control was generally well received, several 
senior officers lamented the loss of being told what to do and the direction this gave, 
perhaps in part due to the stress of having to make challenging decisions about service 
cuts.   This debate around desirable and achievable service levels also saw an increasing 
use of political groups and mixed officer and member groups for internal accountability, 
whilst Stocks Green had attempted (with little success) to engage in civic consultation. 
This is a complex set of relationships, and the nature of financial cuts facing local 
authorities has only served to exacerbate this.  The series of accountabilities outlined 
above frequently come into conflict, and interviewees often discussed the need to develop, 
draw upon, and build conversations with stakeholders to balance these competing 
tensions. 
If we return to the question of guiding paradigms of public management, we see that 
different forms of accountability (and the use of performance management as a part of 
them) draw upon different paradigms.  The PA perspective, with its focus on democracy, 
actors, networks etc., influences the political and legislative forms.  NPM with its focus on 
choice, efficiency and competitiveness influences the managerial and professional forms.  
Civic accountability, however, remains a mix of influences from NPG, which seeks to 
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address the criticisms of NPM, and Public Value, which seeks to present itself as a 
countervailing narrative to NPM.  It may be that NPG risks focusing too much on individual 
service interactions, and although some recent literature looks at the service system (e.g. 
Osborne et al., 2015; Osborne et al., 2016; Radnor et al., 2014; Radnor et al., 2015), 
questions remain about what accountability should look like in a climate of austerity.   
Using public value as a lens, it can be argued that insufficient attention is given to the 
debate about wider ‘public goods’ and that strategies of resistance to the dominant force 
of individualised, entrepreneurial public services may be required if equity and 
sustainability are to be embraced within public service delivery (see Figure 7).  Such 
strategies, however, are not the subject of this thesis, and will need future consideration. 
 Value for money: reconceptualising VFM for public services 
The findings have demonstrated that financial issues dominate current organizational 
thinking and priorities in modern local government.  Regulatory and performance 
management frameworks have been used to implement national policy objectives and to 
assess progress towards achieving both national and more local ambitions.  
Accountability as discussed above considers the relationship between those for whom 
services are conceived and delivered, those who deliver those services, and those who 
ultimately make the decisions about what is delivered and how, describing a complex set 
of relationships and interdependencies.  These are underpinned by the tensions and 
conflicts inherent in competing paradigms of public service traditions.  Bureaucracy, 
management, and governance draw on different theoretical foundations, values and 
concepts (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011) and a holistic view requires an understanding 
of these differing traditions and underlying assumptions.   
External inspections for whole councils no longer exist, other than intervention in the case 
of serious failure, such as Doncaster in 2010. Authorities are left without a clear 
understanding of what other councils are doing or achieving, and several of the case 
studies articulated a desire to obtain more benchmarking data (e.g. M4, B4, C7, L5, R3, 
S3) to help understand the impact of service changes, or regretted losing the clarity that 
came from central government direction. 
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Decoupled from external inspection or external direction, the severity of cuts facing local 
public services makes balancing spending, performance, and ambition conceptually 
challenging and operationally demanding.  And yet despite this, the requirement to deliver 
essential public services has not disappeared.  Thus, one key question is how to 
demonstrate value for money in this specific context? 
Performance management must by most definitions include reference to financial 
management.  As Broadbent and Guthrie (2008) point out, work at the intersection of 
purely accounting-focused literature and that which addresses issues of management 
have rarely come together in an adequate fashion. However, from the findings we can 
observe that this relationship between finance and performance appears to have changed 
significantly over the last six years. 
Figure 7: Public value for money model 
 
Source: author and adapted from Barnes and Radnor (2008) 
Of the 3Es – economy, efficiency, and effectiveness – efficiency has probably had the 
most attention in public service study and practice.  A focus on economy tends to highlight 
the earliest part of the value chain within service delivery, i.e. the cost of the inputs to the 
process.  When financial assessments are made by either internal management or 
external regulators, this by definition limits the evaluation to stages before the point of 
delivery; clearly something necessary to understand and control but that cannot provide 
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a reliable sense of the overall success of a service or organization.  Effectiveness, on the 
other hand, is in theory disinterested with regard to the input and instead focuses on how 
well the service is being delivered.  This relies on a complex and subtle understanding of 
the multi-factorial nature of service delivery, and hence is difficult to ascertain 
quantitatively with sufficient confidence.  In part this may generate some of the difference 
between service evaluation with a focus primarily on outputs, and policy evaluation, which 
focuses more on outcomes.  It is possible for some services to evaluate outcomes, and 
this was certainly part of the discussion with more senior respondents such as Castle 
Gate’s chief executive C1, and Bell Tower’s corporate director B2, but since many are 
either too long term or multi-factorial, it is very difficult to ‘prove’ causality.  This discussed 
tended to draw upon the longer-term economic goals of ‘growing’ the council out of 
austerity, although it was also a feature in interviews with social care and education staff 
such as Rudgeway’s head of social care performance, R1, Castle Gate’s DASS, C4, or 
Stocks Green’s head of school improvement, C5.  Merry Park’s political establishment 
tended to see lower council tax as an outcome to be achieved. 
Efficiency addresses the process of converting the inputs to a service process (usually 
money or staff) into the outputs, and aims to minimise waste in that process.  Unlike most 
private sector goods or service processes, public sector services are expected to deliver 
social, environmental, and economic outcomes, as well as simply ‘delivering a service’.  
Even something like a leisure centre is not just providing a swimming pool, for example, 
but rather is also part of a series of public health outcomes around obesity, long-term 
health conditions etc.  A private sector gym is likely to be unconcerned about whether 
childhood obesity is rising, or what the life expectancy challenges are for recovering 
stroke patients; they are disinterested, apart from any profit-making opportunities that 
may exist, such as being commissioned by a local authority.  A local authority filling 
potholes is also delivering part of its tourism, economic or spatial strategy for the area, all 
objectives likely to be more complex than delivering competitive advantage (Porter, 2008). 
These longer-term outcomes are important when considering both equity and 
sustainability.  Equity has been identified as fourth E by some (e.g. Benington and Moore, 
2010; Moore, 1995; Stoker, 2006) and is an important part of the Public Value discourse.  
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As outlined above, local authorities must have regard to equality of access in the provision 
of universal services, and are obliged to improve the well-being of a local area – features 
not expected of private sector companies, beyond complying with legislative requirements.  
This is the view of Denhardt and Denhardt (2011), i.e. that public services deliver 
democracy, not services. 
Sustainability here can be understood in two forms: firstly, the duty (and power) of local 
government to promote the “economic, environmental and social well-being” of an area 
(DCLG, 2007), and secondly, the legal obligation to set a balanced budget and to deliver 
‘value for money’, i.e. services on a financially sustainable footing.  This requires a 
balancing of the quality and quantity of services provided with the costs of provided those 
services.  This allows for local political determination, i.e. to offer more or less of a service 
dependent on the ambitions of politicians, which, one assumes, should also be based on 
local need.  This requires a consideration of both outputs and outcomes when setting out 
the authority’s performance management framework, and could be seen the development 
of new performance management frameworks by Castle Gate, Bell Tower, Rudgeway, 
and Long Reach.  
This meshing of outputs and outcomes is one of the factors that confounds public sector 
performance management, which can be overloaded with outcome targets that the 
organisations themselves have little influence over, leading to difficulties in generating the 
conditions for accountability.  The language used by policy, and politicians, valorises 
accountability for longer-term outcomes (e.g. Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012; DCLG, 2007; 
DETR, 1999; DTLR, 2000; Heinrich, 2002), but this creates a tension between the short-
term accounting for expenditure, and the longer-term investment needed to improve the 
delivery of outcomes.  This tension, and the short-term nature of financial accountability 
contributes to the challenge of sustainability in public services, as exemplified by the 
recent Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 (DCLG, 2014). All authorities, including 
Merry Park, were balancing the aspirational goals with the need to cut expenditure, yet 
Castle Gate, Long Reach, Bell Tower, and Rudgeway were attempting to develop longer-
term outcomes in their planning and delivery.  This may well prove to be unsustainable.  
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It is perhaps natural that efficiency becomes the focus for much of the agenda, particularly 
for external regulatory bodies, as it seemingly encompasses the overall quality of financial 
processes and the end result of service delivery in much more intelligible and measurable 
ways.  Outcome measurement, on the other hand, remains often elusive to effective 
quantitative measurement, or is subject to many unsatisfactory proxies. 
Often characterised by unit costs or beneficiary costs, efficiency has become a byword 
for sound financial management, as indicated by Gershon ‘efficiencies’, or the drive to 
deliver ‘more with less’ in public service delivery.  This has not been solely a recent 
phenomenon, but has become more critical in the severe budget restrictions facing local 
authorities.  We should therefore challenge the implicit assumption that efficiency and 
value for money are the same; value for money requires articulating a more subtle set of 
concepts, if we are to ensure public value beyond individual service value.  The following 
sections will explore this conceptualisation more fully.   
7.3.1 Exploring the foundations of value for money 
The 3Es have been a key part of New Public Management, as has competition in 
delivering public services (Ferlie et al., 1996; Hood, 1991), and the Conservative policy 
of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) led to the contestability of many services, 
requiring comparisons to do so (Boyne et al., 1999; Entwistle and Laffin, 2005).  This was 
furthered by New Labour’s Best Value regime including Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment and Comprehensive Area Assessment (CPA and CAA). 
As argued elsewhere in this thesis (section 2.4, p.32), managerialist-driven NPM has 
drawn heavily on the notion of competition and contestability as a necessary component 
of public sector reform.   Arguments in favour of market forces generally suggest 
increased quality, reduced cost, and enhanced delivery as the goals (and likely outcomes) 
of proposed reforms.  Yet this seemingly implies an assumption that all three of these will 
occur simultaneously, whereas private sector strategy literature would assume that 
embracing one of these directions would be a way of exercising strategic choice over the 
markets, and would thus form the strategy for differentiating the company’s offer, 
generating a competitive advantage.  In this regard, public sector reform may seem 
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somewhat unrealistic in its expectations, although the corollary of this is that critiques of 
NPM might overstate NPM’s weakness in not generating the heralded benefits.   
One clear impact of NPM thinking regarding value for money has been the emphasis on 
management accounting and control  (Broadbent, Guthrie 2008) which tends to lead to a 
focus on assessing the effect of ownership (Andrews and Boyne, 2011; Walker et al., 
2013; Zafra‐Gómez et al., 2013) or evaluating whether public/private partnerships 
represent good VFM, especially when considering infrastructure (Andersen and 
Jakobsen, 2011; Bøgh Andersen and Blegvad, 2006).  Both Long Reach and Bell Tower 
had dissolved private sector partnerships (i.e. outsourced arrangements, but described 
as partnerships) and brought services back in house.  Long Reach had done this for two 
large services.  Whilst this was described as being the result of below expected 
performance, it was also suggested by interviewees that it was difficult to generate 
sufficient savings when services were outsourced, and that the scale of financial cuts 
needed meant that no arrangements were considered ‘sacred’.  Castle Gate had gone 
further and members expressed the clear view that services should be ‘mutualised’ as a 
first choice, and only if this were not possible should direct outsourcing be considered.  
Two exceptions to this also emerged.  Firstly, within social care commissioning was 
advanced as a way of resolving financial pressures by all case studies. Rudgeway was 
developing a market portal to facilitate individuals’ purchasing services directly.  Bell 
Tower interviewees also referred to “soft market testing” of services.  Secondly, Bell 
Tower, Rudgeway, Stocks Green, Long Reach and Castle Gate were, to greater or lesser 
extents, trying to ‘grow their way’ out of austerity, i.e. increase their taxable base through 
economic development and regeneration, all of which would require cooperation and 
collaboration with the private sector.  These two exceptions, however, represent a 
different view than the traditional outsourcing mindset. 
In attempting to move beyond this focus on the benefits of NPM, some work (e.g. 
Moynihan, 2008, 2013; Radin, 2006; Talbot, 2005, 2010) has highlighted the subjective 
nature of performance management.  Arnaboldi et al. (2015) highlight complexity of the 
performance management challenge, and Micheli and Mari (2014) examine the 
ontological basis for performance management.  This emerging acceptance of the more 
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interpretive nature of performance management is to be welcomed, and allows the raising 
of new propositions here for value for money.   
Another important factor is the focus on public value that emerged in the 1990s (e.g. 
Bozeman and Bretschneider, 1994; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000; Moore, 1994; Moore, 
1995) – which aimed to provide a countervailing narrative to NPM’s dominance and 
excessive focus on excessive focus on efficiency within public service reform, leading to 
it neglecting other, important aspects (Radnor et al., 2016). 
New conceptions of public services (Cabinet Office, 2011, 2014a)  may be returning the 
focus to individual value (particularly in the provision of commissioned social care such 
as Rudgeway and others) and this is discussed earlier, in section 2.9.1 p.52, where this 
phases of reform is characterised as being driven by the entrepreneurial state in Table 3.  
Again, as above, the ‘mutualisation’ of Castle Gate and the regeneration approaches of 
Castle Gate and others seem to support this.  Findings also suggest that universal 
services are being subject to managed decline in at least five of the six cases, in order to 
fund targeted services such as social care, which benefit fewer individuals.  This is not to 
suggest that these services are not important or necessary, but rather that they are 
reflective of an overall move to individualise the relationship between the citizen and the 
state.  Mechanisms such as the NHS ‘family and friends’ test can be read in this light and 
reflect Foucault’s concept of ‘descending individualism’ (Foucault, 1977)  in that 
contemporary society becomes “more individuated the further down the scale we are” 
(Danaher et al., 2000, p.58).  These push the responsibility for improving service 
performance much more on to the individual receiving the service and less onto the 
institution responsible for delivering the service. 
One of the weaknesses of NPG is that it does not yet have a theoretical stance on public 
goods and the citizen that clearly articulates how co-production can reinforce the public 
and democratic values that inform Public Value work (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011), 
although more recent work by Osborne et al. (2016) has started to address this by 
considering both voluntary and involuntary co-production at the individual and at the 
system level.  This is a promising start, and is worthy of further attention, although this 
thesis will not pursue that. 
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Recently McKevitt (2015) has suggested that more work is still needed on (re)defining 
VFM, which as a concept appears almost as hard to define as accountability, and has not 
had sufficient theoretical unpacking.  The next section will begin the process of examining 
a theoretical perspective on VFM that is broader than simply unit costs. 
This is important because of previously discussed significant budget reductions in post-
2010 financial settlements (Local Government Association 2015) and deregulation of 
performance assessment, with a stated political goal of zero central government funding, 
i.e. local authorities should be entirely self-sufficient, based on locally derived taxation.  
More deprived authorities will find this particularly challenging.  When the 2% levy on 
council tax to fund additional social care expenditure was discussed with Stocks Green’s 
head of finance (S3), they clarified that a 2% increase would raise around £1.6m and that 
their current annual social care deficit was around £8m.  Thus, simple efficiencies are no 
longer enough – and more radical approaches are needed to manage public service, and 
‘value’ remains a concept at the core of this challenge.  This was reflected in almost all of 
the case study interviews and will now be reconsidered from a theoretical perspective. 
7.3.2 Finance and austerity: narratives, entrepreneurial services, and the “death 
of improvement” 
Perhaps the most striking finding was the absolute dominance of austerity or budgetary 
concerns in almost every interview.  Local authorities are under significant financial 
pressure, although the extent to which this is the case varies from authority to authority.  
As has been outlined earlier, more deprived authorities (DCLG, 2015a) are more reliant 
on direct government funding for the majority of their revenue spending, whereas more 
affluent areas raise more from council and relatively less from direct government grant.  
Thus, as direct grants (the largest of which is revenue support grant or RSG) have been 
reduced, more deprived areas have had a disproportionately larger reduction in annual 
revenue.  The New Labour years were characterised by an expectation of raising 
performance in services for deprived communities, accompanied by additional funding 
such as Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, Housing Market Renewal, Sure Start, New Deal 
for Communities etc. (Lupton et al., 2013).  Even in the more affluent case studies, 
budgets were still under challenge, sometimes exacerbated by political will.  Merry Park, 
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for example, was committed to reducing the cost of local taxation to residents, whereas 
Rudgeway had a clear set of political pledges that helped protect service budgets, and 
Castle Gate had an explicit goal to avoid outsourcing wherever possible and to retain in-
house services. 
The Best Value programme (2001-2010) was formally conceived as a mechanism for 
driving improvement in public services, which were under a legal ‘duty to improve’ (DCLG 
DETR, 1999).   It is unsurprising, perhaps, that use of exogenously imposed performance 
management grew significantly as the state required a financial and performance 
accounting for the increased funding.  This link between additional funding and additional 
performance management requirements was raised by corporate performance leads in 
Rudgeway (R4), Stocks Green (S2), and Long Reach (L1), and a senior focus group in 
Castle Gate.  
The relationship between finance and performance is complex, and non-linear. This is 
demonstrated in that one extreme, without financial resources, no service provision can 
take place, and at the other extreme, infinite resources will not bring infinite service levels.  
Some service levels are stochastic, some are entirely unpredictable, and many lie 
somewhere in between.  Annual performance auditing and financial planning, however, 
tends to drive attention to year on year performance and respondents had much to say 
on the burden of feeding national performance data requirements (note: not necessarily 
meeting the targets, but ‘feeding the machine’ e.g. S2, B2).   
As has been argued, the cuts were not universally perceived as negative.  There was 
general agreement that the necessity to reduce budgets had driven out inefficiency and 
made services consider fundamental aspects of service delivery.  In some parts, higher 
budget levels were felt to be likely to impede service innovation, and that authorities had 
become more risk-taking, rather than less, as might have been anticipated in order to 
meet budget savings targets; this was highly visible in Rudgeway, Long Reach, Stocks 
Green, and Castle Gate.  In most services, performance target levels were contextualised 
in a sense of ‘what performance can you get for this budget?’, and Castle Gate, Stocks 
Green and Rudgeway were actively developing either zero-based budgeting or integrated 
performance and budgeting systems where priority was given to financial targets.  
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This thesis has previously characterised the post-2010 discourse (see Table 3: Summary 
analysis of major reform phases) as being highly individualistic, and public services are 
represented by ‘the entrepreneurial civil servant’, as seen in some of the innovations of 
the case study organizations.  However, there are limits to the level of ‘entrepreneurial’ 
activity possible, and whilst commercialization of services was a strong feature in many 
interviews, this was felt not to be the answer to every problem, despite the hopeful and 
ambitious views of some elected members and senior managers.  Managers in Merry 
Park and Long Reach in particular felt that increased ‘entrepreneurialism’ was being 
promoted excessively by politicians (and managers), and commercialization promoted 
heavily in Merry Park and Bell Tower, leading to unreasonable expectations and pressure. 
Much public sector reform debate has been driven by ‘more for less’ thinking around a 
‘leaner state’ (Watt, 2013).  McLean et al. (2007) found evidence of enhanced CPA 
performance being ‘bought’ by additional, discretionary spending.  This confirmed the 
fairly well-established feeling within the case study interviews that the improvement 
agenda had been, in some cases at least, previously well supported with money – money 
and increased expectations had gone hand-in-hand – and that the corollary now was that 
those ‘additional’ sources of funding have gone, and overall general levels of expenditure 
are under such strain that a discourse of (continual) improvement is unsupportable unless 
it is accompanied by cost reduction for inefficient services.  For the research participants, 
doing ‘more with the same’ is out of the question, as is, largely, investing in services to 
improve performance.   
For high volume / low complexity services, such as bin collection, libraries, parks, highway 
maintenance etc., the relationship is much clearer, particularly where service demand is 
more stochastic.  There are economies of scale in delivery and the service improvement 
is also thus scalable (incremental improvement) and/or amenable to step change 
(discontinuous improvement); but there is clearly a relationship between resources and 
output / outcome that needs to be further explored within a PMS. 
7.3.3 Impact of deregulation on VFM 
Prior to the 2010 deregulation of council assessment, value for money played a key role 
in establishing the regulated view of performance.  This was delivered through a series 
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of judgements on financial and other resources, called the ‘use of resources’ assessment, 
which assessed “how well a council manages its finances and delivers value for money” 
(Audit Commission, 2005).  VFM was one of the five key themes within the assessment, 
although notions of VMF run through other aspects of use of resources, as well as being 
used to draw upon ‘direction of travel’ (an assessment of likelihood to improve) and 
performance assessments.   
The CPA / CAA processes thus included a statutory explicit value for money assessment 
and VFM as a managerial concept was written throughout the assessment regime and 
delivered by a set of VFM profiles, compiled by the Chartered Institute for Public Finance 
& Accountancy (CIPFA).   The Audit Commission used this data to generate a VFM profile 
for each authority across the vast majority of services delivered by councils, which 
included statutory and discretionary services.  These profiles are still available, but 
authorities are required to subscribe to a fee-paying service to access the data, rather 
than being provided notionally at no cost (the cost of this had been included as part of the 
annual audit and assessment fees charged by the Audit Commission to local authorities). 
As with performance management arrangements, these VFM profiles operated with an 
assumption of continued growth and improvement – in this case reductions in unit costs 
– and during the value for money inspections, authorities were expected to provide an 
account for each service area that was considered from the VFM profile data to be an 
outlier in terms of comparative VFM position.  VFM was also conceptually constructed in 
a positivist, managerial paradigm that reductively condensed service experience into a 
narrow definition of cost of delivery, rather than a more comprehensive understanding of 
the interpretive nature of ‘value’.  In this respect, VFM was probably no different to the 
rest of the regulatory regimes, but the underpinnings of this approach are rarely exposed 
and considered.  
As highlighted elsewhere, the Best Value duty was to “make arrangements to secure 
continuous improvement in the way in which its functions are exercised, having regard to 
a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness” (DETR, 1999).  This was 
updated in 2015 with no change to the wording of this part of the duty.  It is therefore 
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practicably impossible to separate the performance and improvement duties from the 
value for money requirements.   
The removal of the regulatory apparatus has had an impact on council approaches to 
performance management, although attitudes as to whether this was helpful were mixed.   
Bell Tower’s head of performance (B2) felt that theirs was “not an organization that 
naturally focuses on performance”, and that New Labour regulatory system had at least 
been effective in focusing attention on the important services.  Overall, the removal of the 
statutory mechanisms was generally recognised as a good thing, but most authorities 
expressed concerns (Merry Park being a notable exception) that organizations may have 
become a bit ‘trigger happy’ in removing measures, i.e. many measures had been thrown 
out – some that were useful, and some not.   Some felt that this allowed them to be more 
in control of their own priorities and destiny, but others (mainly senior performance staff) 
felt that the lack of legitimacy and acceptance of the importance of a performance 
management system and performance data was now a problem, and they were less able 
to communicate and understand council performance. This mirrors experiences observed 
after deregulation in the UK fire service (Bateman, Maher et al. 2015), and is likely to be 
a common theme across many public services as reduction in ‘red tape’ and ‘bureaucracy’ 
are watchwords in Conservative public sector reform. 
The lack of a formalised performance management framework was considered to be the 
primary problem, although more senior staff in policy or performance roles believed that 
having an overall performance and delivery narrative, and performance judgement (i.e. a 
label or star rating) also made it more difficult to get performance on the agenda. Long 
Reach, Rudgeway, Castle Gate, Merry Park and Stocks Green were beginning to 
replicate some of the missing mechanisms that had been removed through deregulation, 
primarily benchmarking (although some respondents in social care roles raised questions 
about validity of these benchmarking mechanisms; this may be a service-specific reaction, 
as it transgressed geographical boundaries).  
Interestingly, views were expressed by quite a few respondents at more junior levels 
within the corporate apparatus and more senior departmental officers that actually being 
told what to do (i.e. what performance levels to hit, and what was ‘important’) was 
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something they missed.  They remarked that they might not have liked or agreed with the 
priorities, but they were at least considered clear and ‘legitimate’. This, as viewed through 
the lens of transactional analysis (Berne 1968), demonstrated a sense of ‘parent and child’ 
relationship between central and local government, whereas a hierarchical model would 
be preferred, for greater stability.  
The freedom from the restrictive, detailed policy demands and the associated regulatory 
frameworks from central government (Lodge and Hood, 2012) has in part allowed 
authorities to express a sense of becoming more “masters of their own destiny”.  This had 
emerged in two main ways: firstly, as discussed in section 4.2.1 (OP1), a strengthening 
of politicization of performance in key areas, articulated through strong, public, political 
pledges, particularly in Merry Park and Rudgeway. This had also occurred in Castle Gate 
and Stocks Green, although here the pledges were more numerous and ambitious, rather 
than being clear manifesto commitments.  The second way this emerged was in the 
development of more narrative, visual and discursive forms of performance discussion 
(Bateman, Philp et al. 2016) – sometimes articulated as demand / response narratives 
(i.e. ‘you said, we did’); this is discussed in sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 (PM2 and PM3).  
Elected members too were requesting narrative discussions of performance from central 
performance teams, and expressing dissatisfaction with ‘reams of spreadsheets and 
numbers’, again challenging the benefits of an integrated performance management 
system (Bourne et al., 2000; Brignall and Modell, 2000).  This situation has been observed 
previously in other parts of the sector, such as the RAF, where it was addressed by use 
of visual management tools (Bateman et al., 2014), which simultaneously increased the 
visibility of performance information and reduced some of the complexity (Bateman and 
Lethbridge, 2013). In Merry Park, however, elected members went beyond this and 
directly set numerical targets for selected detailed performance indicators – sometimes, 
it was reported, against explicit advice from officers, or without sufficient understanding 
of concomitant results or unexpected consequences.  In the performance zones model, 
this is addressed under the ‘excessive control zone’, and specifically ‘pet projects’, 
whereas the overall process of setting political outcome pledges is conceptualised as 
legitimacy zones – these are directly communicating with the public in terms of aiming to 
secure a democratic mandate.   
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The findings generated views in section 5.2.2 (AF2) around income generation, that 
charging for services that were originally ‘free’, or more accurately covered by the cost of 
council tax were seen as examples of worsening VFM. 
Whilst regulatory systems’ understanding of VFM was no doubt flawed, it was at least 
coherent and consistent within its own frame of reference.  The lack of such coherence 
now presents a challenge to authorities seeking to understand what value for money 
means in a climate of austerity.  These challenges may bring into question the very role 
of local authorities. 
7.3.4 Future Research Propositions: Developing new perspectives on ‘Public 
value for money’ 
As authorities are driven to examine their fundamental purpose, manage 
a targeted decline in their performance, and consider whether or not they can meet their 
statutory duties to their communities, ‘value for money’ (VFM) as a concept becomes 
increasingly problematic.  Simple notions of economy, efficiency and effectiveness are 
insufficient in helping authorities navigate the impact of budget cuts.  Previous work 
(Moore 1995, Stoker 2006) has emphasised the significance of equity / equality as a 
missing component in public service delivery, and public service values (Denhardt and 
Denhardt, 2011) are another important concern that is often overlooked in financial 
management considerations. 
The deregulation of statutory assessment mechanisms presents barriers to effective 
comparisons, and empirical evidence has observed the fragmentation 
of local performance systems, which is encouraging divergent and alternative 
performance management interfaces that themselves are more open to the subjective 
interpretations of how to develop performance measures (Moynihan 2013, Moynihan 
2008).  
These assumptions have been invalidated by the changes to local government finance 
as shown in section 4.3.1 The ‘death of improvement’ (PM1) on p.125, and yet authorities 
were still struggling with the lack of comparative data on value for money.  The scale of 
savings needed was forcing authorities to look at different delivery models, including 
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outsourcing, joint delivery, and commissioned services, as well as stepping down service 
delivery in some areas.   
Therefore, it can be argued that the conceptualization of value for money is now 
inadequate, and should be re-evaluated in order to take into account from whose 
perspective value is judged. 
Existing perspectives on value for money largely assume it is inherently a product of a 
managerialist mind set, rooted in a positivist tradition that assumes VFM is reducible to a 
single measure of ‘truth’, which merely needs to be discovered (Radin, 2006), although 
this is rarely exposed and serves as an implicitly normalised assumption.  Clarke and 
Newman (1997) articulate this as one of a set of competing ideologies, a viewpoint that 
is broadly compelling, given the failed attempts to justify private sector practices as an 
unalloyed good to public services.  The evidence around whether outsourcing services to 
the private sector is mixed at best (e.g. Andersen and Jakobsen, 2011; Boardman and 
Vining, 1989; Walker et al., 2013; Zafra‐Gómez et al., 2013). 
At the heart of managerialism and New Public Management lies a focus on financial 
controls above many others concerns, often deployed through the ‘3Es’ of economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness.  A challenge NPM is that some public services create public 
goods and others create private (i.e. individual) goods. Not only is this distinction lost in 
NPM, but considerations of the 3Es also often overlook the proposed fourth ‘e’: equity 
(Stoker, 2006).  Despite a stated focus on customers, deployed through the mechanisms 
of competition and choice, NPM as a guiding force has failed to deliver on its promises 
around increased service quality.  Radnor et al. (2016) have articulated this failure as 
NPM’s failure to adapt to an increasingly fragmented environment for public services 
(Haveri, 2006), as well as an attention to efficiency that has been deployed to the 
detriment of the remaining two Es.  Whilst others have attempted to advance the debate 
by advocating for a fourth E, ‘equity’ (Stoker 2006), or public value (Moore 1995), the 3Es 
model, accompanied by its partner concept, value for money, has remained the lynchpin 
of evaluating public sector performance and delivery.  In the UK, the Conservatives 
introduced compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) (Boyne et al., 1999), and this was 
supplanted in turn by the New Labour Best Value model, which attempted to address 
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some of the critiques of CCT from unions, Labour authorities and other sources outlined  
in sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.3 (pp.40-45), but which in reality advanced a subtler form of 
contestability that continued to entrench competition and choice within the paradigm for 
public management.  
It cannot be denied that sound financial management and cost control is important – it is 
self-evident that this is the case – yet such quantitative and transactional methods tend 
to encourage a rational choice perspective.  Some public services are successfully 
amenable to this, in particular, high volume / low variation services (e.g. waste collection, 
environmental services etc.) as well as regulated services such as environmental health; 
but many are not.  In particular, what Milward and Provan (2000) refer to as ‘human 
service systems’, such as social care, physical and mental health provision, housing etc. 
are left incapable of realising their full value unless wider notions of quality, justice, and 
social responsibility are addressed in their delivery.  It is clearly possible for more overt 
inequality of delivery to occur if, say, the roads used most by the elite politicians are the 
best maintained, but for services like mental health, such individual and societal values 
are less easy to detect, yet lie at the heart of their very nature. 
Broadbent and Guthrie (2008) define public services as “those activities which are 
enshrined within the notion of public good or service based on universality of access for 
the citizenry, rather than the private provision through a market.  It is assumed these 
‘public services’ should be available for all members of the given society, supplied in an 
equitable fashion.” (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008).  Whilst only formulated seven years 
or so ago, this definition struggles to keep up with changes to the modalities of 
contemporary public service provision.  For example, how do we understand the value 
for money of needs-based services such as much of social care, where funding is given 
to individuals to allow them to procure their services themselves through a mixed-market 
portal, or from a commissioned ‘menu’ of service providers? 
Perceptions of value for money thus remain stubbornly rationalist, whilst the reality they 
attempt to assess does not. Osborne et al. (1995) articulate some of these concerns, 
particularly criticising the rationalist foundation on which the evaluative performance 
management of a social programme is based.  Radin (2006) gives the example of the US 
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Programme Assessment Rating Tool (PART) scheme, which ran between 2002 and 2008.  
PART’s purpose was to evaluate government programmatic delivery to understand which 
programmes were effective and value for money. A number of programmes classed as 
ineffective, or unable to demonstrate their effectiveness, were subsequently protected 
from a savings cut, or in some cases even granted budget increases.  This was despite 
a structured programme of evaluating their value for money (though it was not couched 
in those terms).  Even where rationalist or positivist performance regimes are 
implemented, factors such as political intervention can prevent the system operating 
within its own rules. 
All of this raises questions around the nature of the relationship between performance 
and finance. A value for money judgement is one that balances the performance of a 
service with the costs of that same service, we can observe that a divide exists between 
the staff who make those two judgements.  Finance and performance staff have different 
training and professional values that are implicit within each discipline.   
This has been part of practitioner-based debates for some time, for example, budgeting 
initiatives such as introduction of commitment and accrual accounting, zero-based budget, 
objective-based budgeting, and the American programme budget analysis systems 
(Jones and Pendlebury, 2000; Radin, 2008; Radin, 2006; Seal, 2003).  Radin goes on to 
link the development of such programmes to Hatry’s association of value for money and 
productivity (Hatry, 1978).  These present a struggle for dominance in terms of the 
legitimacy of value for money judgements. 
From this position, we can observe that overall budget judgements are often part of a 
more social process than is often recognised.  There have been sufficient examples of 
what the media calls ‘creative accounting’ to suggest this is not a controversial view point. 
For example, ITV accounts for the budget expenditure for programme creation in the year 
that the programme is broadcast, not the year in which it is made (Knowles, 2017).  This 
is a socially or culturally rational value, rather than a strictly financial one. 
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Rivenbark (2008) also suggests that despite the early introduction of performance 
assessment, it did not gain traction until the 1970s, as it was introduced as a financial 
mechanism, not an organizational one.  
For public services, this is complicated further by the concept of public versus private 
goods. For private-sector commercial transactions, value for money is a straightforward 
comparison of the price the vendor is willing to accept for a good or service, and the price 
the purchaser is willing to pay.  If one matches the other, within the limits acceptable to 
either party, the transaction is considered good value for money.   
The nature of how public services are funded, the scope of what they deliver, and the 
pluralist context in which their priorities are set, mean that this model of one-to-one 
relationship between the consumer of a service or good is not easily transferable to the 
public sector.   
As discussed earlier, New Public Governance approaches (Osborne, 2006; Osborne, 
2010b) have attempted to draw on current thinking about individual interactions with the 
state, building on notions of service value (e.g. Lovelock and Gummesson, 2004; 
Lovelock, 1983; Vargo and Lusch, 2004). Whilst this is helpful in terms of practical 
mechanisms for improving these service interactions, it is only a partial picture.   
Eikenberry and Kluver (2004) argue that market forces can never replace democratic 
accountability, and both Frederickson (1996) and Denhardt and Denhardt (2011) 
(originally 2000) suggest that government and business have very different goals and 
values and applying private-sector entrepreneurial techniques does not work and results 
in unethical behaviour.  
One of the flaws, therefore, of current conceptions of value for money is that focus is 
predominantly on the ‘money’, and insufficiently concerned with ‘value’, particularly in the 
context of Public Value.  The next section explores this dichotomy and outlines some 
theoretical propositions that may be helpful. 
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7.3.5 Synthesising Public Value for Money (PVFM) 
Having discussed the largely unchallenged assumptions around the construction and 
usefulness of value for money, a more nuanced understanding of the concept can be 
developed by viewing it through various lenses associated with theoretical approaches to 
public management.   This is outlined in Table 23: Reconceptualising VFM through 
alternative lenses. 
Table 23: Reconceptualising VFM through alternative lenses 
Paradigm Lens Focus Selected Literature 
New Public 
Management 
Economic 
rationality 
Value for money is a value judgement 
made by a consumer of a service 
(Tiebout, 1956) 
(Williamson, 1979) 
Marketing / 
strategy 
VFM is a conscious strategic choice 
(from several possible) to enhance 
competitive advantage 
(Porter, 2008; 
Prahalad and 
Hamel, 2006) 
 
Public choice, 
rational choice 
Securing the most advantageous 
position for personal advantage / control 
of financial resources by civil servants 
(Niskanen, 1971) 
(Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992) 
(Williamson, 1979) 
Austerity 
Meeting minimum requirements in 
statutory services whilst returning 
maximum funds to central government 
for deficit reduction 
(HM Treasury, 2015) 
Financial 
3Es – best use of financial and other 
resources to achieve economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness 
(Chandler, 2000)  
(DETR, 1999) 
Public 
Administration 
Political 
That which best advances the aims and 
objectives of the ruling political party and 
minimises negative reputational impact 
(Davies, 2000; 
Rhodes, 1996, 1997; 
Svara, 2008) 
Stewardship 
Moral dimension - e.g. the duty to spend 
public money in a responsible fashion 
that best meets the needs of the 
electorate 
(Chandler, 2000) 
(Kingdom, 2000) 
New Public 
Governance 
and Public 
Value 
Public Value 
The greatest advantage for communities 
in most need (equity), tackling societal 
problems for the longer-term 
(sustainability) 
(Denhardt and 
Aristigueta, 2011) 
(Moore, 1995) 
(Stoker, 2006) 
New Public 
Governance 
‘Customer’ value driven approaches 
including engaging in co-production to 
share the labour and benefits 
(transactional value) 
(Osborne, 2006; 
Osborne, 2010b) 
Sources: Author and works listed 
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The challenge emerging here is that mainstream VFM has been conceived in a narrow, 
limited fashion, relying excessively on unit or beneficiary costs, and with the implicit 
assumption of continued reduction in costs and improvement in outputs.  Austerity 
budgets are creating considerable pressure on public services,  
If a more sustainable picture of value for money is to be developed, it must take account 
of the wider sense of public value, and contain measures to understand the sustainability 
of the service in the context of austerity.  Thus, a model of ‘public value for money’ is 
needed that allows a more diverse understanding of value than those proposed by either 
NPM or NPG inspired policies. 
As health and social care budgets come under increasing pressure, several of the 
interviewees discussed the need to consider working in a more systemic way, i.e. across 
partner organizations from a client or service user perspective, yet also raised concerns 
about their own budgets and those of the partners.  
As sector-led improvement continues to feature more heavily in the experience of local 
authorities (see section 5.1.3. p.152), ‘public value for money’ is likely to need to take into 
account a partnership focus for delivery, i.e. considering a broader range of organizations 
that are involved in the delivery chain and where financial investment is likely to provide 
the greatest return, not in terms of cost-saving, but in terms of improved outcomes for 
communities, individuals, businesses and society.  One way to do this may be by 
implementing the public service dominant logic (Osborne et al., 2015) and co-production 
and co-creation theories (Osborne et al., 2016) in ways that emphasise systemic public 
value (Benington and Moore, 2010; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011) rather than focusing 
on individualistic concepts of the service experience for users.  This may form part of 
future work, which would appropriately follow on from, but cannot be adequately explored 
in, this thesis’s examination of the legacy of performance management 
Recommendations for practice that arise from this discussion are considered in section 
8.3, on page 270. 
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 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter has provided a discussion of the three main elements of theoretical 
development arising out of the research findings, called here the ‘performance as 
governance system’.  The three main elements of the discussion proposed are listed here 
in ascending order of abstraction, i.e. from implementation level to conceptualization: 
• A new performance zones model (corresponding to the level of implementation) 
• Five accountability types (corresponding to the level of operationalization) 
• The development of the concept of public value for money (corresponding to the 
level of conceptualization) 
 
Together, these describe the key elements of ‘performance as a system of governance’ 
of public organizations.   
Performance management is considered a primary tool in implementing organizational 
strategies.  However, performance management, or particularly the evaluation of 
performance, is also a primary feature in the operation of accountability. It is also 
fundamental to demonstrating value for money in service provision – outlined here as a 
balanced judgement between the cost of delivering a public good or service, and the 
quality of that good or service.  Often this is portrayed in a simplistic and rationalist manner, 
yet there is considerable evidence to suggest that even rationalist decisions around 
performance can be socially or culturally constructed, sometimes going against the very 
rules established by decision makers. 
The findings have demonstrated significant changes in the ways performance 
management is interpreted and operationalised, driven by two main forces: the 
deregulation of the external assessment regimes, and the high levels of budget constraint 
imposed by central government.  It may be that the former is deployed to conceal the 
latter, but that is not the focus of this research.  Instead, this analysis aims to both explore 
the divergence in performance regimes that other research has predicted will occur after 
deregulation (Bateman et al., 2015; Bateman et al., 2016), and to develop new 
conceptualisations of this system of governance that addresses the weaknesses of 
legacy systems: excessive concern with efficiency (Osborne, 2006), a reductive approach, 
and a lack of consideration for wider public value (Moore, 1995).   
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The notion of performance as a system of governance (figure 3) is an attempt to move 
beyond a reductive, instrumental perception of performance management and to consider 
the more sociological and socialised aspects of performance.   
As Clarke and Newman (1997) suggest, managerialism is not a neutral, value-free term, 
but rather an ideology. Performance management has been strongly associated with 
NPM (e.g. Ferlie et al., 1996; Hood, 1995; Neely, 2005; van Dooren et al., 2010; 
Verbeeten and Spekle, 2015), and whilst some scholars accept the political nature of 
performance management (Aucoin, 2010; Moynihan, 2008), this area remains under-
researched.  Using the local authority as the unit of analysis, this research argues that 
new forms of performance management are emerging that adapt to the primacy of the 
political process and can seek to embed political narratives within the performance 
management framework of an organization, beyond simple executive member approval 
of performance targets.  Whilst as a case study Merry Park may represent a step too far 
in elected members directly setting the detail of performance targets, the deregulation of 
the CPA / CAA performance regime appears to have created a space that allows ruling 
administrations more latitude to explicitly, rather than covertly, integrate their political will 
with organizational goals and visions. 
The performance zones model proposed in section 7.1.3 recognises the cutting of the 
‘golden thread’ and instead proposes a model of managing performance that seeks 
coherence more than integration.  Through changes at the implementation level, this 
model aims to free up organizations to manage the right measures and services at the 
appropriate level, and to create the right conditions for different forms of accountability to 
operate. 
The second proposal in this chapter concerns this challenge: how accountabilities within 
local government can absorb the different tensions and conflicts presented by different 
value bases and modes of enactment.  NPM ideals of customer service focus too much 
on individualized and personalized service interactions, perhaps at the expense of 
political, legislated and wider civic accountability.  Given the need to govern for 
accountability, how can elected members use performance management information to 
both make decisions about budget cuts, and to inform and consult their electorate?  
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Further work is needed to fully disentangle the different forms of accountability operating, 
and it is hoped that the new performance model will provide one tool to allow senior 
council officer decision-makers and elected members to better understand the 
operationalization of austerity.   
Finally, when considering the conceptualization of public services, the ‘death of 
improvement’ and its impact on how performance should be measured and managed, we 
can see that the multiple forms of accountability, their impact on decision-making and 
reputation management, and the impact of austerity all raise serious questions for the 
value for money provided by authorities, that is, the purpose of authorities and what their 
long-term goals should be.  Again, the research suggests that a reductive, linear 
understanding of VFM inhibits a fuller debate around the purpose of public services in 
achieving greater value for the full range of publics they serve – what we call here ‘public 
value for money’.  This concept again needs further unpicking, but despite the explicit 
focus on the 3Es of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in public services, the market-
driven, competition-based nature of NPM has served to focus too much on efficiency.  
Despite efforts within the literature (Benington and Moore, 2010; Bozeman, 2002; O'Flynn, 
2007; Stoker, 2006) and even legislation (DCLG, 2012), the wider public value debate 
remains surprisingly peripheral to the mainstream direction of public services in the UK.  
Austerity may have made this more acute (Lodge and Hood, 2012; Lowndes and 
McCaughie, 2013), but this research argues that if equity and sustainability of vision, 
purpose and resources are not addressed, the most likely outcome is severe reductions 
in services and service quality.  
These issues have been discussed and located within the wider academic dialogue here, 
and the following chapter describes the contributions to theory, practice, empirical 
understanding, and scholarship represented by the governance system elements 
discussed here.
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Chapter 8. Contribution to knowledge and conclusions  
 Introduction 
This research has investigated the legacy of the statutory assessment frameworks used 
between 1997 and 2010 by English local authorities.  The New Labour regimes have been 
characterised by a managerialist obsession with efficiency over other forms of evaluating value, 
as well as the exertion of a centralised mode of control, running counter to an espoused rhetoric 
of local control.  The deregulation implemented by the Coalition administration in 2010 has 
released authorities from a range of obligations, but simultaneously left them facing a policy 
and practice vacuum, as well as generating a tension between the duty to improve and the 
financial resources available to local authorities to deliver services. 
The investigation of current attitudes towards performance and service improvement has 
suggested three key areas of development: these are captured at a high level in Figure 4: 
Findings - performance as system of governance on page 203: 
• The Implementation of performance management frameworks 
• The Operationalization of accountability 
• The Conceptualization of public value for money. 
 
This chapter outlines the contributions to theory, practice, and empirical understanding that this 
thesis makes. 
 Contribution to theory 
This thesis seeks to contribute to theory and scholarship via an overarching discussion around 
theoretical viewpoints, and then developing new theoretical insights in three main areas.  These 
are: performance management, accountability, and value for money. 
Firstly, and at the broadest level, section 2.9.1 (p.52) develops a characterisation of the major 
theoretical paradigms running through public services, e.g. PA, NPM, and NPG, and classifies 
them against examples of enacted policy as well as developing a focus on the primary 
relationship, guiding orientation and key discourses operating within the administrations.   
This challenges Pollitt and Bouckaert’s assertion (2000) that administrations are not useful 
levels of analysis (as summarised below in Table 24).  An understanding of the major concepts 
driving reforms is essential to contextualising reforms.  Additionally, presenting this information 
as a timeline (shown in Appendix viii) allows a fuller understanding of the ways in which 
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legislative, structural, institutional, and other forms of change come together to influence the 
way that public services are reformed, and reform themselves. 
Table 24: Summary of reform paradigm characteristics 
Political 
administration 
Primary 
relationship 
Guiding orientation This research terms this: 
1970s Central government 
and public sector 
Civic service 
orientation 
The neutral public servant 
 
1979 – 1990 Public sector and 
the market 
Market orientation The self-interested public 
servant  
1990 – 1997 Public sector and 
citizens 
Public service 
orientation / customer 
orientation 
The ‘citizen’-servant 
1997 – 2007 Policy networks and 
policy implementers 
Network orientation The networker public servant 
2007 – 2010 Communities and 
partnerships 
Partnership 
orientation 
The reaching-out public servant 
2010 – present Individuals and 
services 
Personalization 
orientation 
The entrepreneurial public-
servant 
Source: Abridged from Table 3: Summary analysis of major reform phases on page 52  
This mode of viewing the multiple influences addresses one of the weaknesses across public 
service scholarship.  Much research locates itself more or less unconsciously within one of 
these paradigms and rarely interacts with the theoretical underpinnings in an explicit manner, 
something that Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) argue would benefit much management research.  
As Radnor et al. (2016) suggest, each of these paradigms can only ever be a partial picture, 
and synthesising a view from multiple perspectives is essential.  Public Management 
approaches emphasise the managerial and organizational aspects of scholarship, yet often 
overlook political and institutional factors such as power dynamics or value-driven behaviours.  
Conversely, Public Administration scholars have often tended to ignore the realities of service 
delivery and operational managerial control.  This research has sought to integrate both these, 
as well as New Public Governance and Public Value, perspectives in its use of literature, theory, 
and evidence.  Some of this work, as described in the literature review and conceptual 
background section has also been published in chapter form in  Ansell and Torfing (2016). 
The discussion of empirical findings has also sought to make a contribution to the academic 
discourse.  The proposed new performance management model articulates a novel 
understanding of how authorities are performing, and facilitates the development of new 
perspectives on performance management.   
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Although previous research (Micheli and Neely, 2010) has attempted to find evidence of the 
‘golden thread’, this work adopted a narrow view of what constituted a golden thread, and did 
not use a local authority as the unit of analysis.  It concluded that its existence could not be 
ascertained.  Their work, however, did not draw on qualitative empirical data gathering with 
interviewees, and overlooked the golden thread as an artefact of performance management – 
a normative ideal that informed much of practice in the period examined, as suggested by 
explicit references to the golden thread in the policy literature and guidance (Audit Commission, 
2001, 2002, 2005, 2009; Audit Commission and I&DeA, 2002).  Authorities were directly 
encouraged to develop integrated performance management approaches, and demonstrating 
the golden thread was part of the explicit assessment methodology.  Whether or not 
establishing a clear strategic set of cascading priorities is desirable, the matter of its 
conceptualization and presence within CPA and CAA is not in doubt. 
This goal of integration is itself supported by the literature around performance management 
systems (e.g. Bourne et al., 2000; Heinrich, 2002; van Dooren et al., 2010).  This thesis, 
however, suggests that this integrated idea has fractured, and argues that this has, in fact, 
been embraced in the current organizational context.  Given these circumstances, the 
performance zones model offers theoretical insights and normative suggestions (contained in 
section 8.3) around how performance management frameworks can be structured differentially 
to provide a more adaptive mechanism.  This includes rationalising the legitimacy and 
managerial components of such systems, i.e. the zone of legitimacy and the zone of service 
control.   
Another area of contribution to theory lies in the understanding of accountability, taking an 
approach that synthesises and adapts Romzek (2000) and Sinclair’s (1995) models of differing 
accountabilities.  Both of these models provide a partial set of accountability types, but neither 
fully describes the different forms of accountability observed within the case studies, and 
neither fully explores the contingencies necessary for accountability in times of severe austerity.  
When accountability is viewed through a managerialist lens such as NPM, accountability 
remains strongly centred on delivery of services, often to individuals.    Criticisms of NPM for 
failing to rise beyond this challenge are common (for example, Chandler et al., 2002; Dunleavy 
et al., 2006b; Lodge and Hood, 2012; Maesschalck, 2004; Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002; 
Pollitt, 2013a; Pollitt and Dan, 2013), and the New Public Governance movement, including 
efforts to establish public service management (e.g. Osborne, 2006; Osborne, 2010b; Osborne 
et al., 2013; Torfing and Triantafillou, 2013; Wiesel and Modell, 2014) can be seen as direct 
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and indirect critiques of NPM’s obsession with efficiency above other aspects of the 3Es.  
Nevertheless, they too risk focusing more on individual service interactions and the relationship 
between service provider and service recipient than public good.  Accountability in these 
contexts focuses on the rights of service recipients to redress, and accountability for delivering 
what is often a short-term benefit to individuals.  
This overly-individualised perspective, driven at least in part by views of the citizen as a 
consumer, fails to embrace the notion of public goods and public value as advanced by the 
public value school (e.g. Alford and Hughes, 2008; Alford and O'Flynn, 2009; Benington and 
Moore, 2010; Bozeman, 2002; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011; Denhardt and Aristigueta, 2011; 
Moore, 1994; Moore, 1995; Moore, 2004; O'Flynn, 2007; Stoker, 2006), which attempts to 
refocus on public service values and democracy.  It should also be acknowledged, however, 
that recent efforts have begun to focus on the notion of the service system, utilizing a public-
service dominant logic and theories of co-creation (e.g. Osborne et al., 2015; Osborne et al., 
2016; Radnor et al., 2014; Radnor et al., 2015). 
We can read NPG, therefore, as an attempt to move beyond NPM’s weaknesses, but still 
residing within the same sphere of individual service; attempting to do NPM’s job but better.  
Whereas public value perhaps provides a countervailing narrative to that of NPM – a rejection 
of the values of business for the values of democracy (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011).  These 
paradigms are pervasive, lurking in the background of policy and service development, yet 
rarely acknowledged.  Again, we return to the question of whether these paradigms, i.e. PA, 
NPG, NPG, are normative prescriptions, or simply socially-constructed descriptions of actions 
and values.  What is clear, however, is that they do co-exist, although at certain points a 
dominance is exerted by one over the others within policy and hence practice.  
Accountability, therefore, must span these broad paradigms if it is to adequately speak for all 
stakeholders.  As has been demonstrated, a simple sanctions-based view of accountability is 
theoretically insufficient to cover the dual nature of citizens as both individual consumers of 
services, and as broad recipients of public value.  The five types of accountability presented 
allow a richer understanding of how different modes of accountability are enacted, socially and 
hierarchically.  The contribution to theory arises from synthesising multiple perspectives to 
allow a more granular understanding. 
The third element of theoretical contribution comes from related efforts at reconceptualising 
value for money.  Here it is argued that VFM has operated solely in a reductive, positivist 
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mindset predicated on continual improvements to delivery and reductions in cost, paralleling 
the expectations around performance management.  When funding to local authorities was 
more buoyant, the fact that this interpretation of VFM was limited and reductive may have been 
less significant.  Now, however, austerity is driving authorities to scale back or manage the 
decline of some services and many are struggling to keep up with levels of demand in social 
care; it is difficult to see how this position equates to value for money for taxpayers. 
This thesis therefore proposes the need to reconsider ‘public value for money’ and the need to 
differentiate between individual and public benefits in the way that VFM is considered.  This is 
potentially a more significant contribution to practice than theory, but novel theorisation is 
required to challenge a largely uncritical acceptance of VFM (McKevitt, 2015).  The aim would 
be to adapt VFM to embrace differential value and to better understand how we might 
contextualise value for money in times of austerity where successful, effective, economic and 
efficient services for many might be reduced in order to pay for highly targeted services for a 
few.  
 Contribution to practice and practical recommendations 
It is hoped that the new performance management model outlined in section 7.1.3 could be 
adopted more widely and used to develop more diverse and thus better adapted performance 
measurement systems across councils.   
The table below makes some practical recommendations as to how each of the performance 
zones might be implemented in order to develop performance systems that better support 
organizational goals and objectives, rather than attempting to maintain an integrated but 
ritualistic performance system derived from historical models.  Key to this will be empowering 
front line services to manage their data flow and decision-making, without forcing them into 
being part of corporate performance monitoring systems that exert a significant time lag on 
services where a quick response is paramount. 
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Table 25: Performance management recommendations 
Zone Primary 
characteristics 
Practical recommendations 
 
Service control 
Detailed operational 
output measures 
requiring short-term 
action / response within 
overall existing 
resources 
Consider qualitative data to support better 
understanding of client / user / customer 
experience, especially for low volume, high 
variety services, as well as explicitly addressing 
public service dominant logics in improvement 
activity at the customer interface.   ‘Sandbox’ 
these measures and delegate control to lower 
levels of supervisory management, with an 
escalation mechanisms – change the locus.  
Emphasis on co-creation / destruction of value 
 
Excessive 
control 
Detailed output 
measures considered, 
controlled, or reviewed at 
an inappropriate level 
Develop a ‘resistance’ strategy – challenge why 
information is gathered.  Understand what forms 
of legitimacy are required and push for narrative 
discussion and co-constructive design.  
Challenge the focus  
 
Corporate 
management 
A mix of output and 
outcome measures 
aimed at capturing the 
priorities of the 
organization  
Reduce the scope and volume of measures here.  
Develop a narrower set of ‘corporate health’ 
indicators and ‘corporate priorities for 
improvement’ and feature projects and 
performance measures on a more dynamic, by 
exception basis 
 
Legitimacy 
A mix of internal and 
external pledges and 
commitments for multiple 
publics; some value-
based, some focused on 
establishing a case for 
resources 
Political pledges need to be engaged with more 
closely as part of developing managerial 
corporate budget and performance planning.  
Performance and intelligence appraisals of 
commitments should be produced on confidential 
basis to allow discussion with governance – 
support the focus with detailed resourcing plans 
and discussions 
 
Accountability 
Higher-level measures 
that are required for 
statutory purposes, and 
measuring of agreed 
organizational pledges 
Assign corporate leads for key accountability 
outcomes / pledges 
Develop narrative based discussion of outcome 
measures, not outputs, and include contextual 
data where appropriate.  Consider cross-
authority or perhaps multi-agency challenge 
sessions  
Source: Author 
It is anticipated that these recommendations could form part of an impact case study 
through recruiting councils to take part in workshops around sharing and developing 
good practice, thus generating a series of key principles for contemporary 
performance management that would be published in a practitioner-focused format. 
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There are also recommendations for practice around the communication of 
performance.  The requirement to publish large amounts of performance data annually 
has been removed; this is quite likely to be a reasonable position, per se, as little 
evidence exists to show that this is helpful or desirable for citizens or resident 
businesses.  However, new practices need to emerge that will facilitate more useful 
discussions with the multiple publics facing local authorities.  These include: 
• The need to be more realistic with residents / electorate, using performance 
information to have a different and better informed form of conversation with 
them 
• The need to be better at communicating the potential impact of changes, 
rationale for changes, and the tensions and trade-offs between public service 
cuts 
• Using language more effectively – compare ‘alternate weekly bin collections’ 
with ‘fortnightly collections’:  they both describe the same situation but one 
sounds much more clearly like a diminution of service standard or level 
 
The recommendations directly above relate strongly to matters of language and 
communication.  This emerges from the interest in the linguistic aspects of the analysis 
that are mentioned, but not fully explored, in section 3.8 (page 99), and this element 
of the project may potentially make a contribution to practice as part of future research. 
The recent example of Liverpool City Council and its proposed referendum on raising 
council tax is significant (Parveen, 2016).  10% is a significant amount – representing 
three times the previously allowed increase, and is likely to be perceived as a very 
large rise by most people.  There is an ongoing issue around the level of trust towards 
politicians  (Aucoin, 2002), and the demands of austerity are forcing many councils to 
take unpopular measures.  This distrust, along with the unpopularity of cuts, drives a 
suspicion that the council is not making ‘sensible’ cuts and is instead passporting the 
financial consequences of this on to residents, perhaps exacerbated by media 
discourses and the strength of the rhetoric established by the Coalition and 
Conservative governments around the need to restrain public expenditure. 
Returning to the notion of value for money; this thesis also develops the initial concept 
of public value for money (PVFM) and makes several recommendations for 
practitioners.  These are: 
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• Focus on transaction cost and unit / beneficiary costs for high volume, low 
variability services 
• Establish more narrative forms of PVFM linked to political pledges at the 
authority level – i.e. stop trying to conduct full council comparisons as these are 
likely to be unhelpful  
• Reemphasise the moral / ethical dimension of public value in public service 
delivery; this may help to address the loss of trust in public institutions 
mentioned above 
• As with the performance zones model recommendations, improve the nature of 
the communication with external and internal publics 
• Challenge the value of benchmarking clubs etc. unless they allow a focus on 
benchmarking processes rather than outcomes / outputs 
• Include a long-range assessment of PVFM based around place-shaping and 
influencing the social, environmental, and economic fabric of an area that is 
developed in relation to a clear and well-articulated vision 
 
Again, these recommendations should be tested and developed in collaboration with 
local authority practitioners, and would provide a further element to demonstrate the 
impact of this research.  A common theme in discussions with staff from case study 
organizations was the desire to know what other councils were doing.  The ability to 
compare performance, and hence to identify potential for learning, has been lost as 
part of the deregulation of performance assessment.  Whilst benchmarking clubs are 
resurgent, these are now viewed by central government as money-making 
opportunities for the private sector bodies running them, and risk lacking the consistent 
focus on improving the value of public services presented by using arm’s length 
government bodies such as the former Audit Commission to deliver them.  It is also 
possible that the rise in peer review (mentioned in section 5.1.3) will be helpful for 
authorities.  External publication of league tables and ratings created a false sense of 
‘competition’, in that authorities were forced to view their own performance in part as 
mediated by the performance of other councils, when councils are not ‘competing’ for 
customers (residents) in any meaningful sense.  The removal of reporting 
requirements thus frees councils from that ‘competition’ and they are, to use a phrase 
from Conservative rhetoric, ‘all in it together’, although perhaps some, more than 
others. 
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 Contribution to empirical understanding 
A third element of contribution is our empirical understanding of the situation facing 
local government; central to this is the term ‘death of improvement’, which is used as 
shorthand for the impact of austerity on local government forms and functions and 
service delivery.  The 1999 Local Government Act placed an enduring duty to secure 
continuous improvement on local authorities, yet this, as this and other research has 
shown, is being undermined by the financial position of most local authorities in 
general, and the most deprived authorities in particular. 
In effect, the continuous improvement duty is being abandoned in some services 
because of the scale of budget cuts.  In many services, the deregulation of 
performance assessment means that effective comparisons are impossible, and thus 
the impact of cuts is difficult to identify.  This may be as much a political manoeuvre 
as much as a freeing up from ‘red tape’ (DCLG, 2010b) – this thesis does not seek to 
ascribe motives in this case – but the result of removing comparative performance 
indicators is that the result of service budget cuts across England is now extremely 
difficult to compare and contrast between authorities.   
Alongside the overall level of cuts to public expenditure, a rebalancing of the remaining 
funds is taking place.  Health and social care now accounts for a greater and 
continuously increasing percentage of local public expenditure, and this is creating 
tensions within public services.  As has been discussed in section 7.2.3: Civic 
accountability, the political nature of cuts is bringing into question the very role of local 
authorities, and highlighting where democratic accountability clashes with managerial 
and legislative responsibilities.  Services that are felt to be ‘easier’ to cut are often 
those that are the most visible to the public in the broadest sense, and individualised 
care services, whilst themselves still being subject to reductions in expenditure levels, 
are consuming ever-increasing proportions of public resources.  This thesis attempts 
to unpack these tensions and the conflict between national policy, local determination, 
and public expectations.  There are no easy answers here for local authorities, and 
more tailored forms of performance management and communication, as discussed 
in section 8.3 may aid debate and understanding.  
This thesis also concludes that the legacy of the 1997-2010 assessment frameworks 
can be seen on a number of levels, and contains both negative and positive aspects, 
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but also that the labour- and data-intensive nature of the assessment frameworks may 
not have helped generate sufficient capability in local authorities to respond to the 
needs and challenges generated by the Government’s austerity programme budgets 
for public services.  This has been characterised by the move towards supposedly 
individualistic, entrepreneurial public services, yet a lack of clarity exists around what 
this could or should look like.  Commissioning is being highlighted as a change in local 
authority practices, yet here, too, divergent attitudes towards commissioning and 
corporate capacity or capability mean that this will not be a panacea for local 
government funding challenges.  
For reasons that are not fully clear from either the national policy or the locally-
gathered empirical data, the severity of the challenges facing local government is not 
being effectively communicated to the public.  This is difficult to achieve in practice, 
without invoking the hostility mentioned in the case of Liverpool.  Effective public 
relations management requires organizations to generate ‘emotional sympathy’ 
(L'Etang, 2007); yet it is difficult to inspire sympathy for the organization that isn’t 
collecting your bins as often as you’d like.   Local government itself accepts that 
austerity has helped to drive out inefficiencies, but it has also initiated an existential 
challenge, the results of which may not be seen for years or perhaps decades.  This 
thesis hopes to facilitate a contribution to the wider debate around public services, 
though this too will require time to achieve. 
 Contribution to scholarship (publishing) 
Finally, in terms of contribution, this thesis seeks to contribute to the current 
scholarship in public service research and theory through publications.  Table 26 
below provides details of actual and proposed publications from this thesis and cross 
references them to the relevant sections in the thesis itself.  At the time of submission, 
the first item “Public Management Theory” (book chapter) has been published, and 
two items are under review; a further book chapter has been accepted provisionally, 
and two additional papers are proposed. 
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Table 26: Publications and thesis section cross reference   
Bibliographical entry Link to thesis 
section  
Radnor, Z., Osborne, S. & Glennon, R. 2016. “Public management 
theory.” In: ANSELL, C. & TORFING, J. (eds.) Handbook on 
Theories of Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
2.3 
Glennon, R., Radnor, Z., & Bateman, N. TBC. “Austerity and public 
service performance frameworks in England” to be submitted to 
Public Administration  
7.1 
Glennon, R., Hodgkinson, I., Knowles, J., Radnor, Z., & Bateman, 
N., “The Impact of Modernization: Examining the aftermath of a 
change agenda on public sector employees” submitted to 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 
2.8; 4.2.2; 4.2.3 
Murphy, P., Glennon, R., Radnor, Z., & Bateman, N. TBC Serving, 
Steering, or Succumbing? Revisiting democratic accountability 
under austerity in English local government in Liddle, J, Kerley, R., 
& Dunning, P. (Eds.), Handbook of International Local Government 
4.2.1; 5.1.2 
Glennon, R., Radnor, Z., & Bateman, N. TBC. “The price of 
austerity: reconceptualising value for money in English local 
authorities” to be submitted to Critical Perspectives in Accounting. 
5.2; 5.2.2 
Glennon, R., Radnor, Z., & Bateman, N. TBC. “Charting the 
landscape of public sector operations management” to be 
submitted to International Journal of Management Reviews  
2.9.1; 2.8 
 
Contributing to scholarship has been a primary goal of this research, and the planned 
and achieved publications above are the main route through which this has been 
achieved to date.  It is anticipated that more practitioner-focused publications would 
also emerge as part of the output of this thesis, and these would be supported by the 
academic publications above in terms of generating and demonstrating impact for 
Research Excellent Framework purposes. 
 Overall conclusions: 
This research posed the question: ‘what was the legacy of New Labour’s performance 
management frameworks for local government?’  As outlined in section 2.4, the 
research did not attempt to evaluate whether or not the performance regimes improved 
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performance, for several reasons.  Firstly, an absolute judgement of whether 
performance improved across over 650+ services, in three hundred or so local 
authorities, with wildly differing demographics, would be a somewhat reductive view 
that minimised deviation from mean performance levels and might not provide a great 
deal of useful information.  This type of quantitative judgement is unlikely to adequately 
describe the lived experience of residents and businesses, particularly given the 
interpretive stance adopted by this research.  Secondly, the question would also be 
moot – the New Labour performance regimes have been disassembled by the 
Coalition and Conservative administrations that followed Labour’s general election 
losses in 2010 and 2015. 
This research instead sought to examine, via case studies, the legacy of the 
performance regime post-2010 and to attempt to understand how authorities had 
reacted to deregulation of performance.  This was explored through seven dimensions:  
• Instrumental 
• Structural 
• Institutional 
• Financial 
• People- or staff-centred 
• Democratic / decisional / community 
• Market / role 
 
One aspiration for the original research was to explore whether there were any 
archetypes that might emerge from interviews, formed from organizational 
preferences for a particular dimension or dimensions of change.  The reality of the 
current local government environment is such that whether or not such archetypes 
exist (and that still seems to be a valid research avenue), the pressure applied to 
organizational systems from imposed austerity budgets has meant that many 
organizational preferences have been subjugated to the exigencies of survival. 
Austerity, savings, and cuts dominated the discussions and interviews, and some 
services were seeing service levels frozen or reduced.  Yet a focus solely on this would 
be a reductive answer to the question of the legacy of New Labour’s comprehensive 
performance and area assessments.   
In attempting to understand the conceptual and policy sphere in which local authorities 
were operating, this research sought to integrate contributions from both Public 
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Management and Public Administration perspectives.  Ashworth et al. (2010b) observe 
that a lack of sufficient research on the empirical background of theories of service 
improvement is cause for concern.  Later work also raises concerns about a lack of 
theory building (Ashworth et al., 2013), and that too much attention instead has been 
paid to evaluating government programmes, little of which appears to have borne fruit 
(Pollitt, 2013a; Pollitt and Dan, 2013).  In part this may be due to the granular nature 
of local government service delivery: the characteristics of social care and highways 
maintenance are without doubt distinct, and they are evidently being treated very 
differently in a climate of austerity.  Individual authorities, too, are clearly discrete 
entities, and political, managerial, and cultural differences feature strongly in the 
research findings. 
And yet, this concern about the lack of theoretical engagement may be well founded.  
Whilst critiques of NPM are plentiful (Chandler et al., 2002; Dunleavy et al., 2006b; 
Hood, 1995; Lodge and Hood, 2012), the main structures of NPM – competition, 
choice, marketization, and the privileging of private sector practices – are all still 
relevant to today’s public services.   Interviews discussing services that fit more neatly 
into a contestable type such as back office processes, customer contact, 
environmental services etc. (and perhaps some that do not fit well) in all six case 
studies mentioned commercialization as one of the routes to sustainability for public 
services.   
This is perhaps nothing new – marketization as a key component of public sector 
reform is nearing 40 years of use at this point – but interview evidence suggests that 
the emphasis has shifted.  The structured processes of evaluating the market and the 
current service delivery arrangements brought in by Best Value have been removed 
and Best Value’s four Cs – challenge, compare, consult, and compete – appear to 
have been overwhelmed by a fifth C, cuts.   The demands of the financial dimension 
are driving behaviours and reducing the capacity of local government to improve, 
change and transform at a time when remaining static seems like it is not an option for 
the participants in this research project.  
Coupled with this, the ‘death of improvement’ discussed in section 4.3.1 has had an 
impact on public services’ performance management.  It might have been expected 
that performance management would play a larger role in discussions around the 
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location of cuts, but the scale of savings required, particularly in more deprived areas, 
has instead served to stimulate more diverse responses.  Even in Merry Park, the most 
affluent of the case studies, and in the top 20% of affluent boroughs nationally, the 
political driver around reducing the taxation burden on residents and businesses is 
pushing services into more radical conversations around service reductions.  Again, 
the politicization of performance (in section 4.2.1) brings a different perspective to the 
traditionally linear and instrumental perceptions of performance management.  These 
changes to the use and perceptions of performance management have been enabled 
by the deregulation of performance regimes under the Coalition government. 
This research intentionally conflated performance and improvement to develop more 
comprehensive responses to questions. This allowed some interesting tensions to 
emerge around the understanding of performance management and its 
contextualisation within local government.   
It may be that the regulated processes of assessing performance – e.g. CPA and CAA, 
and the wider modernization programme – drove the capacity of local authorities 
towards being able to satisfy the information requirements of the regime, above and 
beyond generating capacity to facilitate, lever or generate improvement activity.  This 
appears borne out by comments from interviewees about the impact of deregulation.  
Comments from multiple respondents addressed the sense of ‘feeding the beast’ of 
regulatory performance reporting.  Current team capacity around performance and 
improvement appears to be divided between performance teams and those whose 
remit is change, transformation, or improvement.  Although the research purposefully 
conflated these two agendas, this does not necessarily appear to be the case within 
actual organizations investigated.   
This research, therefore, sought to interrogate the operation of performance 
management as a tool used to justify performance as well as an instrumental 
mechanism in the more traditional interpretation. This gave rise to a research sub-
question that addressed the implementation of performance management. 
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8.6.1 RQ3: How has the removal of statutory performance reporting impacted 
on tool selection, their operation, and the ways that organizations 
publicly justify their achievement? (i.e. the implementation of tools and 
techniques) 
 
Here, the research considered the use of performance management as a key tool in 
addressing service reform and improvement.  As mentioned above, and as detailed in 
section 4.3.1, the dominance of austerity and its impact on the improvement agenda, 
what has been called the ‘death of improvement’, has changed the way that authorities 
are viewing performance management, as has the deregulated assessment 
environment.  This thesis contends that this has resulted in divergent performance 
practices, with an increased politicization of performance discourse, and a shift away 
from numerical presentations to more qualitative and narrative forms for community 
purposes, based more around legitimacy than communicating very detailed 
performance data.  
Historically, local authorities were required to publish performance ‘outturns’ for all 
statutory indicators within annual Best Value Performance Plans, which contained 
previous outturns and future targets and predictions. These were conceived by central 
government as a mechanism for publicly accounting for performance to residents.  
However, most local authority service users are a largely captive audience, i.e. for 
many universal services offered local authorities operate as an effective monopoly and 
it is unfeasible to swap service provider for, say, highways maintenance without 
moving house to another local authority area, and even this simply swaps one 
monopolistic provider for another. Accountability for public service delivery thus needs 
to operate on different lines compared to most of the private sector where competitive 
forces are presumed to maintain or improve service quality. 
Authorities appear to be moving towards more narrative forms of the presentation of 
public performance, which again may suit the more politicised forms of performance 
management discussed in section 4.2.1 – the zones of accountability and legitimacy.   
Rather than a series of numerical targets, all authorities were reporting this more 
narrative form of performance, related back to pledges and manifesto commitments.  
Stocks Green was also attempting to engage residents in debates about where the 
burden of cuts should fall, albeit with limited success. 
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Tool selection for improvement activities, as discussed, was predominantly focused 
on delivering financial savings, although interviewees responsible for social care such 
as Castle Gate’s C4, or Rudgeway’s R1 also saw this as part of a discourse of 
delivering social care differently, i.e. individually-centred mechanisms that would allow 
service users to choose services they wanted, rather than picking from pre-selected 
options offered by local authorities.     
8.6.2 RQ2: How have the emergent governance structures affected the 
sustainability and legitimacy of performance and service improvement 
efforts? (i.e. the operationalization of performance governance) 
 
This research question addressed the operationalization of performance and 
improvement, i.e. how plans and policies are put into practice, and could thus be 
considered the ‘mid-level’ of performance in practice.  Here, too, austerity dominated 
people’s thinking.  As outlined in section 5.2.1, local authority efficiency targets had 
been in existence for over a decade prior to this research, but the austerity programme 
implemented by the 2010-2015 Coalition government and continued so far by the post 
2015 Conservative government appears to have brought a significantly different 
quality to the management and governance of local authorities.  Whilst incremental 
budget cuts are a familiar process, the scope and scale of the savings required has 
pressured authorities to move from ‘managing austerity’ to ‘governing austerity’.  Again, 
the politicised performance management observed in section 4.2.1 comes into conflict 
with the pressure on social care costs and the ‘death of improvement’ discussed in 
section 4.3.1.  Whilst this researcher did not speak to elected members from all 
authorities, each of the three members interviewed discussed the changing nature of 
the governance required to implement cuts in a socially and politically acceptable way, 
as well to navigate the tensions between the universal environmental and other 
services, sometimes described as ‘liveability’, and the increasing costs of social care 
for children and particularly adults. 
Increased use of mixed member and officer boards for governing austerity, or perhaps 
the impact of austerity, were evident in five out of six authorities, with Merry Park 
already having a strong representation from members on such groups.  Whilst non-
public meetings have always been part of political processes, officers in some 
authorities (e.g. Stocks Green, Bell Tower, Merry Park) felt that these were being 
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increasingly viewed as ways of managing the political fallout of austerity budgets.  
Castle Gate’s chief executive (C1) outlined some of the frustrations around working 
with cabinet members to agree cuts in some areas, and the tensions with ward 
councillors about the ‘managed decline’ – this also featured in discussions with some 
of the officers working on environmental services, such as Stocks Green’s S4, or Merry 
Park’s M5. 
These tensions and challenges are driven in part by the conflicting forms of 
accountability outlined in section 7.2 Accountability: five types, where existing 
perspectives on accountability are synthesised into a more nuanced model that 
explores the varying abilities of stakeholders to hold people to account.   
Table 22 (p.241) outlines a range of ways in which accountabilities are enacted.  
Managerial accountability, perhaps the most overt and visible form, operates 
hierarchically within organizations and has a clear ability to sanction staff for not 
meeting the demands of management.  Professional accountability, on the other hand, 
is likely to be strongest in those disciplines that retain external certification, and relies 
on an outside-in enactment of standards and on internal self-policing, with much less 
ability to provide individual sanctions.  Whilst some very high profile incidents have 
occurred, such as the cases of Victoria Climbié or Peter Connelly (Baby P), much of 
the professional holding of standards is reliant on a Foucauldian ‘self-discipline’ 
(Foucault, 1977), where expected norms and behaviours are ‘written in’ across training 
and professional standards.  Sanctions are much less likely to be applied to individuals 
than to organizations.   
The post-2010 local government environment has seen the removal of the externally 
imposed performance regime, thereby making it more difficult to understand the 
performance of a service or local authority.  This may reflect the increasingly 
individualised nature of service interactions as suggested in section 2.9, where it is 
suggested that Coalition and Conservative reforms have refocused the nature of 
interaction between state and citizen to embed a discourse of personalization and 
individualized relationships.  This can perhaps be seen in the replacement of the Audit 
Commission with ‘armchair auditors’ (DCLG, 2011a), or the creation of the ‘friends and 
family test’ in the NHS (NHS England, 2014), which appear to locate responsibility for 
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holding services to account within the remit of the individual service user, rather than 
assuring quality through external inspections.   
Overall, it is difficult to see the removal of externally validated performance regimes 
such as CPA and CAA as a positive move forward for accountability.  This may be 
intentional.  Certainly, austerity budgets and the ‘managed decline’ of some services 
is a difficult ‘sell’ politically, at either the local or national level, and whilst the 
‘accountability of the ballot box’ is certainly a strength of local authorities compared 
with, say, the NHS or housing associations, and represents a necessary part of our 
democratic apparatus, it is far from certain whether this alone is sufficient for political 
accountability.   
Moving, then, to civic accountability (section 7.2.3), we see that the tensions between 
individualistic and community needs described above are replicated and whilst 
accountability to the people remains a clear motif within public service management 
perceptions as discussed by the interviewees, this tended to split into two sub-types: 
accountability to service users (current or future), and accountability to the ‘demos’ or 
the body politic; as Denhardt and Denhardt put it, public services delivery democracy 
(Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011).   
As has been outlined earlier, one of NPM’s weaknesses has been its excessive 
concern with efficiency over other matters.  The drive towards choice and competition 
within public services naturally draws reforms towards an individualistic conception of 
the relationship between public services and those who use them.  This privileging of 
the ‘customer’ within public services is flawed; something well recognised by services 
theory in particular (Lusch and Vargo, 2014; Osborne et al., 2013; Vargo and Lusch, 
2004).  It is flawed because it does not sufficiently accommodate the notion of public 
goods and wider societal benefits that accrue from the delivery of democratically 
organized public services, or for the monopolistic provision found in most public 
services.   
That is not to say, of course, that there is no benefit from further development of the 
notions around public service delivery.  Despite Denhardt and Denhardt’s assertion, 
public managers deliver both services and democracy.  It seems self-evident that at 
least some public services will be inefficient, uneconomical, ineffective, or a 
combination of all three.  Evidence from the case studies suggests that one positive 
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aspect of austerity is that it has driven out some of these inefficiencies, if that term can 
stand in for a variety of defects in service delivery.  The challenge now is that 
authorities are faced with both diminishing returns and questions of critical mass.  As 
observed in section 5.2, incremental budget reductions, or salami-slicing, can only go 
so far.  It is likely that authorities will reach a point at which services either cannot be 
delivered within the economic constraints imposed, or their continued delivery 
becomes unsustainable given other demands.  Already authorities are scaling back 
universal and probably popular services such as environmental upkeep to fund 
targeted services such as adults’ social care, which have much smaller benefitting 
populations.  
The governance of austerity, then, brings into question how to balance the needs and 
desires of the electorate, along with other stakeholders such as businesses, partner 
organizations and other bodies. 
Figure 4: the proposed model of performance as a system of governance, suggests 
governance must be capable of adapting to the requirements of a very different 
funding envelope, of responding to increasing service user expectations, and of 
articulating a better understanding the ‘public’ part of public services.  By this we mean 
that they cannot solely be considered as an aggregation of individual service 
transactions, but that the ‘place-shaping’ agenda – a common part of the CPA / CAA 
regime – should not be ignored, despite the financial challenges facing authorities.  
Accountability for wider public value, including place-shaping, may be difficult to 
restore, but is nonetheless worthwhile. 
This leads us to consider the remaining research question, which addresses the level 
of conceptualization:   
8.6.3 RQ1: How do organizations discuss and create meaning around their 
preferred ways of managing performance and service improvement? (i.e. 
the conceptualization of performance and service improvement) 
 
Public sector reform has been the subject of explicit academic study for many years, 
and much of the scholarship has focused on the two or three major lenses through 
which public services are viewed and understood: Public Administration (e.g. Chandler, 
2000; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Golembiewski, 1974; Henry, 1975), New Public 
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Management (e.g. Christensen and Laegreid, 2002, 2011; Ferlie et al., 1996; Hood, 
1995; Lynn, 1998) and, more recently, New Public Governance (e.g Bao et al., 2012; 
Osborne, 2006; Osborne, 2010b).  There is a relatively stable common core 
understanding of these three, although counter-views are plentiful.  One recent 
counter-view that does not seem to have gained as much traction as might have been 
expected is that of the Public Value movement (as typified by e.g. Alford and Hughes, 
2008; Benington and Moore, 2010; Bozeman, 2002; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2011; 
Moore, 1995; O'Flynn, 2007; Stoker, 2006).   
Moore’s initial 1995 book  focusing on public value can be read as a directly 
countervailing narrative to the then dominant discourse of NPM, as typified by Osborne 
and Gaebler’s Reinventing Government (1992), which drew heavily on (private sector) 
business practices for its conceptual and operational basis. Moore, on the other hand, 
wished to establish a philosophical basis for public managers that emphasised the 
broader values driving public services and the broader value that public service could 
generate; this reflects directly the debate in section 8.6.2 around civic accountability. 
As outlined within this thesis, NPM’s focus on competition, choice, and markets has 
tended to lead to a focus on individual service perspectives, and has often focused 
excessively on efficiency (Radnor et al., 2016), despite evidence for  the complexity of 
local government’s operating environment (Haveri, 2006), and the need for pluralist 
policy development (Rhodes, 1996, 1997).   
This focus on efficiency is never clearer than when considering value for money.  
Whilst the Audit Commission-provided value for money profiles ostensibly compared 
performance and expenditure, this was driven by simplistic unit or beneficiary cost 
measures and the teleological assumption that performance would indefinitely 
increase and cost reduce likewise.  VFM in a time of austerity appears palpably 
different.  In these case studies, services that may be efficient, economical, and 
effective, and have universal application or no significant barriers to their access, such 
as parks and open spaces, roads, refuse collections, libraries and cultural services etc. 
are being purposefully scaled back (here called ‘managed decline’) in favour of 
transferring resources into more specialised and targeted services such as adults’ and 
children’s social care.  It is difficult to see how this complies with the traditional view of 
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value for money.  This is not to blame local government – the scale of the cuts it faces 
them means there may well be little choice in these matters (LGA, 2015) 
Table 23: Reconceptualising VFM through alternative lenses attempts to unpick the 
different perspectives that might inform or guide value for money, and thus have an 
effect on the way VFM guides services.  This is exploratory, rather than normative, 
and seeks to contribute to the debate around reconceptualising VFM.    
It is also suggested in Figure 7: Public value for money model, on page 244, that equity 
and sustainability do not appear to have been fully addressed in understanding local 
authority performance.  Private sector organizations are not charged with delivering 
democracy, or universal provision of public goods.  Yet these two features are 
fundamental to local government.  The thesis argues for the development of a new 
model of ‘public value for money’ that embraces a long-range assessment based 
around place-shaping and influencing the social, environmental, and economic fabric 
of an area, but that also retains some of the practical, operational measures of unit 
and beneficiary costs for those services that suit this approach.  Here again, the theme 
of a differential approach to public service performance management in the widest 
sense returns – the golden thread and cascading sets of objectives have variable 
degrees of success in managing very different council services, and in very different 
councils. 
 Constraints and challenges 
As with all research, and especially doctoral theses, this work is only a partial picture 
of a bounded approach to a problem.  Authentic, well operationalized research is 
aware of its limitations and boundaries.  In the case of this research, choices made in 
the methodology and methods to develop an interpretive, qualitative project guided 
the operationalization towards an epistemological and ontological viewpoint that 
others may not share; this is a feature of the work, and not a weakness.  Therefore, 
as Lincoln and Guba suggest (1985), naturalistic research should be judged on its own 
tradition’s merits. 
Inevitably, the size and volume of literature relating to public sector reform meant that 
a selective approach was taken, and the position of public value as a field was only 
really reconciled during the later stages of the field work, analysis, and discussion.  
This feels defensible, as Public Value is viewed here more as a countervailing 
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narrative to the movement from PA to NPM to NPG, rather than a core stage in that 
process and thus the earlier chapters were left without significant discussion of Public 
Value.    
The initial dimensions were conceived as existing being the same size and perhaps 
importance.  Whilst this did not derail the inductive approach taken to this research, it 
did not allow the initial objective of developing archetypes of reform preferences, 
although again austerity also would have most likely blocked the achievement of this 
objective.  
In terms of this project, the scale of inquiry is naturally a limitation.  More case studies 
and more interviews would have provided more data on which to draw some empirical 
and theoretical conclusions.  In this regard, as outlined in section 3.5.2 on page 85, 
four authorities dropped out of the initial agreement, two of them very late in the day.  
This meant that a disproportionate number were from the North West of England.  A 
wider distribution of the cases might have given greater confidence in more 
generalised conclusions.  Only unitary authorities were selected, so no data was 
gathered on the relationships and performance management arrangements for two-
tier authorities, which had different CPA and CAA methodologies in any case.  
Interviewees were self-selecting within authorities, which brought both advantages 
and disadvantages.   No constraints were thus imposed by a fixed list of interviewees, 
but neither did each case study have a directly comparable set of interviewees and 
there were undoubtedly interesting and useful interviews that were not able to take 
place due to time constraints on the individuals concerned.  This perhaps impeded 
cross-case analysis to some extent, as may have intra-case study divergence, but 
neither of these should have been a barrier to drawing theoretical insights from across 
the cases, which may prove ultimately more useful than comparisons or evaluations 
of individual authorities for this research. 
The iterative coding process itself highlighted more content than could be dealt with in 
this thesis, and the uses of language of change remains an avenue for future 
development. 
Whilst we would contend that theory-building from case study research is both 
possible and desirable (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), this 
research did not attempt to build testable hypotheses for broader, quantitative 
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investigation, although that remains a clear possibility and it is commonly accepted 
that more positivist, quantitative work remains the norm in much business school 
research. 
Finally, the inductive nature of the analysis, whilst shared and challenged with the 
supervisory team, means that conclusions are drawn from three sources: the literature, 
the findings, and the experiences, observations, and history of the primary researcher.  
It has been said that all analysis is qualitative in that even numerical studies rely on 
humans to select appropriate tools, analyse the data, and contextualise the results.  
Hence, the analysis relies on the interpretations applied and the credibility generated 
by the findings, analysis, and discussion. This can, and should, be challenged and 
critiqued. 
 Future work 
As outlined above, the scope of this thesis and the conventions of the format mean 
that not all the ideas generated through the findings, analysis, and discussion can be 
adequately treated here.  Thus, at points, certain ideas and propositions have been 
identified for future consideration; some require additional empirical research, others 
further theoretical development.  This section collates these areas of work. 
First and foremost, the main contributions developed in sections 7.1: Performance 
management frameworks: models, theories, and practices, 7.2: Accountability: five 
types, and 7.3: Value for money: reconceptualising VFM for public services, grouped 
together as ‘performance as a system of governance’ all merit further empirical testing 
in a local authority setting.  This should take the form of additional data gathering to 
validate the conclusions, but also development of practical impact through the 
operational recommendations and practitioner engagement to seek to develop the 
quality of local authority service provision.  An impact case study may prove one way 
to do this.  Additionally, the devolved nations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
could prove a useful comparison with English authorities, as there are both continuities 
and discontinuities of practice and policy.  
Secondly, there were several areas where insufficient space in the impeded a fuller 
development of some of the ideas.  Taken together, these could provide a long-term 
research ‘arc’.  Broadly, these areas can be clustered into the following headings: 
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• The history of reform: trends, values etc. 
• New performance models, theories, and practices 
• The development of multiple accountabilities 
• Co-production, Public Value, and New Public Governance  
• Language of change and reform 
 
 
Table 27: Future work emerging from this thesis 
Area Future activity Link to thesis section 
History of 
reform trends 
Developing the view of the history and 
timeline of public sector reforms and the 
guiding rationales, values etc. 
Section 2.9, page 49 
Table 3: Summary 
analysis of major reform 
phases 
New 
performance 
models, 
theories, and 
practices 
Empirical testing of the new performance 
model in unitary councils. 
 
Development of a model for two-tier areas 
 
The spectrum of performance team delivery 
models  
 
Table 25: Performance 
management 
recommendations, page 
271 
 
Key finding 2 and  
Table 16: Structured 
spectrum of corporate & 
departmental 
performance models, 
page 114 
The 
development of 
multiple 
accountabilities 
Theoretical and empirical development of 
accountabilities (some ongoing work with 
Centre for Public Scrutiny) 
 
 
 
Engaging with wider range of elected 
members on austerity and performance 
Section 5.1.2, page 143, 
Section 7.2, page 223 
Table 22: Five different 
accountabilities in local 
government, page 241 
 
section 6.3.4, page 188 
Co-production, 
Public Value, 
and New Public 
Governance  
Developing equity / equality and 
sustainability in the public value for money 
model (fig 6.) 
 
implementing the public service dominant 
logic (Osborne et al., 2015) and co-
production and co-creation theories 
(Osborne et al., 2016) in ways that 
emphasise systemic public value 
(Benington and Moore, 2010; Denhardt and 
Denhardt, 2011) rather than focusing on 
individualistic concepts of the service 
experience for users.   
 
Using a public value lens, insufficient 
attention is given to the debate about wider 
‘public goods’.  Strategies of resistance to 
the dominant force of individualised, 
entrepreneurial public services may be 
required if equity and sustainability are to 
be embraced within public service delivery, 
Figure 7: Public value for 
money model, page 244 
 
 
Table 23: 
Reconceptualising VFM 
through alternative 
lenses, page 261 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key finding 12 and Table 
23 
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Area Future activity Link to thesis section 
including insourcing and outsourcing of 
services. 
 
The multiple roles of service recipients: 
customers, clients, service users etc. 
 
 
 
Civic accountability, 
section 7.2.3, page 233 
Language of 
change and 
reform 
Analysing the white papers on public reform 
and policy / practice guidance on change, 
transformation etc. (Building on the AJPA 
paper) 
Section 3.8, page 99 on 
data analysis 
 
 Summary and final conclusions  
This research took an exploratory and phenomenological approach to gathering and 
analysing data, and employed a deviant case analysis to identify suitable cases for 
investigation and the development of new theoretical insights (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
This research posed the question: ‘what was the legacy of New Labour’s performance 
management frameworks for local government?’  In addressing this question, the 
empirical findings have shifted the focus towards a consideration of the impact of 
financial austerity, which dominated the interviews in the same way that it is 
dominating the debate at council management teams and political cabinets.   
As discussed in section 5.1.1 on page 139, responses to the deregulation of 
performance have differed, but some consistent themes emerged.  Firstly, most 
participants felt that the performance regimes had exerted a strong influence on 
corporate behaviours and responses; this included both negative and positive aspects.   
CPA and CAA were felt to have imposed a significant time and resource burden on 
authorities. Performance reporting and inspections were intensive, and many were 
unconvinced of the benefits to be gained from this level of activity – feeding the ‘beast’ 
(or machine) were common phrases used by respondents to describe CPA and CAA.  
This led to a sense of CPA and CAA as a constant presence, creating pressure in the 
organization and generating resentment, particularly in service departments.  CPA 
involved corporate inspections, service inspections, a corporate self-assessment, 
financial reporting, and performance indicator outturn reporting to the public (via the 
Best Value Performance Plan) and to central government, as well as returns to other 
central government departments around statutory services.  This burden was 
supplemented by the need to develop and implement strategies, artefacts, and 
processes such as corporate planning, community engagement, to be able to 
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demonstrate the ‘required’ actions within the corporate and service assessments.  
BVPIs expanded over time to cover a very wide range of services, and authorities were 
expected to develop their own PMFs to include local measures for non-statutory 
services (Audit Commission, 2002, 2005).  
Authorities responded to these demands by creating corporate performance teams of 
differing sizes, shapes, and functions, but whose roles generally involved the co-
ordination, development and reporting of assessment expectations.  Academic 
critiques of these regimes are readily found (e.g. Andrews et al., 2005; Boyne and 
Enticott, 2004; Broadbent, 2003; Freer, 2002; Game, 2006; Rashman and Radnor, 
2005; Wilson, 2004b), and much of this debate considered whether the regimes 
actually improved performance or not.  We may ask a similar question about the 
corporate performance teams: did their development increase the capacity and 
capability of authorities to improve, or merely to meet the expectations of assessment?  
Clearly, the truth will lie somewhere between these two points, but participants from 
corporate performance teams tended to talk about the difference between the policing, 
performance role (holding services to account) played by performance teams, and the 
supporting, transformation role (helping services to improve) played by change, 
improvement, or transformation teams. 
Service department participants were also often less positive about CPA and CAA 
experiences, and this spoke directly to one of the tensions around performance 
management: the relationship between services and the corporate centre (section 
4.2.2, finding: OP2). At the heart of this tension is the same debate around whether 
these regimes help or hinder improvement; this thesis does not attempt to answer this 
question.  But the weight of these regimes served to challenge the relationship 
between the corporate centre and services around primacy, and this relationship 
remains difficult in the post-2010 environment, exacerbated by the demands of 
austerity and challenges around imposing cuts.   
Responses were not wholly negative, and one of the most significant, common 
responses was the notion of being ‘master of one’s own destiny’, that is, national policy 
was more directive and perhaps coercive during the Labour administrations, as 
deployed through the measurement of certain services through BVPIs (recalling the 
old adage that ‘what gets measured, gets done’), the setting of direct agreements for 
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performance ‘stretch’ through LPSAs and LAAs, and the comparative pressures 
provided by league tables of PIs and corporate and service inspection results. 
Whilst the rhetoric of assessment regime policy was about local determinism and local 
control (Cabinet Office, 1999; DCLG, 2006, 2008), the reality of these instruments may 
instead have been to create a strongly centralised system of control, rather than one 
of improvement (Broadbent, 2003; Davis, 2011; McLean et al., 2007). Yet despite 
these concerns, the regime was perceived to have at least some value, and as one 
participant put it: 
But I genuinely believe that some of that stuff that Labour put in place was good stuff. And 
I think just throwing it all out did everyone a disservice, actually.  M4 SERVICE 
The whole-scale abandonment of external assessments of corporate (i.e. whole 
council) performance has left a void in three areas: councils understanding their own 
performance, services being able to identify benchmarking and learning opportunities, 
and the ability to use external referents to direct priorities and to challenge the newly-
found ‘freedom’ to deliver cuts to services wherever elected members wished.  
This increased ‘politicization’ of performance management is one of the key findings. 
Freedom from central government diktat has allowed politicians and officers to develop 
more locally determined priorities, often articulated through pledges and manifesto 
commitments (as detailed in section 4.2.1).  Whilst this freedom has felt widely 
welcomed, it has brought with it the responsibility for making the cuts required to meet 
the savings imposed by central government (section 5.2.1).  Undoubtedly, this 
freedom, the freedom to decide where cuts must fall, has been less welcomed by 
participants. 
The challenges associated with financial austerity in local government have broken 
the statutory expectation contained within the Best Value duty to ‘secure continuous 
improvement’ – here termed ‘the death of improvement’, another key finding of this 
research.  Some services are being scaled back via a ‘managed decline’, as financial 
pressures drive authorities to focus on statutory duties such as education or social 
care.   
Changes to how authorities implement performance management are thus driven by 
two elements: firstly, the removal of statutory instruments of performance, which also 
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introduced an increasing, overtly political element to performance, and secondly the 
significant reductions in local authority budgets, which have required an increasing 
focus on change, transformation, and improvement, rather than performance 
management.  This research proposes some new ideas around how a less unified, but 
more coherent, PMF might operate. 
Integrating both points above allows us to question how we allow accountability to 
emerge.  CPA and CAA drove authorities towards accountability for achievement 
within the standards set by the performance regimes, publicly enacted through highly 
visible star ratings and published league tables ranking authorities against each other.  
The dismantling of that performance apparatus is raising new questions around 
accountability – what has been described here as the move from managing austerity 
to governing austerity.  Council officers have legal and professional obligations that 
are increasingly complex and difficult to deliver.  How are they to balance the needs 
of the many (i.e. universal service provision) with the needs of the few (targeted 
services)?  Elected members are seeing the same divisions as they negotiate between 
ward member responsibilities, political imperatives, and the legal requirement to set a 
balanced budget. 
Local government has a unique nature – it is democratic, universal, and charged at 
different times with policing, regulating, developing, and supporting communities and 
areas.  It is also funded indirectly and directly by those communities.   This gives a 
very different relationship with the recipients of those services, whether they are 
customer, citizen, service-user, resident, or business. Across all of these facets, value 
for money is an inherent part of the relationship.   
CPA and CAA’s focus on communities, partnerships, and networks, as outlined in 
section 2.9, has changed.  Post-2010, an increasingly individualised relationship 
between local government and service users has taken precedence again, which risks 
focusing on individual service interactions to the detriment of the wider, social benefits 
of local government as an agent for public goods.  
This is a key flaw of NPM: the focus on efficiency and privileging of consumerist 
perspectives. New Public Governance provides a welcome challenge to some of these 
weaknesses, but it, too, risks focusing on the service interaction to the exclusion of 
systemic benefit.  Recent work (e.g. Osborne et al., 2016) has begun to address this, 
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but this thesis argues that we are entering the phase of the personalization orientation, 
where the expectation is of the ‘entrepreneurial civil servant’ (section 2.9.1).   
The removal of the CPA and CAA assessment regimes has altered the value basis 
behind public sector reforms.  The language of ‘reaching out’ and building ‘prosperous 
communities’ has been replaced with a more hostile and adversarial viewpoint based 
around individuals. The foreword to the Open Public Services White Paper talks of 
publishing data on public services as the only way to “wrest power out of the hands of 
highly paid officials and give it back to the people” (Cabinet Office, 2011, p.5). 
One conclusion arising from the research is that understanding the values that 
underpin reforms is essential to understanding the reforms themselves. This thesis 
has argued for a more nuanced perspective to be taken that examines the values 
behind each of the lenses used to examine reforms and that a synthetical approach 
should be used.  PA, NPM, NPG and PV should not be seen as paradigms in the 
sense described by Kuhn (1970), who challenged the established notion that scientific 
knowledge advances incrementally through building on previous scholarship, arguing 
that shifts in knowledge or breakthroughs create new paradigms of knowledge.  
Neither, we would argue, should these be seen as ‘epistemic’ discourses of knowledge 
(Danaher et al., 2000; Foucault, 2012; Foucault and Rabinow, 1984).  Both concepts 
reject the idea of moving towards a single ‘truth’.  Instead, it is argued, these 
perspectives co-exist at different places within authorities and at different times.  For 
some services, such as, say, leisure centres, a straightforwardly NPM perspective is 
dominant.  These facilities deliver relatively straightforward services in a ‘customer’ 
mode.  They must compete to win and retain customers who operate in an 
environment of free choice – private and independent sector competition is readily 
found, and nobody is forced to go to a gym or swimming pool. Yet even with leisure, 
local authorities can see these types of services as resources to achieve wider public 
health goals, as outlined by Castle Gate’s public health lead, C6.  Other services have 
captive audiences, such as highways maintenance, where no alternative provision 
exists, and whose use is virtually unavoidable; these are clearly public goods, and as 
such should be managed to achieve the widest public value for money.  This thesis 
argues that the active service consumption of highways is palpably different to that of, 
say, benefits applications or social care, and thus different values and perspectives 
will drive them.  No single lens provides a full picture – a point made elsewhere 
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(Radnor et al., 2016), but perhaps underexplored when considering the range of 
council services. 
Perhaps one of the notable legacies of CPA and CAA can be seen in the continued 
focus on achieving long-term outcomes by most of the case studies.  This discussion 
featured strongly in responses around renewing performance management 
frameworks and the desire to develop outcome-based budgeting, although as 
explored in the public value for money model outlined in section 7.3.4, managing at 
the outcome level is conceptually challenging, and doubly so in the climate of austerity.  
There are tensions between managing a long-term outcome, compared to an output 
measure or input measure. 
New Labour’s stated focus on tackling deprivation was unpopular with more affluent 
authorities and the Conservative politicians who represented them, as well as 
undermining political ambitions for a smaller state.  This party political, doctrinal 
hostility may have been a significant motivation for the removal of CPA and CAA 
(Walker, 2011), and certainly CAA did not have the chance to be implemented fully.  
The intentions behind New Labour’s assessment regimes appear to have been to 
reinforce a wider sense of improving (public) value at the local level, even though this 
was delivered through a contradictory framework of tight central control (Leach, 2010).  
Such contradictions continue to influence the post-2010 context: more control at the 
local level, but less guidance from the centre; fewer inspections, but less feedback; 
more freedom to operate, but less money and thus greater need to cut services. 
Inevitably, it is difficult to ascribe a legacy to programmes such as CPA or CAA with 
any definitive sense of causality.  Participants were not asked what local government 
was like pre-1997, although the academic literature gives some clear indications, and 
the research took place some five years after the removal of the CPA and CAA 
framework.  Despite this, the research attempted to explore how, with those five years 
of reflection, local authorities perceived the assessment regimes implemented by the 
Blair and Brown administrations and their current positions; this unavoidably invokes 
comparisons with the current policy context for local government and the previous 
arrangements.  Here the significant changes: austerity, deregulation, and their impact 
on organizations and staff have all sharpened the focus on the need to manage and 
improve performance.   
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It is in this domain that we may observe the legacy of the New Labour approaches to 
performance management and service improvement. The entire Best Value apparatus 
aimed to instigate a culture of performance management across public services.  This 
goal, however well-intentioned, demonstrated a continuation of NPM principles from 
the previous Major and Thatcher administrations; as  some contend (i.e. Bouckaert 
and Halligan, 2007; Ferlie et al., 1996), performance management can be read as a 
metaphor for NPM itself.  Major’s administration had appeared to accept, at least 
partially, the limitations of such principles through the refocusing from customers to 
citizens.  The Blair administrations embarked on a crusade to ‘modernize’ central and 
local government, through a structured programme of organizational, performance, 
and democratic renewal (Downe and Martin, 2006; Massey and Pyper, 2005; OECD, 
2004).   
CPA and CAA may have been ‘beasts’ or ‘machines’ that needed feeding, in terms of 
the resources needed to meet reporting and inspection requirements, but this research 
concludes that the practices inculcated by these regimes required authorities to 
develop resource capacity and staff capability to develop and run performance 
management frameworks that not only met the statutory requirements, but in many 
cases adapted these frameworks to include local performance priorities and measures.  
BVPIs may have initially covered an extensive range, but the data that these PIs made 
available could be used by local authorities to build evidential cases for action or 
decision-making, and hence support evidence-based planning and action, as well as 
‘evidence-based policy’, which was a key term during the Blair and Brown 
administrations (Cabinet Office, 1999).   
CPA may also have simply been a “managerial tool applied to a political environment”  
(Leach, 2010, p.451) and thus, as Leach goes on to argue, may have depoliticised 
local authority performance; this may have been inadvertent, as the rhetoric of local 
determinism was strongly written into the policy and guidance, as has been argued 
earlier.  A further complication is that the assessments may have been inadequately 
constructed to take account of circumstances beyond local policy-maker control, such 
as deprivation, or central government grant formulae, as some have argued (i.e. 
Andrews, 2004; Andrews et al., 2005).   
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Yet the positive features associated with CPA and CAA – the clear guidance, the 
structure, the focus on embedding improvement across the organization – suggest 
that the regime may have helped to develop local authority capacity and capability to 
improve (Ashworth et al., 2010a), particularly the whole authority approach (Martin, 
2011).   Participants felt these skills and competencies were still present, although 
concerns were also expressed about the loss of experienced staff (section 4.2.3). 
This thesis contends that to better understand CPA, and its successor CAA, it is 
important to be able to unpick the values behind the mechanisms, and the reality of 
the practices as compared to the rhetoric of their presentation.  Whilst accepting the 
resource burden generated by CPA and CAA, 26 of the 35 interview participants felt 
that the assessment regimes had contained some positive aspects. Most of those also 
stated that the removal of the regime was not wholly positive in that to some extent it 
reduced authorities’ ability to: 
• identify areas of poor performance 
• compare performance with other authorities  
• provide a legitimising rationale for protecting key services from cuts (i.e. those 
that were high-performing compared nationally or locally, or were critical to 
achieving high scores in CPA or CAA assessments) 
• ‘force’ services to participate in performance management activities and thus 
engage corporately 
• Provide an overview of whole council performance for internal debate or public 
performance discourse (what has been termed here the ‘performance of 
performance’) 
 
Given the nature of this research as described in Chapter 3, these views are 
suggestive, rather than generalizable, although it would seem a logical supposition 
that many of these perspectives would be replicable with further study.  
Finally, this research – like most – perhaps risks raising as many questions as it 
answers.  The Best Value duty remains in force, yet authorities are evidently unable 
to meet this statutory requirement.  The full scale of local authority cuts is perhaps only 
just being felt, as austerity has driven authorities to find inefficiencies and to cut or 
scale back services that might have been politically unpalatable before – so-called 
‘sacred cows’ – and the mechanisms through which authorities will communicate, 
consult, and engage residents, businesses, and other stakeholders are still emerging.  
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2010 onwards has been notable for a lack of consistent policy towards local 
government beyond austerity and a rhetorical attempt to “wrest power out of the hands 
of highly-paid officials” – perhaps an early pre-cursor to ‘take back control’.  This may 
have been a deliberate strategy. 
Perhaps, then, another question that should be asked is: ‘What was the impact of 
removing Best Value as a regime whilst implementing significant budget cuts for local 
government?’  Yet another might be: ‘Are centrally-imposed performance frameworks 
an appropriate method for stimulating improvement in the quality of public services?’  
And a third, more pragmatic, question is: ‘How can we best support local authorities 
to cope through austerity and ensure that wider public value is not harmed?’  This 
research cannot answer these questions, but hopes that raising them might begin the 
process of arriving at an answer in the future. 
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research is being supervised by Professor Zoe Radnor and Dr Nicola Bateman.   
Zoe holds a Chair of Service Operations Management at Loughborough School of 
Business and Economics. Her area of interest is in performance and process 
improvement and, service management in public sector organizations. 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/sbe/staff/profiles/radnorzoe/radnor-professor-
zoe.html  
Nicola Bateman is a Senior Lecturer in Operations Management. Her main research 
interests are performance measures and their use in visual management. 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/sbe/staff/profiles/batemannicola/bateman-
nicola-.html    
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This research forms the core part of Russ’s PhD and will be used to develop a model 
to help better understand how local authorities are responding to the need to improve 
and manage their services. 
What will you be asked to do? 
You will be asked to take part in either a focus group or a 1-2-1 interview.  Russ 
Glennon will conduct all interviews and focus groups.  Focus groups will be made up 
of a range of staff working in corporate and service department improvement roles.  
Both the interviews and the focus groups will have a core set of questions, and 
additional questions may be asked, based on what emerges from the discussion.   
Interviews will take at your site, in a room that is convenient for you.  Interviews will 
last around an hour, and focus groups around two hours. 
What personal information will be required? 
You will be asked about your views on how your organization views and approaches 
service and performance management.  You will not be asked to make judgements on 
how well you, your peers, management or the council performs, and the interview will 
not evaluate your performance.  Your comments will be kept confidential, and you will 
have the opportunity to review what you have said before it is used in the research.  
Once I take part, can I change my mind? 
Yes.  After you have read this information and asked any questions, we will ask you 
to complete an Informed Consent Form. However if at any time, before, during or after 
the sessions you wish to withdraw from the study, please just contact the main 
investigator, Russ Glennon.  You can withdraw at any time, for any reason and you 
will not be asked to explain your reasons.  Please note, however, that after 28/02/2016, 
the information you give will have been aggregated and it will not be possible to 
remove it.   
Will my comments be kept confidential? 
Yes.  Interviews and focus groups will be digitally recorded, and you will get to see the 
transcript of the conversation before any data is used.  You will be able to remove 
anything that you think didn’t come out as you intended it to. Your individual answers 
will not be shared, although an aggregated set of views will be shared with all 
participants from an organization.  The transcripts and recordings will be kept securely, 
password protected, and in line with the university’s data protection policies.  Any 
published material, i.e. the final thesis or any academic papers, will not name 
organizations or attribute any comments to individuals.  All data will be destroyed after 
ten years. 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results will be used to develop a model for better understanding how local 
authorities approach performance and service improvement.  It is hoped that this could 
be used to help authorities develop or enhance improvement strategies.  A short 
summary report will also be produced for all participating organisations. 
What if I am not happy with how the research was conducted or if I have 
questions? 
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If you have any further questions, please contact Russ Glennon on 
r.j.glennon@lboro.ac.uk or on 07799 34 11 81. 
If you are not happy with how the research was conducted, please contact Ms Jackie 
Green, the Secretary for the University’s Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-
Committee:  Ms J Green, Research Office, Hazelrigg Building, Loughborough 
University, Epinal Way, Loughborough, LE11 3TU.  Tel: 01509 222423.  Email: 
J.A.Green@lboro.ac.uk 
The University also has a policy relating to Research Misconduct and Whistle Blowing 
which is available online at 
 http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/Whistleblowing(2).htm.   
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Appendix ii. Letter to potential participating organizations 
NAME 
ADDRESS 
 
DATE 
Dear NAME 
 
My name is Russ Glennon, and I am a PhD researcher at the Centre for Service 
Management in the School of Business and Economics at Loughborough University.  
I am also a former head of performance and policy in local government, with over a 
decade’s service in senior roles. 
I am carrying out research into approaches to performance and service improvement 
within English local authorities.  I am interested in how authorities are using 
performance and service improvement methods in the current climate of significant 
austerity and reduced statutory requirements for corporate performance reporting. 
I would like your permission to come to ORGANIZATION and interview a small number 
of staff, as well as run a focus group. 
I am not looking to make any judgements on how well your authority is doing, nor 
whether you are using the ‘right’ methods etc.  Every local authority has their own 
approach, which suits their local context.  Therefore, this is what is known as 
exploratory research, where I am simply listening to what people say about their own 
approach, and not evaluating them.  I have included a brief summary of my research. 
Naturally, participation is entirely voluntary, and I am held to a strict ethical code that 
will ensure anonymity of your organisation and any comments.  Individuals will have 
final say over their data, and I am happy to feed back views to you or a management 
team if you would find that useful. 
I hope that you are able to participate, as my intention is to carry out research that will 
help local authorities develop their approaches to performance and service 
improvement.  I am very committed to the support and development of local 
government. 
I will phone your office within the next three weeks to follow up this letter, and I am 
happy to answer any questions then, or before if you wish.  You can contact me on 
07799 34 11 81 or r.j.glennon@lboro.ac.uk.  If there is someone else you would prefer 
me to speak to at «Authority_short_name», then please let me know and I will contact 
them. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Russ Glennon 
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 Appendix iii. Informed consent form 
 
Understanding the legacy of public management performance and service improvement 
reform in English local government 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
(To be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read) 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I 
understand that this study is designed to further knowledge and that 
all procedures have been approved by the Loughborough University 
Ethics Approvals (Human Participants) Sub-Committee. 
 
 
 
Yes  
 
 
No  
I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent 
form. 
 
Yes  No  
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
 
Yes  No  
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
 
Yes  No  
I understand that I can withdraw from this study at any stage, for any 
reason, and that I do not need to explain my reasons for withdrawing.  
I am aware that after 28/02/2016 my information will have been 
combined with other sources and will not be disaggregated after this 
date. 
 
Yes  No  
I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict 
confidence and will be kept anonymous and confidential to the 
researchers unless (under the statutory obligations of the agencies 
which the researchers are working with), it is judged that 
confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the 
participant or others.  
 
Yes  
 
No  
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
Yes  No  
Your name 
 
________________________________ 
Your signature 
 
________________________________ 
Signature of investigator 
 
________________________________ 
Date ________________________________ 
319 
 
Appendix iv. Flyer used to communicate research 
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Appendix v. Interview questions 
• Introductions 
• Explain the project 
• Ethical consent 
 
Interview questions 
• Tell me a little bit about your role in the organisation, and your 
background. 
• How would you describe your authority’s approach to performance and 
service management? 
• Since 2010, many of the statutory performance mechanisms have been 
removed.  What impact has this had on how you approach performance 
and service improvement? 
• To whom are you accountable?  What does that look like? 
• What are the most important things when managing performance and 
improvement within the organization?   
• How do you manage improvement across the organization and how do 
you maintain momentum and focus? 
• What are the key tools you use?  (How were these introduced? How 
have they developed?)  
• What’s changed over the last five years? 
• What do you think are the main challenges coming up with regard to 
how you manage performance and improvement over the next couple of 
years? 
• Is there anything else you’d like to add about how the authority handles 
things? 
 
 
 
 
Pick-ups:  
Improvement culture? What evidence can they advance for this – story 
telling or empirical description of what it should look like e.g. normative?  
What democracy / governance changes have taken place? 
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Appendix vi. Focus group questions 
 
• Introductions 
• Explain the project and purpose of focus group (conversation between 
them) 
• Ethical consent 
 
Focus Group questions: 
• How would you describe your authority’s approach to 
performance and service management?  What does it mean to 
each of you? 
• What does an improvement culture look like to you? 
• Who leads improvement, and who should lead it? 
• How do you make improvement sustainable? 
• What skills do you need? 
• How have things changed over the last five years or so? 
(What one thing would you most like to get stuck into?) 
(If you had, say, £50k, what skill would you most like to develop for you and 
which one for one of your service managers?) 
 
 
Pick-ups:  
What sort of culture, skills? 
Are there issues / barriers to democracy / governance, and accountability? 
Are people listened to? 
Are they just ‘feeding the machine’? 
How much has changed? 
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Appendix vii. Samples of transcript and coding 
Key to colours on transcripts: 
• Green text and yellow highlighting: initial sift. 
• Purple text and orange highlighting: second and third sift 
• Turquoise writing: classification into final codes 
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Appendix viii. Timeline analysis of reform efforts 
Figure 8: Timeline analysis of reforms 
 
Source: Author and (Ahmed and Cadenhead, 1998; Aucoin, 2010; Barnes and Radnor, 2008; Bevan and Hood, 2006a; Bovaird and Halachmi, 2001; Burgess and Radnor, 2013; Christensen and 
Laegreid, 2002, 2011; Dawson and Dargie, 2002; Driver, 2006, 2008; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Ferlie et al., 1996; Ferlie et al., 2005; Hood, 1983, 1995; Hood, 2002; Lupton et al., 2013; McLaughlin 
et al., 2002; OECD, 2010; Osborne, 2006; Osborne and McLaughlin, 2002; Radnor and Walley, 2008; Rashman and Radnor, 2005; Stoker, 1997, 1999b, 2002, 2003; Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011; 
Wilson and Hinton, 1993) 
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Appendix ix. Interview coding analysis sheet 
Table 28: Interview coding analysis sheet 
Qualitative statements Linkages First order 
codes 
Theoretical 
categories 
Aggregate 
dimensions 
Statements about political ambition expressed via goals, pledges etc. (not always using language of 
objectives) 
Issues regarding the resource implications of political pledges (not always either assessed or 
understood) 
Move away from national priorities (e.g. CPA / CAA, PSA etc.) and towards more local interpretation 
e.g. ‘master of own destiny’ 
Outcomes, outputs, inputs, etc. – political accountability  
Tighter control of performance data – kept to executive and scrutiny sometimes side-lined 
Capacity to deal with doorstep / mailbag / postbox / mailbox issues (i.e. lack of resources, and 
potential conflict between established priorities and case-based complaints) 
 
 
 
Accountability / 
performance  
Politicization of 
performance (OP1) 
(Beech, 2008; Gamble, 
2006; Leach, 2010; Svara, 
2001; Svara, 2008) 
Organizational 
& political 
challenges 
Statements about control of performance mechanisms 
Struggle for corporate services to show they add value (negotiated tensions between political elite, 
senior departmental officers and senior corporate management ‘us and them’ 
Who controls the ‘performance agenda’ and resources? 
Collegiality, role, and identity of corporate services (recreating new roles more focused on more 
supportive roles 
Differential performance levels – i.e. ‘good’ performers (via external inspection such as Ofsted or 
CQC) pulling away from corporate teams 
Statements about use of community and voluntary sector to fill in 
Statements about working across local authority boundaries 
Need to work in partnership (linked to commissioning) 
Academy schools forcing changes to modes of interaction 
Whole council facing budget challenges, thus moving away from classical NPM business unit 
approach (is this actually not moving away from business unit for managed decline services) 
Significant example of integration in health and social care (this is likely to be identifiable and needs 
careful handling) 
Role shifting of corporate team to function more as internal consultants supporting clients (still 
examples of corporate performance analysis and importance of this) 
Lots of talk of centralising performance teams – tensions with depts. About level of expertise in 
central performance staff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
link to external 
inspections 
Corporate, 
departmental, and 
external relationships 
(OP2) 
(Andrews and Boyne, 
2011; Ashworth et al., 
2010a; Boyne, 2010) 
Loss of ‘competent middle core’ of staff through EVR etc.  
Everyone reporting significantly reduced workforce 
‘brain drain’, especially in areas where people can move outside local government and into the 
private sector / non-local authority roles 
The need to work differently, which may have lots of skills requirements 
Impact of continued cycles of redundancy 
Reliance on graduate trainee etc. to deliver 
Reduction in corporate asset base leading to more ‘flexible’ working, more community based etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
Staffing levels, and the 
loss of individual 
expertise (OP3) 
(Gould-Williams, 2011) 
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Qualitative statements Linkages First order 
codes 
Theoretical 
categories 
Aggregate 
dimensions 
Different skills needed to deliver ‘transformation’ and to manage cuts agenda 
Performance management used to equate to improvement – now about “delivering the unthinkable” 
Funding attached to improvement has now gone 
Assumptions of continuous improvement now invalid 
‘improvement’ associated with cost saving 
Managed decline of street scene / environmental services etc. 
Reduced teams making it hard to analyse services’ data effectively – capacity question 
 
 
link to lean use in 
local gov 
TINA – no more 
incremental 
improvement 
 
The ‘death of 
improvement’ (PM1) 
(Entwistle and Laffin, 
2005)  
(Ashworth et al., 2010b; 
Broadbent, 2003; Entwistle 
and Martin, 2005; Talbot, 
2010) 
Performance 
management 
frameworks 
Need to outline new outcomes-based framework – support for this despite there being less resource 
available 
Need to include political pledges / ambitions (links to political control) 
Problems with lagging performance information reporting 
More discursive political conversations 
Use of data heavy operational performance management outside of corporate regimes etc. 
Differing interpretations of performance within the same organization 
Different models of performance: 
The ‘deficit’ model (highlighting problems) exception reporting (often punitive) 
The political model 
The ‘opportunity’ model – where can we make changes – linked to commissioning sometimes 
The ‘accountability’ model i.e. how services are held to account for what they deliver (against their 
budgets) 
The ‘concern’ model – flagging issues for consideration (but often CYOA?) 
The ‘control’ model – making sure things happen 
The ‘narrative’ or ‘telling the story’ model - reputation management (political?) 
The ‘narrative’ or ‘telling the story’ model - understanding the reasons, often focused on improvement 
The ‘trust’ model – delegating trust to services to allow them to deliver, using more individual 
performance targets 
 
Politics and 
outcome 
management 
Renewal of 
performance 
management 
frameworks (PM2) 
(Moynihan, 2008) 
(Arnaboldi et al., 2015; 
Behn, 2003; Bititci et al., 
2012; Bouckaert and 
Peters, 2002; Bourne et al., 
2000; Bourne et al., 2003; 
Brignall and Modell, 2000; 
Neely, 2005; Radin, 2008; 
Radnor and McGuire, 
2004; Rashman and 
Radnor, 2005) 
Statements about being able to measure different things 
Not all indicators are equal worth 
Getting people to let go of favoured measures 
Removal of statutory indicators allowing a more localised set of measures and significantly weakens 
sense of ‘all indicators must show improvement’, although some have suggested that this allows 
indicators that are not political priorities to drop off the radar 
Preference for benchmarking and peer reviews 
Postbag / doorstep / mailbox performance management 
Preference for sector-led improvement (in health and social care generally) 
Move away from pages of tables and towards more narrative forms, but also seeing more information 
kept internally, and reporting less public sharing of performance data - corporate reports still being 
produced, but less public presenting of this information 
Still a lot of expressed preferences for quantitative measurement – if it cannot be measured then it 
doesn’t exist 
 Authentic performance 
management (PM3) 
(Talbot, 2005) 
(Radin, 2006) 
(Radin, 2008) 
(Moynihan, 2008) 
(Moynihan, 2013) 
(de Lancer Jules, 2011; 
Dereli, 2011; Melnyk et al., 
2014) 
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Qualitative statements Linkages First order 
codes 
Theoretical 
categories 
Aggregate 
dimensions 
Statements about freeing up from burden of reporting 
Statements about authenticity of CPA / CAA as inspection (this varied between positive and negative 
statements) 
Now able to be master of own destiny, better reflect our own priorities 
Some reporting a reduction in burden of reporting from central teams 
There was comfort attached to being told what to do, allowed defence to political ambition 
Allowed people to take their ‘eye off the ball’ 
Castle Gate reporting that performance mgmt. (and no CPA etc.) didn’t give any warning signs before 
negative inspection of children’s and adults’ social care 
Some reporting no significant reduction in burden of report for central teams 
Most reporting children’s and adults’ departments still having to produce significant amounts of data 
returns (especially Ofsted) 
Lack of comparable performance data means it is harder for members and officers to understand the 
relative performance of their services – recreation of benchmarking clubs, although significant 
challenges exist about their validity / usefulness 
 Responses to 
deregulation (IA1) 
(Martin, 2011; May, 2007) Inspection and 
accountability 
Public accountability exercised through narrative / discursive mechanisms 
Public accountability through mechanisms such as armchair auditors to hold services to account 
Accountability to public,  
Legislated accountability through extant inspection regimes (Ofsted) 
Lack of regulated accountability means people stop doing things 
Peer accountability now more significant in authorities 
CPA / CAA  - external presentation of scores etc. provided a level for accountability for reputation, 
which has now gone 
Local authorities retaining some level of accountability for school performance in academies, but 
losing many of the levers to influence / deliver change 
Increasing use of political groups / mixed officer and member groups for internal accountability 
Move away from pages of tables and towards more narrative forms, but also seeing more information 
kept internally, and reporting less public sharing of performance data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More narrative 
forms of 
performance for 
publics 
 
Politicisation 
Differing forms of 
accountability (IA2) 
(Romzek, 2000)  
(Sinclair, 1995)  
(Greasley, 2007; Martin, 
2011) 
Reactions to external inspections – main focus was concern around reputational impact of negative 
inspections 
Managerial challenges around residual inspection regime 
Threat of Ofsted, but CQC not felt to be real challenge 
Social care and education – not feeling much of a change 
Focus on education via Ofsted would effectively facilitate cuts in Adults’ social care 
Some positives to residual inspections, seen as part of accountability  
Social care moving towards greater emphasis on sector-led improvement (links to benchmarking) – 
filling the gaps left by CPA etc.?? 
 
Accountability 
forms 
Residual external 
inspections and peer 
or sector-led 
improvement (IA3) 
 
‘all about the cuts’ 
Financial considerations outweighing all others – hugely repeated in almost every interview, even 
including elected members 
 Dominance of austerity 
financial targets (AF1) 
 Austerity and 
finance 
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Qualitative statements Linkages First order 
codes 
Theoretical 
categories 
Aggregate 
dimensions 
Doing the best possible within tight financial envelope  
Having to consider stopping valued services because of inability to sustain them or other services 
over longer term 
Relationship between performance and finance is changing: no longer more money=better 
performance (although this may well not have been the reality, it was certainly a perception that this 
relationship was like this, or at least more like this in previous years) 
Continuous 
improvement 
versus 
transformation 
Value for money in an 
age of austerity (AF2)  
(McKevitt, 2015) 
Statements about whether the ‘right things have been cut’ and considerations of difference between 
popular services and ‘needed’ services  
Value added by internal performance / change teams  
Significant number of experiences about outsourcing – leading to examples of in-sourcing of some 
big services 
Things put out to tender have not necessarily generated the savings required or delivered the benefits 
promised (two large contracts coming back in) 
The ‘mutual model’ i.e. spinning off services to standalone companies (with some expressed 
preference to do this from within the existing in house team) 
Comments about co-production (often set in context of budget savings) for low volume, high 
variability services such as adults’ and children’s services 
Moving people to lower cost channels 
Technological developments about integration of services 
For high volume, low complexity services – impetus is about moving to cheaper channels 
Gathering more qualitative data to understand user needs and interfaces 
Intelligence-led commissioning work 
Market / portal based approach to commissioning social care 
Developing more in house skills to access customer data (surveys, analysis, systemic integration 
between services etc.) 
Commissioning and the purchaser / provider split 
Engagement with communities / individuals / stakeholders re: service changes 
Moving back from delivering council to being commissioning (i.e. links to market place approach) 
 
Political ambitions Commissioning and 
insourcing / 
outsourcing (AF3) 
(Bovaird and Halachmi, 
2001) 
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